This document may be reproduced in its entirety without modification. CryptoStor FC2002W P/N: 820-0001-06 Rev2 FW: Rev 2.2.2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Revision 0.10 NeoScale Systems, Inc. October 20, 2005 © Copyright NeoScale Systems, Inc. 2005 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy TABLE OF CONTENTS DOCUMENT HISTORY ............................................................................................................................................3 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................4 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................................................4 REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................................................4 SECURITY LEVEL....................................................................................................................................................5 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................................6 FC2002W INTERFACES .............................................................................................................................................6 ROLES AND SERVICES ................................................................................................................................................6 SECURITY FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................................................10 PHYSICAL SECURITY................................................................................................................................................10 SECURED NVRAM................................................................................................................................................103 TAMPER RESPONSE AND ZEROIZATION CIRCUITRY DESTROYS PLAINTEXT CSPS STORED IN THE SECURED NVRAM UPON REMOVAL OF THE COVER.CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................13 KEY INPUT & OUTPUT .............................................................................................................................................15 KEY GENERATION ...................................................................................................................................................15 KEY STORAGE & DESTRUCTION ..............................................................................................................................15 SELF-TESTS ..............................................................................................................................................................15 CONDITIONAL TESTS ................................................................................................................................................16 EMC/EMI...................................................................................................................................................................16 DESIGN ASSURANCE ............................................................................................................................................16 APPROVED FIPS MODE OF OPERATION ........................................................................................................16 SET UP AND INITIALIZATION PROCEDURE FOR THE FIPS MODE OF OPERATION ......................................................17 Revision 0.10 2 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Document History Revision Comments Author Date 0.1 Initial draft M. Liedstrand 6/30/04 0.2 Updates after initial review with Domus Labs M. Liedstrand 8/10/04 0.3 First version submitted to Domus Labs M. Liedstrand 10/1/04 0.4 Added Certificate numbers. Dharmesh Shah 3/31/2005 0.5 Incorporated Domus comments for NIST Rose Quijano- 7/22/2005 Nguyen/Samiullah Mohammed/Bob Lockhart 0.6 Network User Updated Rose Quijano- 7/25/05 Nguyen 0.7 Additional Changes from Domus Rose Quijano- 7/25/05 Nguyen 0.8 Removed Network User Rose Quijano- 9/28/05 Nguyen 0.9 Updated based on 10/14 feedback from CSE & Rose Quijano- 10/18/05 NIST (through Domus) Nguyen 0.10 Changed Security Officer Roles Rose Quijano- 10/20/2005 Nguyen Acronyms and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard CM Cryptographic Module CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSE Communications Security Establishment DES Data Encryption Standard FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology RNG Random Number Generator Revision 0.10 3 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Introduction Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security policy for the CryptoStor FC2002W from NeoScale Systems, Inc. This security policy describes how the FC2002W SAN Security Appliance meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the module in an approved mode of operation. This document was prepared as part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of the FC2002W. References This document provides information on the security operations and capabilities of the FC2002W as it relates to FIPS 140-2. More information is available on the FC2002W from the NeoScale Systems website at http://www.neoscale.com. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 -- Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/. Revision 0.10 4 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Security Level The CryptoStor FC2002W is designed to comply with the overall requirements of FIPS 140-2, level 3. The following table indicates module level compliance as applicable: Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Cryptographic Module Ports & Interfaces 3 Roles, Services and Authentication 3 Finite State Model 3 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 3 EMI/EMC 3 Self-Tests 3 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Cryptographic Module Security Policy 3 Overall Level of Certification 3 The CryptoStor FC2002W does not contain a user accessible operating system nor provide services for mitigation of other forms of attack aside from those specified. Revision 0.10 5 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Overview The NeoScale CryptoStor FC2002W appliance, referred to in this document as the FC2002W, is a Fibre Channel Storage Area Network (SAN) data security appliance that provides data flow control and encryption based on configured policy rules. Operating as a fully transparent, in-line storage appliance, the FC2002W inspects storage traffic and applies information flow controls and strong encryption to the data payload at gigabit rates. Storage data privacy policies are centrally managed, employing access and encryption rules which are easily modified to suit current and evolving storage infrastructures. Deep frame