),36 6(&85,7< 32/,&< 1HW6FUHHQ WrvÃ#&" QIÃ("%% SrÃ7 &RS\ULJKW 1RWLFH © Copyright NetScreen Technologies, Inc. 2002 May be reproduced only in its entirety [without revision] vv ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ÃÃÃ ÃUhiyrÃsÃ8r 7DEOH RI &RQWHQWV $ 6FRSH RI 'RFXPHQW %6HFXULW\ /HYHO &5ROHV DQG 6HUYLFHV ',QWHUIDFHV ( 6HWWLQJ ),36 0RGH 2WKHU 3DUDPHWHUV ) ),36 &HUWLILFDWH 9HULILFDWLRQ *&ULWLFDO 6HFXULW\ 3DUDPHWHU &63 'HILQLWLRQV 0DWUL[ &UHDWLRQ RI &ULWLFDO 6HFXULW\ 3DUDPHWHU &63 YHUVXV WKH 6HUYLFHV 5ROHV ,GHQWLW\ *ORVVDU\ ,QGH[ L ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ vvv ÃÃÃ v ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ÃÃÃ $ 6FRSH RI 'RFXPHQW The NetScreen-500 is an Internet security device that integrates firewall, virtual private networking (VPN) and traffic shaping functionalities. Through the VPN, the NetScreen-500 provides the following: · IPSec standard security · Data Encryption Standard (DES), triple-DES and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key management Note: Only DES is used for legacy systems. · Manual and automated IKE (ISAKMP) · Use of RSA and DSA certificates The NetScreen-500 also provides an interface for users to configure or set policies through the console or network ports. The general components of the NetScreen-500 include firmware and hardware. The main hardware components consist of a main processor, memory, flash, ASIC (GigaScreen), 10/100 Mbps ethernet interface, GBIC network interface, console interface, backplane, redundant power supplies and fan tray. The entire case is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the modules. The NetScreen-500's physical configuration is defined as a multi-chip standalone module. % 6HFXULW\ /HYHO The NetScreen-500 meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. 7DEOH 0RGXOH 6HFXULW\ /HYHO 6SHFLILFDWLRQ Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ÃÃÃ 7DEOH 0RGXOH 6HFXULW\ /HYHO 6SHFLILFDWLRQ &RQWLQXHG Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A & 5ROHV DQG 6HUYLFHV TheNetScreen-500 supports five distinct roles: · Cryptographic Officer Role (Root): The module allows one Crypto-Officer. This role is assigned to the first operator who logs on to the module using the default user name and password. Only the Crypto-Officer can create other administrators, and change to FIPS mode. · User Role (Admin): The Admin user can configure specific security policies. These policies provide the module with information on how to operate (for example, configure access policies and VPN encryption with Triple-DES). · Read-Only User Role (Admin): This role can only perform a limited set of services to retrieve information or status. This role cannot perform services to configure the box. · VSYS User Role: This role has the same operations as the User Role above, except that a VSYS user only operates within a particular virtual system. See the NetScreen Concept and Examples ScreenOS Reference Guide for more information about virtual systems. · VSYS Read-Only User Role: This role has the same operations as the Read-Only User Role above, except that a VSYS read-only user only operates within a particular virtual system. See the NetScreen Concept and Examples ScreenOS Reference Guide for more information about virtual systems. The module allows up to 22 concurrent Admin users, either in a User Role or in a Read-Only Role. The root administrator can create a virtual system (vsys) administrator for each vsys, if the device has multiple virtual systems configured. The vsys administrator can function in either the "user" role or "read-only" role. A virtual system is the architecture that enables the device to respond with a different set of configurations for each vsys administrator. Therefore, a single box can appear to be several logical "virtual systems." ! ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ The NetScreen-500 provides the following services: · Clear: Clear dynamic system info · Exec: Exec system commands · Exit: Exit command console · Get: Get system information · Ping: Ping other host · Reset: Reset system · Save: Save command · Set: Configure system parameters · Trace-route: Trace route · Unset: Unconfigure system parameters The NetScreen-500 supports both role-based and identity-based authentication. · Role-based authentication provides a user name and password but the actual authentication occurs at a RADIUS server. Role-based authentication is only available to User Role (Admin). · All other forms of authentication (local database) are classified as identity based. · The module supports identity-based authentication for the Crypto-Officer (local database), the User Role (local database), the Read-Only User Role (Local database), VSYS User Role, and VSYS Read-Only Role User Role. