Security Builder R FIPS Module Version 2.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Certicom Corp. October 26, 2006 Copyright c 2004-2006 Certicom Corp. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. "Security Builder" is a registered trademark of Certicom Corp. Contents 1 Introduction 4 1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Change Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 9 2.1 Physical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 Computer Hardware and OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3 Software Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 13 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 14 4.1 Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3 Operator Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5 Finite State Model 17 6 Physical Security 19 7 Operational Environment 20 8 Cryptographic Key Management 21 8.1 Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2 Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.3 Key Entry and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.4 Key Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.5 Zeroization of Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9 Self-Tests 23 9.1 Power-up Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.1.1 Tests upon Power-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.1.2 On-Demand Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.2 Conditional Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.3 Failure of Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2 10 Design Assurance 24 10.1 Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.2 Delivery and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.3 Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.4 Guidance Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 26 11.1 Timing Attack on RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11.2 Attack on Biased Private Key of DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A Crypto Officer And User Guide 27 A.1 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1.1 Installing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1.2 Uninstalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2 Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2.1 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2.2 De-initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2.3 Self-Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2.4 Show Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 A.3 When Module is Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140- 2 Security Policy for Certicom's Security Builder R FIPS Module Version 2.0 (SB FIPS Module). SB FIPS Module is a cryptographic toolkit for C language users, providing services of various cryptographic algorithms such as hash algo- rithms, encryption schemes, message authentication, and public key cryptography. This Security Policy specifies the rules under which SB FIPS Module must oper- ate. These security rules are derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [1], and related documents [6, 7, 8]. 1.2 Purpose This Security Policy is created for the following purposes: 1. It is required for FIPS 140-2 validation. 2. To outline SB FIPS Module's conformance to FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Requirements. 3. To provide users with how to configure and operate the cryptographic mod- ule in order to comply with FIPS 140-2. 1.3 References References [1] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, December 3, 2002. [2] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex A: Ap- proved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, March 11, 2004. [3] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex B: Ap- proved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, July 2, 2003. [4] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex C: Ap- proved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, March 17, 2003. 4 [5] NIST Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Annex D: Ap- proved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, February 23, 2004. [6] NIST Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, Draft, March 24, 2004. [7] NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, July 26, 2004. [8] NIST Frequently Asked Questions for the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, December 18, 2003. 