Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Level 2 Validation Version 0.6 April 23, 2015 © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 1 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 3 1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 MODELS ............................................................................................................................. 3 1.3 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3 1.4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 3 1.5 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4 1.6 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4 2 CISCO SYSTEMS 5508 WIRELESS LAN CONTROLLER ............................................ 5 2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS .................................................. 5 2.2 MODULE INTERFACES ......................................................................................................... 5 2.3 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .......................................................................... 7 2.4 SERVICES AVAILABLE IN A NON-FIPS MODE OF OPERATION ............................................ 9 2.5 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ........................................................................................... 9 2.6 PHYSICAL SECURITY ........................................................................................................ 10 2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 12 2.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................. 13 2.9 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 18 2.10 SELF-TESTS PERFORMED ................................................................................................... 18 3 SECURE OPERATION ..................................................................................................... 19 © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller, Firmware 8.0 with SNMP Stack v15.3, OPENSSL-0.9.8g-8.0.0, QUICKSEC-2.0-8.0 and FP-CRYPTO-7.0.0; referred to in this document as controller or the module. This security policy describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed. 1.2 Model  Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html. 1.3 Module Validation Level The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2. No. Area Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key management 2 8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2 9 Self-Tests 2 10 Design Assurance 2 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Overall module validation level 2 Table 1 Module Validation Level 1.4 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the routers from the following sources: © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems Security. Please refer to the following website: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/product _data_sheet0900aecd802930c5.html http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com. The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. 1.5 Terminology In this document, the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller is referred to as Controller, WLC, or the module. 1.6 Document Organization The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: Vendor Evidence document Finite State Machine Other supporting documentation as additional references This document provides an overview of the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the appliances. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non- disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems. © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2 Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller The Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller (herein referred to as the module) is designed for maximum 802.11n performance and offers scalability for medium to large-scale enterprise and Government wireless deployments. The module supports Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) security. CAPWAP uses DTLS to provide a secure link over which CAPWAP control messages are sent and supports data DTLS to provide a secure link for CAPWAP data traffic. DTLS is essentially TLS, but over datagram (UDP) transport. WPA2 is the approved Wi-Fi Alliance interoperable implementation of the IEEE 802.11i standard. The module automatically detects, authorizes and configures access points, setting them up to comply with the centralized security policies of the wireless LAN. In a wireless network operating in this mode, WPA2 protects all wireless communications between the wireless client and other trusted networked devices on the wired network with AES-CCMP encryption. CAPWAP protects all control and bridging traffic between trusted network access points and the module with DTLS encryption. Optional CAPWAP data DTLS (v1.0) is also supported by the module. The module supports HTTPS using TLS, CAPWAP, WPA2 (802.11i), MFP, RADIUS KeyWrap (using AES key wrapping), IPSec, Local-EAP, EAP-FAST, TACACS+, and SNMP. HTTPS using TLS uses 2048 bit modulus RSA keys to wrap 128/256 bit AES symmetric keys, and RADIUS KeyWrap uses 128 bit AES symmetric keys. 2.1 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics Each Controller is a multi-chip standalone security appliance, and the cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” and “bottom” surfaces of the case. 2.2 Module Interfaces The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables: Router Physical Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface 8 1000BaseT, 1000Base-SX and Data Input Interface 1000Base-LH transceiver slots 8 1000BaseT, 1000Base-SX and Data Output Interface 1000Base-LH transceiver slots 8 1000BaseT, 1000Base-SX and Control Input Interface 1000Base-LH transceiver slots, Console Port: RS232 (DB-9 male/RJ-45), mini-USB © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Router Physical Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface LED Indicators, Console Port: Status Output Interface RS232 (DB-9 male/RJ-45), mini- USB Power Supply 1 and 2 Power Interface Table 2 - Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping Figure 1 - Cisco 5508WLC Front Panel Figure 2 - Cisco 5508 WLC Rear Panel © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.3 Roles, Services and Authentication The module supports these four roles:  AP Role—This role is filled by an access point associated with the controller.  