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ " ÃÃÃ ' ,QWHUIDFHV The NetScreen-500 provides a number of interfaces: · LCD and Control Pad: A display with control keys that can be used to perform basic configurations and to view status reports through the LCD and control pad. The LCD displays two lines, each line capable of displaying up to 16 characters. · Two to four network cards. These may be either 10/100 Base T or GBIC interfaces. · HA-1: dedicated RJ-45 used for failover processing. · HA-2: backup dedicated RJ-45 used for failover processing if HA-1 fails. · MGT: dedicated RJ-45 used exclusively for management traffic, such as Telnet, SCS, or HTTP. · Console port: DB9 serial port connector. · Modem port: DB9 serial port connector. Disabled in FIPS mode. · PCMCIA interface for a memory flash card. · Up to two power interfaces. · 22 LED status interfaces: 12 general, 4 interface module, and 6 port LEDs. The following sections describe these LEDs. # ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ ­ Twelve General LEDs: LED Purpose Color Meaning STATUS System status Blinking amber Booting up normally Blinking green Normal operation ALARM System alarm Red Critical alarm - failure of hardware component or software module (such as a cryptographic algorithm) Green No alarm condition present Amber Major alarm: · Low memory (<10% remaining) · High CPU utilization (>90%) · Log memory full · Sessions full · Maximum number of VPN tunnels reached · Firewall attacks detected · HA status changed or redundant group member not found Dark No alarm PWR1 Power Supply #1 Green Power supply #1 is functioning correctly Red Power supply failure, or bay is empty PWR2 Power Supply #2 Green Power supply #1 is functioning correctly Red Power supply failure, or bay is empty FAN Fan status Green All fans functioning properly Red One or more fans failed TEMP Temperature Green Temperature is within safety range Red Outside safety range HA High Availability Green Unit is master Blinking green Redundant group member cannot be found Amber Unit is slave Dark HA not configured FW Firewall alarm Green No alarm attacks Red Firewall alarm/event has occurred ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ $ ÃÃÃ LED Purpose Color Meaning VPN VPN activity Blinking green VPN activity - encrypting/decrypting traffic Blinking yellow VPN drops or denies traffic Red VPN tunnels have reached 90%of the maximum number of simultaneously active IPSec SAs. Dark No VPN defined or no tunnels active SESSION Firewall session Green Sessions are < 70% utilization utilization Yellow Sessions are between 70% and 90% utilization. Red Sessions are >90% utilization. PCMCIA PC card status Green PC card is installed in PCMCIA slot. Blinking green PC card is active Red PC card is >90% full or read/write activity has failed. Dark PCMCIA slot is empty. SHAPE Traffic shaping Green Traffic shaping in operation Blinking green Traffic shaping transmits packets Blinking yellow Traffic shaping drops packets Red Configured guaranteed bandwidth > available interface bandwidth Dark No traffic shaping configured ­ Four module status LEDs: Illuminates green to correspond to the position of the installed interface modules: Green: Card operational Blinking Red: Card failed Dark: No card ­ Six network status LEDs for the MGT, HA-1 and HA-2 ports. Each Ethernet port has two LEDs: the left LED indicates 10Mbps or 100Mbps; the right LED indicates link and network activity. % ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ ( 6HWWLQJ ),36 0RGH By default, on the first power-up, the module is in non-FIPS mode. The commands "get config", or "get system" indicate if the system is in FIPS mode. The module can be set to FIPS mode only through the CLI. To set the module to FIPS mode, execute "set fips-mode enable" through the CLI. Special note for firmware upgrade: if pre-4.0 firmware is upgraded to FIPS version 4.0 or higher, re-enable FIPS mode again by issuing the commands "unset fips- mode enable", "set fips-mode enable", and reboot the device. You must do this even if the device was previously in FIPS mode. This command will perform the following: · Disable administration via SSL · Disable the loading and output of the configuration file from the TFTP server · Disable the Global reporting agent · Disable administration via SNMP · Disable the debug service · Disable the modem port · Enforce HTTP only through VPN with AES encryption · Enforce Telnet only through VPN with AES encryption · Enforce AES for VPN to manual key only, IKE is disabled for AES · Enforce SCS to use only 3DES to manage the box · Disable the MD5 algorithm Execute the "save" command. Execute the "reset" command. Please note the following: · Configure the HA encryption key before using the HA link. · Telnet and HTTP (WEB UI) are allowed only through VPN with AES encryption. · The derivation of keys for ESP-Encryption and ESP-Authentication using a user's password is in non-FIPS mode. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ & ÃÃÃ · User names and passwords are case-sensitive. The password consists of at least six alphanumberic characters. Since there are 26 uppercase letters, 26 lowercase letters, and 10 digits, the total number of available characters is 62. 6 The probability of someone guessing a password is 1/(62 ) = 1/56,800,235,584, which is far less than a 1/1,000,000 random success rate. If three login attempts from the console fail consecutively, the console will be disabled for one minute. If three login attempts from Telnet or the WebUI (through VPN with AES encryption) fail consecutively, any login attempts from that source will be dropped for one minute. · If there are multiple login failure retries within one minute and since the user is locked out after three contiguous login failures, the random success rate for 6 6 6 6 multiple retries is 1/(62 ) + 1/ 62 ) + 1/(62 ) = 3/(62 ), which is far less than 1/100,000. · DSA-signed firmware image cryptographic strength analysis: the firmware is signed by a well-protected DSA private key. The generated signature is attached to the firmware. In order for the device to accept an unauthorized image, the image has to have a correct 40-byte (320-bit) signature. The 320 probability of someone guessing a signature correctly is 1/(2 ), which is far less than 1/1,000,000. · The image download takes at least 23 seconds, so there can be no more than 3 download tries within one minute. Therefore, the random success rate for 320 320 320 320 multiple retries is 1/(2 ) + 1/(2 ) + 1/(2 ) = 3/(2 ), which is far less than 1/100,000. · In order for authentication data to be protected against disclosure, substitution and modification, the administrator password is not echoed during entry. · The NetScreen-500 does not employ a maintenance interface or have a maintenance role. · When in FIPS mode, the NetScreen-500 WebUI only displays options that comply with FIPS regulations. · The output data path is logically disconnected from the circuitry and processes performing key generation, or key zeroization. · The NetScreen-500 provides a Show Status service via the GET service. · The NetScreen-500 cannot be accessed until the initialization process is complete. ' ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ · The NetScreen-500 implements the following power-up self-tests: Device Specific Self-Tests: ­ Boot ROM firmware self-test is via DSA signature ­ SDRAM read/write check ­ ASIC chip test Algorithm Self-Tests: ­ DES, CBC mode, encrypt/decrypt ­ TDES, CBC mode, encrypt/decrypt ­ SHA-1 ­ RSA (encryption and signature) ­ DSA Sign/Verify ­ Exponentiation ­ AES, CBC mode, encrypt/decrypt ­ SHA-1-HMAC ­ Bypass test The NetScreen-500 implements the following conditional tests: ­ PRNG continuous test ­ Hardware RNG test ­ SCS key agreement test ­ DH key agreement test ­ DSA pair-wise consistency test ­ RSA pair-wise consistency test ­ Bypass test ­ Firmware download DSA signature test ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ( ÃÃÃ 2WKHU 3DUDPHWHUV Note the following: · A pair-wise consistency test for the DH, DSA and RSA (encryption and signature) key-pairs is employed. · The firmware can be loaded using the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) or the PCMCIA port, where a firmware load test is performed via a DSA signature. · Keys are generated using a FIPS approved pseudo random number generator per ANSI X9.31, Appendix C. · For every usage of the module's random number generator, a continuous RNG self-test is performed. Note that this is performed on both the FIPS-approved RNG and non-FIPS-approved RNG. · In FIPS mode, only FIPS-approved algorithms are used. · The NetScreen-500 enforces both identity-based and role-based authentication. Based on their identity, the operator assumes the correct role. · Operators must be authenticated using user names and passwords. Authentication will occur locally. The user can be authenticated via a RADIUS server. The RADIUS server provides an external database for user role administrators. The NetScreen-500 acts as a RADIUS proxy, forwarding the authentication request to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server replies with either an accept or reject message. See the log for authenticated logins. The RADIUS shared secret has to be at least 6 characters. · The operator must enter the user name and password. All logins through a TCP connection disconnect after three consecutive login failures, and an