5 1.4 Change Notes The following are placed here by RCS upon check-in. $Log: SBFIPSModule2SecurityPolicy.tex,v $ Revision 1.24.2.10 2006/10/26 23:26:42 ayamada Update the date. Revision 1.24.2.9 2006/10/26 21:53:44 rtsang Simplified operational environment description. Revision 1.24.2.8 2006/10/23 17:58:00 ayamada Slight improvement. Revision 1.24.2.7 2006/10/12 15:19:05 ayamada Added Linux and Windows with 64-bit x86. Revision 1.24.2.6 2006/07/20 19:10:08 ayamada A minor editorial correction. Revision 1.24.2.5 2006/06/21 15:41:10 ayamada Added Symbian 9 and updated the dates and copyright years. Revision 1.24.2.4 2006/01/04 17:48:16 ayamada Updated the date. Revision 1.24.2.3 2006/01/04 17:45:47 ayamada Removed Linux ARM MV3.1 for now. Revision 1.24.2.2 2006/01/04 13:16:49 ayamada Added WinCE ARM and Linux MV 3.1. Revision 1.24.2.1 2005/06/07 15:16:01 ayamada Copied the latest versionf from the trunk. Revision 1.26 2005/05/05 14:48:05 ayamada Revised based on the comments from NIST/CSE. Revision 1.25 2005/03/28 15:38:18 ayamada Editorial corrections and refinements. Revision 1.24 2005/01/28 14:55:32 ayamada A typo fix. Revision 1.23 2005/01/19 20:05:59 ayamada Correction on the date of the document. Revision 1.22 2005/01/19 20:03:43 ayamada Added Certificate Number of HMAC. Revision 1.21 2005/01/19 13:24:19 ayamada Added OS layer in Figure 2, S/W Block Diagram. Then, updated the date on the SP. Revision 1.20 2004/12/01 18:56:37 korr updated date 6 Revision 1.19 2004/12/01 16:25:10 korr updated compatibility matrix Revision 1.18 2004/10/26 17:36:52 ayamada 1. Certificate numbers are supplied except for HMAC and another ECDSA. 2. Typo fix. Revision 1.17 2004/10/06 13:34:14 ayamada Updated the KAT description. Revision 1.16 2004/08/18 15:53:52 ayamada Updated for the latest advisory. Revision 1.15 2004/08/17 16:51:25 ayamada Added more description to further clarify the FSM. Revision 1.14 2004/08/17 12:35:40 ayamada Revised based on the second round comments from the testing laboratory. Revision 1.13 2004/08/16 19:12:36 ayamada Minor editorial error correction. Revision 1.12 2004/08/16 14:39:17 ayamada Some corrections. Revision 1.11 2004/08/13 14:15:31 ayamada Editorial corrections. Revision 1.10 2004/08/12 17:09:33 ayamada Major revision based on the first round comments from the testing laboratory. Revision 1.9 2004/08/09 14:40:14 ayamada Editorial corrections. Revision 1.8 2004/08/04 18:00:51 ayamada A typo fix. Revision 1.7 2004/08/04 18:00:27 ayamada Correction in Section 2.1. Revision 1.6 2004/08/04 17:41:05 ayamada More information about elliptic curves. Revision 1.5 2004/08/03 15:09:27 ayamada Nomenclature update. Revision 1.4 2004/07/30 16:39:45 ayamada Figure 2 is added. Revision 1.3 2004/07/30 15:26:39 ayamada Figure 2 is added. Revision 1.2 2004/07/30 12:43:24 ayamada Further editorial revision. Revision 1.1 2004/07/30 12:04:39 ayamada 7 Initial revision: Filename change. Revision 1.12 2004/07/30 12:00:09 ayamada Name Change: SB FIPS Provider -> SB FIPS Module Revision 1.11 2004/07/29 18:10:26 ayamada Editorial revision. Revision 1.10 2004/07/14 18:30:42 ayamada More editorial corrections. Revision 1.9 2004/07/13 15:38:14 ayamada Added mitigations of attacks. Revision 1.8 2004/07/13 13:36:47 ayamada Editorial corrections. Revision 1.7 2004/07/09 19:11:09 ayamada Editorial corrections. Revision 1.6 2004/07/09 16:05:26 ayamada Tables 4 and 5 are merged. Revision 1.5 2004/07/09 14:32:13 ayamada 1. Moved important tables into the main body. 2. Further re-organization. Revision 1.4 2004/07/07 15:21:41 ayamada Reorganization of the sections and correct table number references. Revision 1.3 2004/07/06 20:08:09 ayamada First editorial revision. Revision 1.2 2004/07/05 22:59:43 ayamada Crypto Officer Guide and User Guide are added. Revision 1.1 2004/07/05 21:42:33 ayamada Initial revision. 8 2 Cryptographic Module Specification SB FIPS Module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module, consisting of the following components: A commercially available general-purpose computer hardware. A commercially available Operating System (OS) that runs on the computer hardware. SB FIPS Module software that runs on the computer hardware and OS. 2.1 Physical Specifications The general-computer hardware component consists of the following devices: 1. CPU (Microprocessor) 2. Memory (a) Working memory is located on the RAM containing the following spaces: i. Input/output buffer ii. Plaintext/ciphertext buffer iii. Control buffer Key storage is not deployed in this module. (b) Program memory is also located on RAM. 3. Hard Disk (or disks) 4. Display Controller 5. Keyboard Interface 6. Mouse Interface 7. Network Interface 8. Serial Port 9. Parallel Port 9 10. Power Supply The configuration of this component is illustrated in Figure 1. 