inspection allows access and encryption policies to be dynamically applied at wire-speed. True gigabit throughput with low latency and transparent operation ensures uninterrupted, scalable storage data protection. The FC002 is a multi-chip standalone module and the cryptographic boundary of the module is defined by its metal enclosure, excluding the fan and power supply assemblies which are field replaceable (hot swappable) modules. FC2002W Interfaces The FC2002W provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device. The physical interfaces provided by the FC2002W are mapped to the FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output as described in the following table: Logical Interface Physical Interface Mapping Data Input Interface Fibre Channel Port Data Output Interface Fibre Channel Port; Smartcard connector Control Input Interface Smart Card 10/100BASE-TX LAN, Port Console, Smart Card used for system key archival. Status Output LEDs, 10/100BASE-TX LAN port, Interface Console Port, Front Panel Display Power Interface PCI Compact Power Connector Table 1 ­ FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces Roles and Services The FC2002W supports identity-based authentication. Users authorized to access the unit are required to enter a username and password to authenticate their identity to the system in order to perform authorized tasks. The FC2002W can be accessed in one of the following ways: · CLI via the Console Serial Port · CLI via SSH (v2) · Graphical User Interface (GUI) using HTTPS via TLS (SSL v3.1) Revision 0.10 6 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy When the user successfully logs into the unit, the authorized role is allowed. The user is not allowed to alter the role while logged into the unit. The module supports four roles by default. These are mapped as shown below: Role FIPS Mapping Type of Authentication Data Authentication Administrator Crypto-Officer Identity-based The operator is granted access to the FC2002W CLI or GUI after providing proper user ID and corresponding password. Security Officer Crypto-Officer Identity-based The operator is granted access to the FC2002W CLI or GUI after providing proper user ID and corresponding password. Recovery Officer Crypto-Officer Identity-based The operator is granted access to the FC2002W CLI or GUI after providing proper user ID and corresponding password. Each of these roles is described and discussed below. Administrator Role The Administrator is responsible for configuring the non-security services of the FC2002W. Typical functions allowed to an Administrator are: · Unit connectivity to the SAN · IP/LAN connectivity for UI · CryptoStor network configuration management · System event logging and tracking · CryptoStor account creation, maintenance and deletion Security Officer Role The Security Officer is responsible the security related aspects of the FC2002W such as the implementation and management of security policies and system key management. Typical functions allowed to an Security Officer are: · Security Office and Recovery Officer account management · Data security planning and threat assessment Revision 0.10 7 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy · Security policy rule design, configuration and maintenance · Insertion of system keys · Certificate maintenance and updates · Audit log maintenance · Encryption/Decryption Recovery Officer Role The Recovery Officer is responsible for archiving and recovery of the system keys. Services The FC2002W supports the services for each role as listed in the following table. The type of access is specified as "R" for read only, "W" for write access and "E" for the ability to execute the service. Revision 0.10 8 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Role Authorized Services Cryptographic Type(s) of Keys and CSPs Access Administrator View system configuration and None R status Set/modify system configuration None W Create/modify/delete user account None W Enable/disable ports None E View system log file None R Export system log file Key Encrypting E Key (KEK) Restart system None E Firmware update Firmware Load E Key Security Officer Create/modify/delete Security None R, W Officer account Create/delete system keys Key Encrypting W, E Key (KEK) Encryption/Decryption Encryption Key E Create recovery system key shares Key Encrypting W, E Key (KEK) Create/delete/view encryption keys Encryption key W, E Zeroize keys None E Create/modify/delete security HMAC W policies View system & audit log None R Export system & audit log files Key Encrypting E Key (KEK) View/import certificates None R, W Recovery Officer Export/import recovery system key Key Encrypting R, W share Key (KEK) Revision 0.10 9 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Role Authorized Services Cryptographic Type(s) of Keys and CSPs Access Security Functions Physical Security The CryptoStor FC2002W is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module designed to meet FIPS 140-2, level 3 for physical security. The module consists of production grade components with standard passivation techniques applied. The cryptographic security boundary is defined by the unit's opaque sheetmetal enclosure with the exception of the fan and power supply modules which are field replaceable. Access to the circuitry is restricted through the use of tamper-evidence labels applied to the removable cover and the chassis showing visible evidence if the unit has been opened after shipment. The FC2002W is 2U (3.75 inches) high by 17.3 inches wide by 22.25 inches deep. It includes a single access cover protected with tamper-evident labels and the tamper response and zeroization circuitry. The unit contains 2 printed circuit board assemblies connected through a micro high-speed interface connector/socket combination. The smaller PCB containing the cryptographic functions is roughly 11 x 8 inches. The larger PCB containing processor, controller and data path functions is roughly 11 x 17 inches. The 2 redundant power supplies are externally accessible from the front of the module. The power is brought to the PCBs through a power interface connector, mounted at the rear of the power supply cavity containing the power supplies, and a harness connecting directly to the PCBs. Cooling for the FC2002W is provided by 3 fans mounted external to the main sheet metal enclosure which blows are into the module with ventilation holes on the opposite side of the chassis. Ventilation holes in the housing are protected from undetected probing through the use of internal baffles. The following screen shots 1 illustrate where to place tamper seal evidence. One tamper seal is placed lower left corner of FC2002W and the other tamper seal is placed upper right corner. Each tamper seals sit on top or cover a screw. The only way to get to the cover is to break the tamper seals. Revision 0.10 10 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Revision 0.10 11 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Revision 0.10 12 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Secured NVRAM Tamper response and zeroization circuitry destroys plaintext CSPs stored in the secured NVRAM upon removal of the cover. Cryptographic Key Management · Symmetric Key Algorithms Algorithm Modes Use Key Sizes Certificate # Implemented TDES (FIPS 46-3) CBC Encryption of 168 275, 285 media; Encryption of log files AES (FIPS 197) CBC Encryption of 256 173, 183 media; Encryption of media keys · Assymmetric Key Algorithms Algorithm Modes Use Key Sizes Certificate # Implemented RSA (FIPS 186-2) PKCS #1 Electronic sign & 1024 26 verify operations V1.5 · Hashing Algorithms Algorithm Use Certificate # SHA-1 Hash digest for signing log files. 