Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module Software Version 5.1f

Security Policy Document Version 1.13

Mocana Corporation

May 4, 2010

Copyright Mocana Corporation 2010. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. MODULE OVERVIEW	
2. SECURITY LEVEL	4
3. MODES OF OPERATION	5
Approved mode of operation Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms	
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES	6
5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY	6
ASSUMPTION OF ROLES	6
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY	7
Roles and Services Other Services Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) Definition of Public Keys: Definition of CSPs Modes of Access	
7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	13
8. SECURITY RULES 9. PHYSICAL SECURITY	
10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY	14
11. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE	15
Key Destruction Service	15
12. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS	15

1. Module Overview

The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module (Software Version 5.1f) is a software only, multichip standalone cryptographic module that runs on a general purpose computer. The purpose of this module is to provide FIPS Approved cryptographic routines to consuming applications via an Application Programming Interface. The physical boundary of the module is the case of the general purpose computer. The logical boundary of the cryptographic module is the single dynamic link library (DLL) for Windows and the shared object (SO) for Linux and Solaris.

The cryptographic module runs on the following operating environments:

- Windows XP (single-user mode)
- Windows Mobile 6.1 (single-user mode)
- Windows CE 5.0 (single-user mode)
- Solaris 10 (single-user mode)
- Linux 2.6 (single-user mode)
- VxWorks 5.5 (single-user mode)
- Intel/WindRiver Linux v3 (single-user mode)
- iPhone OS 3.1.3 (single-user mode)




Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Interface Diagram




Figure 2 – Logical Cryptographic Boundary

2. Security Level

The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Security Level 1 of FIPS 140-2.

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification

3. Modes of Operation

Approved mode of operation

The module supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The following FIPS Approved algorithms are supported:

- AES (ECB, CBC, CTR and GCM modes; E/D; 128, 192 and 256)
- AES (CCM, CMAC; hash; 128, 192 and 256)
- Triple-DES (3-key and 2-key; TCBC mode; E/D)
- HMAC-SHA-1
- HMAC-SHA-224
- HMAC-SHA-256
- HMAC-SHA-384
- HMAC-SHA-512
- SHA-1
- SHA-224
- SHA-256
- SHA-384
- SHA-512
- RSA key generation, signature generation and verification (Gen Key 9.31; PKCS #1 1.5, Sig Gen and Sig Ver: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096; PSS Sig Gen and Sig Ver: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096)
- DSA key generation, signature generation and verification (PQG Gen/Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen/Ver; 1024)
- ECDSA key generation, signature generation and verification (CURVES P; 192, 224, 256, 384, 521)
- FIPS 186-2 RNG

Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms

Within the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the module supports the following allowed algorithms:

- Diffie-Hellman (for key agreement; provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength)
- RSA Key Wrapping (provides between 80 and 128 bits of encryption strength)
- ECDH (for key agreement; provides between 80 and 256 bits of encryption strength)

In addition to the above algorithms, the following algorithms are available in the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation:

- DES, Blowfish, ARC2, ARC4, MD2, MD4, MD5, HMAC-MD5, AES EAX, AES XCBC
- RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption/decryption

4. Ports and Interfaces

The physical ports of the module are provided by the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical interfaces are defined as the API of the cryptographic module. The module's API supports the following logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output.

5. Identification and Authentication Policy

Assumption of roles

The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module shall support two distinct roles (User and Cryptographic Officer). The cryptographic module does not provide any identification or authentication methods of its own. The Cryptographic Officer and the User roles are implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

Role	Type of Authentication	Authentication Data
User	N/A	N/A
Cryptographic Officer	N/A	N/A

Table 2 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

6. Access Control Policy

Roles and Services

Role	Authorized Services
User	Self-tests
	Show Status
Cryptographic-Officer	DH Key Generation
	• DH Key Exchange
	ECDH Key Exchange
	RSA Key Generation
	RSA Signature Generation
	RSA Signature Verification
	RSA Key Wrapping Encryption
	RSA Key Wrapping Decryption
	DSA Key Generation
	DSA Signature Generation
	DSA Signature Verification
	ECDSA Key Generation
	ECDSA Signature Generation
	ECDSA Signature Verification
	AES Encryption
	AES Decryption
	AES Message Authentication Code
	TDES Encryption
	TDES Decryption
	• SHA-1
	• SHA-224/256
	• SHA-384/512
	HMAC-SHA1 Message Authentication Code
	HMAC-SHA224/256 Message Authentication Code
	HMAC-SHA384/512 Message Authentication Code
	• FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generation
	Key Destruction

Table 3 – Services Authorized for Roles

Other Services

The cryptographic module supports the following service that does not require an operator to assume an authorized role:

• Self-tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2. It is invoked by reloading the library into executable memory.

Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

The following are CSPs that may be contained in the module:

Кеу	Description/Usage	Generation	Storage	Entry / Output	Destruction
DH Private Components	Used to derive the secret session key during DH key agreement protocol	Internally using the FIPS 186-2 RNG	Temporarily in volatile RAM	N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
ECDH Private Components	Used to derive the secret session key during ECDH key agreement protocol	Internally using the FIPS 186-2 RNG	Temporarily in volatile RAM	N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
DRNG Seed Key	Used to seed the RNG for key generation	Externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext Output:	Automatically after use
RSA Private Key	Used to create RSA digital signatures	Externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	N/A Entry: Plaintext Output: N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
RSA Key Wrapping Private Key	Used for RSA Key Wrapping decryption operation	Externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext Output: N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
DSA Private Key	Used to create DSA digital signatures	May be internally generated using the FIPS 186-2 RNG or generated externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext if generated externally Output: Plaintext	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.

Table 4: CSP Information

Кеу	Description/Usage	Generation	Storage	Entry / Output	Destruction
ECDSA Private Key	Used to create DSA digital signatures	May be internally generated using the FIPS 186-2 RNG or generated externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext if generated externally Output: Plaintext	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
TDES Key	Used during TDES encryption and decryption	Externally.	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext Output: N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
AES Keys	Used during AES encryption, decryption, and CMAC operations	Externally.	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext Output: N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.
HMAC Keys	Used during HMAC- SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 operations	Externally.	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Plaintext Output: N/A	An application program which uses the API may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP.

Definition of Public Keys:

The following are the public keys contained in the module:

Key	Description/Usage	Generation	Storage	Entry/Output
DH Public Component	Used to derive the secret session key during DH key agreement protocol	Internally using the FIPS 186-2 RNG	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Receive Client Public Component during DH exchange. Output: Transmit Host Public Component during DH exchange
ECDH Public Component	Used to derive the secret session key during ECDH key agreement protocol	Internally using the FIPS 186-2 RNG	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Entry: Receive Client Public Component during DH exchange. Output: Transmit Host Public Component during DH exchange
RSA Public Keys	Used to verify RSA signatures	Externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Input: Plaintext Output: N/A
RSA Key Wrapping Public Keys	Used for RSA Key Wrapping encryption operation	Externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Input: Plaintext Output: N/A
DSA Public Keys	Used to verify DSA signatures	May be internally generated using the FIPS 186-2 RNG or generated externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Input: Plaintext if generated externally Output: Plaintext
ECDSA Public Keys	Used to verify ECDSA signatures	May be internally generated using the FIPS 186-2 RNG or generated externally	Temporarily in volatile RAM	Input: Plaintext if generated externally Output: Plaintext

 Table 5: Public Key Information

Definition of CSPs Modes of Access

Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services.

Role		Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
C.O.	User		
Х		DH Key Generation	Use DH Parameters Generate DH Key pair
Х		DH Key Exchange	Use DH Private Component Generate DH shared secret
Х		ECDH Key Exchange	Use ECDH Private Component Generate ECDH shared secret
Х		RSA Key Generation	Generate RSA Public/Private Key pair
Х		RSA Signature Generation	Use RSA Private Key Generate RSA Signature
Х		RSA Signature Verification	Use RSA Public Key Verify RSA Signature
Х		RSA Key Wrapping Encryption	Use RSA Public Key Performs Key Wrapping Encryption
Х		RSA Key Wrapping Decryption	Use RSA Private Key Performs Key Wrapping Decryption
Х		DSA Key Generation	Generate DSA Key Pair for Signature Generation/Verification
Х		DSA Signature Generation	Use DSA Private Key Generate DSA Signature
Х		DSA Signature Verification	Use DSA Public Key Verify DSA Signature
Х		ECDSA Key Generation	Generate ECDSA Key Pair for Signature Generation/Verification
Х		ECDSA Signature Generation	Use DSA Private Key Generate ECDSA Signature
Х		ECDSA Signature Verification	Use ECDSA Public Key Verify ECDSA Signature
Х		AES Encryption	Use AES Key
Х		AES Decryption	Use AES Key
Х		AES Message Authentication	Use AES Key