Client Role—This role is filled by a wireless client associated with the controller.  User Role—This role performs general security services including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The product documentation refers to this role as a management user with read-only privileges.  Crypto Officer (CO) Role—This role performs the cryptographic initialization and management operations. In particular, it performs the loading of optional certificates and key-pairs and the zeroization of the module. The product documentation refers to this role as a management user with read-write privileges. This Module does not support a Maintenance Role User Services The services available to the User role consist of the following: Services & Description Keys & CSPs Access System Status The LEDs show the network activity and overall operational status and the command line status commands output system status. N/A User & CO authentication to the module using TACACS+ N/A (No keys are accessible) TACACS+. Secure communications between controller and IPSec N/A (No keys are accessible) RADIUS Establishment and subsequent receive 802.11i RADIUS Key Wrap N/A (No keys are accessible) PMK from the RADIUS server. Table 3 - User Services Crypto Officer Services The Crypto Officer services consist of the following: Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs Self Test and Initialization Cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware N/A (No keys are accessible) integrity tests, module initialization. System Status The LEDs show the network activity and overall N/A (No keys are accessible) operational status and the command line status commands output system status. TACACS+ User & CO authentication to the module using TACACS+ authentication secret, TACACS+. TACACS+ authorization secret, TACACS+ accounting secret – w, d © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. IPSec Secure communications between controller and IKE session encryption key, IKE RADIUS session authentication key, IPSec session encryption key, IPSec session authentication key – d ISAKMP preshared – w,d Zeroization Zeroize CSPs and cryptographic keys by calling All Keys and CSPs will be destroyed ‘switchconfig key-zeroize controller’ command or cycling power to zeroize all cryptographic keys stored in SDRAM. The CSPs (password, secret, cscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert, engineID) stored in Flash can be zeroized by overwriting with a new value. Module Configuration Selection of non-cryptographic configuration N/A settings SNMPv3 Non-security related monitoring by the CO snmpEngineID, SNMPv3 Password, using SNMPv3 SNMP session key – w, d  Establishment and subsequent data HTTPS/TLS TLS pre-master secret, encryption key, integrity key – w, d transfer of a TLS session for use between the module and the CO.  Protection of syslog messages DTLS Data Encrypt Enabling optional DTLS data path encryption DTLS Master Secret, encryption for Office Extended AP’s keys, DTLS Session Integrity Keys – w, d RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11i RADIUS Server Shared Secret, PMK from the RADIUS server. RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK, – w, d Table 4 - Crypto Officer Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete) AP and Client Services The AP and Client services consist of the following: Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs MFP (AP Role) Generation and subsequent distribution of MFP N/A (No keys are accessible) key to the AP over a CAPWAP session. Local EAP Authenticator Establishment of EAP-TLS or EAP-FAST based N/A (No keys are accessible) (Client Role) authentication between the client and the Controller. 802.11i (AP Role) Establishment and subsequent data transfer of an N/A (No keys are accessible) 802.11i session for use between the client and the access point RADIUS Key Wrap (AP Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11i N/A (No keys are accessible) and Client Role) PMK from the RADIUS server. Table 5 – AP and Client Services User and CO Authentication The Crypto Officer role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the module via CLI. The OS prompts the CO for their username and password, if the password is validated against the CO’s password in memory, the user is allowed entry to execute CO services. CO passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 251,596,800 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. The calculation should be 10 x 9 x 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 32 x 52 = 251, 596, 800). Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 251,596,800, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. AP Authentication The module performs mutual authentication with an access point through the CAPWAP protocol, using an RSA key pair with 1024 to 2048 bit modulus, which has an equivalent symmetric key strength of 80 and 112 bits. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a 1 in 2^80 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 1.8 x 10^21 attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support. Client Authentication The module performs mutual authentication with a wireless client through EAP-TLS or EAP- FAST protocols. EAP-FAST is based on EAP-TLS and uses EAP-TLS key pair and certificates. The RSA key pair for the EAP-TLS credentials has modulus size of 1024 bit to 2048 bit, thus providing between 80 bits and 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a 1 in 2^80 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 1.8 x 10^21 attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support. 