269 · HMAC Algorithm Use Certificate # SHA-1 Hash digests for configuration file. 25 SHA-512 Hash digests for configuration file. 25 Revision 0.10 13 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy · Random number generator Specification Use Certificate # ANSI 9.31 Key generation 35 The following table describes the keys stored or used by the module. Key Use Key Type Generation Storage Description Key Encrypting Encrypt other AES 256 Generated automatically using Stored in secured Key (KEK) keys PRNG compliant to ANSI NVRAM X9.31 or electronically recovered. Message To protect HMAC Generated automatically using Stored in secured Authentication configuration PRNG compliant to ANSI NVRAM Code Key files X9.31 or electronically (HMAC) recovered. Media Keys User to store AES 256 Generated automatically using Stored in secured user data TDES PRNG compliant to ANSI NVRAM X9.31. Remote Access SSL/SSH RSA Generated automatically using Private key portion PRNG compliant to ANSI stored in secured remote access X9.31. NVRAM 2-factor Additional TDES 16 bits generated automatically Stored encrypted Authentication authentication using PRNG compliant to ANSI using the PPK onto Key method for user X9.31 with 1st 8 bits appended the hard disk. access to module to the end to produce 24 bits. Password Encrypt TDES Generated automatically using Stored in secured protection key password file PRNG compliant to ANSI NVRAM (PPK) stored in module X9.31. Software/firmware Verification of RSA Key pair generated at Neoscale load key integrity of with public key stored on the firmware module Revision 0.10 14 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Key Input & Output Keys may be electronically entered or exported (archived) in encrypted form. Archiving of the keys can only be done using split-key (M of N) export when in FIPS compliant mode. Keys cannot be exported from the CryptoStor FC2002W in cleartext form. Key Generation Keys are generated automatically using the PRNG complaint to ANSI 9.31. Key Storage & Destruction The system keys (KEK and HMAC) are stored in cleartext in secured NVRAM and are not accessible to anyone without tampering the unit causing zeroization of the secured NVRAM. The media keys are stored in encrypted form using the system keys. Zeroize Command "Zeroize" is a Command Line Interface (CLI) command used for key zeroization without tripping the tamper switches. Opening the cover results in tripping the tamper switches. Self-tests The CryptoStor FC2002W performs the following self-tests at power up. These self tests are run without any operator intervention during each occurrence of the unit being powered up. · RNG KAT · Cryptographic algorithm KAT for all implementations of AES, TDES, RSA and SHA-1. · Software/firmware integrity test · FPGA programming test · DDR memory test · d test · Flash memory test · Box open status test · Configuration Policy File Integrity Test Data ports are offline until satisfactory completion of power-up self-tests. The failure of any self-test will result in the module transitioning into the error state. When an error is encountered, the module will return an error status message pertaining to the error encountered via the CLI. The operator can attempt to clear the error by rebooting the module. Failing this, the module must be sent to Neoscale for Service. Revision 0.10 15 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Conditional tests The CryptoStor FC2002W performs the following conditional tests. · Continuous RNG test · Pair-wise consistency test · Firmware load test EMC/EMI The CryptoStor FC2002W is independently tested and complies with code 47 of FCC regulations, Part 15, Subpart B for class B equipment. Design Assurance Configuration management is established with the use the Concurrent Versions System (CVS). This version control system is the primary configuration management system used for the CryptoStor line of products. It is provides all standard version control features needed to maintain a history of a source tree ­ be it software, FPGA, board design or documentation. All configuration items (parts, documents, software, user guidance) of the module are assigned with a unique identification number and labeled accordingly. Approved FIPS Mode of Operation When operating the CryptoStor FC2002W in the FIPS mode of operation, the following rules are enforced: · Exporting or importing of System Keys must be done using split-key (M, N) export. · The Configuration File is exported separate from the System Keys. The CryptoStor includes the following non-approved security functions when not set to the FIPS mode of operation: · Exporting of System Keys to a file or smartcard in encrypted form using a passphrase. · Importing of System Keys in encrypted form using a passphrase. · Exporting of the Configuration File along with System Keys onto a smartcard. Revision 0.10 16 of 17 NeoScale Systems, Inc. CryptoStor FC2002W Security Policy Set Up and Initialization Procedure for the FIPS Mode of Operation To setup the CryptoStor FC2002W in the FIPS mode of operation, perform the following instructions: · After the initial boot process, log in an administrator using the default password. · Change the Administrator default password as instructed. · Enter the hostname and configuration parameters for the CryptoStor. · Log in as the Security Officer using the default password. · Change the Security Officer default password as instructed. · Login to the FC2002W as Security Officer through the CLI. · Enter the command set fipsmode on To verify the FIPS mode of operation is set: · Login to the FC2002W GUI management console as either the Administrator or Crypto Officer · Select the System: Summary page. · Verify FIPS Mode of Operation is set to yes. Revision 0.10 17 of 17