Security Builder FIPS Module R Versions 4.0 B and 4.0 S FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Certicom Corp. February 18, 2008 Copyright c 2007-2008 Certicom Corp. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. "Security Builder" is a registered trademark of Certicom Corp. Certicom Corp. has intellectual property rights relating to technology embodied in the product that is described in this document. In particular, and without limitation, these intel- lectual property rights may include one or more of the U.S. and non-U.S. patents listed at http://www.certicom.com/patents and one or more additional patents or pending patent applications in the U.S. and in other countries. Information subject to change. 2 Contents 1 Introduction 5 1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4 Change Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 9 2.1 Physical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.1 Version 4.0 B Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.2 Version 4.0 S Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 Firmware Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.2.1 Version 4.0 B Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.2.2 Version 4.0 S Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 14 3.1 Version 4.0 B Ports and Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2 Version 4.0 S Ports and Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 15 4.1 Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3 Operator Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5 Finite State Model 18 6 Physical Security 19 7 Operational Environment 20 8 Cryptographic Key Management 21 8.1 Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2 Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.3 Key Entry and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.4 Key Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.5 Zeroization of Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9 Self-Tests 22 9.1 Power-up Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.1.1 Tests upon Power-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.1.2 On-Demand Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.2 Conditional Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.3 Failure of Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3 10 Design Assurance 23 10.1 Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.2 Delivery and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.3 Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.4 Guidance Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 24 11.1 Attack on Biased Private Key of DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 A Crypto Officer And User Guide 25 A.1 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.1.1 Installing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.1.2 Uninstalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2 Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2.1 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2.2 De-initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2.3 Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.2.4 Show Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.3 When Module is Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Secu- rity Policy for Certicom's Security Builder R FIPS Module Versions 4.0 B and 4.0 S (SB FIPS Module). SB FIPS Module is a cryptographic toolkit for C language users, providing services of various cryptographic algorithms such as hash algorithms, en- cryption schemes, message authentication, and public key cryptography. This Security Policy specifies the rules under which SB FIPS Module must operate. These secu- rity rules are derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [1], and related documents [6, 7, 8]. 1.2 Purpose This Security Policy is created for the following purposes: 1. It is required for FIPS 140-2 validation. 2. To outline SB FIPS Module's conformance to FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Re- quirements. 3. To provide users with how to configure and operate the cryptographic module in order to comply with FIPS 140-2. 1.3 References References [1] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, De- cember 3, 2002. [2] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, May 19, 2007. [3] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, November 4, 2004. [4] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, March 19, 2007. [5] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, March 19, 2007. [6] NIST Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, Draft, March 24, 2004. [7] NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, March 19, 2007. 5 [8] NIST Frequently Asked Questions for the Cryptographic Module Validation Pro- gram, December 8, 2006. 6 1.4 Change Notes The following are placed here by RCS upon check-in. $Log: FIPSModuleHandHeldSecurityPolicy.tex,v $ Revision 1.3.14.14 2008/02/18 05:39:19 ayamada Corrections and clarifications based on the comments from CMVP. Revision 1.3.14.13 2008/01/10 19:29:01 ayamada 1. Correction on the firmware cryptographic boundary. 2. Correction: Software -> Firmware. Revision 1.3.14.12 2008/01/10 16:24:50 ayamada 1. Correction in Figure 3: Operating System -> Firmware Image 2. Additions to Table 3: Initialization and Deinitialization. 