

# RSA BSAFE<sup>®</sup> Crypto-C Micro Edition

## Version 4.1

### Security Policy Level 1 with Level 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication

This is a non-proprietary Security Policy for RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 4.1 (Crypto-C ME). It describes how Crypto-C ME meets the Level 2 security requirements of FIPS 140-2 for roles, services and authentication, the Level 3 security requirements of FIPS 140-2 for design assurance, and the Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2 for all other aspects. It also describes how to securely operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the United States Government requirements for cryptographic modules. For more information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program, see the [NIST website](#).

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# 1 Introduction

The Crypto-C ME software development toolkit is designed to enable developers to incorporate cryptographic technologies into applications. Crypto-C ME security software helps to protect sensitive data as it is stored, using strong encryption techniques to ease integration with existing data models. Using the capabilities of Crypto-C ME software in applications helps provide a persistent level of protection for data, lessening the risk of internal, as well as external, compromise.

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**Note:** In this document, the term *cryptographic module*, refers to the Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module for Level 1 overall security, Level 2 roles, services, and authentication, and Level 3 design assurance.

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## 1.1 References

This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the Crypto-C ME cryptographic module in terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. For more information about Crypto-C ME and the entire RSA BSAFE product line, see:

- Information on the full line of RSA products and services is available at [www.emc.com/domains/rsa/](http://www.emc.com/domains/rsa/).
- RSA BSAFE product overviews are available at [www.emc.com/security/rsa-bsafe.htm](http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-bsafe.htm).
- Answers to technical or sales related questions are available at [www.emc.com/support/rsa/](http://www.emc.com/support/rsa/).

## 1.2 Document Organization

This Security Policy explains the cryptographic module's FIPS 140-2 relevant features and functionality. This document comprises the following sections:

- This section, “**Introduction**” on page 2 provides an overview and introduction to the Security Policy.
- “**Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit**” on page 3 describes Crypto-C ME and how it meets FIPS 140-2 requirements.
- “**Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME**” on page 24 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
- “**Services**” on page 29 lists the functions of Crypto-C ME.
- “**Acronyms and Definitions**” on page 35 lists the acronyms and definitions used in this document.

With the exception of the non-proprietary *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 4.1 Level 2 Security Policy*, the FIPS 140-2 validation submission documentation is EMC Corporation-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact RSA.

## 2 Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit

Crypto-C ME is designed with the ability to optimize code for different processors, and specific speed or size requirements. Assembly-level optimizations on key processors mean Crypto-C ME algorithms can be used at increased speeds on many platforms.

Crypto-C ME offers a full set of cryptographic algorithms including asymmetric key algorithms, symmetric key block and stream algorithms, message digests, message authentication, and Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) support. Developers can implement the full suite of algorithms through a single Application Programming Interface (API) or select a specific set of algorithms to reduce code size or meet performance requirements.

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**Note:** When operating in a FIPS 140-2-approved manner, the set of available algorithms cannot be changed.

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### 2.1 Cryptographic Module

Crypto-C ME is classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module for the purposes of FIPS 140-2. As such, Crypto-C ME must be tested on a specific operating system and computer platform. The cryptographic boundary includes Crypto-C ME running on selected platforms running selected operating systems while configured in “single user” mode. Crypto-C ME is validated as meeting all FIPS 140-2 Level 2 for roles, services, and authentication, Level 3 for design assurance, and Level 1 overall security requirements.

Crypto-C ME is packaged as a set of dynamically loaded modules or shared library files containing the module's entire executable code. The Crypto-C ME toolkit relies on the physical security provided by the host PC in which it runs.

## RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 4.1 Security Policy Level 1 with Level 2

The following table lists the certification levels sought for Crypto-C ME for each section of the FIPS 140-2 specification.

Table 1 Certification Levels

Section of the FIPS 140-2 Specification	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall	1

### 2.1.1 Laboratory Validated Operating Environments

For FIPS 140-2 validation, Crypto-C ME is tested by an accredited FIPS 140-2 testing laboratory on the following operating environments:

- Microsoft®:
  - Windows 7 Enterprise SP1:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005, no C runtime library (no CRT)
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010
    - x86-64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005
    - x86-64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
  - Windows 8.1 Enterprise, x86-64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
  - Windows Server 2003 Enterprise R2:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005, no CRT
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
    - Itanium® (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005
    - Itanium (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT

- Windows Server 2008 Enterprise R2:
  - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005, no CRT
  - x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010
  - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005
  - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
  - Itanium (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005
  - Itanium (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
- Windows Server 2012 Standard, x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010
- Windows Server 2012 Standard R2, x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
- Red Hat®:
  - Enterprise Linux® 5.x:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Linux Standard Base (LSB) 3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - Itanium (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - PowerPC® (32-bit), built with gcc 3.4
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with gcc 3.4
    - IBM® S390 (31-bit), built with gcc 4.3
    - IBM S390x (64-bit), built with gcc 4.3
  - Enterprise Linux 6.x:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with LSB4.0 and gcc 4.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB4.0 and gcc 4.4
  - Fedora™ 17 on ARMv7, built with gcc 4.6 (soft float)
- Novell®:
  - SUSE® Linux Enterprise Server 11.0:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with LSB4.0 and gcc 4.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB4.0 and gcc 4.4
    - PowerPC (32-bit), built with gcc 3.4
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with gcc 3.4
- Canonical® Ubuntu® 12.04 Long Term Support (LTS) on ARMv7, built with gcc 4.6 (hard float)
- FreeBSD® 8.3 on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with gcc 4.2

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- Oracle<sup>®</sup>:
  - Solaris<sup>®</sup> 10:
    - SPARC<sup>®</sup> v8 (32-bit), built with Sun Studio 10, Sun C 5.8
    - x86 (32-bit), built with Sun Studio 10, Sun C 5.8
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Sun Studio 10, Sun C 5.8
  - Solaris 11:
    - SPARC v8+ (32-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
    - SPARC v9-T2 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
    - SPARC v9-T4 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
- IBM:
  - AIX<sup>®</sup> v6.1:
    - PowerPC (32-bit), built with XLC v9.0
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with XLC v9.0
  - AIX v7.1:
    - PowerPC (32-bit), built with XLC v11.1
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with XLC v11.1
- HP:
  - HP-UX 11.31
    - PA-RISC 2.0 (32-bit), built with HP ANSI-C 11
    - PA-RISC 2.0W (64-bit), built with HP ANSI-C 11
    - Itanium (32-bit), built with cc B3910B A.06.12
    - Itanium (64-bit), built with cc B3910B A.06.12
- Apple<sup>®</sup>:
  - Mac<sup>®</sup> OS X 10.x on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with gcc 4.2.1
  - iOS 6.x on ARMv7 (32-bit), built with Xcode 5 and clang 500.2.76
- Google<sup>®</sup>:
  - Android<sup>®</sup> 2.3 (Gingerbread) on ARMv7 (32-bit), built with Android NDK rev 8d and gcc 4.6.7
  - Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) on x86 (32-bit), built with Android NDK rev 8d and gcc 4.6.7
  - Android 4.1 (Jelly Bean) on ARMv7 (32-bit), built with Android NDK rev 8d and gcc 4.6.7

- WindRiver®:
  - VxWorks 6.4 on PowerPC 604 (32-bit), built with gcc version 3.4.4
  - VxWorks 6.7 on PowerPC 604 (32-bit), built with gcc version 4.1.2

## 2.1.2 Affirmation of Compliance for other Operating Environments

Affirmation of compliance is defined in Section G.5, “Maintaining Validation Compliance of Software or Firmware Cryptographic Modules,” in *Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program*. Compliance is maintained in all operational environments for which the binary executable remains unchanged. Specifically, RSA affirms compliance for the following operational environments:

- Microsoft:
  - Windows XP Professional, SP3 on x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows XP Professional, SP2 on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows Vista Enterprise on x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows Vista Enterprise on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows 7 Enterprise, SP1 on x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows 7 Enterprise, SP1 on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows 8.1 Enterprise on x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows Server 2003 Enterprise, R2 on Itanium, built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT
  - Windows Server 2008 Enterprise, R2 on Itanium, built with Visual Studio 2005 and Visual Studio 2010, either CRT or no CRT.
  - Windows Server 2012 Standard, x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010, no CRT
  - Windows Server 2012 Standard R2, x86\_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2010
- Red Hat:
  - Enterprise Linux 5.x, Security Enhanced (SE) configuration:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with LSB 3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4

