

# Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module

# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Version 1.16

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#### 1. Introduction

This document is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module. It contains a specification of the rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 multi-chip standalone software module. This security policy, v1.16, is for the revalidation of the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module to include information about new test platform and minor code changes. The security policy from the previous validated version of the module can be found on CMVP validation website under certificates #1648, #1915, #2214 and #2337.

#### 1.1. Purpose of the Security Policy

There are three major reasons that a security policy is required:

- it is required for FIPS 140-2 validation,
- it allows individuals and organizations to determine whether the cryptographic module, as implemented, satisfies the stated security policy, and
- it describes the capabilities, protection, and access rights provided by the cryptographic module, allowing individuals and organizations to determine whether it will meet their security requirements.

#### 1.2. Target Audience

This document is intended to be part of the package of documents that are submitted for FIPS validation. It is intended for the following people:

- Developers working on the release
- FIPS 140-2 testing lab
- Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
- Consumers

# 2. Cryptographic Module Specification

This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module, and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1.

The following section describes the module and how it complies with the FIPS 140-2 standard in each of the required areas.

#### 2.1. Description of Module

The Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module is a software only security level 1 cryptographic module that provides general-purpose cryptographic services to the remainder of the Linux kernel. The cryptographic module runs on an ARMv8 processor.

The following table shows the overview of the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.

Security Component	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	3
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 1. Security Levels

The module has been tested on the following platforms:

Module/Implementation	Processor	Device	O/S & Ver.
Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module (SKC1.6)	ARMv8	Samsung Galaxy S6	Android Lollipop 5.0.2
Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module (SKC1.6)	ARMv7	Samsung Galaxy Tab S2	Android Lollipop 5.1

Table 2. Tested Platforms

Note: Per IG G.5, CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

#### 2.2. Description of Approved Mode

When the module is initialized, the self-tests are executed automatically at the loading time and the module enters FIPS-Approved mode automatically if the self-tests pass. A kernel proc file is set to indicate if device is in FIPS-Approved mode or in error state. The error state flag is used for the value of the process file /proc/sys/crypto/fips\_status (returns 0 if in FIPS-Approved mode; returns 1 if in FIPS Error.)

Users can check the module status by connecting the device to a PC and issuing the following command, \$adb shell cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips\_status. (returns 0 if in FIPS-Approved mode; returns

#### 1 if in FIPS Error.)

When the module is in the operational state, it can alternate service by service between FIPS-Approved mode and non-FIPS mode.

The module provides the following CAVP validated algorithms in either FIPS Approved mode or non-FIPS mode:

Algorithms	Standards	FIPS Approved (Cert #)
AES (ECB, CBC) encryption and decryption with 128, 192, 256 bits key	FIPS 197	Cert. #3292, #3461
AES GCM encryption and decryption with 128, 192, 256 bits key, IV generated externally	SP 800-38D	Cert. #3292, #3461
HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	FIPS 198-1	Cert. #2090, #2207
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	FIPS 180-4	Cert. #2731, #2857
Triple-DES (ECB, CBC) encryption and decryption	SP 800-67	Cert. #1877, #1952
RNG with AES-128	ANSI X9.31	Certs. #1355
Hash-based DRBG with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	SP 800-90A	Certs. #750, #849
HMAC-based DRBG with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	SP 800-90A	Certs. #750, #849
Block Cipher (CTR) based DRBG with AES-128, AES- 192, AES-256	SP 800-90A	Certs. #750, #849

Table 3. CAVP validated algorithms

Note: Due to the RNG transition in the end of 2015 listed in SP 800-131A, the ANSI X9.31 RNG implemented in the module only operates in non-FIPS even though it has been validated by CAVP and it meets the self-tests requirements described in section 4.9 of FIPS 140-2 standard.

#### 2.3. Cryptographic Module Boundary

#### 2.3.1. Software Block Diagram




Figure 1: Software Block Diagram

The binary image that contains the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module for the appropriate platform is as follows:

boot.img (version SKC1.6)

Related documentation:

- S/W Detailed Level Design v1.18
- Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy (this document)

Note: The master component list is provided in Section 2.10 of S/W Detailed Level Design document.

