Security Policy: Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) Cryptographic module used in Motorola Solutions Astro APX2000, SRX2200, APX2500, APX3000, APX4000, APX4500, APX6000, APX6000XE, APX6500, APX7000, APX7000XE, and APX7500 radios. Version: R01.01.16 Date: April 13, 2015 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 1 of 23 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 3 1.1 SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.3 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.4 ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................................................... 4 1.5 ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE HARDWARE / FIRMWARE VERSION NUMBERS..................................................................... 4 1.6 ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ............................................................................................. 5 1.7 PORTS AND INTERFACES .................................................................................................................................................. 6 2. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY LEVELS ....................................................................................................................................... 7 3. FIPS 140-2 APPROVED OPERATIONAL MODES ........................................................................................................ 8 3.1 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS FOR OPERATION AT FIPS 140-2 OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL 2 ............................................. 8 3.2 NON APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ............................................................................................................................ 9 4. CRYPTO OFFICER AND USER GUIDANCE............................................................................................................... 10 4.1 ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE IN A SECURE MANNER (CO) ...................................................... 10 4.2 ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING USER BEHAVIOR (CO) ........................................................................................................ 10 4.3 APPROVED SECURITY FUNCTIONS, PORTS, AND INTERFACES AVAILABLE TO USERS ..................................................... 10 4.4 USER RESPONSIBILITIES NECESSARY FOR SECURE OPERATION ..................................................................................... 10 5. SECURITY RULES ........................................................................................................................................................... 11 5.1 FIPS 140-2 IMPOSED SECURITY RULES ......................................................................................................................... 11 5.2 MOTOROLA IMPOSED SECURITY RULES ........................................................................................................................ 14 6. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ............................................................................................ 15 7. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY.................................................................................................................................... 16 8. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ......................................................................................................................................... 17 8.1 ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE SUPPORTED ROLES ............................................................................................................ 17 8.2 ASTRO SUBSCRIBER MACE SERVICES .......................................................................................................................... 17 8.3 KEY MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................................................................................... 19 8.4 CSP ACCESS TYPES ....................................................................................................................................................... 20 9. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY .......................................................................................................... 23 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 2 of 23 1. Introduction 1.1 Scope This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine, herein identified as the Astro Subscriber MACE, must operate. Included in these rules are those derived from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and those imposed additionally by Motorola Solutions, Inc These rules, in total, define the interrelationship between the: 1. Module Operators, 2. Module Services, and 3. Critical Security Parameters (CSPs). 1.2 Definitions ALGID Algorithm Identifier CBC Cipher Block Chaining CFB Cipher Feedback CKR Common Key Reference CO Cryptographic Officer or Crypto-Officer CODEC Coder/Decode CPS Customer Programming Software CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book EID Encrypted Integrated Data IV Initialization Vector KEK Key Encryption Key KID Key Identifier KLK Key Loss Key KMM Key Management Message KPK Key Protection Key KVL Key Variable Loader LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register MAC Message Authentication Code MACE Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator OFB Output Feedback OMAP Open Multimedia Applications Platform OTAR Over The Air Rekeying TEK Traffic Encryption Key Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 3 of 23 1.3 Overview The Astro Subscriber MACE provides secure key management, Over-the-Air-Rekeying (OTAR), and voice and data encryption for the following Motorola Solutions mobile and portable two-way radios: APX2000 (portable) SRX2200 (portable) APX2500 (mobile) APX3000 (portable) APX4000 (portable) APX4500 (mobile) APX6000 (portable) APX6000XE (portable) APX6500 (mobile) APX7000 (portable) APX7000XE (portable) APX7500 (mobile) 1.4 Astro Subscriber MACE Implementation The Astro Subscriber MACE is implemented as a single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2. 