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- Novell:
  - SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with LSB 3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - PowerPC (32-bit), built with gcc 3.4
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with gcc 3.4
  - SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 on Itanium (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4
- Canonical:
  - Ubuntu 11.04 on ARMv7, built with gcc 4.6 (soft float)
  - Ubuntu 12.04 LTS:
    - x86 (32-bit), built with LSB 3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB3.0 and gcc 3.4
    - x86\_64 (64-bit), built with LSB4.0 and gcc 4.4
- Oracle:
  - Solaris 10:
    - SPARC v8+ (32-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
    - SPARC v9-T2 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
    - SPARC v9-T4 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
    - SPARC v9-T5 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12
  - Solaris 11, SPARCv9-T5 (64-bit), built with Solaris Studio 12.3, Sun C 5.12.
- HP:
  - HP-UX 11.23
    - PA-RISC 2.0 (32-bit), built with HP ANSI-C 11
    - PA-RISC 2.0W (64-bit), built with HP ANSI-C 11
- IBM:
  - AIX v5.3:
    - PowerPC (32-bit), built with XLC v8.0
    - PowerPC (64-bit), built with XLC v8.0
- Apple:
  - Mac OS X 10.x on x86 (32-bit), built with gcc 4.0.1
  - iOS 6.x on ARMv7s (32-bit), built with Xcode 5 and clang 500.2.76
- WindRiver VxWorks 6.8 on ARMv4 (32-bit), built with gcc version 4.1.2.

The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.



### 2.1.3 Configuring Single User Mode

This section describes how to configure single user mode for the different operating system platforms supported by Crypto-C ME.

#### Microsoft Windows

To configure single user mode for systems running a Microsoft Windows XP Professional, Windows Vista Enterprise, Windows 7 Enterprise, Windows 8 Enterprise, Windows 2003 Server Enterprise, Windows 2008 Server Enterprise, or Windows 2012 Server Standard operating system, guest accounts, server services, terminal services, remote registry services, remote desktop services, and remote assistance must be disabled. For detailed instructions on how to perform these tasks, see the Microsoft support site.

#### Red Hat Enterprise or Fedora, Novell SUSE, or Canonical Ubuntu Linux

To configure single user mode for systems running a Red Hat Enterprise or Fedora, Novell SUSE, or Canonical Ubuntu Linux operating system:

1. Log in as the `root` user.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` to remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in `/etc/shadow` for the pseudo-users are either a star (\*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit `/etc/nsswitch.conf` so `files` is the only option for `passwd`, `group`, and `shadow`. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. In the `/etc/xinetd.d` directory, edit `rexec`, `rlogin`, `rsh`, `rsync`, `telnet`, and `wu-ftpd`, setting the value of `disable` to `yes`.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

#### Oracle Solaris

To configure single user mode for systems running an Oracle Solaris operating system:

1. Log in as the `root` user.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` to remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in `/etc/shadow` for the pseudo-users are either a star (\*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit `/etc/nsswitch.conf` so `files` is the only option for `passwd`, `group`, and `shadow`. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit `/etc/inet/inetd.conf` to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

### **HP-UX**

To configure single user mode for systems running an HP-UX operating system:

1. Log in as the `root` user.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users. Make sure the password fields for the pseudo-users are a star (\*). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit `/etc/nsswitch.conf` so `files` is the only option for `passwd` and `group`. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit `/etc/inetd.conf` to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons such as `telnetd`, `rlogind`, `remshd`, `rexecd`, `ftpd`, and `tftpd`.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

### **IBM AIX**

To configure single user mode for systems running an IBM AIX operating system:

1. Log in as the `root` user.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users. Make sure the password fields for the pseudo-users are a star (\*). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Remove all lines beginning with a plus sign (+) or minus sign (-) from `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/group`. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit `/etc/inetd.conf` to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons such as `telnetd`, `rlogind`, `remshd`, `rexecd`, `ftpd`, and `tftpd`.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

### **FreeBSD**

To configure single user mode for systems running a FreeBSD operating system:

1. Log in as the `root` user.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` to remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in `/etc/shadow` for the pseudo-users are either a star (\*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit `/etc/nsswitch.conf` so `files` is the only option for `passwd`, `group`, and `shadow`. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. In the `/etc/xinetd.d` directory, edit `rexec`, `rlogin`, `rsh`, `rsync`, `telnet`, and `wu-ftp`, setting the value of `disable` to `yes`.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

## Apple Mac OS X

To configure single user mode for systems running an Apple Mac OS X operating system:

1. Start a terminal session.
2. Edit `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/master.passwd` to remove all the users except `root` and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in `/etc/master.passwd` for the pseudo-users are either a star (\*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Disable the following services: `exec`, `ftp`, `login`, `shell`, `telnet`, and `tftp`. To do this from the command line:

```
sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/  
    <service_name>.plist
```

4. Delete user accounts.
  - a. Run **System Preferences**.
  - b. Select **Accounts**.
  - c. Click on the lock to make changes and authenticate yourself.
  - d. Delete all user accounts except your account.
5. Disable services.
  - a. Run **Directory Utility**.
  - b. Select **Show Advanced Settings**.
  - c. Select the **Service** tab.
  - d. Click on the lock to make changes and authenticate yourself.
  - e. Disable all services other than **Local**.
6. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

## Apple iOS

The Apple iOS operating system is a single user operating system so no steps are required to configure single user mode.

## Google Android

The Google Android operating systems are single user operating systems so no steps are required to configure single user mode.

## Wind River VxWorks

The Wind River VxWorks operating systems are single user operating systems so no steps are required to configure single user mode.

## 2.2 Crypto-C ME Interfaces


Crypto-C ME is validated as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The physical cryptographic boundary of the module is the case of the general-purpose computer or mobile device, which encloses the hardware running the module. The physical interfaces for Crypto-C ME consist of the keyboard, mouse, monitor, CD-ROM drive, floppy drive, serial ports, USB ports, COM ports, and network adapter(s).

The logical boundary of the cryptographic module is the set of master and resource shared library files, and signature files comprising the module:

- Master shared library:
  - `cryptocme.dll` on systems running a Windows operating system
  - `libcryptocme.so` on systems running a Solaris, Linux, AIX, FreeBSD, Android, or VxWorks operating system
  - `libcryptocme.sl` on systems running an HP-UX operating system
  - `libcryptocme.dylib` on systems running a Mac OS X or iOS operating system.
- Resource shared libraries:
  - `ccme_base.dll`, `ccme_base_non_fips.dll`, `ccme_asym.dll`, `ccme_aux_entropy.dll`, `ccme_ecdrbg.dll`, `ccme_ecc.dll`, `ccme_ecc_non_fips.dll`, `ccme_ecc_accel_fips.dll`, `ccme_ecc_accel_non_fips.dll`, and `ccme_error_info.dll` on systems running a Windows operating system.
  - `libccme_base.so`, `libccme_base_non_fips.so`, `libccme_asym.so`, `libccme_aux_entropy.so`, `libccme_ecdrbg.so`, `libccme_ecc.so`, `libccme_ecc_non_fips.so`, `libccme_ecc_accel_fips.so`, `libccme_ecc_accel_non_fips.so`, and `libccme_error_info.so` on systems running a Solaris, Linux, AIX, FreeBSD, or Android operating system.
  - `libccme_base.sl`, `libccme_base_non_fips.sl`, `libccme_asym.sl`, `libccme_aux_entropy.sl`, `libccme_ecdrbg.sl`, `libccme_ecc.sl`, `libccme_ecc_non_fips.sl`, `libccme_ecc_accel_fips.sl`, `libccme_ecc_accel_non_fips.sl`, and `libccme_error_info.sl` on systems running an HP-UX operating system.
  - `libccme_base.dylib`, `libccme_base_non_fips.dylib`, `libccme_asym.dylib`, `libccme_aux_entropy.dylib`, `libccme_ecdrbg.dylib`, `libccme_ecc.dylib`, `libccme_ecc_non_fips.dylib`, `libccme_ecc_accel_fips.dylib`, `libccme_ecc_accel_non_fips.dylib`, and `libccme_error_info.dylib` on systems running a Mac OS X or iOS operating system.
- Signature files: `cryptocme.sig` and `cryptocme_test_on_use.sig`.