3. Additions to Tables 3 and 5: Zeroization (i.e., destruction). Revision 1.3.14.11 2008/01/04 14:11:41 ayamada Added a table on keys and CSPs. A typo fix as well. Revision 1.3.14.10 2007/07/03 11:38:48 ayamada Correction on Figure 3. Revision 1.3.14.9 2007/06/28 15:18:35 ayamada Editorial correction. Revision 1.3.14.8 2007/06/28 14:52:07 ayamada Further clarification on network port. Revision 1.3.14.7 2007/06/27 14:07:49 ayamada More correction. Revision 1.3.14.6 2007/06/26 18:28:56 ayamada Some editorial corrections. Revision 1.3.14.5 2007/06/26 12:45:58 ayamada Added the algorithm certificate numbers for the Scanner. Revision 1.3.14.4 2007/06/06 18:55:50 ayamada Added the module for the scanner. Revision 1.3.14.3 2007/05/03 12:40:10 ayamada Added further information on the hardare and firmware. Revision 1.3.14.2 2007/05/02 19:11:20 ayamada Correction on the haedware descriptions. Revision 1.3.14.1 2007/04/26 13:33:45 ayamada Brought in the latest version from the trunk. Revision 1.10 2007/04/19 13:56:28 ayamada More accurate description of the hardware. Revision 1.9 2007/04/19 13:27:59 ayamada Correction in the instruction in Appendix. Revision 1.8 2007/04/19 13:23:22 ayamada Clarification in the Appendix and typo fix. Revision 1.7 2007/04/09 16:06:22 ayamada Added more on the Operational Environment. Revision 1.6 2007/04/09 15:18:59 ayamada Editorial correction. Revision 1.5 2007/04/03 15:45:34 ayamada 7 Correction on the HW diagram and description. Revision 1.4 2007/04/03 14:59:27 ayamada Hardware and firmware information is added. Revision 1.3 2007/03/22 18:20:09 ayamada Some corrections. Revision 1.2 2007/03/22 12:46:35 ayamada Typo fix. Revision 1.1 2007/03/21 19:46:10 ayamada Initial revision. 8 2 Cryptographic Module Specification SB FIPS Module is a multiple-chip standalone firmware cryptographic module. 2.1 Physical Specifications 2.1.1 Version 4.0 B Hardware The hardware component of Hand Held Products BASE 20205B-FIPSE consists of the following devices: 1. CPU (ARM 920T) 2. Memory (a) Working memory is located on the RAM containing the following spaces: i. Input/output buffer ii. Plaintext/ciphertext buffer iii. Control buffer Key storage is not deployed in this module. (b) Program memory is also located on RAM. 3. LED 4. Serial Port 5. Wireless Network Interface 6. Power Supply The configuration of this component is illustrated in Figure 1. 2.1.2 Version 4.0 S Hardware The hardware component of Hand Held Products Scanner 4820SF-FIPSE consists of the following devices: 1. CPU (ARM 920T) 2. Memory (a) Working memory is located on the RAM containing the following spaces: i. Input/output buffer ii. Plaintext/ciphertext buffer iii. Control buffer Key storage is not deployed in this module. (b) Program memory is also located on RAM. 9 External Source of Power Power LED Supply System Bus Serial Wireless CPU Memory Interface Interface Serial Port Network : Cryptographic Boundary : Flow of data, control input, and status output : Flow of control input : Flow of status output Figure 1: Cryptographic Module 4.0 B Hardware Block Diagram 10 3. Scanner 4. Button 5. LED 6. Serial Port 7. Wireless Network Interface 8. Battery The configuration of this component is illustrated in Figure 2. 2.2 Firmware Specifications SB FIPS Module is manufactured by Certicom Corp., providing services to the C com- puter language users. The interface into SB FIPS Module is via Application Programmer's Interface (API) function calls. These function calls provide the interface to the cryptographic services, for which the parameters and return codes provide the control input and sta- tus output (see Figure 3). 2.2.1 Version 4.0 B Firmware SB FIPS Module 4.0 B is to be linked with the Hand Held Products BASE firmware 31205423-052. 2.2.2 Version 4.0 S Firmware SB FIPS Module 4.0 S is to be linked with Hand Held Products Scanner firmware 31205480-025. 11 Scanner Button LED Battery System Bus Serial Wireless CPU Memory Interface Interface Serial Port Network : Cryptographic Boundary : Flow of data, control input, and status output : Flow of control input : Flow of status output Figure 2: Cryptographic Module 4.0 S Hardware Block Diagram 12 Application Program Module Interface (API) SB FIPS Module Firmware Image : Cryptographic Boundary : Data flows Figure 3: Cryptographic Module Firmware Block Diagram 13 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3.1 Version 4.0 B Ports and Interfaces The physical and logical interfaces for SB FIPS Module 4.0 B are summarized in Ta- ble 1. Table 1: Version 4.0 B Logical and Physical Interfaces I/O Logical Interface Physical Interface Data Input API Serial port Data Output API Serial/Wireless port Control Input API Serial Port Status Output Return Code LED Power Input Initialization Function The power supply is the power interface. Maintenance Not supported Not supported 3.2 Version 4.0 S Ports and Interfaces The physical and logical interfaces for SB FIPS Module 4.0 S are summarized in Ta- ble 2. Table 2: Version 4.0 S Logical and Physical Interfaces I/O Logical Interface Physical Interface Data Input API Scanner/Serial port Data Output API Serial/Wireless port Control Input API Button/Serial port Status Output Return Code LED Power Input Initialization Function N.A. (Battery is included.) Maintenance Not supported Not supported 14 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Roles SB FIPS Module supports Crypto Officer and User Roles. These roles are enforced by this Security Policy. The Crypto Officer has the