FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Cisco FIPS Object Module Cisco Systems, Inc. DOCUMENT VERSION: 3.0 December 15, 2015 © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 1 1.3 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 1 1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 2 1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 2 2 CISCO FIPS OBJECT MODULE........................................................................................ 3 3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE CHARACTERISTICS ................................................... 4 3.1 MODULE INTERFACES ......................................................................................................... 5 3.2 ROLES AND SERVICES ......................................................................................................... 6 3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY .......................................................................................................... 7 3.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS .......................................................................................... 7 3.4.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .............................................................. 7 3.4.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................ 8 3.4.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in FIPS Mode .......................... 8 3.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 8 3.5.1 Key Generation ............................................................................................. 8 3.5.2 Key Storage................................................................................................... 9 3.5.3 Key Access.................................................................................................... 9 3.5.4 Key Protection and Zeroization ..................................................................... 9 3.6 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 11 3.6.1 Self-tests performed .................................................................................... 11 4 SECURE DISTRIBUTION AND OPERATION .............................................................. 13 4.1 SECURE DISTRIBUTION ..................................................................................................... 13 4.2 SECURE OPERATION ......................................................................................................... 13 APPENDIX A ­ ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................... 14 © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. i This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This document is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM). This security policy describes how the FOM (Software Version: 6.0) meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, and how to operate it in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the Cisco FIPS Object Module. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 -- Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html. 1.2 Module Validation Level The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2. No. Area Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1 4 Finite State Model 1 5 Physical Security N/A 6 Operational Environment 1 7 Cryptographic Key management 1 8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1 9 Self-Tests 1 10 Design Assurance 3 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall module validation level 1 Table 1 ­ Module Validation Level 1.3 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco FIPS Object Module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available from the following sources: For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com. The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 1 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 1.4 Terminology In this document, the Cisco FIPS Object Module is referred to as FOM, the library, or the module. 1.5 Document Organization The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: · Vendor Evidence document · Finite State Machine · Other supporting documentation as additional references This document provides an overview of the Cisco FIPS Object Module and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the module. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non- disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2 Cisco FIPS Object Module The Cisco FIPS Object Module is a software library that provides cryptographic services to a vast array of Cisco's networking and collaboration products. The module provides FIPS 140 validated cryptographic algorithms and KDF functionality for services such as IPSec (IKE), SRTP, SSH, TLS, and SNMP. The module does not directly implement any of these protocols, instead it provides the cryptographic primitives and functions to allow a developer to implement the various protocols. These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by either the CAVP or the CMVP. The module is based on the OpenSSL FIPS canister with additions to support Suite B algorithms. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 3 Cryptographic Module Characteristics Figure 1 ­ FOM block diagram The module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. For the purposes of the FIPS 140-2 level 1 validation, the FOM is a single object module file named fipscanister.o (Linux / FreeBSD Android) or fipscanister.lib (Microsoft Windows). The object code in the object module file is incorporated into the runtime executable application at the time the binary executable is generated. The Module performs no communications other than with the consuming application (the process that invokes the Module services via the Module's API). The module's logical block diagram is shown in Figure 1 above. The dashed red border denotes the logical cryptographic boundary of the module. The physical cryptographic boundary of the module is the enclosure of the system on which it is executing and is denoted by the solid black border. This module was tested on the following platforms for the purposes of this FIPS validation: © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Operating # Platform System Processor 1 Cisco WLC 5508 Linux 2.6 Cavium Octeon MIPS64 (CN5645) 2 Cisco WLC 5508 (build with assembler code) Linux 2.6 Cavium Octeon MIPS64 (CN5645) 3 Google (LG) Nexus 4 Android 4.4 ARM v7 (Qualcomm Snapdragon S4) 4 Gateway FX6860 MS Windows 8.1 Intel Core i7 (i7-2600) 5 Gateway FX6860 MS Windows 8.1 Intel Core i7 (i7-2600) with AES-NI 6 Cisco UCS C200 M2 FreeBSD 9.2 Intel Xeon (Intel 5680) 7 Cisco UCS C22 M3 Linux 2.6 Intel Xeon (Intel E5-2450) with AES-NI Table 2 ­ Tested Operational Environments (OEs) 3.1 Module Interfaces The physical ports of the Module are the same as the system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API). The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions. The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the application (and the device upon which it is running), and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table: Interface Description Data Input API input parameters - plaintext and/or ciphertext data Data Output API output parameters - plaintext and/or ciphertext data Control Input API function calls - function calls, or input arguments that specify commands and control data used to control the operation of the module Status Output API return codes- function return codes, error codes, or output arguments that receive status information used to indicate the status of the module Table 3 ­ FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 3.2 Roles and Services The Module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both Crypto-User and Crypto-Officer roles. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Module does not support user authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module. The Crypto Officer can install and initialize the Module. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly entered when installing the Module or performing system administration functions on the host operating system. · User Role: Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. This role has access to all of the services provided by the Module. · Crypto-Officer Role: All of the User Role functionality as well as installation of the Module on the host computer system. This role is assumed implicitly when the system administrator installs the Module library file. The following table lists the approved or non-approved but allowed services available in FIPS Approved mode. Service Role CSP Access Module Installation Crypto Officer None N/A Symmetric Symmetric keys AES, Triple- User, Crypto Officer Execute encryption/decryption DES Symmetric Digest User, Crypto Officer AES CMAC key Execute Key transport User, Crypto Officer Asymmetric private key RSA Execute Key agreement User, Crypto Officer DH and ECDH private key Execute Asymmetric private key RSA, Digital signature User, Crypto Officer Execute DSA, ECDSA Key Generation Asymmetric keys DSA, User, Crypto Officer Write/execute (Asymmetric) ECDSA, and RSA Key Generation Symmetric keys AES, Triple- User, Crypto Officer Write/execute (Symmetric) DES Keyed Hash (HMAC) User, Crypto Officer HMAC key Execute Message digest (SHS) User, Crypto Officer None N/A Random number Seed/entropy input, User, Crypto Officer Write/execute generation V, C, Key, and S Show status User, Crypto Officer None N/A Module initialization User, Crypto Officer None N/A Perform Self-test User, Crypto Officer None N/A Zeroization User, Crypto Officer All CSPs N/A Table 4 ­ Roles, Services, and Keys (Approved Mode) © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. The following table lists the non-Approved services available in non-approved mode. Service Role CSP Access Key transport using non-Approved User, Crypto Asymmetric private Execute RSA key size Officer key RSA Key agreement using non-Approved User, Crypto DH and ECDH private domain parameters size for Diffie- Execute Officer key Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman Random number generation (as per User, Crypto Seed/entropy input, Write/execute the DRBG defined in SP800-90) Officer V, C, Key, and S Digital signature using non-Approved User, Crypto Asymmetric private Execute RSA key size Officer key RSA Asymmetric Key Generation using User, Crypto Asymmetric key RSA Write/execute non-Approved RSA key size Officer Table 5 ­ Roles, Services, and Keys (Non-Approved Mode) 3.3 Physical Security The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security. 3.4 Cryptographic Algorithms The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms. 3.4.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms The FOM supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations: Algorithm Algorithm Certificate Numbers AES 3404, 3405 CCM 3404, 3405 CVL 504, 505, 506, 507 DRBG 817, 818 DSA 961, 962 ECDSA 678, 679 HMAC 2172, 2173 KBKDF (SP800-108) 52, 53 RSA 1743, 1744 SHS 2817, 2818 Triple-DES 1926, 1927 Table 6 ­ Approved Cryptographic Algorithms It should be noted that the XTS-AES mode, included in the AES algorithm certificates numbers 3404 and 3405 in Table 5, and as defined in NIST SP 800-38E and referred to in "Annex A: © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2" `Symmetric Key', Section 1, `Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)', should only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. Additionally, it should be noted that per NIST SP 800-131A, through December 31, 2015, the use of 2-key Triple DES for encryption is restricted: the total number of blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 220. After December 31, 2015, 2-key Triple DES shall not be used for encryption. Decryption using 2-key Triple DES is allowed for legacy-use. 3.4.