FIPS 1402 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for: Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (PX04S model) Type A TOSHIBA CORPORATION Rev 1.1.0 1 Dec 28, 2015 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................ 3 ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................... 3 SECTION 1 ­ MODULE SPECIFICATION............................................................................................... 5 SECTION 1.1 ­ PRODUCT VERSION ...................................................................................................... 5 SECTION 2 ­ ROLES SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .................................................................. 5 SECTION 2.1 ­ SERVICES ....................................................................................................................... 6 SECTION 3 ­ PHYSICAL SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 7 SECTION 4 ­ OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................... 8 SECTION 5 ­ KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 6 ­ SELF TESTS ....................................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 7 ­ DESIGN ASSURANCE ..................................................................................................... 10 SECTION 8 ­ MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS............................................................................... 10 APPENDIX A ­ EMI/EMC ....................................................................................................................... 10 2 Dec 28, 2015 Overview The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (listed in Section1.1 Product Version) is used for solid state drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, and FW download. This CM is multiple-chip embedded, and the physical boundary of the CM is the entire SSD. The logical boundary is SAS interface (same as the physical boundary). The physical interface for power-supply and for communication is one SAS connector. The CM is connected with host system by SAS cable. The logical interface is the SAS, TCG SWG, and Enterprise SSC. The CM has the non-volatile storage area for not only user data but also the keys, CSPs, and FW. The latter storage area is called the "system area", which is not logically accessible / addressable by the host application. The CM is intended to meet the requirements of FIPS140-2 Security Level 2 Overall. The Table below shows the security level detail. Section Level 1. Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3. Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4. Finite State Model 2 5. Physical Security 2 6. Operational Environment N/A 7. Cryptographic Key Management 2 8. EMI/EMC 2 9. SelfTests 2 10. Design Assurance 2 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Level 2 Table 1 Security Level Detail Interface Ports Data Input SAS connector Control Input SAS connector Data Output SAS connector Status Output SAS connector Power Input SAS connector Table 1-1 Physical/Logical Port Mapping This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety. Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard CM Cryptographic Module CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator 3 Dec 28, 2015 EDC Error Detection Code FW Firmware HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication code KAT Known Answer Test LBA Logical Block Address MSID Manufactured SID NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator PCB Printed Circuit Board POST Power on Self-Test PSID Printed SID SED Self-Encrypting Drive SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SID Security ID 4 Dec 28, 2015 Section 1 ­ Module Specification The CM has one FIPS 140 approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation. The CM provides services defined in Section 2.1 and other non-security related services. Section 1.1 ­ Product Version The following models are validated with the following FW version and HW version: HW version: A0 with PX04SVQ080B, PX04SVQ160B FW version: ZZ00 The PX04SVQxxxB varies "Product ID" value of INQUIRY command according to customer requirements. These "Product ID" values are X440_TPM3V800AMD and X365_TPM3V1T6AMD. Section 2 ­ Roles Services and Authentication This section describes roles, authentication method, and strength of authentication. Role Name Role Type Type of Authentication Authentication Multi Attempt strength Authentication Strength EraseMaster Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 SID Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster0 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster1 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 ... ... ... ... ... ... BandMaster8 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 Table 2 Identification and Authentication Policy Per the security policy rules, the minimum PIN length is 6 bytes. Therefore the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 4msec when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 15,000 times in 1 min. Therefore the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000. Even if TryLimit1 is infinite, the probability that random attempts is same. 1 TryLimit is the upper limit of failure of authentication of each role. 5 Dec 28, 2015 Section 2.1 ­ Services This section describes services which the CM provides. Service Description Role(s) Keys & CSPs RWX(Read,Wr Algorithm(CAV Method ite,eXecute) P Certification Number) Band Block or allow read (decrypt) / BandMaster0 Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 SECURITY Lock/Unlock write (encrypt) of user data in ... Key (#2231) PROTOCOL IN(TCG a band. Locking also requires BandMaster8 Set Method Result) read/write locking to be enabled Cryptographic Erase user data (in EraseMaster MEK(s) W Hash_DRBG(#8 SECURITY Erase cryptographic means) by 67) PROTOCOL IN(TCG changing the data encryption RKey X AES256-CBC(#3 Erase Method Result) key 485) Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 Key (#2231) Data