responsibility for installing SB FIPS Module (see Table 3). Table 3: Roles and Services Service Crypto Officer User Installation, etc. Installation Uninstallation Initialization Deinitialization Self-tests Show status Keys and CSPs Zeroization Symmetric Cipher (AES) Key generation Encrypt Decrypt Hash Algorithms and Message Authentication (SHA, HMAC) Hashing Message Authentication Random Number Generation (pRNG) Instantiation Seeding Request Digital Signature (DSA) Key pair generation Sign Verify Key Agreement (DH) Key pair generation Shared secret generation In order to operate the module securely, it is the Crypto Officer and User's responsi- bility to confine calls to those methods that have been FIPS 140-2 Approved or allowed. Thus, in the approved mode of operation, all Roles shall confine themselves to calling FIPS Approved or allowed algorithms, as marked in Table 4. 15 4.2 Services SB FIPS Module supports many cryptographic algorithms. The set of cryptographic algorithms supported by SB FIPS Module are given in Table 4. Table 4: Supported Algorithms and Standards Algorithm FIPS Cert Approved Number or allowed 4.0 B 4.0 S Block Ciphers AES (ECB, CBC, CFB128, OFB128, #547 #590 CTR) [FIPS 197] Hash Functions SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2] #612 #641 SHA-224 [FIPS 180-2] #612 #641 SHA-256 [FIPS 180-2] #612 #641 Message HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS 198] #288 #307 Authentication HMAC-SHA-224 [FIPS 198] #288 #307 HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS 198] #288 #307 RNG ANSI X9.62 RNG [ANSI X9.62] #315 #336 Digital DSA [FIPS 186-2] #222 #232 Signature Key Agreement DH [ANSI X9.42] The AES, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC- SHA256, RNG, and DSA algorithms have been validated to comply with FIPS. SB FIPS Module also supports a FIPS allowed key establishment technique (key agree- ment), DH. In order to operate the module in compliance with FIPS, only these FIPS Approved or allowed algorithms should be used. Table 5 summarizes the keys and CSPs used in the FIPS mode. Table 5: Key and CSP, Key Size, Security Strength, and Access Algorithm Key and CSP Key Size Strength Access AES key 128-256 bits 128-256 bits Create, Read, Use, Destroy HMAC key 160-256 bits 80-128 bits Create, Read, Use, Destroy pRNG seed key, seed 160 bits 80 bits Use DSA key pair 1024-15360 bits 80-256 bits Create, Read, Use, Destroy DH static/ephemeral 1024-15360 bits 80-256 bits Create, Read, key pair Use, Destroy 16 4.3 Operator Authentication SB FIPS Module does not deploy authentication mechanism. The roles of Crypto Officer and User are implicitly selected by the operator. 17 5 Finite State Model The Finite State model contains the following states: Installed/Uninitialized Initialized Self-Test Idle Crypto Officer/User Error The following is the important features of the state transition: 1. When the module is installed by the Crypto Officer, the module is in the In- stalled/Uninitialized state. 2. When the initialization command is applied to the module, i.e., the module is loaded on the memory, turning to the Initialization state. Then, it transits to the Self-Test state automatically, running the Power-up Tests. While in the Self-Test state, all data output via the data output interface is prohibited. On success the module enters Idle; on failure the module enters Error and the module is dis- abled. From the Error state the Crypto Officer may need to re-install to attempt correction. 3. From the Idle state (which is only entered if self-tests have succeeded), the mod- ule can transit to the Crypto Officer/User state when an API function is called. 4. When the API function has completed successfully, the state transits back to Idle. 5. If the Conditional Test (Continuous RNG Test or Pair-wise Consistency Test) fails, the state transits to Error and the module is disabled. 6. When On-demand Self-test is executed, the module enters the Self-Test state. On success the module enters Idle; on failure the module enters Error and the module is disabled. 7. When the de-initialization command is executed, the module goes back to the Installed/Uninitialized state. 18 6 Physical Security SB FIPS Module operates on a device where a production grade enclosure is used. 19 7 Operational Environment SB FIPS Module runs in the non-modifiable environment, where the device is a base station for a hand held scanner. 20 8 Cryptographic Key Management SB FIPS Module provides the underlying functions to support FIPS 140-2 Level 1 key management. The user will select FIPS Approved or allowed algorithms and will handle keys with appropriate care to build up a system that complies with FIPS 140- 2. It is the Crypto Officer and User's responsibility to select FIPS 140-2 validated algorithms (see Table 4). 8.1 Key Generation SB FIPS Module provides FIPS 140-2 compliant key generation. The underlying ran- dom number generation uses a FIPS Approved method, the ANSI X9.62 RNG [4]. 8.2 Key Establishment SB FIPS Module provides the following FIPS allowed key establishment technique [5]: 1. Diffie-Hellman (DH) The DH key agreement technique implementation supports modulus sizes from 512 bits to 15360 bits that provides between 56 and 256 bits of security strength, where 1024 bits and above must be used to provide minimum of 80 bits of security. It is responsibility of the application to ensure that the appropriate key establish- ment techniques are applied to the appropriate keys. 8.3 Key Entry and Output Keys must be imported or exported from the cryptographic boundary in encrypted form using a FIPS Approved algorithm. 