Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Version 2.0.10 Cellcrypt FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version 2.0.10 March 1, 2016 Copyright Notice Copyright © Cellcrypt, 2016. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision. Trademarks featured or referred to within this Cellcrypt document are the property of their respective trademark holders. Such use of non-Cellcrypt trademarks is intended for reference of identification purposes only and does not indicate affiliation, sponsorship or endorsement of Cellcrypt or any Cellcrypt products and service. Acknowledgements Cellcrypt acknowledges that this document was derived from the OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 Security Policy document version 2.0.10 from the CMVP FIPS validation certificate #1747. Page 2 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy Modification History 2016-01-28 Initial draft. 2016-02-29 Modified to match current Security Policy for OpenSSL Cert. #1747 Page 3 of 30 References Reference Full Specification Name [ANS X9.31] Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA) [FIPS 140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001 [FIPS 180-3] Secure Hash Standard [FIPS 186-4] Digital Signature Standard [FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard [FIPS 198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [SP 800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication [SP 800-38C] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality [SP 800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC [SP 800-56A] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP 800-67R1] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher [SP 800-89] Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications [SP 800-90] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators [SP 800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths Page 4 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6  ......................................................................................................................................................... 7  2. Tested Configurations ................................................................................................................. 8  3. Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................... 10  4. Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................. 11  4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys .................................................................... 15  5. Roles, Authentication and Services........................................................................................... 18  6. Self-test ..................................................................................................................................... 20  7. Operational Environment .......................................................................................................... 22  8. Mitigation of other Attacks ....................................................................................................... 23  Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance .............................................................................. 24  Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint .................................................................. 26  Appendix C Compilers ................................................................................................................. 29  Page 5 of 30 1 Introduction This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module (SCoreV3), hereafter referred to as the Module. The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object module file named fipscanister.o (Linux®1/Unix®2) or fipscanister.lib (Microsoft Windows®3). The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services). Note that the Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Version 2.0.10 is fully backwards compatible with all earlier revisions of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0. The v2.0.10 Module incorporates support for new platforms without disturbing functionality for any previously tested platforms. The v2.0.10 Module can be used in any environment supported by the earlier revisions of the Module, and those earlier revisions remain valid. The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Security Requirement Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security NA Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks NA Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements                                                         1 Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. 2 UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group 3 Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries. Page 6 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy   The Module’s software version for this validation is 2.0.10. The v2.0.10 Module incorporates changes from the v2.0 module to support additional platforms. The v2.0.10 Module can be used in all the environments supported by the earlier v2.0, v2.0.1, v2.0.2, v2.0.3, v2.0.4, v2.0.5, v2.0.6, v2.0.7, v2.0.8 and v2.0.9 revisions of the Module. Note, the v2.0.6 Module revision only incorporates changes from the v2.0 module to completely remove the Dual EC DRBG algorithm. All revisions prior to v2.0.8 that are not v2.0.6, in particular v2.0.7, still contain the Dual EC DRBG algorithm. The v2.0.8 revision again removes Dual EC DRBG that was restored in 2.0.7, and it will remain absent from all future revisions. The Dual EC DRBG algorithm shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation Figure 1 - Module Block Diagram Page 7 of 30 2 