2.2 Computer Hardware and OS The combination of computer hardware and OS include the following representa- tive platforms: 1. Red Hat Linux Application Server 3.0, x86 (Binary compatible to AS 2.1) 2. Solaris 2.9, SPARC 32-bit SPARC 3. Solaris 2.9, SPARC 64-bit SPARC 4. HP-UX 11.00, 32-bit PA-RISC (Binary compatible to 11i) 5. HP-UX 11.00, 64-bit PA-RISC (Binary compatible to 11i) 6. Windows 2003, x86 (Binary compatible to Windows 98/2000/XP) 7. AIX 5.2, 32-bit Power PC (Binary compatible to AIX 5.1) 8. AIX 5.2, 64-bit Power PC (Binary compatible to AIX 5.1) 9. Red Hat Linux Application Server 3.0, Itanium (Binary compatible to AS 2.1) 10. Windows 2003, Itanium 11. HP-UX 11i, Itanium 12. Windows CE 3.0, ARM (Binary compatible to Windows CE 4.0 and Win- dows Mobile 5.0) 13. Symbian 9, ARM 14. Red Hat Linux Application Server 4.0, 64-bit x86 15. Windows XP, 64-bit x86 SB FIPS Module is also suitable for any platforms of any manufactures with compatible processors and equivalent or larger system configurations, and com- patible OS versions. For example, an identical SB FIPS Module can be used on any Linux for x86 processors, and an identical SB FIPS Module can be used on all Windows for x86 processors. 10 External Display Keyboard Mouse Source of Terminal Power Hard Disk Display Keyboard Mouse Power Drive Controller Interface Interface Supply System Bus CPU Memory Network Serial Parallel Interface Interface Interface Network Serial Port Parallel Port : Cryptographic Boundary : Flow of data, control input, and status output : Flow of control input : Flow of status output Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Hardware Block Diagram 11 2.3 Software Specifications The SB FIPS Module component is manufactured by Certicom Corp., providing services to the C computer language users in a shared object format. A single source code base is used for all identified computer hardware and OS. The interface into the SB FIPS Module shared object is via Application Pro- grammer's Interface (API) function calls. These function calls provide the in- terface to the cryptographic services, for which the parameters and return codes provide the control input and status output (see Figure 2). Application Program Module Interface (API) SB FIPS Module Operating System : Cryptographic Boundary : Data flows Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Software Block Diagram 12 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces The physical and logical interfaces are summarized in Table 1. Table 1: Logical and Physical Interfaces I/O Logical Interface Physical Interface Data Input API Ethernet port Data Output API Ethernet port Control Input API Keyboard and Mouse Status Output Return Code Display Power Input Initialization Function The Power Supply is the (sbg2 FIPS140Initialize()) power interface. 13 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Roles SB FIPS Module supports Crypto Officer and User Roles, meeting FIPS 140- 2 Level 1 requirements. These roles are enforced by this Security Policy. The Crypto Officer has the responsibility for installing SB FIPS Module (see Table 2). In order to operate the module securely, it is the Crypto Officer and User's responsibility to confine calls to those methods that have been FIPS 140-2 Ap- proved. Thus, in the approved mode of operation, all Roles shall confine them- selves to calling FIPS Approved algorithms, as marked in Table 3. 4.2 Services SB FIPS Module supports many cryptographic algorithms. The set of crypto- graphic algorithms supported by SB FIPS Module are given in Table 3. The DES (DES is provided for legacy systems), TDES, AES, SHS (SHA- 1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512), HMAC-SHS (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512), RNG, DSA, RSA PKCS #1, and ECDSA algorithms have been validated to com- ply with FIPS. SB FIPS Module also supports FIPS Approved or allowed key es- tablishment techniques (key agreement and key wrapping), DH, ECDH, ECMQV, and RSA PKCS #1. In order to operate the module in compliance with FIPS, only these FIPS Approved algorithms should be used. DESX, ARC2, ARC4, MD5, MD2, and HMAC-MD5 are supported as non FIPS Approved algorithms. In order to operate the module in compliance with FIPS, these algorithms should not be used. 4.3 Operator Authentication SB FIPS Module does not deploy authentication mechanism. The roles of Crypto Officer and User are implicitly selected by the operator. 