8.4 Key Storage SB FIPS Module does not store keys. 8.5 Zeroization of Keys SB FIPS Module functions zeroize all intermediate security sensitive material. All CSPs are zeroized when they are no longer needed by calling destroy functions. De- struction of CSP is enforced in a manner such that missed destruction will make SB FIPS Module no longer functional. 21 9 Self-Tests 9.1 Power-up Tests 9.1.1 Tests upon Power-up Self-tests are initiated automatically by the module at start-up. The following tests are applied: 1. Known Answer Tests (KATs): KATs are performed on AES, SHS, HMAC-SHS, and RNG. For DSA, Pair-wise Consistency Test is used. 2. Firmware Integrity Test: The firmware integrity test deploys HMAC-SHA-256 to verify the integrity of the module. 9.1.2 On-Demand Self-Tests On-demand self tests may be invoked by the Cryptographic Officer or User by invoking a function, which is described in the Crypto Officer And User Guide in Appendix A. 9.2 Conditional Tests The Continuous RNG Test is executed on all RNG generated data, examining the first 160 bits of each requested random generation for repetition. This ensures that the RNG is not stuck at any constant value. Also, upon each generation of a DSA key pair, the generated key pair is tested of their correctness by generating a signature and verifying the signature on a given message as a Pair-wise Consistency Test. 9.3 Failure of Self-Tests Failure of the Self-tests places the cryptographic module in the Error state, wherein no cryptographic operations can be performed. It is a hard error, and re-loading, and possibly re-building as well, of the firmware image is necessary to attempt recovery. 22 10 Design Assurance 10.1 Configuration Management A configuration management system for the cryptographic module is employed and has been described in a document to the testing laboratory. It uses the Concurrent Versioning System (CVS) to track the configurations. 10.2 Delivery and Operation Please refer to Section A.1 of Crypto Officer And User Guide in Appendix A to review the steps necessary for the secure installation and initialization of the cryptographic module. 10.3 Development Detailed design information and procedures have been described in documentation sub- mitted to the testing laboratory. The source code is fully annotated with comments, and is also submitted to the testing laboratory. 10.4 Guidance Documents Crypto Officer Guide and User Guide are provided in Appendix A. This appendix outlines the operations for Crypto Officer and User to ensure the security of the module. 23 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks SB FIPS Module implements mitigation of the following attacks: 1. Attack on biased private key of DSA 11.1 Attack on Biased Private Key of DSA The standards for choosing ephemeral values in DSA introduce a slight bias. Means to exploit these biases were presented to ANSI by D. Bleichenbacher. In order to mitigate this attack, the following is executed: The bias in the RNG is reduced to levels which are far below the Bleichenbacher attack threshold. Change Notice 1 of FIPS 186-2 is published to mitigate this attack: http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/tkdigsigs.html 24 A Crypto Officer And User Guide A.1 Installation In order to carry out a secure installation of SB FIPS Module, the Crypto Officer must follow the procedure described in this section. A.1.1 Installing The Crypto Officer is responsible for the installation of SB FIPS Module. Only the Crypto Officer is allowed to install the product. Build the firmware image to be loaded by linking the object module, sbgse4.o, to the application. Then load the image that includes the object module to the device. A.1.2 Uninstalling Overwrite the object module, sbgse4.o, on the device. A.2 Commands A.2.1 Initialization sbg4 FIPS140Initialize() This function runs a series of self-tests on the module. These tests examine the integrity of the shared object, and the correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms. If these tests are successful, a value of SB SUCCESS will be returned and the module will be enabled. A.2.2 De-initialization sbg4 FIPS140Deinitialize() This function de-initializes the module. A.2.3 Self-Tests sbg4 FIPS140RunTest() This function runs a series of self-tests, and return SB SUCCESS if the tests are successful. These tests examine the integrity of the shared object, and the correct op- eration of the cryptographic algorithms. If these tests fail, the module will be disabled. Section A.3 of this document describes how to recover from the disabled state. A.2.4 Show Status sbg4 FIPS140GetState() This function will return the current state of the module. 25 A.3 When Module is Disabled When SB FIPS Module becomes disabled, attempt to bring the module back to the Installed state by calling sbg4 FIPS140Deinitialize(), and then to initialize the module using sbg4 FIPS140Initialize(). If the initialization is successful, the module is recovered. If this attempt fails, uninstall the module and re-install it. If the module is initialized successfully by this re-installation, the recovery is successful. If this recovery attempt fails, it indicates a fatal error. Please contact Certicom Support immediately. 26