Role		Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	
C.O.	User			
		Code		
Х		TDES Encryption	Use TDES Key	
Х		TDES Decryption	Use TDES Key	
Х		SHA-1	Generate SHA-1 Output; no CSP access	
Х		SHA-224/256	Generate SHA-224/256 Output; no CSP access	
Х		SHA-384/512	Generate SHA-384/512 Output; no CSP access	
Х		HMAC-SHA-1 Message Authentication Code	Use HMAC-SHA-1 Key Generate HMAC-SHA-1 Output	
х		HMAC-SHA- 224/256 Message Authentication Code	Use HMAC-SHA-224/256 Key Generate HMAC-SHA-224/256 Output	
Х		HMAC-SHA- 384/512 Message Authentication Code	Use HMAC-SHA-384/512 Key Generate HMAC-SHA-384/512 Output	
Х		FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generation	Use Seed Key to generate random number Destroy Seed Key after use	
Х		Key Destruction	Destroy All CSPs	
	Х	Show Status	N/A	
	Х	Self-Tests	N/A	

7. Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are applicable because the Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module operates in a modifiable operational environment. Operational testing of the module was performed on the following environments:

- Windows XP (single-user mode)
- Windows Mobile 6.1 (single-user mode)
- Windows CE 5.0 (single-user mode)
- Solaris 10 (single-user mode)
- Debian 4.0 with Linux 2.6 (single-user mode)
- OpenSuse 10.3 with Linux 2.6 (single-user mode)
- VxWorks 5.5 (single-user mode)
- Intel/WindRiver Linux v3 (single-user mode)
- iPhone OS 3.1.3 (single-user mode)

8. Security Rules

The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module design corresponds to the following security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.

- 1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct roles. These are the User role and the Cryptographic Officer role.
- 2. The cryptographic module does not provide any operator authentication.
- 3. The cryptographic module shall encrypt/decrypt message traffic using the Triple-DES or AES algorithms.
- 4. The cryptographic module shall perform the following self-tests:

Power-up Self-Tests:

- Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:
 - AES-ECB, CBC, CCM, CMAC, CTR, GCM Known Answer Test
 - Triple-DES Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-224 Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
 - HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
 - SHA-1 Known Answer Test
 - SHA-224 Known Answer Test

- SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- SHA-384 Known Answer Test
- SHA-512 Known Answer Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Known Answer Test
- DSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- ECDH Pairwise Consistency Test
- DH Pairwise Consistency Test
- FIPS 186-2 RNG Known Answer Test
- Software Integrity Test: HMAC-SHA-1
- Critical Functions Tests: N/A

Conditional Tests:

- DSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- FIPS 186-2 RNG Continuous Test
- 5. At any time, the operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the powerup self-tests by reloading the cryptographic module into memory.
- 6. The cryptographic module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the power-up self-tests.
- 7. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
- 8. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
- 9. The module shall not support concurrent operators.
- 10. DES, Blowfish, ARC2, ARC4, MD2, MD4, MD5, HMAC-MD5, AES EAX, AES XCBC, and RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption/decryption are not allowed for use in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

9. Physical Security

The FIPS 140-2 Area 5 Physical Security requirements are not applicable because the Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module is software only.

10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

11. Cryptographic Officer Guidance

The operating system running the Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Module must be configured in a single-user mode of operation.

Key Destruction Service

There is a context structure associated with every cryptographic algorithm available in this module. Context structures hold sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. These context structures must be destroyed via respective API calls when the application software no longer needs to use a specific algorithm any more. This API call will zeroize all sensitive information including cryptographic keys before freeing the dynamically allocated memory. See the *Mocana Cryptographic API Reference* for additional information.

12. Definitions and Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Program Interface
CO	Cryptographic Officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DLL	Dynamic Link Library
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Algorithm
TDES	Triple-DES

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

SO Shared Object