Tested Configurations # Operational Environment Processor EC B Optimiz- ations (Target) 1 Microsoft Windows 7 32 bit Intel Celeron (x86) None BKP W2 2 Fedora 14 Intel Core i5 (x86) AES-NI BKP U2 3 Microsoft Windows 7 64 bit Intel Pentium 4 (x86) None BKP W2 4 Windows 7 64-bit Intel Core i5-2430M (x86) AES-NI BKP W2 5 Apple OS X 10.7 Intel Core i7-3615QM None BKP U2 6 Ubuntu 13.04 AM335x Cortex-A8 (ARMv7) None BKP U2 7 Ubuntu 13.04 AM335x Cortex-A8 (ARMv7) NEON BKP U2 8 Linux 3.8 ARM926 (ARMv5TEJ) None BKP U2 9 Linux 3.4 under Citrix XenServer 6.2 None BKP U2 Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 10 Linux 3.4 under Citrix XenServer 6.2 AES-NI BKP U2 Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 11 Linux 3.4 under VMware ESXi 5.1 None BKP U2 Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 12 Linux 3.4 under VMware ESXi 5.1 AES-NI BKP U2 Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 13 None BKP U2 Linux 3.4 under Microsoft Windows Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 2012 Hyper-V 14 AES-NI BKP U2 Linux 3.4 under Microsoft Windows Intel Xeon E5-2430L (x86) 2012 Hyper-V 15 FreeBSD 10.0 Xeon E5-2430L (x86) None BKP U2 16 FreeBSD 10.0 Xeon E5-2430L (x86) AES-NI BKP U2 17 Apple iOS 7.1 64-bit on ARMv8 Apple A7 (ARMv8) None BKP U2 18 Apple iOS 7.1 64-bit on ARMv8 Apple A7 (ARMv8) NEON BKP U2 19 iOS 8.1 64-bit Apple A7 (ARMv8) None BKP U2 NEON 20 iOS 8.1 64-bit Apple A7 (ARMv8) BKP U2 and Crypto Extensions 21 iOS 8.1 32-bit Apple A7 (ARMv8) None BKP U2 22 iOS 8.1 32-bit Apple A7 (ARMv8) NEON BKP U2 23 Android 5.0 32-bit Qualcomm APQ8084 (ARMv7) None BKP U2 24 Android 5.0 32-bit Qualcomm APQ8084 (ARMv7) NEON BKP U2 25 Android 5.0 64-bit SAMSUNG Exynos7420 None BKP U2 (ARMv8) Page 8 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy NEON 26 Android 5.0 64-bit SAMSUNG Exynos7420 BKP U2 and (ARMv8) Crypto Extensions Table 2 - Tested Configurations (B = Build Method; EC = Elliptic Curve Support). The EC column indicates support for all NIST defined B, K, and P curves (BKP). See Appendix A for additional information on build method and optimizations. See Appendix C for a list of the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective operational environments. Page 9 of 30 3 Ports and Interfaces The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API). Logical interface type Description Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters Data input API entry point data input stack parameters Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters Data output API entry point data output stack parameters Table 3 - Logical interfaces As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned). Page 10 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and Non-approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Function Algorithm Options Cert # Random Number [SP 800-90] DRBG4 Generation; Hash DRBG 157, Symmetric key Prediction resistance HMAC DRBG, no reseed 229, generation supported for all variations CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function 264, 292, 316, 342, 485, 540, 607, 723 [SP 800-67] 3-Key TDES TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; 1223, CMAC generate and verify 1346, 1398, 1465, 1492, 1522, 1695, 1742, 1780, Encryption, 1853 Decryption and [FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8, 1884, CMAC CFB 128, CTR, XTS; CCM; GCM; CMAC 2116, [SP 800-38B] CMAC generate and verify  2234, [SP 800-38C] CCM 2342, [SP 800-38D] GCM 2394, [SP 800-38E] XTS 2484, 2824, 2929, 3090, 3264 Message Digests [FIPS 180-3] SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1655, 1840, 1923, 2019, 2056, 2102, 2368, 2465, 2553, 2702                                                         4 For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800-90] and [SP800-57]. Page 11 of 30 [FIPS 198] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1126, 1288, 1363, 1451, 1485, Keyed Hash 1526, 1768, 1856, 1937, 2063 Digital Signature and [FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, 960, Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS, SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, 1086, Generation SigVerPSS (2048/3072/4096 with all SHA-2 1145, sizes) 1205, 1273, 1477, 1535, 1581, 1664 [FIPS 186-4] DSA PQG Gen, PQG Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen, Sig 589, Ver (1024/2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes) 661, 693, 734, 748, 764, 853, 870, 896, 933 [FIPS 186-2] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-384 P-521 K-233 K- 270, 283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571 ) 315, PKV: CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P- 347, 521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B- 383, 233 B-283 B-409 B-571 ) 394, 413, 496, 528, 558, 620 PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-384 P-521 ) 264, PKV: CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P- 378 521 ) Page 12 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K- 270, 224 K-256 K-384 K-521 B-224 B-256 B-384 B- 315, 521 ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates ) 347, PKV: CURVES( ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B ) 383, SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 394, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: 413, (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 496, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 528, 512) K-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: 558, (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-224, 620 256, 384, 512) B-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA- 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) ) SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P- 