The underlying logical interface to Crypto-C ME is the API, documented in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*. Crypto-C ME provides for Control Input through the API calls. Data Input and Output are provided in the variables passed with the API calls, and Status Output is provided through the returns and error codes documented for each call. This is illustrated in the following diagram.

Figure 1 Crypto-C ME Logical Interfaces



**Note:** Shared libraries for systems running a Mac OS X or iOS operating system might include Apple code signatures applied by customers. If such a signature is present, the signature is not included in the logical boundary and is explicitly excluded from the software signature check.

## 2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication

Crypto-C ME meets all FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for roles, services, and authentication, implementing both a User role and Crypto Officer role. Role-based authentication is implemented for these roles. Only one role can be active at a time and Crypto-C ME does not allow concurrent operators.

### 2.3.1 Provider Configuration

The application is responsible for enabling Level 2 roles and authentication prior to the module being loaded.

The application must supply the `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` feature when creating the FIPS 140 provider.

**To load the cryptographic module with the `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` feature:**

1. Call `R_PROV_FIPS140_new()` including `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` as one of the provider features.
2. Configure the location of the cryptographic module library files using `R_PROV_FIPS140_set_path()`.
3. Call `R_PROV_FIPS140_load()` to load the cryptographic module.

The cryptographic module uses a database of role identity information to validate authentication attempts by the operator. The roles database stores a salted message digest of a PIN for each role it authenticates. The roles database can be stored either in memory or in a file. The application must set up a roles database and add authentication data before it can perform Level 2 role authentication.

**To create the roles database in a file:**

1. Load the FIPS140 provider with the `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` feature.
2. Set the location of the file by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file()` and specify the path to the file.

---

**Note:** For operating systems using wide character sets, call `R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file_w()` instead.

---

3. Create the file by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_init_roles()`.

**To create the roles database in memory:**

1. Load the FIPS140 provider with the `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` feature.
2. Initialize the data in memory by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_init_roles()`.

To set the initial authentication data in the roles database, the call to `R_PROV_FIPS140_init_roles()` must supply an authentication callback function. The authentication callback function is called once for each type of role to allow the application to set the initial authentication data.

## PIN Data

PIN data supplied by the application is hashed using the SHA-512 algorithm to generate 64 bytes of authentication data, which is stored in the roles database.

To prevent successful random authentication attempts the application must set random PIN data of sufficient security strength. The PIN must contain random data with the equivalent of a minimum of 74 effectively random bits. The actual length of the PIN data depends upon the randomness of the source of PIN data used by the application.

The minimum length of the PIN specified in this Security Policy document is sufficient to prevent brute force searching of the PIN value with a probability greater than 1 in 100000 over a period of one minute when the hash calculations are performed by a computing resource with the performance equivalence of a cluster of up to one million Amazon EC2 GPU instances. Other considerations of the application environment might require other PIN lengths. Up to 64 bytes of PIN data can be passed to the module by a call to assume a role.

### 2.3.2 Crypto Officer Role

The Crypto Officer is responsible for installing and loading the cryptographic module. After the module is installed and operational, an operator can assume the Crypto Officer role by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_assume_role()` with `R_FIPS140_ROLE_OFFICER`. The preinstalled authentication callback function will gather PIN data during the call. A message digest of the PIN, generated using SHA-512, is checked against the authentication data held by the roles database.

An operator assuming the Crypto Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. For a complete list of functions available to the Crypto Officer, see [“Services” on page 29](#).

### 2.3.3 Crypto User Role

An operator can assume the Crypto User role by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_assume_role()` with `R_FIPS140_ROLE_USER`. The preinstalled authentication callback function will gather PIN data during the call. A message digest of the PIN, generated using SHA-512, is checked against the authentication data held by the roles database.

An operator assuming the Crypto User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for `R_PROV_FIPS140_self_test_full()`, which is reserved for the Crypto Officer. For a complete list of Crypto-C ME functions, see [“Services” on page 29](#).

### 2.3.4 Unloading and Reloading the Module

A roles database stored in memory is erased when the cryptographic module is unloaded. When the cryptographic module is reloaded, the roles database must be recreated before any roles are accessible. For the steps to create a roles database in memory, see “[To create the roles database in memory:](#)” on page 14.

A roles database stored in file remains on the file system when the module is unloaded. When the cryptographic module is reloaded, the application can reuse the existing roles database.

#### To reuse an existing roles database:

1. Load the FIPS140 provider with the `R_FIPS140_FEATURE_SL2_roles` feature.
2. Set the location of the file by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file()` and specify the path to the file. This reads the roles database, if it exists.

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**Note:** For operating systems using wide character sets, call `R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file_w()` instead.

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In all cases, when the module is reloaded the application cannot assume any role until it initializes access to the roles database. After access to the roles database is established an application must reauthenticate to each role it assumes.



## 2.4 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic key management is concerned with generating and storing keys, managing access to keys, protecting keys during use, and zeroizing keys when they are not longer required.

### 2.4.1 Key Generation

Crypto-C ME supports the generation of DSA, RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public and private keys. Also, Crypto-C ME uses the CTR Deterministic Random Bit Generator (CTR DRBG) as the default pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for asymmetric and symmetric keys used in algorithms such as AES, Triple DES, RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC, and HMAC.

### 2.4.2 Key Storage

Crypto-C ME does not provide long-term cryptographic key storage. If a user chooses to store keys, the user is responsible for storing keys exported from the module.

The following table lists all keys and CSPs in the module and where they are stored.

Table 2 Key Storage

Key or CSP	Storage
Hardcoded DSA public key	Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (encrypted).
Hardcoded AES key	Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (plaintext).
AES keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
Triple-DES keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
HMAC with SHA-1 and SHA-2 keys (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256)	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
Diffie-Hellman public/private keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
ECC public/private keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
RSA public/private keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
DSA public/private keys	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
CTR DRBG entropy	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
CTR DRBG V value	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
CTR DRBG key	Volatile memory only (plaintext).

Table 2 Key Storage (continued)

<b>Key or CSP</b>	<b>Storage</b>
HMAC DRBG entropy	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
HMAC DRBG V value	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
HMAC DRBG key	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
HMAC DRBG init_seed	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
FIPS 186-2 seed	Volatile memory only (plaintext).
FIPS 186-2 key	Volatile memory only (plaintext).

### 2.4.3 Key Access

An authorized operator of the module has access to all key data created during Crypto-C ME operation.

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**Note:** The Crypto User and Crypto Officer roles have equal and complete access to all keys.

---

The following table lists the different services provided by the toolkit with the type of access to keys or CSPs.

Table 3 Key and CSP Access

<b>Service Type</b>	<b>Key or CSP</b>	<b>Type of Access</b>
Encryption and decryption	Symmetric keys (AES, Triple-DES)	Read/Execute
Digital signature and verification	Asymmetric keys (DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA), and RSA)	Read/Execute
Message digest	None	N/A
MAC	HMAC keys	Read/Execute
Random number generation	CTR DRBG entropy, V, and key HMAC DRBG entropy, V, key, and init_seed FIPS 186-2 seed and key	Read/Write/Execute
Key generation	Symmetric keys (AES, Triple-DES) Asymmetric keys (DSA, ECDSA, RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and ECDH) MAC keys (HMAC)	Write
Key establishment primitives	Asymmetric keys (RSA, DH, ECDH)	Read/Execute

Table 3 Key and CSP Access (continued)

Service Type	Key or CSP	Type of Access
Self-test (Crypto Officer service)	Hardcoded keys (DSA and AES)	Read/Execute
Show status	None	N/A
Zeroization	All	Read/Write

#### 2.4.4 Key Protection/Zeroization

All key data resides in internally allocated data structures and can be output only using the Crypto-C ME API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. The operator should follow the steps outlined in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition Developers Guide* to ensure sensitive data is protected by zeroizing the data from memory when it is no longer needed. All volatile keys and CSPs listed in [Table 2](#) are zeroized by unloading the module from memory.