1.5 Astro Subscriber MACE Hardware / Firmware Version Numbers FIPS Validated Cryptographic Module FIPS Validated Cryptographic Module Hardware Kit Numbers Firmware Version Numbers 5185912Y01, 5185912Y03, or 5185912Y05 R01.05.12 Note: The Astro Subscriber MACE may operate in FIPS Approved mode with Module Firmware Version number R01.02.00, R01.02.01, R01.02.02 (previously validated under FIPS 140-2 Cert. #1535), R07.11.10, R07.11.11, R01.03.13, R07.11.12, R01.04.07 (previously validated under FIPS 140-2 Cert. #1751), R01.05.12. The Astro Subscriber MACE supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms which may be installed separately from MACE firmware using the Program Update service. While the installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the module includes this firmware. Approved Algorithm Certificate Part Number Algorithm Number Firmware Version Numbers AES-256 (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB) 819 5185912 Family R01.00.00 AES-256 (GCM) 1295 5185912 Family R02.00.00 Note: Either AES Firmware Version R01.00.00 or both R01.00.00 and R02.00.00 must be loaded for the Astro Subscriber MACE to be in FIPS Approved mode. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 4 of 23 1.6 Astro Subscriber MACE Cryptographic Boundary Figure 1: MACE Chip (Top) Figure 2: MACE Chip (Interfaces) The Astro Subscriber MACE Cryptographic Boundary is drawn around the MACE IC as shown below. The MACE IC has an SSI port (used for Data, Control, Status, and OTAR Key data), a KVL port (used for Key Data, Control, and Status), and Power Connections. Crypto Boundary KVL MACE Port KYLD 1.8 V Power SSI SSI RX Port SSI TX Audio CODECs OMAP CPLD Figure 3: Cryptographic Boundary Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 5 of 23 1.7 Ports and Interfaces The Astro Subscriber MACE provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces: Table 1: Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Qty Logical Interface Definition Description Serial 1 - Data Input The main physical port Synchronous provided by the module. It - Data Output Interface (SSI) provides access to the - Control Input majority of the supported interfaces. - Status Output Key Variable 1 - Data Input This interface provides the Loader (KVL) input and output to a Key - Control Input Variable Loader (KVL). - Status Output Self-test Indicator 1 - Status Output This interface provides Interface status output to indicate all power-up self-tests completed successfully. Power 1 - Power Input This interface powers all circuitry. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 6 of 23 2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels The Astro Subscriber MACE can be configured to operate at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2. The table below shows the FIPS 140-2 Level of security met for each of the eleven areas specified within the FIPS 140-2 security requirements. Table 2: Astro Subscriber MACE Security Levels FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Validated Level at Section overall Security Level 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI / EMC 3 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 7 of 23 3. FIPS 140-2 Approved Operational Modes The Astro Subscriber MACE can be configured to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a Non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. Documented below are the configuration settings that are required for the module to be used in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation at overall Security Level 2. At any given time, the FIPS Status service can be used to determine whether the module is operating at overall Security Level 2 or in a non-FIPS Approved mode. Status is indicated by the FIPS STATUS RESPONSE message: Non-FIPS Compliance Mode or Level 2 FIPS Approved Mode. 3.1 Configuration Settings for operation at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2 Documented below are the actions and configuration settings required to enable FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2. 1. Disable Motorola Data Communication Over The Air Rekeying (MDC OTAR). The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module. 2. Disable Key Loss Key (KLK) generation. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module. 3. Enable Red Keyfill. When Red Keyfill is disabled, the module will not allow keys to be entered in plaintext form; all keys entered into the module must be encrypted. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module. 4. Only Approved and Allowed algorithms installed. The module supports the following Approved algorithms: AES-256 (Cert. #819) ­Used for encryption and decryption in the following Approved modes: OFB, ECB, CBC, and 8-bit CFB. AES-256 GCM (Cert. #1295) ­ Used for symmetric encryption / decryption of Encrypted Integrated Data (EID) SHA-256 (Cert. #817) ­ used for password hashing for internal password storage and digital signature verification during firmware integrity test and firmware load test SHA-384 (Cert #2399) HMAC/SHA-384 (Cert #1796) RSA-2048 (Cert. #396) ­ used for digital signature verification during firmware integrity test and firmware load test SP800-90A CTR DRBG (Cert. #505) ­ used for IV and KPK generation 5. The module supports the following Allowed algorithm: AES MAC (Cert. #819) ­ Used to provide authentication within APCO OTAR. AES MAC as used within APCO OTAR has been vendor affirmed and is approved when used for Project 25 APCO OTAR. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 8 of 23 Maximal length 64-bit LFSR. Non-deterministic Hardware Random Number Generator 6. Zeroize default security parameters: The Program Update service should be used to ensure all default CSP's are zeroized. The Program Update service is invoked in the factory at programming time and can be invoked in the field either by a FLASHPort Upgrade through CPS or a FLASHPort Upgrade with a KVL and PCMCIA card. 7. Infinite UKEK Retention is disabled. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module. 3.2 Non Approved Mode of Operation A non-FIPS Approved mode of operation is transitioned to when any of the following is true: 1. MDC OTAR is enabled. 2. KLK generation is enabled. 3. Infinite UKEK Retention feature is enabled. All keys are zeroized including the KEKs when the Infinite UKEK Retention feature transitions from enable to disable and also from disable to enable. The module maintains FIPS mode status and will provide this upon operator request. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 9 of 23 4. Crypto Officer and User Guidance 4.1 Administration of the Astro Subscriber MACE in a secure manner (CO) The Astro Subscriber MACE requires no special administration for secure use after it is set up for use in a FIPS Approved manner. To do this, set the module's parameters to the settings listed in section 3 of this document via the Download Configuration Parameters service. Note that all keys will be zeroized after the Program Update service has completed. 4.2 Assumptions regarding User Behavior (CO) The Astro Subscriber MACE has been designed in such a way that no special assumptions regarding User Behavior have been made that are relevant to the secure operation of the unit. 4.3 Approved Security Functions, Ports, and Interfaces available to Users Astro Subscriber MACE services available to the Astro Subscriber MACE User are listed in section 8.2. No Physical Ports or Logical Interfaces are directly available to the Astro Subscriber MACE User, only indirectly through the Subscriber Radio in which the Astro Subscriber MACE is installed. 4.4 User Responsibilities necessary for Secure Operation If the module's power is lost, the keys used for the AES GCM algorithm shall be redistributed to the module. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 10 of 23 5. Security Rules The Astro Subscriber MACE enforces the following security rules. These rules are separated into those imposed by FIPS 140-2 and those imposed by Motorola. 5.1 FIPS 140-2 Imposed Security Rules 1. The Astro Subscriber MACE inhibits all data output via the data output interface whenever an error state exists and during self-tests. 2. The Astro Subscriber MACE logically disconnects the output data path from the circuitry and processes when performing key generation, manual key entry, or key zeroization. 3. Authentication data (e.g. PINs) are entered in encrypted form. Authentication data is not output during entry. 4. At FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2, secret cryptographic keys are entered in plaintext form over a physically separate port. 5. The Astro Subscriber MACE enforces Identity-Based authentication. 6. The Astro Subscriber MACE supports a User role and a Crypto-Officer role. Authenticated operators are authorized to assume either supported role. 7. The Astro Subscriber MACE re-authenticates an operator when it is powered-up after being powered-off. 8. The Astro Subscriber MACE prevents brute-force attacks on its password by using a 10-digit password that reduces the probability of a successful random attempt to one in 10,000,000,000. It would require 100,000 attempts in one minute to lower the random attempt success rate to less than 1 in 100,000. A limit of 15 failed authentication attempts is imposed; 15 consecutive failed authentication attempts causes all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid) and the password to be reset to the factory default. 9. The Astro Subscriber MACE uses RSA-2048 to prevent brute-force attacks on the digital signature used to verify firmware integrity during a Program Update. As the Program Update service requires more than one minute to complete the random attempt success rate during a one minute period cannot be lowered to less than 1 in 100,000. 10. Authentication data is not output during entry. 11. The Astro Subscriber MACE provides the following services requiring a role: Program Update Transfer Key Variable Privileged APCO OTAR Change Active Keyset Change Password Encrypt Digital Decrypt Digital Zeroize Selected Keys Key/Keyset Check Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 11 of 23 12. The Astro Subscriber MACE provides the following services not requiring a role: FIPS Status Initiate Self Tests Validate Password Zeroize All Keys Zeroize All Keys and Password Non-Privileged APCO OTAR Reset Shutdown Extract Error Log Clear Error Log Download Configuration Parameters 13. The Astro Subscriber MACE implements all firmware using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to enhance performance. 14. The Astro Subscriber MACE protects secret keys and private keys from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. 