14 Table 2: Roles, Services and Access Service Crypto User Keys and CSPs Access Officer Installation, etc. Installation Uninstallation Self-tests ECDSA public key Use Show status Symmetric Ciphers Key generation AES, TDES, DES keys Create, (DES for legacy systems) Read Encrypt AES, TDES, DES keys Use (DES for legacy systems) Decrypt AES, TDES, DES keys Use (DES for legacy systems) Hash Algorithms and Message Authentication Hashing Msg. Authentication HMAC keys Use Random Number Generation Seeding Seed Use Request Digital Signature Key pair RSA, DSA, ECDSA Create, generation key pairs Read Sign RSA, DSA, ECDSA Use private keys Verify RSA, DSA, ECDSA Use public keys Key Agreement Key pair ECDH, ECMQV, DH Create, generation key pairs Read Shared secret ECDH, ECMQV, DH Use generation key pairs Key Wrapping Key pair RSA key pairs Create, generation Read Wrap RSA public keys Use Unwrap RSA private keys Use 15 Table 3: Supported Algorithms and Standards Algorithm FIPS Cert Approved Number or allowed Number Block Ciphers DES (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) #272 (for legacy systems) [FIPS 46-3] TDES (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) #276 [FIPS 46-3] DESX (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) AES (ECB, CBC, CFB128, OFB128) #175 [FIPS 197] ARC2 (ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB64) [RFC 2268] Stream Cipher ARC4 Hash Functions SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2] #260 SHA-224 [FIPS 180-2] #260 SHA-256 [FIPS 180-2] #260 SHA-384 [FIPS 180-2] #260 SHA-512 [FIPS 180-2] #260 MD5 [RFC 1321] MD2 [RFC 1115] Message HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS 198] #9 Authentication HMAC-SHA-224 [FIPS 198] #9 HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS 198] #9 HMAC-SHA-384 [FIPS 198] #9 HMAC-SHA-512 [FIPS 198] #9 HMAC-MD5 [RFC 2104] RNG ANSI X9.62 RNG [ANSI X9.62] #25 Digital DSS [FIPS 186-2] #115 Signature ECDSA [FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.62] #1 RSA PKCS1-v1 5 [PKCS #1 v2.1] #20 Key Agreement DH [ANSI X9.42] ECDH [ANSI X9.63] ECMQV [ANSI X9.63] Key Wrapping RSA PKCS1-v1 5 [PKCS #1 v2.1] RSA OAEP [PKCS #1 v2.1] 16 5 Finite State Model The Finite State model contains the following states: Installed/Uninitialized Initialized Self-Test Idle Crypto Officer/User Error The following is the important features of the state transition: 1. When the module is installed by the Crypto Officer, the module is in the Installed/Uninitialized state. 2. When the initialization command is applied to the module, i.e., the module is loaded on the memory, turning to the Initialization state. Then, it transits to the Self-Test state automatically, running the Power-up Tests. While in the Self-Test state, all data output via the data output interface is prohibited. On success the module enters Idle; on failure the module enters Error and the module is disabled. From the Error state the Crypto Officer may need to re-install to attempt correction. 3. From the Idle state (which is only entered if self-tests have succeeded), the module can transit to the Crypto Officer/User state when an API function is called. 4. When the API function has completed successfully, the state transits back to Idle. 5. If the Conditional Test (Continuous RNG Test or Pair-wise Consistency Test) fails, the state transits to Error and the module is disabled. 6. When On-demand Self-test is executed, the module enters the Self-Test state. On success the module enters Idle; on failure the module enters Error and the module is disabled. 17 7. When the de-initialization command is executed, the module goes back to the Installed/Uninitialized state. 18 6 Physical Security Physical security is not applicable to this software module at Level 1 Security. 