## 2.5 Cryptographic Algorithms

To achieve compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standard, only FIPS 140-2-approved or allowed algorithms can be used in an approved mode of operation.

The following table lists the FIPS 140-2-approved and allowed algorithms supported by Crypto-C ME with validation certificate numbers.

Table 4 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved and allowed Algorithms

Algorithm Type	Algorithm	Validation Certificate
Symmetric Key	AES in CBC, CFB 128-bit, ECB, OFB 128-bit, CTR, and CCM modes (with 128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes) AES in XTS mode (with 128 and 256-bit key sizes) AES in GCM mode with automatic Initialization Vector (IV) generation (with 128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes).	2859
	Triple-DES in ECB, CBC, CFB 64-bit, and OFB 64-bit modes. <b>Note:</b> The use of two-key Triple-DES for encryption is restricted. For more information, see <a href="#">“Crypto Officer and Crypto User Guidance” on page 24</a>	1706
Asymmetric Key	DSA (2048 to 4096-bit key sizes)	858
	ECDSA (224 to 571-bit key sizes)	507
	ECDSA2 Component Test	299
	RSA (2048 to 4096-bit key size)	1499
	RSASP1 Component Test RSADP Component Test	298 300
Key Agreement	DH (2048 to 4096-bit key size) and ECDH (224 to 571-bit key size)	Non-approved (Allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode).
	KASECC_(ECCCDH) Primitive Component Test	296
Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)	X9.63 KDF - Component Test	297
	TLS Pseudo-random Function (TLS PRF) - Component Test	297
	Password-based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) As defined in NIST Special Publication 800-132, PBKDF2 can be used in FIPS 140-2 mode when used with FIPS 140-2-approved symmetric key and message digest algorithms. For more information, see <a href="#">“Crypto Officer and Crypto User Guidance” on page 24</a> .	Vendor affirmed <sup>1</sup>
Random Number	CTR DRBG	507
	HMAC DRBG	507
	FIPS 186-2 PRNG - Change Notice 1, with and without the mod q step	1282

Table 4 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved and allowed Algorithms (continued)

Algorithm Type	Algorithm	Validation Certificate
Key Wrapping	RSA encrypt and decrypt (2048 to 4096-bit key size). For key wrapping using RSA, the key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength. Less than 112 bits of security (key sizes less than 2048 bits) is non-compliant.	Non-approved (Allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode for key transport).
Message Digest	SHA-1, and SHA-224, 256, 384, 512, 512/224, and 512/256	2402
Message Authentication Code	HMAC-SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA512/224, and SHA512/256	1799

<sup>1</sup>Not yet tested by the CAVP, but is approved for use in FIPS 140-2 mode. RSA affirms correct implementation of the algorithm.

The following Crypto-C ME algorithms are not FIPS 140-2-approved:

- AES in BPS mode for format-preserving encryption (FPE)
- DES
- DESX
- DES40
- Camellia
- GOST
- SEED
- RC2
- RC4
- RC5
- RSA with key sizes less than 2048 bits
- DSA with key sizes less than 2048 bits
- ECDSA with key sizes less than 224 bits
- DH with key sizes less than 2048 bits
- ECDH with key sizes less than 224 bits
- MD2
- MD4
- MD5
- HMAC MD5
- ECAES
- ECIES
- Dual EC DRBG

- Entropy RNG
- OTP RNG

For more information about using Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner, see [“Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME” on page 24](#).

## **2.6 Self Tests**

Crypto-C ME performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation.

If a power-up self-test fails for one of the resource libraries, all cryptographic services for the library are disabled. Services for a disabled library can only be re-enabled by reloading the FIPS 140-2 module. If a conditional self-test fails, the operation fails but no services are disabled.

For self-test failures (power-up or conditional) the library notifies the user through the returns and error codes for the API.

### **2.6.1 Power-up Self-test**

Crypto-C ME implements the following power-up self-tests:

- AES in CCM, GCM, GMAC, and XTS mode Known Answer Tests (KATs)
- Triple DES KATs
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 KATs
- HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 KATs
- TLS 1.0/1.1 ANSI X9.63 KDF KATs
- RSA sign/verify KATs
- RSA sign/verify test
- DSA sign/verify test
- ECDSA sign/verify test
- DH and ECDH conditional tests
- PRNG (CTR DRBG, HMAC DRBG, and FIPS 186-2) KATs
- Software integrity test using DSA signature verification.

Power-up self-tests are executed automatically when Crypto-C ME is loaded into memory.

## 2.6.2 Conditional Self-tests

Crypto-C ME performs two conditional self-tests:

- A pair-wise consistency test each time Crypto-C ME generates a DSA, RSA, or EC public/private key pair.
- A Continuous Random Number Generation (CRNG) test each time the toolkit produces random data, as per the FIPS 140-2 standard. The CRNG test is performed on all approved and non-approved PRNGs (CTR DRBG, HMAC DRBG, FIPS 186-2, Dual EC DRBG, Entropy RNG, and OTP RNG).

## 2.6.3 Critical Functions Tests

Crypto-C ME performs known answer tests for:

- MD5 and HMAC-MD5, which are available when the `R_MODE_FILTER_FIPS140_SSL` and `R_MODE_FILTER_JCMVP_SSL` mode filters are set.
- Camellia ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB for key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits, which are available when the `R_MODE_FILTER_JCMVP` and `R_MODE_FILTER_JCMVP_SSL` mode filters are set.

## 2.6.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA key operations implement blinding, a reversible way of modifying the input data, so as to make the RSA operation immune to timing attacks. Blinding has no effect on the algorithm other than to mitigate attacks on the algorithm. Blinding is implemented through blinding modes, and the following options are available:

- Blinding mode off.
- Blinding mode with no update, where the blinding value is constant for each operation.
- Blinding mode with full update, where a new blinding value is used for each operation.

## 3 Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME

This section provides an overview of how to securely operate Crypto-C ME in compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standards.

### 3.1 Crypto Officer and Crypto User Guidance

The Crypto Officer and Crypto User must only use algorithms approved for use in a FIPS 140 mode of operation, as listed in [Table 4 on page 20](#). The requirements for using the approved algorithms in a FIPS 140 mode of operation are as follows:

- Two-key Triple-DES encryption is restricted. From January 1, 2011 through to December 31, 2015, the total number of blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than  $2^{20}$  (a block is the 64-bit block of a Triple-DES encryption operation). This restriction also applies to those keys first used prior to 2011 and continue to be used beyond December 31, 2010.

After December 31, 2015, two-key Triple DES shall not be used for encryption.

Two-key Triple-DES decryption is allowed for legacy-use after 2010.

- The length of a DSA key pair for digital signature generation and verification must be either 2048 or 3072 bits. For digital signature verification, 1024 bits is allowed for legacy-use.
- The length of an RSA key pair for digital signature generation and verification must be a multiple of 512 between 2048 and 4096 bits, inclusive. For digital signature verification, a multiple of 512 greater than or equal to 1024 and less than 2048 bits is allowed for legacy-use.
- The key length for an HMAC generation or verification must be between 112 and 4096 bits, inclusive. For HMAC verification, a key length greater than or equal to 80 and less than 112 is allowed for legacy-use.
- EC key pairs must have named curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves: P224, P256, P384, P521, B233, B283, B409, B571, K233, K283, K409, and K571. Named curves P192, B163, and K163 are allowed for legacy-use.
- When using RSA for key wrapping, the strength of the methodology is between 112 and 150 bits of security.
- The Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 112 and 150 bits of security.
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitives must use curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves. Using NIST-recommended curves, the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 112 and 256 bits of security.
- When using an approved RNG to generate keys, the requested security strength for the RNG must be at least as great as the security strength of the key being generated.



- When using GCM feedback mode for symmetric encryption, the authentication tag length and authenticated data length may be specified as input parameters, but the Initialization Vector (IV) must not be specified. It must be generated internally.
- In the case where the module is powered down, a new key must be used for AES GCM encryption/decryption.
- For Password-based Key Derivation, the following restrictions apply:
  - Keys generated using PBKDF2 shall only be used in data storage applications.
  - The minimum password length is 14 characters, which has a strength of approximately 112 bits, assuming a randomly selected password using the extended ASCII printable character set is used.