2.4 Services Available in a Non-FIPS Mode of Operation  SSHv1  SNMP v1 and v2  IPSec/IKE with Diffie-Hellman 768-bit/1024-bit modulus and Triple-DES 2.5 Unauthenticated Services An unauthenticated operator may observe the System Status by viewing the LEDs on the module, which show network activity and overall operational status. A solid green LED indicates normal operation and the successful completion of self-tests. The module does not support a bypass capability in the approved mode of operations. © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 9 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.6 Physical Security This section describes placement of tamper-evident labels and opacity shields on the module. Labels must be placed on the device and maintained by the Crypto Officer in order to operate in the FIPS approved mode of operation. The 5508 FIPS kit (AIR-CT5508FIPSKIT=) which includes the FIPS opacity shield and FIPS Tamper Evident Labels. The Tamper Evident Labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Please note that the placement of tamper-evident labels on the module is not required for FIPS 140 security Level 1 deployments. For FIPS 140 security level 2 scenarios, the tamper-evident labels are required to meet physical security requirements Follow these steps to install the opacity shield and tamper evident labels: 1) Align the FIPS shield to the front of the controller unit, aligning screw holes to existing mount holes on left and right sides of controller. 2) Attach one of the front brackets to the controller using three M4 screws. The screws will go through the front mount bracket, then through the FIPS shield, and thread into the side of the controller. Follow the same steps to attach the second bracket to the opposite side. - Note that only three of the four holes on each bracket are used (top, left, and right). 3) Clean the cover of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evidence labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. The temperature of the router should be above 10C. 4) Put tamper-evident labels over the bottom panel. 5) Attach the opacity shield over the front face. 6) Place one seal each over the left and right side mounting brackets, for a total of two (2) labels These protect the front opacity shield from removal. The two (2) seals on the rear protect any components from being removed without tamper evidence. All four seals protect against the removal or prying open of the top cover to expose the module's interior. 7) The labels completely cure within five minutes. © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 3 - Tamper Evident Label Placement (side view) Figure 4 - Tamper Evident Label Placement (rear view) The tamper evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident seals have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident seals can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back. The Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals for evidence of tamper as determined by their deployment policies (every 30 days is recommended). If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact Cisco accordingly NOTE: Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location. © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.7 Cryptographic Algorithms The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms. Approved Cryptographic Algorithms The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations, whose names are SNMP (FW: SNMA Stack v15.3), OSSL (FW: OPENSSL-0.9.8g-8.0.0), QuickSec (FW: QUICKSEC-2.0-8.0) and 5508 CN56xx Datapath (HW: CN56XX; FW: FP-CRYPTO- 7.0.0). SNMP OSSL QuickSec 5508 CN56xx Datapath FW: FW: FW: HW: P/N P/N or Version SNMP Stack OPENSSL- QUICKSEC-2.0- CN56XX v15.3 0.9.8g-8.0.0 8.0 FW: FP- CRYPTO-7.0.0 AES-CBC #2906 #2894 #2895 #1348 AES-CCM #2906 #2894 #2895 N/A AES-ECB #2906 #2894 #2895 N/A AES-CMAC #2906 #2894 #2895 N/A SHA-1 N/A #2437 #2438 #1230 SHA-256 N/A #2437 N/A N/A HMAC SHA-1 #1840 #1830 #1831 #787 DRBG N/A #526 N/A N/A RSA N/A #1524 N/A N/A CVL (SP800- N/A #322 N/A N/A 135) KBKDF (SP800- N/A #31 N/A N/A 108) Table 6 - Approved Cryptographic Algorithms Note: RSA Cert. #1524 only supports RSA Signature Verification in this module. Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms  AES (Cert. #2894, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)  Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)  HMAC-MD5  MD5  NDRNG  RC4  Triple-DES (non-compliant) © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.8 Cryptographic Key Management Cryptographic keys are stored in plaintext form, in flash for long-term storage and in SDRAM for active keys. The AES key wrap KEK, AES key wrap MACK keys, and the Pre shared key (PSK) are input by the CO in plaintext over a local console connection. The PMK is input from the RADIUS server encrypted with the AES key wrap protocol or via IPSec. RSA public keys are output in plaintext in the form of X.509 certificates. The CAPWAP session key is output wrapped with the AP's RSA key, and the MFP MIC key and 802.11i PTK, 802.11i GTK are output encrypted with the CAPWAP session key. Asymmetric key establishment (RSA key transport) is used in the creation of session keys during EAP-TLS and EAP-FAST. Any keys not explicitly mentioned are not input or output. Table 6 lists the access to the keys by service. Table 7 lists the secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the module. Please note that the CSPs below are stored in plaintext in both SDRAM and Flash. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size General Keys/CSPs DRBG entropy input SP 800-90 HW based entropy source 256-bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig CTR_DRBG output used to construct key-zeroize seed controller’ command or Power cycle DRBG seed SP 800-90 Input to the DRBG that 384 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig CTR_DRBG determines the internal key-zeroize state of the DRBG. controller’ Generated using DRBG command or derivation function that Power cycle includes the entropy input from hardware-based entropy source. DRBG V SP 800-90 Internal V value used as 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig CTR_DRBG part of SP 800-90a key-zeroize CTR_DRBG controller’ command or Power cycle DRBG Key SP 800-90 This is the 256-bit DRBG 256 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig CTR_DRBG key used for SP 800-90a key-zeroize CTR_DRBG controller’ command or Power cycle cscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert rsa-pkcs1-sha2 Verification certificate, 2048 Flash Overwrite with used with CAPWAP