alarm is logged. · A separate session is assigned to each successful administrator login. · The password is not echoed during the administrator login. · SCS uses 3DES encryption only. · The first time an operator logs on to the module, the operator uses the default user name and password which is "netscreen", "netscreen". This user is assigned the Crypto-Officer role. · The Crypto-Officer is provided with the same set of services as the user with four additional services: (1) "set admin" and "unset admin". These two services allow the Crypto-Officer to create a new user, change a current user's user name and password, or delete an existing user. (2) "set fips enable" and "unset ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ fips enable". These two services allow the Crypto-Officer to switch between FIPS mode and default mode. · HTTP can come through the VPN only with AES encryption. The default page timeout is set to 10 minutes; this is user configurable. The maximum number of HTTP connections, i.e., the maximum number of concurrent WebUI logins depends on how many TCP sockets are currently available in the system. The maximum number of available TCP sockets is 2048. This number is shared with other TCP connections. · Telnet can come through the VPN with AES encryption only. · There are a maximum of 22 sessions shared between Telnet and SCS. · Upon a telnet or console login failure, the next prompt will not come up for an estimated 5 seconds. · The NetScreen-500's chips are production-grade quality and include standard passivation techniques. · The NetScreen-500 is contained within a metal production-grade enclosure. Figure 1 Front of the NetScreen-500 Device · The enclosures are opaque to visible spectrum radiation. · The enclosure includes a removable cover and is protected by a tamper ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ÃÃÃ evident seal. The location of the tamper evident seal is shown in Figure 2. Tamper-Evident Seal Figure 2 Tamper Evident Seal · The source code is annotated with detailed comments. · Ninety-two percent of the software within a cryptographic module is implemented using a high-level language (C); 5% is written in assembly due to performance issues; and 3% are WEB page files such as HTML and GIF for the WebUI. · The Netscreen-500 does not use third party applications. · The NetScreen-500 generates an Initial Vector (IV) using a FIPS approved pseudo random number generator for the beginning of a session. The IV is incremented by one for each packet belonging to this session. · IKE, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and RSA encryption are employed for public key- based key distribution techniques, which are commercially available public key methods. · The policy is associated with keys located in the modules. The private/public key pair of the module is located at a certain and exact memory location of the flash. · All keys are stored in plain text. · All keys and unprotected security parameters can be zeroized through the Unset and Clear commands, except the RNG key. · The NetScreen-500 does not perform key archiving. ! ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ · The NetScreen-500 includes the following algorithms: ­ FIPS Approved: DSA/SHA1 TDES (CBC) DES (CBC) AES (CBC) SHA-1-HMAC RSA Sign/Verify (PKCS #1) RSA Encrypt/Decrypt (used for key wrapping only) ­ Non-FIPS Approved: MD5 DH · The NetScreen-500 conforms to FCC part 15, class A. · On failure of any power-up self-test, the module enters and stays in either the Algorithm Error State, or Device specific error state, depending on the self- test failure. The console displays error messages and the status LED flashes red. It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to return the module to NetScreen Technologies, Inc. for further analysis. · On failure of any conditional test, the module enters and stays in a permanent error state, depending on the type of failure: Bypass test failure, SCS key agreement test failure, DH key agreement test failure, DSA pair-wise test failure, or RSA pair-wise agreement test failure. The console displays error messages and the status LED flashes red. It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to return the module to NetScreen Technologies, Inc. for further analysis. · On power down, previous authentications are erased from memory and need to be re-authenticated again on power-up. · Bypass tests are performed at power-up, and as a conditional test. Bypass state occurs when the administrator configures the box with a non-VPN policy and traffic matching this policy arrives at the network port. The bypass enabled status can be found by retrieving the entire policy list. Two internal actions must exist in order for bypass to happen: (1) a non-VPN policy is matched for this traffic, and (2) a routing table entry exists for the traffic that matches this non-VPN policy. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ " ÃÃÃ · In FIPS mode, SCS can use 3DES only to encrypt/decrypt commands. Also if the command from SCS is to set or get the AES manual key, it will fail and a message is logged. · VPN with AES encryption is manual key only. In other words, IKE is disabled for the VPN using AES. · HA traffic encryption is 256 bit AES. · If the VPN uses 3DES Encryption, the key exchange protocol IKE is enforced to use group 5 only. # ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ ) ),36 &HUWLILFDWH 9HULILFDWLRQ In FIPS mode, during the loading of the X509 certificate, if the signing CA certificate cannot be found in the NetScreen-500, the following message is displayed on the console: Please contact your CA's administrator to verify the following finger print (in HEX) of the CA cert... xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx Do you want to accept this certificate y/[n]? Where x is one of (0, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,A,B,C,D,E,F). Based on the result of the CA certificate fingerprint checking, the Crypto Officer accepts or denies the loaded certificates. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ $ ÃÃÃ * &ULWLFDO 6HFXULW\ 3DUDPHWHU &63 'HILQLWLRQV Below is a list of Critical Security Parameter (CSP) definitions: · IPSEC Manual Key: DES, TDES, and AES for user traffic encryption. It is from user input. · IPSEC Session Key: DES, TDES, and AES for user traffic encryption. It is generated by the IKE key exchange. · IKE Pre-Shared Key:User input data to generate IKE session key and SHA-1- HMAC key. · IKE Session Key: DES, TDES, AES for peer-to-peer IKE message encryption. · User Name and Password: Crypto-Officer and Users' user names and passwords. · SCS Server/Host Key: RSA keypairs used in secure command shell (equivalent to SSH). · SCS Session Key: Encryption key to encrypt telnet commands by using 3DES only. · DSA Public Key: Firmware-download authentication key. · HA Key: AES Encryption key for HA data. · IKE DSA Key: DSA key pair used in IKE identity authentication. · IKE RSA Key: RSA key pair used in IKE identity authentication. · PRNG Algorithm Key: ANSI X9.31 algorithm key required to generate pseudo-random numbers. These items are stored in volatile RAM and in non- volatile flash memory. · SHA-1-HMAC Key: IPSEC authentication key between end users, and IKE authentication between two peers. % ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ 0DWUL[ &UHDWLRQ RI &ULWLFDO 6HFXULW\ 3DUDPHWHU &63 YHUVXV WKH 6HUYLFHV 5ROHV ,GHQWLW\ The following matrix defines the set of services to the CSPs of the module, providing information on generation, destruction and usage. It also correlates the User roles and the Crypto-Officer roles to the set of services to which they have privileges. The matrices use the following convention: · G: Generate · D: Delete · U: Usage · N/A: Not Available &U\SWR2IILFHU CSP \ Services Set Unset Clear Get Exec Save Ping Reset Exit Trace -route IPSEC Manual Key G D N/A U N/A U N/A N/A N/A N/A IPSEC Session Key G D N/A U N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A IKE Pre-shared Key G D N/A U G U N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE Session Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A a b User Name G D N/A U N/A U N/A N/A N/A N/A and Password SCS Server/Host Key G D D U G U N/A D N/A N/A (Server Key) SCS Session Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A DSA Public Key N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A HA Key G D N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE DSA Key N/A D N/A N/A G,D,U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE RSA Key N/A D N/A N/A G,D,U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PRNG Algorithm Key N/A N/A N/A N/A G,U N/A N/A D N/A N/A SHA-1-HMAC Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A a.The Crypto-Officer is authorized to change all authorized operators' user names and passwords, but the user is only allowed to change his/her own user name and password b.The Crypto-Officer is authorized to remove all authorized operators. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ & ÃÃÃ 8VHU DQG 96<6 8VHU CSP \ Services Set Unset Clear Get Exec Save Ping Reset Exit Trace -route IPSEC Manual Key G D N/A U N/A U N/A N/A N/A N/A IPSEC Session G D N/A U N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A Key IKE Pre-shared G D N/A U G U N/A N/A N/A N/A Key IKE Session Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A a User Name G N/A N/A U N/A U N/A N/A N/A N/A and Password SCS Server/Host G D D U G U N/A D N/A N/A Key (Server Key) SCS Session Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A DSA Public Key N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A HA Key G D N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE DSA Key N/A D N/A N/A G,D,U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE RSA Key N/A D N/A N/A G,D,U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PRNG Algorithm N/A N/A N/A N/A G,U N/A N/A D N/A N/A Key SHA-1-HMAC Key N/A N/A D N/A N/A N/A N/A D N/A N/A a.The Crypto-Officer is authorized to change all authorized operators' user names and passwords, but the user is only allowed to change his/her own user name and password. ' ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ 5HDG2QO\ 8VHU DQG 96<6 5HDG2QO\ 8VHU CSP \ Services Get Ping Exit Trace- route IPSEC Manual Key U N/A N/A N/A IPSEC Session Key U N/A N/A N/A IKE Pre-shared Key U N/A N/A N/A IKE Session Key N/A N/A N/A N/A User Name and Password U N/A N/A N/A SCS Server/Host Key U N/A N/A N/A SCS Session Key N/A N/A N/A N/A DSA Public Key N/A N/A N/A N/A HA Key N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE DSA Key N/A N/A N/A N/A IKE RSA Key N/A N/A N/A N/A PRNG Algorithm Key N/A N/A N/A N/A SHA-1-HMAC Key N/A N/A N/A N/A ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ( ÃÃÃ ! ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ÃÃÃ *ORVVDU\ Authentication Header (AH). See ESP/AH. Authentication. Administrator authentication ensures the user identity by validating user name and password. Data authentication ensures data is from a legitimate source, and its content has not been altered. The algorithms used in data authentication include DSA signature check in the firmware download or IKE exchange, and the keyed hash algorithm SHA-1-HMAC used in IKE exchange or IPSEC data integrity check. CLI. The command line interface. DNS. The Domain Name System maps domain names to IP addresses. DHCP. The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol used to dynamically assign IP addresses to networked computers. ESP/AH. The IP level security headers, AH and ESP, were originally proposed by the Network Working Group focused on IP security mechanisms, IPSec. The term IPSec is used loosely here to refer to packets, keys, and routes that are associated with these headers. The IP Authentication Header (AH) is used to provide authentication. The IP Encapsulating Security Header (ESP) is used to provide confidentiality to IP datagrams. GBIC. A Gigabit Interface Connector (GBIC) is the kind of interface module card used on the NetScreen-500 for connecting to a fiber optic network. Internet Key Exchange (IKE). The method for exchanging keys for encryption and authentication over an unsecured medium, such as the Internet. Internet Protocol (IP). An Internet standard protocol that defines a basic unit of data called a datagram. A datagram is used in a connectionless, best-effort, delivery system. The Internet protocol defines how information gets passed between systems across the Internet. IP Security (IPSec). Security standard produced by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It is a protocol suite that provides everything you need for secure communications--authentication, integrity, and confidentiality--and makes key exchange practical even in larger networks. See also DES-CBC, ESP/ AH. ISAKMP. The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) provides a framework for Internet key management and provides the specific protocol support for negotiation of security attributes. By itself, it does not establish session keys, however it can be used with various session key establishment protocols to provide a complete solution to Internet key management. ADQTÃ #!ÃTrpvÃQyvpÃÃIrTprr$ ! ÃÃÃ MD5. Message Digest (version) 5, an algorithm that produces a 128-bit message digest (or hash) from a message of arbitrary length. The resulting hash is used, like a "fingerprint" of the input, to verify authenticity. RADIUS. Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service is a service for authenticating and authorizing dialup users. SCS. Secured Command Shell, using SSH to encrypt telnet traffic. SHA-1. Secure Hash Algorithm-1, an algorithm that produces a 160-bit hash from a message of arbitrary length. (It is generally regarded as more secure than MD5 because of the larger hashes it produces.) Virtual System. A feature unique to NetScreen systems (not appliances), a Virtual System is a subdivision of the main system that appears to the user to be a stand-alone entity. Virtual Systems reside separately from each other in the same NetScreen device. Each one can be managed by its own Virtual System Administrator. !! 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