For random passwords (that is, a string of characters from a given set of characters in which each character is equally likely to be selected), the strength of the password is given by:  $S=L*(\log N/\log 2)$  where  $N$  is the number of possible characters (for example, for the ASCII printable character set  $N = 95$ , for the extended ASCII printable character set  $N = 218$ ) and  $L$  is the number of characters. A password of the strength  $S$  can be guessed at random with the probability of 1 in  $2^S$ .

- The minimum length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is 16 bytes.
- The iteration count is as large as possible, with a minimum of 1000 iterations recommended.
- The maximum key length is  $(2^{32} - 1) * b$ , where  $b$  is the digest size of the message digest function.
- Derived keys can be used as specified in [NIST Special Publication 800-132](#), Section 5.4, options 1 and 2.

## 3.2 Roles

If a user of Crypto-C ME needs to operate the toolkit in different roles, then the user must ensure all instantiated cryptographic objects are destroyed before changing from the Crypto User role to the Crypto Officer role, or unexpected results could occur.

The following table lists the roles a user can operate in.

Table 5 Crypto-C ME Roles

Role	Description
R_FIPS140_ROLE_OFFICER	An operator assuming the Crypto Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. The complete list of the functionality available to the Crypto Officer is outlined in <a href="#">“Services” on page 29</a> .
R_FIPS140_ROLE_USER	An operator assuming the Crypto User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for <code>R_PROV_FIPS140_self_test_full()</code> , which is reserved for the Crypto Officer. The complete list of Crypto-C ME functions is outlined in <a href="#">“Services” on page 29</a> .

### 3.3 Modes of Operation

The following table lists and describes the available mode filters to determine the mode Crypto-C ME operates in and the algorithms allowed.

Table 6 Crypto-C ME Mode Filters

Mode	Description
R_MODE_FILTER_FIPS140 FIPS 140-2-approved.	Implements FIPS 140-2 mode and provides the cryptographic algorithms listed in <a href="#">Table 4 on page 20</a> . The default pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is CTR DRBG.
R_MODE_FILTER_FIPS140_SSL FIPS 140-2-approved if used with TLS protocol implementations.	Implements FIPS 140-2 SSL mode and provides the same algorithms as R_LIB_CTX_MODE_FIPS140, plus the MD5 message digest algorithm. This mode can be used in the context of the key establishment phase in the TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocol. For more information, see Section D.2, “Acceptable Key Establishment Protocols,” in <i>Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program</i> . The implementation guidance disallows the use of the SSv2 and SSv3 versions. Cipher suites including non-FIPS 140-2- approved algorithms are unavailable. This mode allows implementations of the TLS protocol to operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner with CTR DRBG as the default PRNG.
R_MODE_FILTER_JCMVP Not FIPS 140-2-approved.	Implements Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program (JCMVP) mode and provides the cryptographic algorithms approved by the JCMVP.
R_MODE_FILTER_JCMVP_SSL Not FIPS 140-2-approved.	Implements JCMVP SSL mode and provides the cryptographic algorithms approved by the JCMVP, plus the MD5 message digest algorithm.

In each mode of operation, the complete set of services, which are listed in this Security Policy, are available to both the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles (with the exception of `R_FIPS140_self_test_full()`, which is always reserved for the Crypto Officer).

---

**Note:** Cryptographic keys must not be shared between modes. For example, a key generated FIPS 140-2 mode must not be shared with an application running in a non-FIPS 140-2 mode.

---

## 3.4 Operating Crypto-C ME

Crypto-C ME operates in an unrestricted mode on startup, providing access to all cryptographic algorithms available from the FIPS 140-2 provider set against the library context. To restrict the module to a specific set of algorithms, call `R_LIB_CTX_set_mode()` with one of the mode filters listed in [Table 6 on page 26](#).

After setting Crypto-C ME into a FIPS 140-2-approved mode, Crypto-C ME enforces only the algorithms listed in [Table 4 on page 20](#) are available to operators. To disable FIPS 140-2 mode, call `R_LIB_CTX_set_mode()` with `NULL` to put Crypto-C ME back into an unrestricted mode.

`R_PROV_FIPS140_self_tests_full()` is restricted to operation by the Crypto Officer.

The user of Crypto-C ME links with the `ccme_core` and `ccme_fipsprov` static libraries for their platform. At run time, `ccme_fipsprov` loads the `cryptocme` master shared library, which then loads all of the resource shared libraries. For more information, see “FIPS 140-2 Libraries” in Chapter 7, FIPS 140-2 Operations, in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition Developers Guide*.

The current Crypto-C ME role is determined by calling `R_LIB_CTX_get_info()` with `R_LIB_CTX_INFO_ID_ROLE`. Authenticate and switch to a new role by calling `R_PROV_FIPS140_authenticate_role()` with one of the information identifiers listed in [Table 5 on page 25](#).

## 3.5 Startup Self-tests

Crypto-C ME provides the ability to configure when power-up self-tests are executed. To operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner, the default shipped configuration, which executes the self-tests when the module is first loaded, must be used.

For more information about this configuration setting, see the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition Installation Guide*.

## 3.6 Pseudo-random Number Generator

In all modes of operation, Crypto-C ME provides the CTR DRBG as the default pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).

Users can choose to use an approved PRNG other than the default, including HMAC DRBG or FIPS 186-2 (with or without mod  $q$ ) when creating a cryptographic object and setting this object against the operation requiring random number generation (for example, key generation).

Crypto-C ME also includes a non-approved Entropy PRNG used to generate seed material for the approved PRNGs.

### 3.6.1 PRNG Seeding

In the FIPS 140-2 validated library, Crypto-C ME implements deterministic PRNGs, which can be called to generate random data. The quality of the random data output from these PRNGs depends on the quality of the supplied seeding (entropy). Crypto-C ME provides internal entropy collection (for example, from high precision timers) where possible. On platforms with limited internal sources of entropy, it is strongly recommended to collect entropy from external sources.

Additional entropy sources can be added to an application either by:

- Replacing internal entropy by calling `R_CR_set_info()` with `R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENT_CB` and the parameters for an application-defined entropy collection callback function.
- Adding to internal entropy by calling `R_CR_entropy_resource_init()` to initialize an entropy resource structure and then adding this to the library context by calling `R_LIB_CTX_add_resource()`.

For more information about these functions, see the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*.

---

**Note:** If entropy from external sources is added to an application using `R_CR_set_info()` with `R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENT_CB` or `R_CR_entropy_resource_init()`, no assurances are made about the minimum strength of generated keys.

---

For more information about seeding PRNGs, see “Randomness Recommendations for Security” in [RFC 1750](#).

## 4 Services

The following is the list of services, authenticated and unauthenticated, provided by Crypto-C ME. Authenticated services can only be used by users authenticated in the Crypto Officer or Crypto User role. Unauthenticated services can be used by any user.

For more information about authentication of roles, see “Roles, Services, and Authentication” on page 14. For more information about individual functions, see the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*.