256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA- 1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B- 233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA- 1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) ) PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 ) 264, PKV: CURVES( ALL-P ) 378 SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) ) SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P- 256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA- 1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) ) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST defined B, K and P curves except sizes 12, 24, 163 and 192 36, 53, 71, 85, 260, 331, ECC CDH (KAS) 372, 472 All NIST defined P curves 10, 49 Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. The Module supports one operational environment configuration for elliptic curve. All NIST defined curves listed in Table 2 with the EC column are marked "BKP". Page 13 of 30   Category  Algorithm Description Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all Key Agreement EC DH NIST defined B, K and P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module. The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for Key Encryption, RSA encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B Decryption compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services. Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions The Module implements the following services which are Non-Approved per the SP 800-131A transition: Cert Function Algorithm Options # Random Number [ANS X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256   Generation; Symmetric key generation [SP 800-90] DRBG Dual EC DRBG (note the Dual EC DRBG algorithm shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation) Digital Signature and [FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS (1024/1536 with all SHA sizes, Generation 2048/3072/4096 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-2] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-4] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1) [FIPS 186-2] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-192 K-163 B-163 ) SIG(gen): CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571 ) [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-192 K-163 B-163 ) SigGen: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224:(SHA-1) P-256:(SHA-1) P- 384:(SHA-1) P-521:(SHA-1) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233:(SHA-1) K- 283:(SHA-1) K-409:(SHA-1) K-571:(SHA-1) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B- 233:(SHA-1) B-283:(SHA-1) B-409:(SHA-1) B- 571:(SHA-1) ) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves sizes ECC CDH (CVL) 163 and 192 Table 4c – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions X9.31 RNG is NonApproved effective December 31, 2015, per the CMVP Notice "X9.31 RNG transition, December 31, 2015”. These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.  Page 14 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy EC DH Key Agreement provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. RSA Key Wrapping provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength.  The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes FIPS_mode_set()5, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If FIPS_mode_set() fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed.  The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-3 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process. 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures. CSP Name Description RSA SGK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature generation key RSA KDK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key DSA SGK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature generation key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature generation key ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature generation key EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key. AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key AES GCM AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key TDES EDK TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key TDES CMAC TDES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512) Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CO-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication User-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed.                                                         5 The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the FIPS_mode_set() wrapper function. Page 15 of 30 The module does not output intermediate key generation values. CSP Name Description RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key RSA KEK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key DSA SVK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature verification key ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key. Table 4.1b – Public Keys For all CSPs and Public Keys: Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores RNG and DRBG state values for the lifetime of the RNG or DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of RNG and DRBG state values used for the Modules' default key generation service.  Generation: The Module implements ANSI X9.31 compliant RNG and SP 800-90 compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module.  Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.  Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary.  Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module.  Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism: as shown in [SP 800-90] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength Page 16 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy cannot be met.  