#### 2.3.2. Hardware Block Diagram

This figure illustrates the various data, status and control paths through the cryptographic module. Inside, the physical boundary of the module, the mobile device consists of standard integrated circuits, including processors and memory. These do not include any security-relevant, semi- or custom integrated circuits or other active electronic circuit elements. The physical boundary includes power inputs and outputs, and internal power supplies. The logical boundary of the cryptographic module contains only the security-relevant software elements that comprise the module.




Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram

# 3. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

FIPS Interface	Ports
Data Input	API input parameters
Data Output	API output parameters
Control Input	API function calls
Status Output	API return codes; kernel log file, /proc/sys/crypto/fips_status
Power Input	Physical power connector

Table 4. Ports and Interfaces

## 4. Roles, Services and Authentication

#### 4.1. Roles

Role	Description
User	Perform general security services, including cryptographic operations and
	other Approved security functions.
Crypto Officer	Perform Initialization of Module.

Table 5. Roles

The module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both User and Crypto Officer roles. The module does not allow concurrent operators.

The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module. No further authentication is required. The Crypto Officer can initialize the module.

#### 4.2. Services

The following table describes the services in FIPS-Approved mode:

Role	Services	Algorithms	CSP	Access (Read, Write, Execute)
User	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	AES with:  • ECB • CBC	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
		3-key Triple-DES with: • ECB • CBC	168 bits key	R, W, EX
User	Keyed Hash	HMAC with:	At least 112 bits HMAC key	R, W, EX
User	Message Digest	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	N/A	R, W, EX

Role	Services	Algorithms	CSP	Access (Read, Write, Execute)
User	Random Number Generation with "drbg"	Hash-based DRBG with:  SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	Entropy input string, seed, V and C	R, W, EX
		HMAC-based DRBG with:  • SHA-1  • SHA-256  • SHA-384  • SHA-512	Entropy input string, seed, V and Key	R, W, EX
		Block Cipher (CTR) based DRBG with:	Entropy input string, seed, V and Key	R, W, EX
Crypto Officer	Initialization	N/A	N/A	EX
User	Self-Test (Self-test is executed automatically when device is booted or restarted)	AES, Triple-DES, HMAC, SHA and DRBG	344 bits HMAC Key for integrity test	R, EX
User	Check Status/Get State	N/A	N/A	R
User	Zeroization	N/A	AES key, Triple-DES key, HMAC key, seed	R, W, EX

Table 6. Approved Services

The following table describes the services in non-FIPS mode. Any use of these services with non-Approved algorithms will cause the module to operate in the non-FIPS mode implicitly.

Role	Services	Algorithms	CSP	Access (Read, Write, Execute)
User	Symmetric	DES	56 bit keys	R, W, EX
OSCI	Encryption and	Twofish	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
	Decryption	ARC4	Various key sizes	R, W, EX
		AES GCM mode (AES-GCM)	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
		RFC 4106 AES GCM mode (RFC4106-AES-GCM)	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
		RFC 4543 AES GCM mode (RFC4543-AES-GCM)	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
		AES CTR mode (AES-CTR)	128, 192, 256 bits key	R, W, EX
		Triple-DES CTR mode (Triple- DES-CTR)	112, 168 bits key	R, W, EX
		2-key Triple-DES	112 bits key	R, W, EX
User	Message Digest	MD5	N/A	R, W, EX

Role	Services	Algorithms	CSP	Access (Read, Write, Execute)
User	Random Number	ansi_cprng	Seed	R, W, EX
	Generation with	Krng	Seed	R, W, EX
	"ansi_cprng", "krng" or "fips(ansi_cprng)"	fips(ansi_cprng) Note: This is the CAVP validated ANSI X9.31 RNG with AES-128; however, it is disallowed after 2015.	128 bits seed and seed key	R, W, EX
User	Partial Compression and Decompression	Pcompress	N/A	R, W, EX
User	Error Detecting Code	CRC32c	N/A	R, W, EX
User	Data Compression	Deflate	N/A	R, W, EX
	·	LZO	N/A	R, W, EX
User	Hashing	GHASH	N/A	R, W, EX
User	Multiplication Function	GF128MUL	N/A	R, W, EX

Table 7. Non-Approved Services

Note: The module does not share CSPs between an Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS-Approved must be imported to the module via API input parameters while running in the FIPS-Approved mode. The non-Approved RNG shall only be used for non-Approved services in non-FIPS mode.