15. The Astro Subscriber MACE provides a means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the Astro Subscriber MACE is associated with the correct entities to which the key is assigned. Each key in the Astro Subscriber MACE is entered and stored with the following information: Key Identifier ­ 16 bit identifier Algorithm Identifier ­ 8 bit identifier Key Type ­ Traffic Encryption Key or Key Encryption Key Physical ID, Common Key Reference (CKR) number, and Keyset number ­ Identifiers indicating storage locations. Along with the encrypted key data, this information is stored in a key record that includes a CRC over all of the fields to detect data corruption. When used or deleted the keys are referenced by CKR/Key ID/Algid, Key ID/Algid, Physical ID, or CKR/Keyset. 16. The Astro Subscriber MACE denies access to plaintext secret and private keys contained within the Astro Subscriber MACE. 17. The Astro Subscriber MACE provides the capability to zeroize all plaintext cryptographic keys and other unprotected critical security parameters within the Astro Subscriber MACE. 18. The Astro Subscriber MACE provides the following non-FIPS Approved Random Number Generators to provide random numbers used as Initialization Vectors (IV) and the seeds for the Approved RNG. Maximal length 64-bit LFSR. Non-deterministic Hardware Random Number Generator 19. The Astro Subscriber MACE conforms to FCC 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B requirements. 20. The Astro Subscriber MACE performs the following self-tests: Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 12 of 23 Table 3: Power On Self-Tests Self-Test Description Result of Self-Test Failure AES Encrypt & Decrypt Each algorithm is tested by The module enters an error KATs for each of the using a known key, known state if any Cryptographic following modes: data, and if required a known Algorithm Test fails. The - OFB IV. The data is then error state may be exited by - CBC encrypted and compared with powering the module off then - ECB known encrypted data; the on. - CFB (8-bit) test passes if the final data - GCM matches the known data, otherwise it fails. The SHA-384 KAT encrypted data is then decrypted and compared with HMAC-SHA-384 KAT the original plaintext; the test passes if the decrypted data matches the original plaintext, otherwise it fails. DRBG KAT The DRBG is initialized with a The module enters an error known answer seed and V state if the DRBG KAT fails. generated by the hardware The error state may be exited RNG. The DRBG is run and by powering the module off a random bit block is then on. generated. The DRBG is then reseeded and another random bit block is generated. The two random bit blocks are compared. The test passes if the generated data does not match. Firmware Integrity Test - A digital signature is The module enters an error includes the following: generated over the code state if the Firmware Integrity - SHA-256 KAT when it is built using SHA-256 Test fails. - RSA 2048 Verify and RSA-2048 and is stored As soon as an error indicator KAT with the code upon download is output via the status into the module. When the interface, the module module is powered up the transitions from the error state digital signature is verified. If to a state that only allows new the digital signature matches firmware to be loaded. the test passes, otherwise it fails. Powering the module off then on or resetting the module using the Reset service will initiate the power-up and on-demand self-tests. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 13 of 23 Table 4: Conditional Self-Tests Self-Test Description Result of Self-Test Failure Firmware Load Test A digital signature is The module enters an error generated over the code state if the Firmware Load when it is built using SHA-256 Test fails. This error state and RSA-2048. Upon may be exited by powering download into the module, the the module off then on which digital signature is verified. If will start the download and the digital signature matches validation process over. the test passes, otherwise it fails. Continuous Random For each RNG, an initial value The module enters an error Number Generator is generated and stored upon state if the Continuous Tests: power up. This value is not Random Number Generator - DRBG used for anything other than Test fails. This error state - NDRNG to initialize comparison data. may be exited by powering - LFSR A successive call to any one the module off then on. of the RNGs generates a new set of data, which is compared to the comparison data. If a match is detected, this test fails; otherwise the new data is stored as the comparison data and returned to the caller. 21. The Astro Subscriber MACE outputs a status indicator via the Self-test Indicator interface to indicate all self-tests passed. A status indicator is not output via the Self- test Indicator interface whenever an error state is entered due to a failed self-test. 22. The Astro Subscriber MACE does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state. 5.2 Motorola Imposed Security Rules 1. The Astro Subscriber MACE does not support multiple concurrent operators. 2. All cryptographic module services are suspended during key loading. 3. After a sufficient number (15) of consecutive unsuccessful user login attempts, the module will zeroize all keys from the Key Database. 4. The module does not support the output of plaintext or encrypted keys. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 14 of 23 6. Identification and Authentication Policy The Astro Subscriber MACE supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto-Officer). The Astro Subscriber MACE uses a 10-digit password to authenticate the User and an RSA- 2048 digital signature to authenticate the Crypto-Officer. The role of the operator is specified by selecting which physical port will be used to authenticate and access module services. The authentication data for the Program Update service is the digital signature of the downloaded firmware. Table 5: Authorized Roles Role Authentication Type Authentication Data Required User Identity-Based User ID and 10-digit Password Crypto-Officer Identity-Based RSA-2048 digital signature for Program Update service Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 15 of 23 7. Physical Security Policy The Astro Subscriber MACE is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2 and is designed to meet Level 3 physical security requirements. The information below is applicable to Cryptographic Module hardware kit numbers 5185912Y01, 5185912Y03 and 5185912Y05, which have identical physical security characteristics. The Astro Subscriber MACE is covered with a hard opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper with the module. The security provided from the hardness of the module's epoxy encapsulate is claimed at ambient temperature (20 to 25 degrees Celsius) only. No assurance of the epoxy hardness is claimed for this physical security mechanism outside of this range. The Astro Subscriber MACE does not contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical security of the module while delivering to operators. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 16 of 23 8. Access Control Policy 8.1 Astro Subscriber MACE Supported Roles The Astro Subscriber MACE supports two (2) roles. These roles are defined to be the: User role and, Cryptographic Officer (Crypto-Officer or CO) role. 8.2 Astro Subscriber MACE Services Table 6: Services Allocated to Authorized Roles Role Service Description User CO X Program Update Update the module firmware. Firmware upgrades are authenticated using a digital signature. The Program Update Public Signature Key (a 2048 bit public RSA key) is used to validate the signature of the firmware image being loaded before it is allowed to be executed. All keys and CSPs are zeroized during a Program Update. To maintain validation, only validated firmware should be loaded. Loading non-validated firmware will invalidate the modules validation. X Transfer Key Transfer key variables to the MACE Key Database via a Variable Key Variable Loader (KVL). If the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is enabled then keys will be transferred from the KVL in plaintext. If Red Keyfill is disabled, all keys transferred from the KVL will be encrypted. The Red Keyfill configuration parameter can be changed using the Download Configuration Parameters service. Any modification of the Red Keyfill parameter will zeroize all keys; therefore the operator shall reinitialize the module in accordance with the instructions provided in Section 3.1 of this document. X Privileged APCO Modify and query the Key Database via APCO OTAR OTAR Key Management Messages. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation. X Change Active The active keyset is used to store a group of keys for Keyset current use while inactive keysets are used to store keys for future use. This service modifies the currently active keyset used for selecting keys for encryption / decryption services. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 17 of 23 Role Service Description User CO X Change Password Modify the current password used to identify and authenticate the User role. Fifteen consecutive failed attempts causes the KPK to be zeroized, a new KPK to be generated, all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid), and the password to be reset to the factory default. X Encrypt Digital Encrypt digital voice or data. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation. X Decrypt Digital Decrypt digital voice or data. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation. X Zeroize Selected Zeroize selected key variables from the Key Database Keys by Physical ID (PID) or Common Key Reference (CKR). X Key/Keyset Check Obtain status information about a specific key/keyset The following services are available without assuming an authorized role. Table 7: Unauthenticated Services Service Description FIPS Status Provides current FIPS status about whether the module is operating at overall Security Level 3, or in a non-Approved mode of operation. Initiate Self Tests Performs module self-tests comprised of cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware integrity test, and critical functions test. Initiated by module reset or transition from power off state to power on state. Validate Validate the current password used to identify and authenticate the User Password role. Fifteen consecutive failed attempts causes the KPK to be zeroized, a new KPK to be generated, all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid), and the password to be reset to the factory default. Zeroize All Keys Zeroize all keys from the Key Database. (Module can be reinitialized using a Key Variable Loader.) Zeroize All Keys Zeroizes the KPK and all keys and CSPs in the key database and and Password causes a new KPK to be generated. Resets the password to the factory default. Allows user to gain controlled access to the module if the password is forgotten. (Module can be reinitialized using a Key Variable Loader.) Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 18 of 23 Service Description Non-Privileged Hello and Capabilities Key Management Messages may be performed APCO OTAR without a role Reset (Crypto Soft reset of module to remove module from error states or a transition Module) from power off to power on state. Shutdown (Crypto Prepares module for removal of power. Module) Extract Error Log Status Request. Provides detailed history of error events. Clear Error Log Clears history of error events. Download Download configuration parameters used to specify module behavior. Configuration Examples include enable/disable APCO OTAR, SingleKey, or MultiKey Parameters mode, etc. If the Tamper configuration parameter changed the module will zeroize the KPK and all keys and CSPs in the key database and will generate and store a new KPK. 8.3 Key Management CSPs: The following table provides a list and description of all CSPs managed by the module. Table 8: CSP Definition CSP Identifier Description SP800-90 CTR A 128-bit seed value used within the SP800-90A CTR DRBG. The V is DRBG V not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed is not entered into or output from the module. SP800-90 CTR Key used to seed the SP800-90A CTR DRBG during initialization. The DRBG Key seed key is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed key is not entered into or output from the module. Black Keyloading A 256 bit AES key used for decrypting keys entered into the module via Key (BKK) a KVL when the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is disabled. Stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized through the Program Update service. The BKK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module. Image Decryption A 256-bit AES key used to decrypt downloaded images. Stored in Key (IDK) plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized through the Program Update service. The IDK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module. Key Encryption 256 bit AES key used for encryption of other keys in OTAR. Stored Keys (KEKs ) encrypted on KPK in non-volatile memory. Entered through the KVL or APCO OTAR. KEK's are not output from the module. Key Protection 256 bit AES key used to encrypt TEKs and KEKs stored in non-volatile Key (KPK) memory. The KPK is not entered into or output from the module. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 19 of 23 CSP Identifier Description Password The 10-digit password is entered encrypted on the PEK. After decryption the plaintext password is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory. The SHA-256 hash of the decrypted password is compared with the hash value stored in non-volatile memory during password validation. The password is not output from the module. Password 256 bit AES key used for decrypting password during password Encryption Key validation. Stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized (PEK) through the Program Update service. The PEK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module. Traffic Encryption 256 bit AES key used for voice and data encryption. Stored encrypted Keys (TEKs) on KPK in non-volatile memory. Entered through the KVL or APCO OTAR. TEK's are not output from the module. Public Keys: The following table lists and describes all Public Keys managed by the module. Table 9: Public Key Definition Public Key Description Name Programmed 2048 bit RSA key used to validate the signature of the firmware image Signature Key being before it is allowed to be executed and is also used for authentication of the Crypto-Officer role. Loaded during manufacturing. The Programmed Signature Key is not output from the module. 8.4 CSP Access Types Table 10: CSP Access Types Access Type Description c - Check CSP Checks status and key identifier information of key. d - Decrypt CSP Decrypts TEK or KEK retrieved from non-volatile memory using the KPK. Decrypts TEKs or KEKs entered via the KVL when the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is disabled using the Black Keyloading Key. Decrypts entered password with PEK during password validation. e - Encrypt CSP Encrypts TEK or KEK with KPK prior to storage in non-volatile memory. g - Generate CSP Generates KPK, SP800-90 CTR DRBG V, or SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key. i - Invalidate CSP Marks encrypted TEKs or KEKs stored in non-volatile memory as invalid. TEKs or KEKs marked invalid can then be over-written when new TEKs or KEKs are stored. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 20 of 23 Access Type Description s - Store CSP Stores KPK in volatile and non-volatile memory. Stores encrypted TEKs or KEKs in non-volatile memory, over-writing any previously invalidated TEK or KEK in that location. Stores plaintext BKK, PEK, or IDK in non-volatile memory. u - Use CSP Uses CSP internally for encryption / decryption services. z - Zeroize CSP Zeroizes key. Table 11: CSP versus CSP Access Service CSP Role No Role Required Keyloading Key) Encryption Key) Encryption Key) Encryption Key) Decryption Key) PEK (Password Protection Key) Crypto-Officer SP800-90 CTR SP800-90 CTR TEK (Traffic BKK (Black IDK (Image DRBG Key Password KEK (Key KPK (Key DRBG V User Program Update z, s u, z, s z z z, s z Transfer Key Variable u i, e, z, u i, e, z, s s Privileged APCO u d, u, i, u d, u, i, OTAR e, z, s e, z, s Change Active Keyset Change Password i z, g, s d, u, z u i Encrypt Digital d, u Decrypt Digital d, u Zeroize Selected Keys i i Key/Keyset Check c c FIPS Status c c Initiate Self Tests Validate Password i z, g, s d, u, z u i Zeroize All Keys i i Zeroize All Keys and i z, g, s i Password Non-Privileged APCO OTAR (not for key entry) Reset g, u, z g, s Shutdown Extract Error Log Clear Error Log Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 21 of 23 Service Download Parameters Configuration SP800-90 CTR CSP DRBG V SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key BKK (Black Keyloading Key) IDK (Image Decryption Key) Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE i KEK (Key Encryption Key) KPK (Key z, g, s Protection Key) Password PEK (Password Encryption Key) i TEK (Traffic Encryption Key) User Role Crypto-Officer Page 22 of 23 No Role Required 9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The Astro Subscriber MACE is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of those required by FIPS 140-2, including but not limited to power consumption, timing, fault induction, or TEMPEST attacks. Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Astro Subscriber MACE Page 23 of 23