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in the FIPS approved mode: · Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 219 bits of encryption strength) · EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength) · RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 132 bits of encryption strength) 3.4.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in FIPS Mode The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are not permitted for use in the FIPS approved mode: · Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength) · EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength) · RSA (key wrapping; key establishment; non-compliant less than 112-bits of encryption strength) Any use of the non-approved algorithm will cause the module to operate in the non-Approved mode implicitly. 3.5 Cryptographic Key Management 3.5.1 Key Generation The Module supports generation of DH, ECDH, DSA, RSA, and FIPS 186-4 ECDSA public- private key pairs. The Module employs a NIST SP800-90A random number generator for creation of both symmetric keys and the seed for asymmetric key generation. The entropy and seeding material for the NDRNG is provided to it by the calling application (and not by the module) which is outside the module's logical boundary but contained within the module's physical boundary. The minimum effective strength of the DRBG seed is at least 112 bits when used in a FIPS approved mode of operation, therefore the minimum number of bits of © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. entropy requested when the module makes a call to the DRBG is 112. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy 3.5.2 Key Storage Public and private keys are provided to the Module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. The Module does not perform persistent storage of keys. 3.5.3 Key Access An authorized application as user (the Crypto-User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. 3.5.4 Key Protection and Zeroization Keys residing in internally allocated data structures can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for intermediate data items. Only the process that creates or imports keys can use or export them. No persistent storage of key data is performed by the Module. All API functions are executed by the invoking process in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. All CSPs can be zeroized by power-cycling the module (with the exception of the Software Integrity key). In the event Module power is lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. The module supports the following keys and critical security parameters (CSPs): © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 9 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ID Algorithm Size Description Asymmetric Keys RSA RSA: 1,024, 2,048, 3,072 bits Used for signature DSA DSA: 1,024, 2,048, 3,072 bits verification. ECDSA ECDSA: P-256, P-384, P-521 RSA: Also used for key transport (where the size of the modulus is greater than or equal to 2048 bits) Asymmetric Keys RSA RSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits Used for signature DSA DSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits generation with SHA-2 used ECDSA ECDSA: P-256, P-384, P-521 in key pair generation. RSA: Also used for key transport (where the size of the modulus is greater than or equal to 2048 bits) Symmetric Keys AES AES: 128, 192, 256 bits Used for symmetric Triple-DES Triple-DES: 128, 192 bits encryption/decryption Diffie-Hellman/ DH DH: Public Key ­ 2,048-10,000 bits Used for key agreement EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key ­ 224-512 bits private key ECDH ECDH: P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash_DRBG DRBG - V (440/888 bits) CSPs for Hash_DRBG as per (as per - C (440/888 bits) NIST SP800-90A. NIST SP - entropy input (The length of the 800-90A) selected hash) HMAC_DRBG DRBG - V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) CSPs for HMAC_DRBG as (as per - Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits) per NIST SP800-90A. NIST SP - entropy input (The length of the 800-90A) selected hash) CTR_DRBG DRBG - V (128 bits) CSPs for CTR_DRBG as per (as per - Key (AES 128/192/256) NIST SP800-90A. NIST SP - entropy input (The length of the 800-90A) selected AES) Keyed Hash key HMAC All supported key sizes for HMAC Used for keyed hash (Key sizes must be a minimum of 112- bits) Software Integrity HMAC HMAC-SHA-1 Used to perform software key integrity test at power-on. This key is embedded within the module. Table 7 ­ Cryptographic Keys and CSPs © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 3.6 Self-Tests The Module performs both power-up self-tests at module initialization 1 and continuous condition tests during operation. Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state as the module is single threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are complete. If the power-up self- tests fail subsequent calls to the module will fail and thus no further cryptographic operations are possible. 