The cryptographic module is part of the kernel image. The following documents provide a description and API functions of the cryptographic services listed above:

- https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt
- http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6451?page=0,0
- Linux system call API man pages provided in chapter 2 of the Linux man pages obtainable from git://github.com/mkerrisk/man-pages.git
- Linux kernel internals including interfaces between kernel components documented in the book ISBN-13: 978-0470343432
- Linux kernel driver development documentation covering the kernel interfaces available for device drivers: ISBN-13: 978-0596005900
- Functional Design document provided by Samsung is available upon request.

#### 4.3. Operator Authentication

There is no operator authentication; assumption of role is implicit by action.

#### 4.4. Mechanism and Strength of Authentication

No authentication is required at security level 1; authentication is implicit by assumption of the role.

#### 5. Finite State Machine

For information pertaining to the Finite State Model, please refer to the Functional Design document.

# 6. Physical Security

The Module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.

# 7. Operational Environment

This module will operate in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition.

#### 7.1. Policy

The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent operators are explicitly excluded).

The external application that makes calls to the cryptographic module is the single user of the cryptographic module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.

# 8. Cryptographic Key Management

The keys and CSPs in FIPS-Approved mode are described in the following table:

Algorithm	Keys/CSPs	Keys/CSPs Input	Keys/CSPs Output	Keys/CSPs Zeroization
AES Key	128, 192 and 256 bits key	API input parameter	N/A	Call the zeroization API function for block cipher
Triple-DES	168 bits key	API input parameter	N/A	Call the zeroization API function for block cipher
НМАС	At least 112 bits HMAC key	API input parameter	N/A	Call the zeroization API function for hash
SP 800-90A DRBG	Entropy input string	The seed is provided by the /dev/random	N/A	Call the zeorization API function for prng
SP 800-90A DRBG	seed, V, C and Key	N/A	N/A	Call the zeorization API function for prng
HMAC with SHA-256	344 bits HMAC key for integrity test	N/A	N/A	Not required to be zeroized according to FIPS 140-2 IG 7.4

Table 8. Key Input, Key Output and Key Zeroization for Keys/CSPs

#### 8.1. Random Number Generation

The module employs an Approved SP 800-90A DRBG for creation of random numbers in FIPS Approved mode. The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is obtained by calling the get\_random\_bytes() function to collect random data from the Linux-provided /dev/random pseudo-device provided by the underlying Operating System.

CAVEAT: The module generates random strings whose strengths are modified by available entropy.

#### 8.2. Key Generation

The module does not provide any key generation service or perform key generation for any of its Approved algorithms. Keys are passed in from clients via algorithm APIs. Seeds for random number generation are imported into the module.

#### 8.3. Key Entry and Output

The module does not support manual key entry or key output. Keys or other CSPs can only be exchanged between the module and the calling application using appropriate API calls.

#### 8.4. Key Storage

Keys are not stored inside cryptographic module. A pointer to plaintext key is passed through. Intermediate key storages are immediately assigned to Zero.

#### 8.5. Zeroization Procedure

The zeroization mechanism for all of the CSPs is to replace 0s in the memory which originally store the CSPs. It is the calling application responsibility to call the appropriate key zeroization API function to zeroize the keys/CSPs after their use. For more details on zeroization API functions, please refer to the Functional Design document which is provided by Samsung upon request.

# 9. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

Lab Name: Samsung Electronics EMC Laboratory

FCC Registration: #451343

The test device which runs the module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (i.e., for home use).

For information related to FCC ID of the devices, please refer to the Functional Design document which is provided by Samsung upon request.

#### 10. Self-Tests

Self-test uses the existing Crypto API tcrypt module to perform known-answer self-test of algorithms. The module is configured as a built-in kernel module instead of a loadable module as is the case of Linux Crypto API. Tests of all FIPS-approved algorithms are executed. The self-tests are run during early-kernel startup when built-in kernel modules are initialized. Self-tests can also be invoked by the user by restarting the device. When self-tests are done successfully, the proc entry for /proc/sys/crypto/fips\_status will return 0. A binary integrity test will then be performed in call from tcrypt. If self-test or integrity test fail, an error flag (static variable) is set, an error code returns to the API function caller to indicate the error, the module enters in an error state (FIPS\_ERR), and Crypto APIs that return cryptographic information is blocked. The proc entry for /proc/sys/crypto/fips\_status will return 1 when the module is in ERROR state.