### 4.1 Authenticated Services

R_CR_add_filter()	R_CR_get_error_string()
R_CR_asym_decrypt()	R_CR_get_file()
R_CR_asym_decrypt_init()	R_CR_get_function()
R_CR_asym_encrypt()	R_CR_get_function_string()
R_CR_asym_encrypt_init()	R_CR_get_info()
R_CR_CTX_add_filter()	R_CR_get_line()
R_CR_CTX_alg_supported()	R_CR_get_memory()
R_CR_CTX_free()	R_CR_get_reason()
R_CR_CTX_get_info()	R_CR_get_reason_string()
R_CR_CTX_ids_from_sig_id()	R_CR_ID_from_string()
R_CR_CTX_ids_to_sig_id()	R_CR_ID_sign_to_string()
R_CR_CTX_new()	R_CR_ID_to_string()
R_CR_CTX_new_ef()	R_CR_import_params()
R_CR_CTX_reference_inc()	R_CR_key_exchange_init()
R_CR_CTX_set_info()	R_CR_key_exchange_phase_1()
R_CR_decrypt()	R_CR_key_exchange_phase_2()
R_CR_decrypt_final()	R_CR_keywrap_init()
R_CR_decrypt_init()	R_CR_keywrap_unwrap()
R_CR_decrypt_update()	R_CR_keywrap_unwrap_init()
R_CR_derive_key()	R_CR_keywrap_unwrap_PKEY()
R_CR_derive_key_data()	R_CR_keywrap_unwrap_SKEY()
R_CR_digest()	R_CR_keywrap_wrap()
R_CR_digest_final()	R_CR_keywrap_wrap_init()
R_CR_digest_init()	R_CR_keywrap_wrap_PKEY()
R_CR_digest_update()	R_CR_keywrap_wrap_SKEY()
R_CR_dup()	R_CR_mac()
R_CR_dup_ef()	R_CR_mac_final()
R_CR_encrypt()	R_CR_mac_init()
R_CR_encrypt_final()	R_CR_mac_update()
R_CR_encrypt_init()	R_CR_new()
R_CR_encrypt_update()	R_CR_new_ef()
R_CR_entropy_bytes()	R_CR_next_error()
R_CR_entropy_gather()	R_CR_random_bytes()
R_CR_entropy_resource_init()	R_CR_random_init()
R_CR_export_params()	R_CR_random_reference_inc()
R_CR_free()	R_CR_random_seed()
R_CR_generate_key()	R_CR_secret_join_final()
R_CR_generate_key_init()	R_CR_secret_join_init()
R_CR_generate_parameter()	R_CR_secret_join_update()
R_CR_generate_parameter_init()	R_CR_secret_split()
R_CR_get_detail()	R_CR_secret_split_init()
R_CR_get_detail_string()	R_CR_set_info()
R_CR_get_error()	R_CR_sign()