Encryption / decryption of None MEKs X AES256-XTS-R( SCSI READ/WRITE read/write(decr unlocked user data to/from #3487) Commands band AES256-XTS-W ypt/encrypt) (#3486) Firmware Enable / Disable firmware SID PubKey X RSASSA-PKCS SECURITY Download download and load a complete #1-v1_5(#1795) PROTOCOL IN(TCG firmware image, and save it. Set Method Result), If the code passes "Firmware SCSI WRITE Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 load test", the device is reset BUFFER Key (#2231) and will run with the new code. RandomNumbe Provide a random number None Seed R Hash_DRBG(#8 SECURITY r generation generated by the CM 67) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Random Method Result) Reset(run Runs POSTs and delete None N/A N/A N/A Power on reset POSTs) CSPs in RAM Set band Set the location and size of BandMaster0 Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 SECURITY position and the LBA range ... Key (#2231) PROTOCOL IN(TCG size BandMaster8 Set Method Result) Set PIN Setting PIN (authentication All for their RKey X AES256-CBC(#3 SECURITY data) PIN Table MAC X 485) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Key HMAC-SHA256 Set Method Result) (#2231) SHA256(#2879) Show Status Report status of the CM None N/A N/A N/A SCSI REQUEST SENSE Zeroization Erase user data in all bands None2 RKey X,W AES256-CBC(#3 SECURITY by changing the data 485) PROTOCOL IN(TCG encryption key, initialize Table MAC X,W HMAC-SHA256 RevertSP Method range settings, and reset KEY (#2231) Result) PINs for TCG MEKs W Hash_DRBG(#8 67) PIN W Table 3 FIPS Approved services Algorithm CAVP Certification Number AES256-CBC #3485 AES256-XTS-R #3487 AES256-XTS-W #3486 SHA256 (SEC CPU) #2879 HMAC-SHA256 (SEC CPU) #2231 RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 #1795 Hash_DRBG #867 Table 4 FIPS Approved Algorithms 2 Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the TCG RevertSP method. 6 Dec 28, 2015 Algorithm Description NDRNG Hardware RNG used to seed the approved Hash_DRBG. Minimum entropy of 8 bits is 7.53. Table 4-1 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Section 3 ­ Physical Security The CM has the following physical security: Production-grade components with standard passivation Exterior of the drive is opaque Five tamper-evident security seals are applied to the CM in factory Three opaque and tamper-evident security seals (VOID LABEL H, VOID LABEL J and VOID LABEL K) are applied to side of the CM and edge of OUTER SHEET3. These seals prevent cover removal and an attacker to access the PCB Two opaque and tamper-evident security seals (VOID LABEL F and VOID LABEL G) are applied to side of the CM. These seals prevent cover removal The tamper-evident security seals cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence 3 OUTER SHEET is an opaque seal covering some holes of the top cover. It cannot leave "VOID" message, but leaves the evidence of the cut. 7 Dec 28, 2015 The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically (every month or every two months) for one or more of the following tamper evidence. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be removed. Message "VOID" on security seal or the CM Text on security seals do not match original Cutting line on security seal or OUTER SHEET Security seal cutouts do not match original Mark of alphabetic character(s) which constitute a word "VOID" Cutting line (Security seals and OUTER SHEET) Section 4 ­ Operational Environment Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a "non-modifiable", that is the CM cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. 8 Dec 28, 2015 Section 5 ­ Key Management The CM uses keys and CSPs in the following table. Key/CSP Length Type Zeroize Method Establishment Output Persistence/Storage BandMaster/Erase 256 PIN Zeroization service Electronic input No SHA digest/System Area Master/SID PINs Encrypted by RKey / MEKs 512 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No System Area Output: Host can MSID 256 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing Plain / System Area retrieve PubKey 2048 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing No Plain / System Area Obfuscated(Plain in FIPS RKey 256 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No means) / System Area Entropy collected from NDRNG at Seed 440 DRBG seed Power-Off instantiation No Plain/RAM (Minimum entropy of 8 bits: 7.53) Encrypted by RKey / Table MAC Key 256 HMAC Key Zeroization service DRBG No System Area Note that there is no security-relevant audit feature and audit data. Section 6 ­ Self Tests The CM runs self-tests in the following table. Function Self-Test Type Abstract Firmware Integrity Check Power-On EDC 32-bit SHA256 (F.E CPU) Power-On Digest KAT SHA256 (SEC CPU) Power-On Digest KAT HMAC-SHA256 (F.E CPU) Power-On Digest KAT HMAC-SHA256 (SEC CPU) Power-On Digest KAT AES256-CBC Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT AES256-XTS-R Power-On Decrypt KAT AES256-XTS-W Power-On Encrypt KAT Hash_DRBG Power-On DRBG KAT RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 Power-On Signature verification KAT Hash_DRBG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one NDRNG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one 9 Dec 28, 2015 Firmware load test Conditional Verify signature of downloaded firmware image by RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 When the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state. Section 7 ­ Design Assurance Initial operations to setup this module are following: 1. Get MSID from SAS interface. 2. Set range configurations with BandMaster(s) authority by using MSID as PIN. 3. Change BandMaster(s)/EraseMaster/SID PINs. 4. Set PortLocked in Download port to "TRUE". To get more details, refer to the guidance document provided with the CM. Section 8 ­ Mitigation of Other Attacks The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements. Appendix A ­ EMI/EMC This CM is a "Class B" device and was tested and verified to conform to the EMI/EMC requirements found in the following regulation: FCC Subpart 15B 10 Dec 28, 2015