19 7 Operational Environment This module is to be run in single user mode on the target operating system. For an operating system such as UNIX, Linux or Windows, it must be configured to run in single user mode. Mobile devices running Windows CE or Symbian are single user devices, thus always operate in single user mode. 20 8 Cryptographic Key Management SB FIPS Module provides the underlying functions to support FIPS 140-2 Level 1 key management. The user will select FIPS Approved algorithms and will handle keys with appropriate care to build up a system that complies with FIPS 140-2. It is the Crypto Officer and User's responsibility to select FIPS 140-2 validated algorithms (see Table 3). 8.1 Key Generation SB FIPS Module provides FIPS 140-2 compliant key generation. The underlying random number generation uses a FIPS Approved method, the ANSI X9.62 RNG [4]. 8.2 Key Establishment SB FIPS Module provides the following FIPS Approved or allowed key establish- ment techniques [5]: 1. Diffie-Hellman (DH) 2. EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 3. ECMQV 4. RSA PKCS1-v1 5 5. RSA OAEP The RSA key wrapping techniques above are based on the PKCS #1 v2.1 standard, and are used to transport keys. It is users responsibility to ensure that the appropriate key establishment tech- niques are applied to the appropriate keys. 8.3 Key Entry and Output It is not allowed to import or export keys, including a seed key, and other security sensitive information outside of physical boundary in plaintext format. For key entry and export, users must ensure to deploy appropriate encryption method us- ing FIPS Approved encryption algorithms in SB FIPS Module or any other FIPS validated cryptographic module. 21 8.4 Key Storage SB FIPS Module is a low-level cryptographic toolkit, and as such does not provide key storage. 8.5 Zeroization of Keys SB FIPS Module functions zeroize all intermediate security sensitive material. All CSPs are zeroized when they are no longer needed by calling destroy functions. Destruction of CSP is enforced in a manner such that missed destruction will make SB FIPS Module no longer functional. 22 9 Self-Tests 9.1 Power-up Tests 9.1.1 Tests upon Power-up Self-tests are initiated automatically by the module at start-up. The following tests are applied: 1. Known Answer Tests (KATs): KATs are performed on DES (DES is provided for legacy systems), TDES, AES, SHS, HMAC-SHS, RNG, and RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 Signature Algo- rithm. For DSA and ECDSA, Pair-wise Consistency Test is used. 2. Software Integrity Test: The software integrity test deploys ECDSA signature validation to verify the integrity of the module. 9.1.2 On-Demand Self-Tests On-demand self tests may be invoked by the Cryptographic Officer or User by invoking a function, which is described in the Crypto Officer And User Guide in Appendix A. 9.2 Conditional Tests The Continuous RNG Test is executed on all RNG generated data, examining the first 160 bits of each requested random generation for repetition. This ensures that the RNG is not stuck at any constant value. Also, upon each generation of a RSA, DSA, or ECDSA key pair, the generated key pair is tested of their correctness by generating a signature and verifying the signature on a given message as a Pair-wise Consistency Test. 9.3 Failure of Self-Tests Failure of the Self-tests places the cryptographic module in the Error state, wherein no cryptographic operations can be performed. If any Self-test fails, the crypto- graphic module will output error code. 23 10 Design Assurance 10.1 Configuration Management A configuration management system for the cryptographic module is employed and has been described in a document to the certifying lab. It uses the Concurrent Versioning System (CVS) to track the configurations. 10.2 Delivery and Operation Please refer to Section A.1 of Crypto Officer And User Guide in Appendix A to review the steps necessary for the secure installation and initialization of the cryptographic module. 10.3 Development Detailed design information and procedures have been described in documenta- tion submitted to the certifying laboratory. This toolkit is designed and developed using high level language C, for C and C++ users. The low level language assembly is used to optimize lower level operations. Development for the cryptographic module is carried out in a multi-platform environment. Certicom is using the CVS revision control system to control revi- sions. Development of new versions and major features are performed on a branch of the software, and these branches merged back into the trunk after testing and review, but the branch is maintained to perform post-release maintenance. Releases are tested first in engineering (via an automated daily procedure, the daily build). They are then committed to the product candidate repository. These releases are then sent to the QA department which must run its own tests before they move them into the product branch. Only QA can move candidates into products. Daily the software is built automatically on over 45 platforms (servers to em- bedded devices and PDAs) and the regression tests run. In addition to this, daily integration builds are performed to check the use of the cryptographic library as used in the higher level protocol products. Weekly, code test coverage and code quality tools (purify and insure) are run on the product (these are very extensive tests taking longer than a day to complete). 24 Weekly benchmarks are also automatically performed on a representative subset of devices. 10.4 Guidance Documents Crypto Officer Guide and User Guide are provided in Appendix A. This appendix outlines the operations for Crypto Officer and User to ensure the security of the module. 25 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks SB FIPS Module implements mitigation of the following attacks: 1. Timing attack on RSA 2. Attack on biased private key of DSA 11.1 Timing Attack on RSA When employing Montgomery computations, timing effects allow an attacker to tell when the base of exponentiation is near the secret modulus. This leaks infor- mation concerning the secret modulus. In order to mitigate this attack, the following is executed: The bases of ex- ponentiation are randomized by a novel technique that requires no inversion to remove (unlike other blinding methods e.g. BSAFE Crypto-C User Manual v 4.2). Note that Remote Timing Attacks are Practical: http://crypto.stanford.edu/ dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf 11.2 Attack on Biased Private Key of DSA The standards for choosing ephemeral values in El-Gamal type signatures intro- duce a slight bias. Means to exploit these biases were presented to ANSI by D. Bleichenbacher. In order to mitigate this attack, the following is executed: The bias in the RNG is reduced to levels which are far below the Bleichenbacher attack threshold. Change Notice 1 of FIPS 186-2 is published to mitigate this attack: http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/tkdigsigs.html 26 A Crypto Officer And User Guide A.1 Installation In order to carry out a secure installation of SB FIPS Module, the Crypto Officer must follow the procedure described in this section. A.1.1 Installing The Crypto Officer is responsible for the installation of SB FIPS Module. Only the Crypto Officer is allowed to install the product. The Crypto Officer must have administrative privileges on the computer. Place the shared object, libsbgse2.[so,dll], in an appropriate location on the computer hardware for your development environment. A.1.2 Uninstalling Remove the shared object, libsbgse2.[so,dll], from the computer hard- ware. A.2 Commands A.2.1 Initialization sbg2 FIPS140Initialize() This function runs a series of self-tests on the module. These tests examine the integrity of the shared object, and the correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms. If these tests are successful, a value of SB SUCCESS will be returned and the module will be enabled. A.2.2 De-initialization sbg2 FIPS140Deinitialize() This function de-initializes the module. A.2.3 Self-Tests sbg2 FIPS140RunTest() 27 This function runs a series of self-tests, and return SB SUCCESS if the tests are successful. These tests examine the integrity of the shared object, and the correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms. If these tests fail, the module will be disabled. Section A.3 of this document describes how to recover from the disabled state. A.2.4 Show Status sbg2 FIPS140GetState() This function will return the current state of the module. For more details, refer to sbg2fsm.h. A.3 When Module is Disabled When SB FIPS Module becomes disabled, attempt to bring the module back to the Installed state by calling sb FIPS140Deinitialize(), and then to ini- tialize the module using sb FIPS140Initialize(). If the initialization is successful, the module is recovered. If this attempt fails, uninstall the module and re-install it. If the module is initialized successfully by this re-installation, the re- covery is successful. If this recovery attempt fails, it indicates a fatal error. Please contact Certicom Support immediately. 28