FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module Version 1.0.1 By Cohesity, Inc. May 5, 2016 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy References Reference Full Specification Name [ANS X9.31] Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA) [FIPS 140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001 [FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard [FIPS 186-4] Digital Signature Standard [FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard [FIPS 198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [SP 800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication [SP 800-38C] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality [SP 800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC [SP 800-56A] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP 800- Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher 67R1] [SP 800-89] Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit [SP 800-90A] Generators [SP 800- Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key 131A] Lengths 2 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Table of Contents 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4 2 Tested Configurations .................................................................................................. 6 3 Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................... 7 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality ................................................. 8 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys ................................................................... 14 5 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 14 6 Self-test ....................................................................................................................... 16 7 Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 18 8 Mitigation of other Attacks.......................................................................................... 19 Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance ................................................................. 20 Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint ....................................................... 23 3 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 1 Introduction This document is the security policy for the Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module, hereafter referred to as the Module. The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object module file named fipscanister.o (Linux® 1.The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services). The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Security Requirement Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security NA Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks NA Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements The Module’s software version for this validation is 1.0.1. 1 Linux is registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. 4 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Figure 1 - Module Block Diagram 5 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 2 Tested Configurations Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module has been validated on the following platforms and no claims can be made as to correct operation of the Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module or the security strengths of the generated keys when operating on a platform that is not listed on the validation certificate: # Operational Environment Processor Optimiz- EC B ations (Target) 1 CentOS 7.2 Intel Xeon E5-2630 (x86) None P U2 Table 2 - Tested Configurations (B = Build Method; EC = Elliptic Curve Support). The EC column indicates support for prime curve only (P). In addition to the validation, the Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module has been tested by Cohesity Inc. on the following platforms: • CentoOS 7.x (x86) –g++ The Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module has also been tested on the following hardware configurations • CS2500 (Intel Xeon E5-2630 (x86)) • CS2300 (Intel Xeon E5-2630 (x86)) See Appendix A for additional information on build method and optimizations. 6 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 3 Ports and Interfaces The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API). Logical interface type Description Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters Data input API entry point data input stack parameters Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters Data output API entry point data output stack parameters Table 3 - Logical interfaces As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned). 7 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and Non-approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Function Algorithm Options Cert # Random Number [SP 800-90A] DRBG 3 Hash DRBG Generation; 1162 Prediction resistance HMAC DRBG Symmetric key generation 2 supported for all variations CTR DRBG (AES) [SP 800-67R1] 3-Key Triple-DES TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; 2176 CMAC generate and verify Encryption, [FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8, 3967 Decryption and CFB 128, CTR, CCM; GCM; CMAC CMAC [SP 800-38B] CMAC generate and verify [SP 800-38C] CCM [SP 800-38D] GCM 4 128/256 XTS [SP 800-38E] XTS Message Digests [FIPS 180-4] SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 3271 [FIPS 198-1] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 2585 Keyed Hash [FIPS 186-2] RSA Digital Signature and GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, 2027 Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS (2048/3072/4096 with all SHA-2 Generation2 sizes) SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS (1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA-2 sizes) [FIPS 186-4] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen (2048/3072 with all 1081 SHA-2 sizes) Sig Gen (2048/3072 with SHA1 and all SHA-2 sizes) PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024/2048/3072 with SHA1 and all SHA-2 sizes) 2 Keys/CSPs generated in FIPS mode cannot be used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa. 3 For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800-90A] and [SP800-57]. 4 The module’s AES GCM implementation meets IG A.5. The IV is generated deterministically, as per the guidance in SP800-38D section 8.2.1. 8 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 - 873 521 ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates ) PKV: CURVES( ALL-P) SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)) SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P- 256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA- 1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512)) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST defined P curves except sizes 163 and CVL 192 Cert.# 796 ECC CDH (KAS) Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. The Module supports one operational environment configurations for elliptic curve; NIST prime curve only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P"). 9 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Category Algorithm Description Key Agreement EC DH Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all NIST defined P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module. Key Encryption, RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B Decryption compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services. Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions The Module implements the following services which are Non-Approved per the SP 800-131A transition: Function Algorithm Options [ANS X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256 Random Number Generation; Symmetric key generation [SP 800-90A] DRBG Dual EC DRBG Random Number (note the Dual EC DRBG algorithm shall not be Generation; used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation) Symmetric key generation [FIPS 186-2] RSA Digital Signature and GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS (1024/1536 with all SHA sizes, Generation 5 2048/3072/4096 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-2] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-4] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-2] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-192) SIG(gen): CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521) [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-192) SigGen: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224:(SHA-1) P-256:(SHA-1) P-384: (SHA-1) P-521:(SHA-1)) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) NIST Recommended P curves sizes 163 ECC CDH (CVL) and 192 Table 4c – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions 5 Keys/CSPs generated in FIPS mode cannot be used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa 10 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy X9.31 RNG is Non-Approved effective December 31, 2015, per the CMVP Notice "X9.31 RNG transition, December 31, 2015". These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. EC DH Key Agreement provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. RSA Key Wrapping provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes FIPS_mode_set() 6, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If FIPS_mode_set() fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed. The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-3 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process. 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures. CSP Name Description RSA SGK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature generation key RSA KDK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key DSA SGK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature generation key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature generation key ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined P curves) signature generation key EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined P curves) private key agreement key. AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key AES GCM AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key Triple-DES EDK Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key Triple-DES CMAC Triple-DES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512) Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) 6 The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the FIPS_mode_set() wrapper function. 11 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CO-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication User-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed. The module does not output intermediate key generation values. CSP Name Description RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key RSA KEK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key DSA SVK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature verification key ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST P curves) signature verification key EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined P curves) public key agreement key. Table 4.1b – Public Keys For all CSPs and Public Keys: Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of DRBG state values used for the Modules' default key generation service. Generation: The Module implements SP 800-90A compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module. Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary. Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary. Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys 12 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and Table 4 (Dual_EC_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. 13 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 5 Roles, Authentication and Services The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed passing the appropriate password to the FIPS_module_mode_set() function. The password values may be specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password. Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed. Since minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of 1/25616, or less than 1/1038. The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time. Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module. • User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. • Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API functions. All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access. Service Role Description Initialize User, CO Module initialization. Does not access CSPs. Self-test User, CO Perform self tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs. Functions that provide module status information: • Version (as unsigned long or const char *) Show status User, CO • FIPS Mode (Boolean) Does not access CSPs. Functions that destroy CSPs: • fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs Zeroize User, CO (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs) All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application. Used for random number and symmetric key generation. • Random Seed or reseed a DRBG instance • User, CO number Determine security strength of a DRBG instance • generation Obtain random data Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs. 14 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Service Role Description Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys: Asymmetric RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK User, CO key generation There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP800-90A Used to encrypt or decrypt data. Symmetric User, CO encrypt/decrypt Executes using AES EDK, Triple-DES EDK (passed in by the calling process). Symmetric Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. User, CO digest Executes using AES CMAC, Triple-DES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Message digest User, CO Does not access CSPs. Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Keyed Hash User, CO Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process). Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not Key transport 7 establish keys into the module). User, CO Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process). Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not Key agreement User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Digital User, CO Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, signature ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process). Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs. Table 5 - Services and CSP Access 7 “Key transport” can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to the Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module. 15 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 6 Self-test The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test. Algorithm Type Test Attributes Software integrity KAT HMAC-SHA1 HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements. AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or XTS-AES the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256) AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths Triple-DES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key Triple-DES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1 DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384 DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA256 Dual_EC_DRBG: P-256 and SHA256 PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. The K-233 self-test is not ECDSA performed for operational environments that support prime curve only (see Table 2). ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6 Table 6a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test) The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for the target system. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CMT Laboratory and listed in Appendix A is verified during installation of the Module file as described in Appendix A. The FIPS_mode_set()8 function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set() 8 succeeds. The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which 8 FIPS_mode_set() calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() 16 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the calling application. The Module also implements the following conditional tests: Algorithm Test DRBG Tested as required by [SP800-90A] Section 11 DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair Table 6b - Conditional Tests In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re- instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90A]; this is not something the Module can do itself. Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt. The Module supports two operational environment configurations for elliptic curve: NIST prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") and all NIST defined curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP"). 17 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 7 Operational Environment The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation. 18 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 8 Mitigation of other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2 19 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance The test platforms represent different combinations of installation instructions. For each platform there is a build system, the host providing the build environment in which the installation instructions are executed, and a target system on which the generated object code is executed. The build and target systems may be the same type of system or even the same device, or may be different systems – the Module supports cross-compilation environments. Each of these command sets are relative to the top of the directory containing the uncompressed and expanded contents of the distribution files openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz (NIST prime curves only as listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P"). The command sets are: U1: ./config no-asm make make install U2: ./config make make install W1: ms\do_fips no-asm W2: ms\do_fips Installation instructions 1. Download and copy the distribution file to the build system. These files can be downloaded from http://www.openssl.org/source/. 2. Verify the HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the distribution file; see Appendix B. An independently acquired FIPS 140-2 validated implementation of SHA-1 HMAC must be used for this digest verification. Note that this verification can be performed on any convenient system and not necessarily on the specific build or target system. Alternatively, a copy of the distribution on physical media can be obtained from OSF 9. 9 For some prospective users the acquisition, installation, and configuration of a suitable FIPS 140-2 validated product may not be convenient. OSF will on request mail a CD containing the source code distribution, via USPS or international post. A distribution file received by that means need not be verified by a FIPS 140-2 validated implementation of HMAC-SHA-1. For instructions on requesting this CD see http://openssl.com/fips/verify.html. 20 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 3. Unpack the distribution gunzip -c openssl-fips-2.0.12.tar.gz | tar xf - cd openssl-fips-2.0.12 or gunzip -c openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz | tar xf - cd openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12 4. Execute one of the installation command sets U1, W1, U2, W2 as shown above. No other command sets shall be used. 5. The resulting fipscanister.o or fipscanister.lib file is now available for use. 6. The calling application enables FIPS mode by calling the FIPS_mode_set() 10 function. Note that failure to use one of the specified commands sets exactly as shown will result in a module that cannot be considered compliant with FIPS 140-2. Linking the Runtime Executable Application Note that applications interfacing with the FIPS Object Module are outside of the cryptographic boundary. When linking the application with the FIPS Object Module two steps are necessary: 1. The HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the FIPS Object Module file must be calculated and verified against the installed digest to ensure the integrity of the FIPS object module. 2. A HMAC-SHA1 digest of the FIPS Object Module must be generated and embedded in the FIPS Object Module for use by the FIPS_mode_set()10 function at runtime initialization. The fips_standalone_sha1 command can be used to perform the verification of the FIPS Object Module and to generate the new HMAC-SHA-1 digest for the runtime executable application. Failure to embed the digest in the executable object will prevent initialization of FIPS mode. At runtime the FIPS_mode_set()9 function compares the embedded HMAC-SHA-1 digest with a digest generated from the FIPS Object Module object code. This digest is the final link in the chain of validation from the original source to the runtime executable application file. Optimization The “asm” designation means that assembler language optimizations were enabled when the binary code was built, “no-asm” means that only C language code was compiled. For OpenSSL with x86 there are three possible optimization levels: 10 FIPS_mode_set() calls the Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() 21 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy 1. No optimization (plain C) 2. SSE2 optimization 3. AES-NI+PCLMULQDQ+SSSE3 optimization Other theoretically possible combinations (e.g. AES-NI only, or SSE3 only) are not addressed individually, so that a processor, which does not support all three of AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, and SSSE3 will fall back to SSE2 optimization. For more information, see: • http://www.intel.com/support/processors/sb/CS-030123.htm?wapkw=sse2 • https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/256280 For OpenSSL with ARM there are two possible optimization levels: 1. Without NEON 2. With NEON (ARM7 only) For more information, see http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/neon.php 22 FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint The Cohesity OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v1.0.1 is rebranding of OpenSSL FIPS Object Module SE v.2.0.12, which consists of the FIPS Object Module (the fipscanister.o or fipscanister.lib contiguous unit of binary object code) generated from the specific source files. For NIST prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") the source files are in the specific special OpenSSL distribution openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz with HMAC-SHA-1 digest of 3da3e6d610378ad4b6ee2638a141c17cb3a2aabf located at http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz. Note this is from the previous revision of the FIPS Object Module as no modifications relevant to NIST prime curves only were introduced in revision 2.0.12. The set of files specified in this tar file constitutes the complete set of source files of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build. The OpenSSL distribution tar file (and patch file if used) shall be verified using the above HMAC- SHA-1 digest(s). The arbitrary 16 byte key of: 65 74 61 6f 6e 72 69 73 68 64 6c 63 75 70 66 6d (equivalent to the ASCII string "etaonrishdlcupfm") is used to generate the HMAC-SHA-1 value for the FIPS Object Module integrity check. The functionality of all earlier revisions of the FIPS Object Module are subsumed by this latest revision, so there is no reason to use older revisions for any new deployments. However, older revisions remain valid. The source distribution files and corresponding HMAC-SHA-1 digests are listed below: openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.11.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.11.tar.gz Digest: 571662bb0e413bd42f612c695c0b76deb2e9b33e openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz Digest: 02cc9ddfffb2e917d1cdc9ebc97a9731c40f6394 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz Digest: 91d267688713c920f85bc5e69c8b5d34e1112672 23