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```
R_CR_sign_final()
R_CR_sign_init()
R_CR_sign_update()
R_CR_SUB_from_string()
R_CR_SUB_to_string()
R_CR_TYPE_from_string()
R_CR_TYPE_to_string()
R_CR_validate_parameters()
R_CR_verify()
R_CR_verify_final()
R_CR_verify_init()
R_CR_verify_mac()
R_CR_verify_mac_final()
R_CR_verify_mac_init()
R_CR_verify_mac_update()
R_CR_verify_update()
R_PKEY_cmp()
R_PKEY_copy()
R_PKEY_CTX_add_filter()
R_PKEY_CTX_free()
R_PKEY_CTX_get_info()
R_PKEY_CTX_get_LIB_CTX()
R_PKEY_CTX_get_memory()
R_PKEY_CTX_new()
R_PKEY_CTX_new_ef()
R_PKEY_CTX_reference_inc()
R_PKEY_CTX_set_info()
R_PKEY_decode_pkcs8()
R_PKEY_delete()
R_PKEY_dup()
R_PKEY_dup_ef()
R_PKEY_EC_NAMED_CURVE_from_string()
R_PKEY_EC_NAMED_CURVE_to_string()
R_PKEY_encode_pkcs8()
R_PKEY_FORMAT_from_string()
R_PKEY_FORMAT_to_string()
R_PKEY_free()
R_PKEY_from_binary()
R_PKEY_from_binary_ef()
R_PKEY_from_bio()
R_PKEY_from_bio_ef()
R_PKEY_from_file()
R_PKEY_from_file_ef()
R_PKEY_from_public_key_binary()
R_PKEY_from_public_key_binary_ef()
R_PKEY_generate_simple()
R_PKEY_get_info()
R_PKEY_get_num_bits()
R_PKEY_get_num_primes()
R_PKEY_get_PEM_header()
R_PKEY_get_PKEY_CTX()
R_PKEY_get_type()
R_PKEY_is_matching_public_key()
R_PKEY_iterate_fields()
R_PKEY_load()
R_PKEY_new()
R_PKEY_new_ef()
R_PKEY_PASSWORD_TYPE_from_string()
R_PKEY_PASSWORD_TYPE_to_string()
R_PKEY_print()
R_PKEY_public_cmp()
R_PKEY_public_from_bio()
R_PKEY_public_from_bio_ef()
R_PKEY_public_from_file()
R_PKEY_public_from_file_ef()
R_PKEY_public_get_PEM_header()
R_PKEY_public_to_bio()
R_PKEY_public_to_file()
R_PKEY_reference_inc()
R_PKEY_SEARCH_add_filter()
R_PKEY_SEARCH_free()
R_PKEY_SEARCH_init()
R_PKEY_SEARCH_new()
R_PKEY_SEARCH_next()
R_PKEY_set_info()
R_PKEY_set_provider_filter()
R_PKEY_signhash()
R_PKEY_store()
R_PKEY_to_binary()
R_PKEY_to_bio()
R_PKEY_to_file()
R_PKEY_to_public_key_binary()
R_PKEY_TYPE_from_string()
R_PKEY_TYPE_public_to_PEM_header()
R_PKEY_TYPE_to_PEM_header()
R_PKEY_TYPE_to_string()
R_PKEY_verifyhash()
R_PROV_FIPS140_assume_role()
R_PROV_FIPS140_authenticate_role()
R_PROV_FIPS140_authenticate_role_with_token()
R_PROV_FIPS140_free()
R_PROV_FIPS140_get_default_resource_list()
R_PROV_FIPS140_get_info()
R_PROV_FIPS140_get_reason()
R_PROV_FIPS140_init_roles()
R_PROV_FIPS140_load()
R_PROV_FIPS140_load_ef()
R_PROV_FIPS140_load_env()
R_PROV_FIPS140_new()
R_PROV_FIPS140_reason_string()
R_PROV_FIPS140_ROLE_from_string()
R_PROV_FIPS140_ROLE_to_string()
R_PROV_FIPS140_self_tests_full()
R_PROV_FIPS140_self_tests_short()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_info()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_path()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_path_w()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_pin()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_pin_with_token()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file()
R_PROV_FIPS140_set_roles_file_w()
R_PROV_FIPS140_STATUS_to_string()
```

R_SKEY_delete()	R_SKEY_SEARCH_add_filter()
R_SKEY_dup()	R_SKEY_SEARCH_free()
R_SKEY_dup_ef()	R_SKEY_SEARCH_init()
R_SKEY_free()	R_SKEY_SEARCH_new()
R_SKEY_generate()	R_SKEY_SEARCH_next()
R_SKEY_get_info()	R_SKEY_set_info()
R_SKEY_load()	R_SKEY_set_provider_filter()
R_SKEY_new()	R_SKEY_store()
R_SKEY_new_ef()	

## 4.2 Unauthenticated Services

R_add()	BIO_new_fp_ef()
BIO_append_filename()	BIO_new_init()
BIO_cb_cmd_to_string()	BIO_new_init_ef()
BIO_cb_post()	BIO_new_mem()
BIO_cb_pre()	BIO_new_mem_ef()
BIO_CB_return()	BIO_open_file()
BIO_clear_flags()	BIO_open_file_w()
BIO_clear_retry_flags()	BIO_pending()
BIO_copy_next_retry()	BIO_pop()
BIO_ctrl()	BIO_print_hex()
BIO_debug_cb()	BIO_printf()
BIO_dump()	BIO_push()
BIO_dump_format()	BIO_puts()
BIO_dup_chain()	BIO_read()
BIO_dup_chain_ef()	BIO_read_filename()
BIO_eof()	BIO_reference_inc()
BIO_f_buffer()	BIO_reset()
BIO_f_null()	BIO_retry_type()
BIO_find_type()	BIO_rw_filename()
BIO_flags_to_string()	BIO_s_file()
BIO_flush()	BIO_s_mem()
BIO_free()	BIO_s_null()
BIO_free_all()	BIO_seek()
BIO_get_app_data()	BIO_set()
BIO_get_buffer_num_lines()	BIO_set_app_data()
BIO_get_cb()	BIO_set_bio_cb()
BIO_get_cb_arg()	BIO_set_buffer_read_data()
BIO_get_close()	BIO_set_buffer_size()
BIO_get_flags()	BIO_set_cb()
BIO_get_fp()	BIO_set_cb_arg()
BIO_get_info_cb()	BIO_set_cb_recursive()
BIO_get_mem_data()	BIO_set_close()
BIO_get_retry_BIO()	BIO_set_flags()
BIO_get_retry_flags()	BIO_set_fp()
BIO_get_retry_reason()	BIO_set_info_cb()
BIO_gets()	BIO_set_mem_eof_return()
BIO_method_name()	BIO_set_read_buffer_size()
BIO_method_type()	BIO_set_retry_read()
BIO_new()	BIO_set_retry_small_buffer()
BIO_new_ef()	BIO_set_retry_special()
BIO_new_file()	BIO_set_retry_write()
BIO_new_file_ef()	BIO_set_write_buffer_size()
BIO_new_file_w()	BIO_should_io_special()
BIO_new_file_w_ef()	BIO_should_read()
BIO_new_fp()	BIO_should_retry()

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BIO_should_small_buffer()	ERR_STATE_remove_state()
BIO_should_write()	ERR_STATE_set_error_data()
BIO_tell()	R_ERR_STATE_free()
BIO_wpending()	R_ERR_STATE_get_error()
BIO_write()	R_ERR_STATE_get_error_line()
BIO_write_filename()	R_ERR_STATE_get_error_line_data()
R_BASE64_decode()	R_ERR_STATE_new()
R_BASE64_decode_checked()	R_ERR_STATE_set_error_data()
R_BASE64_decode_checked_ef()	R_ERROR_EXIT_CODE()
R_BASE64_decode_ef()	R_FILTER_sort()
R_BASE64_encode()	R_FORMAT_from_string()
R_BASE64_encode_checked()	R_FORMAT_to_string()
R_BASE64_encode_checked_ef()	R_ITEM_cmp()
R_BASE64_encode_ef()	R_ITEM_destroy()
R_BUF_append()	R_ITEM_dup()
R_BUF_assign()	R_LIB_CTX_add_filter()
R_BUF_cmp()	R_LIB_CTX_add_provider()
R_BUF_cmp_raw()	R_LIB_CTX_add_resource()
R_BUF_consume()	R_LIB_CTX_add_resources()
R_BUF_cut()	R_LIB_CTX_dup()
R_BUF_dup()	R_LIB_CTX_dup_ef()
R_BUF_free()	R_LIB_CTX_free()
R_BUF_get_data()	R_LIB_CTX_get_detail_string()
R_BUF_grow()	R_LIB_CTX_get_error_string()
R_BUF_insert()	R_LIB_CTX_get_function_string()
R_BUF_join()	R_LIB_CTX_get_info()
R_BUF_length()	R_LIB_CTX_get_reason_string()
R_BUF_max_length()	R_LIB_CTX_new()
R_BUF_new()	R_LIB_CTX_new_ef()
R_BUF_prealloc()	R_LIB_CTX_reference_inc()
R_BUF_reset()	R_LIB_CTX_set_info()
R_BUF_resize()	R_LIB_CTX_set_mode()
R_BUF_strdup()	R_lock()
CRYPTOC_ME_library_info()	R_LOCK_add()
CRYPTOC_ME_library_version()	R_lock_ctrl()
ERR_STATE_add_error_data()	R_LOCK_exec()
ERR_STATE_clear_error()	R_LOCK_free()
ERR_STATE_error_string()	R_lock_get_cb()
ERR_STATE_func_error_string()	R_lock_get_name()
ERR_STATE_get_error()	R_LOCK_lock()
ERR_STATE_get_error_line()	R_LOCK_new()
ERR_STATE_get_error_line_data()	R_lock_num()
ERR_STATE_get_next_error_library()	R_lock_r()
ERR_STATE_get_state()	R_lock_set_cb()
ERR_STATE_lib_error_string()	R_LOCK_unlock()
ERR_STATE_load_ERR_strings()	R_lock_w()
ERR_STATE_load_strings()	R_locked_add()
ERR_STATE_peek_error()	R_locked_add_get_cb()
ERR_STATE_peek_error_line()	R_locked_add_set_cb()
ERR_STATE_peek_error_line_data()	R_lockid_new()
ERR_STATE_peek_last_error()	R_lockids_free()
ERR_STATE_peek_last_error_line()	R_MEM_clone()
ERR_STATE_peek_last_error_line_data()	R_MEM_compare()
ERR_STATE_print_errors()	R_MEM_delete()
ERR_STATE_print_errors_fp()	R_MEM_free()
ERR_STATE_put_error()	R_MEM_get_global()
ERR_STATE_reason_error_string()	R_MEM_malloc()



R_MEM_new_callback()	R_passwd_stdin_cb()
R_MEM_new_default()	R_PEM_get_LIB_CTX()
R_MEM_realloc()	R_PEM_get_PASSWD_CTX()
R_MEM_strdup()	R_PEM_set_PASSWD_CTX()
R_MEM_zfree()	R_PROV_ctrl()
R_MEM_zmalloc()	R_PROV_free()
R_MEM_zrealloc()	R_PROV_get_default_resource_list()
R_os_clear_sys_error()	R_PROV_get_info()
R_os_get_last_sys_error()	R_PROV_PKCS11_clear_quirks()
PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_close_token_sessions()
PRODUCT_FIPS_140_ECC_MODE_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_cryptoki_version()
PRODUCT_FIPS_140_MODE_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_description()
PRODUCT_FIPS_140_SSL_ECC_MODE_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_driver_name()
PRODUCT_FIPS_140_SSL_MODE_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_driver_path()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_FREE()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_driver_path_w()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_driver_version()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_FROM_STRING()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_flags()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_TO_STRING()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_info()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_NEW()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_manufacturer_id()
PRODUCT_LIBRARY_VERSION()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_quirks()
PRODUCT_NON_FIPS_140_MODE_RESOURCE_LIST()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_count()
R_PAIRS_add()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_description()
R_PAIRS_clear()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_firmware_version()
R_PAIRS_free()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_flags()
R_PAIRS_generate()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_hardware_version()
R_PAIRS_get_info()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_ids()
R_PAIRS_init()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_info()
R_PAIRS_init_ef()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_slot_manufacturer_id()
R_PAIRS_new()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_default_pin()
R_PAIRS_new_ef()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_flags()
R_PAIRS_next()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_info()
R_PAIRS_parse()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_label()
R_PAIRS_parse_allow_sep()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_login_pin()
R_PAIRS_reset()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_manufacturer_id()
R_PAIRS_set_info()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_model()
R_PASSWD_CTX_free()	R_PROV_PKCS11_get_token_serial_number()
R_PASSWD_CTX_get_info()	R_PROV_PKCS11_init_token()
R_PASSWD_CTX_get_passwd()	R_PROV_PKCS11_init_user_pin()
R_PASSWD_CTX_get_prompt()	R_PROV_PKCS11_load()
R_PASSWD_CTX_get_verify_prompt()	R_PROV_PKCS11_new()
R_PASSWD_CTX_new()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_driver_name()
R_PASSWD_CTX_reference_inc()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_driver_path()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_callback()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_driver_path_w()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_info()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_info()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_old_callback()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_login_cb()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_pem_callback()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_quirks()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_prompt()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_slot_info()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_verify_prompt()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_token_login_pin()