3.6.1 Self-tests performed · POST tests o AES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt) o AES-CCM Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt) o AES-GCM Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt) o AES-CMAC Known Answer Test o AES-XTS Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt) o DRBG Known Answer Tests HASH_DRBG Known Answer Test HMAC_DRBG Known Answer Test CTR_DRBG Known Answer Test o DSA Sign/Verify Test o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify Test o HMAC Known Answer Tests HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA224 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test o ECC CDH KAT o RSA Known Answer Test (Separate sign and verify) o SHA-1 Known Answer Test o Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA1) o Triple-DES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt) · Conditional tests o Pairwise consistency tests for RSA, DSA, and ECDSA o Continuous random number generation test for approved DRBG. · Critical Function Tests (applicable to the DRBG, as per SP800-90A, Section 11) o Instantiate Test o Generate Test 1 The FIPS mode initialization is performed prior to the application invoking the FIPS_mode_set() function call (which returns a "1" for success and "0" for failure). Initialization is performed by an OS Loader on module power up. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. o Reseed Test o Uninstantiate Test A single function call, FIPS_mode_set(), is required to enable the Module for operation in the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. When the Module is in FIPS mode all security functions and cryptographic algorithms are performed in Approved mode. FIPS mode can only be enabled after the application invokes the FIPS_mode_set() call which returns a "1" for success and "0" for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the host application. Prior to this invocation the Module has already gone through its initialization sequence. The FIPS_mode_set() function checks that the initialization sequence and POSTs (performed by the OS Loader at module power-up) have completed successfully. The initialization sequence starts with a check of the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-1 digest computed at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA-1 digest matches the stored known digest then the power-up self-tests, consisting of the algorithm specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer tests, are performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal global error flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any such power-up self-test failure is a hard error that can only be recovered by reinstalling the Module 2. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the Module is in FIPS mode. This function call also returns a "1" for success and "0" for failure, and interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the host application. 2 The FIPS_mode_set() function could be re-invoked but such re-invocation does not provide a means of recovering from an integrity test or known answer test failure. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 4 Secure Distribution and Operation 4.1 Secure Distribution The Cisco FOM is intended only for use by Cisco personnel and as such is accessible only from the secure Cisco internal web site. Only authorized employees have access to the module. 4.2 Secure Operation The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is an independent virtual memory area that is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the process that invokes it, and thus satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation. The module is installed using one of the set of instructions in the `CiscoSSL 6.0 FIPS Compliance Guide' document appropriate to the target system. A complete revision history of the source code from which the Module was generated is maintained in a version control database 3. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CSTL Laboratory is verified during installation of the Module file as described in the `CiscoSSL 6.0 FIPS Compliance Guide' document. The HMAC fingerprint of the validated distribution file is: a8b02b2531ecf9cb649865c61fc83d2cffe9a023 Upon initialization of the Module by the OS loader directly after Module power-up, the power- up self-tests will execute. Successful completion of the power-up self- tests ensures that the module is operating in the FIPS mode of operation. The self-tests are called when initializing the module, or alternatively using the FIPS_selftest() function call. 3 This database is internal to Cisco since the intended use of this crypto module is by Cisco development teams. © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Appendix A ­ Acronyms and Abbreviations Term Expansion / Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard API Application Program Interface CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSE Communications Security Establishment CSP Critical Security Parameter CVL Component Validation List DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FOM FIPS Object Module GCM Galois/Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol IKE Internet Key Exchange IPSec Internet Protocol Security KAT Known Answer Test KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function KDF Key Derivation Function MAC Message Authentication Code MS Microsoft NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology OS Operating System POST Power-On Self-Test RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SP Special Publication SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol SSH Secure Shell TLS Transport Layer Security XEX XOR Encrypt XOR XOR Exclusive OR XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing © Copyright 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.