Page 17 of 30 5 Roles, Authentication and Services The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed by passing the appropriate password to the FIPS_module_mode_set() function. The password values may be specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password.  Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed. Since minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of 1/25616, or less than 1/1038. The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time.  Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module.  User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.  Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API functions. All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access. Service Role Description Initialize User, CO Module initialization. Does not access CSPs. Self-test User, CO Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs. Functions that provide module status information:  Version (as unsigned long or const char *) Show status User, CO  FIPS Mode (Boolean) Does not access CSPs. Functions that destroy CSPs:  fips_rand_prng_reset: destroys RNG CSPs.  fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs Zeroize User, CO (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs.) All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application. Used for random number and symmetric key generation.  Seed or reseed a DRBG instance Random  Determine security strength of a DRBG instance number User, CO  Obtain random data generation Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs. Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys: Asymmetric RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK User, CO key generation There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP800-90 Page 18 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy Service Role Description Symmetric Used to encrypt or decrypt data. User, CO encrypt/decrypt Executes using AES EDK, TDES EDK (passed in by the calling process). Symmetric Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. User, CO digest Executes using AES CMAC, TDES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Message digest User, CO Does not access CSPs. Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Keyed Hash User, CO Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process). Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not Key transport6  User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process). Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not Key agreement User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Digital User, CO Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, signature ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process). Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs. Table 5 - Services and CSP Access                                                         6 "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to the Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS Module. Page 19 of 30 6 Self-test The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test. Algorithm Type Test Attributes Software integrity KAT HMAC-SHA1 HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements. AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length XTS-AES KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256) AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths TDES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key TDES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1 DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384 DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA256 ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. The K-233 self-test is not performed for operational environments that support prime curve only (see Table 2). ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6 Table 6a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test) The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for the target system. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CMT Laboratory and listed in Appendix A is verified during installation of the Module file as described in Appendix A. The FIPS_mode_set()7 function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set()9 succeeds.  The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the calling application.                                                           7 calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() FIPS_mode_set() Page 20 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy The Module also implements the following conditional tests: Algorithm Test DRBG Tested as required by [SP800-90] Section 11 DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ANSI X9.31 RNG Continuous test for stuck fault Table 6b - Conditional Tests In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re- instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90]; this is not something the Module can do itself. Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt. The Module supports one operational environment configurations for elliptic curve. All NIST defined curves listed in Table 2 with the EC column are marked "BKP". Page 21 of 30 7 Operational Environment The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation. Page 22 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy 8 Mitigation of other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2. Page 23 of 30 Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance The test platforms represent different combinations of installation instructions. For each platform there is a build system, the host providing the build environment in which the installation instructions are executed, and a target system on which the generated object code is executed. The build and target systems may be the same type of system or even the same device, or may be different systems – the Module supports cross-compilation environments. Each of these command sets are relative to the top of the directory containing the uncompressed and expanded contents of the distribution files openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz (all NIST defined curves as listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP"). The command sets are: U1: ./config no-asm make make install U2: ./config make make install W1: ms\do_fips no-asm W2: ms\do_fips Installation instructions 1. Download and copy the distribution file to the build system. These files can be downloaded from http://www.openssl.org/source/. 2. Verify the HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the distribution file; see Appendix B. An independently acquired FIPS 140-2 validated implemention of SHA-1 HMAC must be used for this digest verification. Note that this verification can be performed on any convenient system and not necessarily on the specific build or target system. Alternatively, a copy of the distribution on physical media can be obtained from OSF8. 3. Unpack the distribution gunzip -c openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz | tar xf - cd openssl-fips-2.0.10 4. Execute one of the installation command sets U1, W1, U2, W2 as shown above. No other command sets shall be used. 5. The resulting fipscanister.o or fipscanister.lib file is now available for use.                                                         8 For some prospective users the acquisition, installation, and configuration of a suitable FIPS 140-2 validated product may not be convenient. OSF will on request mail a CD containing the source code distribution, via USPS or international post. A distribution file received by that means need not be verified by a FIPS 140-2 validated implementation of HMAC-SHA-1. For instructions on requesting this CD see http://openssl.com/fips/verify.html. Page 24 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy 6. The calling application enables FIPS mode by calling the FIPS_mode_set()9 function. Note that failure to use one of the specified commands sets exactly as shown will result in a module that cannot be considered compliant with FIPS 140-2. Linking the Runtime Executable Application Note that applications interfacing with the FIPS Object Module are outside of the cryptographic boundary. When linking the application with the FIPS Object Module two steps are necessary: 1. The HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the FIPS Object Module file must be calculated and verified against the installed digest to ensure the integrity of the FIPS object module. 2. A HMAC-SHA1 digest of the FIPS Object Module must be generated and embedded in the FIPS Object Module for use by the FIPS_mode_set()11 function at runtime initialization. The fips_standalone_sha1 command can be used to perform the verification of the FIPS Object Module and to generate the new HMAC-SHA-1 digest for the runtime executable application. Failure to embed the digest in the executable object will prevent initialization of FIPS mode. At runtime the FIPS_mode_set()11 function compares the embedded HMAC-SHA-1 digest with a digest generated from the FIPS Object Module object code. This digest is the final link in the chain of validation from the original source to the runtime executable application file. Optimization The “asm” designation means that assembler language optimizations were enabled when the binary code was built, “no-asm” means that only C language code was compiled. For OpenSSL with x86 there are three possible optimization levels: 1. No optimization (plain C) 2. SSE2 optimization 3. AES-NI+PCLMULQDQ+SSSE3 optimization Other theoretically possible combinations (e.g. AES-NI only, or SSE3 only) are not addressed individually, so that a processor which does not support all three of AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, and SSSE3 will fall back to SSE2 optimization. For more information, see:  http://www.intel.com/support/processors/sb/CS-030123.htm?wapkw=sse2   http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-instructions- aes-ni/?wapkw=aes-ni  For OpenSSL with ARM there are two possible optimization levels: 1. Without NEON 2. With NEON (ARM7 only) For more information, see http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/neon.php                                                          9 calls the Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() FIPS_mode_set() Page 25 of 30 Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint The Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module v2.0.10 consists of the FIPS Object Module (the fipscanister.o or fipscanister.lib contiguous unit of binary object code) generated from the specific source files. For all NIST defined curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP") the source files are in the specific special OpenSSL distribution openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz with HMAC- SHA-1 digest of af8bda4bb9739e35b4ef00a9bc40d21a6a97a780 located at http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz. The openssl command from a version of OpenSSL that incorporates a previously validated version of the module may be used: openssl sha1 -hmac etaonrishdlcupfm openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz For NIST prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") the source files are in the specific special OpenSSL distribution openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz with HMAC-SHA-1 digest of 02cc9ddfffb2e917d1cdc9ebc97a9731c40f6394 located at http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz. Note this is from the previous revision of the FIPS Object Module as no modifications relevant to NIST prime curves only were introduced in revision 2.0.10. The set of files specified in this tar file constitutes the complete set of source files of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build. The OpenSSL distribution tar file (and patch file if used) shall be verified using the above HMAC- SHA-1 digest(s). The arbitrary 16 byte key of: 65 74 61 6f 6e 72 69 73 68 64 6c 63 75 70 66 6d (equivalent to the ASCII string "etaonrishdlcupfm") is used to generate the HMAC-SHA-1 value for the FIPS Object Module integrity check. The functionality of all earlier revisions of the FIPS Object Module are subsumed by this latest revision, so there is no reason to use older revisions for any new deployments. However, older revisions remain valid. The source distribution files and corresponding HMAC-SHA-1 digests are listed below: openssl-fips-2.0.9.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-2.0.9.tar.gz Digest: 54552e9a3ed8d1561341e8945fcdec55af961322 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz Page 26 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy Digest: 91d267688713c920f85bc5e69c8b5d34e1112672 openssl-fips-2.0.8.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.8.tar.gz Digest: 7f486fbb598f3247ab9db10c1308f1c19f384671 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.8.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.8.tar.gz Digest: 7a5f40ef8cebe959372d16e26391fcf23689209b openssl-fips-2.0.7.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.7.tar.gz Digest: 295064925a6d95271e2fa2920181ec060f95c7ab openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.7.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.7.tar.gz Digest: dddfdc78c7e827c61fe92bd4817a7f2c3e67153 openssl-fips-2.0.6.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.6.tar.gz Digest: 2b8d831df22d4dfe6169aa2a8e74c35484c26c21 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.6.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.6.tar.gz Digest: 852f43cd9ae1bd2eba60e4f9f1f266d3c16c0319 openssl-fips-2.0.5.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.5.tar.gz Digest: 8b44f2a43d098f6858eb1ebe77b73f8f027a9c29 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.5.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.5.tar.gz Digest: 148e4e127ffef1df80c0ed61bae35b07ec7b7b36 openssl-fips-2.0.4.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.4.tar.gz Digest: eaa5f86dab2c5da7086aec4786bce27d3b3c1b8a openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.4.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.4.tar.gz Digest: 13302f75c82c8b482c9ac96828984a270a45c284 openssl-fips-2.0.3.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.3.tar.gz Digest: 5dfe03bc3f57c2862ea97823ea3111d7faf711b2 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.3.tar.gz Page 27 of 30 URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.3.tar.gz Digest: 9d6b21218d7d5480aa0add68e682d321e3ffbfa7 openssl-fips-2.0.2.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.2.tar.gz Digest: e099d5096eb69c2dd8591379f38b985801188663 openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.2.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.2.tar.gz Digest: 887fa6802c253c32e6c4c83b7a091118fa8c6217 openssl-fips-2.0.1.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.1.tar.gz Digest: 1e05b021fdcd6e77c6155512bbce2d0cbc725aec openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.1.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.1.tar.gz Digest: af82c8ebb9d3276be11feffd35e6b55bd0d1839f openssl-fips-2.0.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.tar.gz Digest: 2cdd29913c6523df8ad38da11c342b80ed3f1dae openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.tar.gz URL: http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.tar.gz Digest: e8d5ee306425b278bf6c8b077dae8e4a542e8215 Page 28 of 30 Cellcrypt Secure Core 3 FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy Appendix C Compilers This appendix lists the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective Operational Environments. Note this list does not imply that use of the Module is restricted to only the listed compiler versions, only that the use of other versions has not been confirmed to produce a correct result. # Operational Environment Compiler 1 Microsoft Windows 7 32 bit Microsoft 32-bit C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 16.00 2 Fedora 14 gcc 4.5.1 3 Microsoft Windows 7 64 bit Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 16.00 for x64 Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 16.00 for 4 Windows 7 x64 5 Apple OS X 10.7 Apple LLVM version 4.2 6 Ubuntu 13.04 gcc 4.7.3 7 Ubuntu 13.04 gcc 4.7.3 8 Linux 3.8 gcc 4.7.3 9 Linux 3.4 under Citrix XenServer 6.2 gcc 4.8.0 10 Linux 3.4 under Citrix XenServer 6.2 gcc 4.8.0 11 Linux 3.4 under VMware ESXi 5.1 gcc 4.8.0 12 Linux 3.4 under VMware ESXi 5.1 gcc 4.8.0 13 gcc 4.8.0 Linux 3.4 under Microsoft Windows 2012 Hyper-V 14 gcc 4.8.0 Linux 3.4 under Microsoft Windows 2012 Hyper-V 15 FreeBSD 10.0 clang 3.3 16 FreeBSD 10.0 clang 3.3 17 Apple iOS 7.1 64-bit on ARMv8 clang 5.1 18 Apple iOS 7.1 64-bit on ARMv8 clang 5.1 19 iOS 8.1 64-bit clang-600.0.56 20 iOS 8.1 64-bit clang-600.0.56 21 iOS 8.1 32-bit clang-600.0.56 22 iOS 8.1 32-bit clang-600.0.56 23 Android 5.0 gcc 4.9 24 Android 5.0 gcc 4.9 25 Android 5.0 64-bit gcc 4.9 Page 29 of 30 # Operational Environment Compiler 26 Android 5.0 64-bit gcc 4.9 Table C - Compilers Page 30 of 30