R_PASSWD_CTX_set_wrapped_callback()	R_PROV_PKCS11_set_user_pin()
R_passwd_get_cb()	R_PROV_PKCS11_unload()
R_passwd_get_passwd()	R_PROV_PKCS11_update_full()
R_passwd_set_cb()	R_PROV_PKCS11_update_only()

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R_PROV_reference_inc()	STACK_push()
R_PROV_set_info()	STACK_set()
R_PROV_setup_features()	STACK_set_cmp_func()
R_PROV_SOFTWARE_add_resources()	STACK_shift()
R_PROV_SOFTWARE_get_default_fast_resource_list()	STACK_unshift()
R_PROV_SOFTWARE_get_default_small_resource_list()	STACK_value()
R_PROV_SOFTWARE_new()	STACK_zero()
R_PROV_SOFTWARE_new_default()	R_THREAD_create()
R_RW_LOCK_free()	R_thread_id()
R_RW_LOCK_new()	R_THREAD_id()
R_RW_LOCK_read()	R_thread_id_get_cb()
R_RW_LOCK_read_exec()	R_thread_id_set_cb()
R_RW_LOCK_unlock()	R_THREAD_init()
R_RW_LOCK_write()	R_THREAD_self()
R_RW_LOCK_write_exec()	R_THREAD_wait()
R_SELECT_ctrl()	R_THREAD_yield()
R_SELECT_dup()	R_time()
R_SELECT_free()	R_TIME_cmp()
R_SELECT_get_info()	R_time_cmp()
R_SELECT_new()	R_TIME_CTX_free()
R_SELECT_set_info()	R_TIME_CTX_new()
R_STATE_cleanup()	R_TIME_CTX_new_ef()
R_STATE_disable_cpu_features()	R_TIME_dup()
R_STATE_init()	R_TIME_dup_ef()
R_STATE_init_defaults()	R_time_export()
R_STATE_init_defaults_mt()	R_TIME_export()
R_SYNC_get_method()	R_TIME_export_timestamp()
R_SYNC_METH_default()	R_TIME_free()
R_SYNC_METH_pthread()	R_time_free()
R_SYNC_METH_solaris()	R_time_from_int()
R_SYNC_METH_vxworks()	R_time_get_cmp_func()
R_SYNC_METH_windows()	R_time_get_export_func()
R_SYNC_set_method()	R_time_get_func()
STACK_cat()	R_time_get_import_func()
STACK_clear()	R_time_get_offset_func()
STACK_clear_arg()	R_time_import()
STACK_data()	R_TIME_import()
STACK_delete()	R_TIME_import_timestamp()
STACK_delete_all()	R_TIME_new()
STACK_delete_all_arg()	R_time_new()
STACK_delete_ptr()	R_time_new_ef()
STACK_dup()	R_TIME_new_ef()
STACK_dup_ef()	R_TIME_offset()
STACK_find()	R_time_offset()
STACK_for_each()	R_time_set_cmp_func()
STACK_free()	R_time_set_export_func()
STACK_insert()	R_time_set_func()
STACK_lfind()	R_time_set_import_func()
STACK_move()	R_time_set_offset_func()
STACK_new()	R_time_size()
STACK_new_ef()	R_TIME_time()
STACK_num()	R_time_to_int()
STACK_pop()	R_unlock()
STACK_pop_free()	R_unlock_r()
STACK_pop_free_arg()	R_unlock_w()

## 5 Acronyms and Definitions

The following table lists and describes the acronyms and definitions used throughout this document.

Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions

Term	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard. A fast symmetric key algorithm with a 128-bit block, and keys of lengths 128, 192, and 256 bits. Replaces DES as the US symmetric encryption standard.
API	Application Programming Interface.
BPS	Brier, Peyrin and Stern. An encryption mode of operation used with the AES and Triple DES symmetric key algorithms for format-preserving encryption (FPE).
Attack	Either a successful or unsuccessful attempt at breaking part or all of a cryptosystem. Various attack types include an algebraic attack, birthday attack, brute force attack, chosen ciphertext attack, chosen plaintext attack, differential cryptanalysis, known plaintext attack, linear cryptanalysis, and middle person attack.
Camellia	A symmetric key algorithm with a 128-bit block, and keys of lengths 128, 192, and 256 bits. Developed jointly by Mitsubishi and NTT.
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining. A mode of encryption in which each ciphertext depends upon all previous ciphertexts. Changing the Initialization Vector (IV) alters the ciphertext produced by successive encryptions of an identical plaintext.
CFB	Cipher Feedback. A mode of encryption producing a stream of ciphertext bits rather than a succession of blocks. In other respects, it has similar properties to the CBC mode of operation.
CRNG	Continuous Random Number Generation.
CTR	Counter mode of encryption, which turns a block cipher into a stream cipher. It generates the next keystream block by encrypting successive values of a counter.
CTR DRBG	Counter mode Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
CTS	Cipher text stealing mode of encryption, which enables block ciphers to be used to process data not evenly divisible into blocks, without the length of the ciphertext increasing.
DES	Data Encryption Standard. A symmetric encryption algorithm with a 56-bit key. See also Triple DES.
DESX	A variant of the DES symmetric key algorithm intended to increase the complexity of a brute force attack.
Diffie-Hellman	The Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key exchange algorithm. There are many variants, but typically two entities exchange some public information (for example, public keys or random values) and combines them with their own private keys to generate a shared session key. As private keys are not transmitted, eavesdroppers are not privy to all of the information comprising the session key.

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Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm. An asymmetric algorithm for creating digital signatures.
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
Dual EC DRBG	Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
EC	Elliptic Curve.
ECAES	Elliptic Curve Asymmetric Encryption Scheme.
ECB	Electronic Codebook. A mode of encryption, which divides a message into blocks and encrypts each block separately.
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
ECIES	Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme.
Encryption	The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext can be read by anyone who has the key and decrypts (undoes the encryption) the ciphertext.
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards.
FPE	Format-preserving encryption. Encryption where the ciphertext output is in the same format as the plaintext input. For example, encrypting a 16-digit credit card number produces another 16-digit number.
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode. A mode of encryption combining the Counter mode of encryption with Galois field multiplication for authentication.
GMAC	Galois Message Authentication Code. An authentication only variant of GCM.
GOST	GOST symmetric key encryption algorithm developed by the USSR government. There is also the GOST message digest algorithm.
HMAC	Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication Code.
HMAC DRBG	HMAC Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
IV	Initialization Vector. Used as a seed value for an encryption operation.
JCMVP	Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program.
KAT	Known Answer Test.
Key	A string of bits used in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and decrypt data. Can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext. The types of keys include distributed key, private key, public key, secret key, session key, shared key, subkey, symmetric key, and weak key.

Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
MD2	A message digest algorithm, which hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest. MD2 is no longer considered secure.
MD4	A message digest algorithm, which hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest.
MD5	A message digest algorithm, which hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest. Designed as a replacement for MD4.
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology. A division of the US Department of Commerce (formerly known as the NBS) which produces security and cryptography-related standards.
OFB	Output Feedback. A mode of encryption in which the cipher is decoupled from its ciphertext.
OS	Operating System.
PBKDF1	Password-based Key Derivation Function 1. A method of password-based key derivation, which applies a message digest (MD2, MD5, or SHA-1) to derive the key. PBKDF1 is not recommended for new applications because the message digest algorithms used have known vulnerabilities, and the derived keys are limited in length.
PBKDF2	Password-based Key Derivation Function 2. A method of password-based key derivation, which applies a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm to derive the key.
PC	Personal Computer.
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant.
PPC	PowerPC.
privacy	The state or quality of being secluded from the view or presence of others.
private key	The secret key in public key cryptography. Primarily used for decryption but also used for encryption with digital signatures.
PRNG	Pseudo-random Number Generator.
RC2	Block cipher developed by Ron Rivest as an alternative to the DES. It has a block size of 64 bits and a variable key size. It is a legacy cipher and RC5 should be used in preference.
RC4	Symmetric algorithm designed by Ron Rivest using variable length keys (usually 40-bit or 128-bit).
RC5	Block cipher designed by Ron Rivest. It is parameterizable in its word size, key length, and number of rounds. Typical use involves a block size of 64 bits, a key size of 128 bits, and either 16 or 20 iterations of its round function.
RNG	Random Number Generator.
RSA	Public key (asymmetric) algorithm providing the ability to encrypt data and create and verify digital signatures. RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, the developers of the RSA public key cryptosystem.

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Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions

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<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
SEED	SEED symmetric key encryption algorithm developed by the Korean Information Security Agency.
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm. An algorithm, which creates a unique hash value for each possible input. SHA takes an arbitrary input, which is hashed into a 160-bit digest.
SHA-1	A revision to SHA to correct a weakness. It produces 160-bit digests. SHA-1 takes an arbitrary input, which is hashed into a 20-byte digest.
SHA-2	The NIST-mandated successor to SHA-1, to complement the Advanced Encryption Standard. It is a family of hash algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256), which produce digests of 224, 256, 384, 512, 224, and 256 bits respectively.
SEED	A symmetric key algorithm developed by the Korean Information Security Agency.
Triple DES	A variant of DES, which uses three 56-bit keys.
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked Codebook mode with ciphertext stealing. A mode of encryption used with AES.

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