#### 10.1. Power-Up Tests

At module start-up, Known Answer Tests are performed. These tests are automatic and do not need operator intervention. If the value calculated and the known answer does not match, the module immediately enters into FIPS\_ERR state. Once the module is in FIPS\_ERR state, the module becomes unusable via any interface.

The module implements each of the following Known Answer Tests separately:

- AES encryption and decryption tested separately
- Triple-DES encryption and decryption tested separately
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- SP 800-90A DRBG (Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG and CTR DRBG)

#### 10.2. Integrity Check

At build time -

- Calculate a hmac(sha256) of only the module code (available in .text, .rodata, .init.text and .exit.text sections of kernel image).
- Once generated, the build time hmac of the module code is updated in the kernel image itself as a read-only data.

#### At run time -

• Calculate a hmac(sha256) of only the module code, available in running kernel on the device (.text, .init.text, .exit.text and .rodata sections of running kernel)

If this run-time hmac is same as build time hmac, Integrity test is considered passed. If calculated and stored values do not match, set error state, FIPS ERR.

#### 10.3. Conditional Tests

A continuous random number generator test is performed during each use of the Approved SP 800-90A DRBG. If values of two consecutive random numbers match, then cryptographic module goes into error state. A CRNG test is also implemented for the Linux provided /dev/random RNG which is usually used by calling user for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG.

# 11. Design Assurance

#### 11.1. Configuration Management

Perforce is used as the repository for both source code and documents. All source code and documents are maintained in internal server. Release is based on the Changelist number, which is auto-generated. Every check-in process creates a new Changelist number.

Versions of controlled items include information about each version. For documentation, revision history inside the document provides the current version of the document. Version control maintains the all the previous version and the version control system automatically numbers revisions. For source code, unique information is associated with each version such that source code versions can be associated with binary versions of the final product. The source code of the module (version SKC1.6) available in the Samsung internal Perforce repository, as listed in Functional Design document, is used to build target binary.

#### 11.2. Delivery and Operation

The cryptographic module is never released as Source code. The module sources are stored and maintained at a secure development facility with controlled access.

This cryptographic module is built-in along with the Linux Kernel. Product that does not need FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic module may decide to change the build flag CONFIG\_CRYPTO\_FIPS in Kernel config. The development team and the manufacturing factory share a secured internal server for exchanging binary software images. The factory is also a secure site with strict access control to the manufacturing facilities. The module binary is installed on the mobile devices (phone and tablets) using direct binary image installation at the factory. The mobile devices are then delivered to mobile service operators. Users cannot install or modify the module. The developer also has the capability to deliver software updates to service operators who in turn can update end-user phones and tablets using Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. Alternatively, the users may bring their mobile devices to service stations where authorized operators may use developer-supplied tools to install software updates on the phone. The developer vets all service providers and establishes secure communication with them for delivery of tools and software updates. If the binary is modified by unauthorized entity, the device has a feature to detect the change and thus not accept the binary modified by an unauthorized entity.

# 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

No other attacks are mitigated.

# 13. Glossary and Abbreviations

**AES** Advanced Encryption Specification

**CAVP** Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program

**CBC** Cipher Block Chaining

**CMT** Cryptographic Module Testing

**CMVP** Cryptographic Module Validation Program

CSP Critical Security Parameter

DES Data Encryption Standard

**DRBG** Deterministic Random Bit Generator

**FSM** Finite State Model **GCM** Galois/Counter Mode

**HMAC** Hash Message Authentication Code

MAC Message Authentication Code

**NIST** National Institute of Science and Technology

**O/S** Operating System

RNG Random Number GeneratorSDK Software Development KitSHA Secure Hash AlgorithmSHS Secure Hash Standard

**TDES** Triple DES

#### 14. References

[1] FIPS 140-2 Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html

[2] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html

[3] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html

[4] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html

[5] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html

[6] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html

[7] SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html

[8] ANSI X9.31 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)

[9] SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

[10] SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

[11] SP 800-131A Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html