to new certificate validate the certificate that authenticates the access point generated/installed © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size at manufacturing Diffie-Hellman public key Diffie-Hellman The public key used in 2048 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig (Group 14) Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-zeroize exchange controller’ command or Power cycle Diffie-Hellman private key Diffie-Hellman The private key used in 224 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig (Group 14) Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-zeroize exchange controller’ command or Power cycle Diffie-Hellman shared secret Diffie-Hellman The shared key used in 2048 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig (Group 14) Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-zeroize exchange. Created per the controller’ Diffie-Hellman command or protocol Power cycle RADIUS Server Shared Secret Shared secret This is the shared secret 22 bytes Flash Overwrite with between the RADIUS new password server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form. RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionK AES-128/256 AES-128/AES-256 128-256 SDRAM ‘switchconfig ey encryption/decryption key, bits key-zeroize used in IPSec tunnel controller’ between module and command or RADIUS to Power cycle encrypt/decrypt EAP keys. RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey HMAC Integrity/authentication 128-256 SDRAM ‘switchconfig key, used in IPSec tunnel bits key-zeroize between module and controller’ RADIUS command or Power cycle User password Shared Secret Identity based Variable Flash Overwrite with authentication data for (8+ new password user character s) Enable secret Password Identity based Variable Flash Overwrite with authentication data for CO (8+ new secret character s) TACACS+ authentication secret Shared secret This is the authentication 64 bytes Flash Overwrite with shared secret between the new secret TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form. © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size TACACS+ authorization secret Shared secret This is the authorization 64 bytes Flash Overwrite with shared secret between the new secret TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form. TACACS+ accounting secret Shared secret This is the accounting 64 bytes Flash Overwrite with shared secret used for new secret authentication between the TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form. IKE/IPSEC IKE session encryption key AES Derived in the module 256-bit SDRAM ‘switchconfig used for IKE payload AES key-zeroize encryption/decryption controller’ command or Power cycle IKE session authentication key HMAC-SHA-1 Derived in the module 160 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig used for IKE payload key-zeroize integrity verification controller’ command or Power cycle ISAKMP pre-shared Shared secret This shared secret was 8 chars Flash Overwrite with manually entered by CO new secret for IKE pre-shared key based authentication mechanism. IPSec authentication key HMAC-SHA1 used to authenticate the 160 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig IPSec peer key-zeroize controller’ command or Power cycle IPSec encryption key AES Used to Secure IPSec 256-bit SDRAM ‘switchconfig traffic AES key-zeroize controller’ command or Power cycle DTLS DTLS Pre-Master Secret Shared Secret Generated by approved 48 bytes SDRAM ‘switchconfig DRBG for generating the key-zeroize DTLS encryption key controller’ command or Power cycle DTLS Master Secret Shared Secret Derived from DTLS Pre- 48 bytes SDRAM ‘switchconfig Master Secret. Used to key-zeroize create the DTLS controller’ encryption and integrity command or keys Power cycle © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size DTLS Encryption/Decryption AES-CBC Session Keys used to e/d 128-256 SDRAM ‘switchconfig Key (CAPWAP session keys) CAPWAP control bits key-zeroize messages controller’ command or Power cycle DTLS Integrity Keys HMAC-SHA1 Session keys used for 128-256 SDRAM ‘switchconfig integrity checks on bits key-zeroize CAPWAP control controller’ messages command or Power cycle SNMPv3 snmpEngineID Shared secret 32-bits Unique Flash Overwrite with string to new engine ID identify the SNMP engine Shared Secret This secret is used to 32 bytes Flash Overwrite with SNMPv3 Password derive HMAC-SHA1 key new password for SNMPv3 Authentication SNMPv3 session key AES 128-bit Encrypts SDRAM ‘switchconfig SNMPv3 key-zeroize traffic controller’ command or Power cycle HTTPS/TLS HTTPS TLS Pre-Master secret Shared secret Shared secret created 48 bytes SDRAM ‘switchconfig using asymmetric key-zeroize cryptography from which controller’ new HTTPS session keys command or can be created. Power cycle HTTPS TLS Encryption Key AES-CBC AES key used to encrypt 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig TLS data key-zeroize controller’ command or Power cycle HTTPS TLS Integrity Key HMAC-SHA1 HMAC-SHA-1 key used 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig for HTTPS integrity key-zeroize protection controller’ command or Power cycle TLS Pre-Master Secret Shared secret Shared secret used to 48 byte SDRAM ‘switchconfig generate new TLS session key-zeroize keys for syslog. controller’ command or Power cycle TLS Encryption Key AES-CBC Symmetric AES key for 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig encrypting syslog key-zeroize messages over TLS. controller’ command or Power cycle © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size TLS Integrity Key HMAC-SHA1 Used for TLS integrity 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig protection of syslog key-zeroize messages. controller’ command or Power cycle Infrastructure MFP MIC Key AES-CMAC This 128-bit AES key is 128 bits SDRAM ‘switchconfig generated in the controller key-zeroize using approved DRBG. controller’ This key is sent to the AP command or encrypted with the DTLS Power cycle encryption key. This key is used by the AP to sign management frames when infrastructure MFP is enabled. 802.11i 802.11i Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Shared secret This is the shared secret 63 bytes Flash Overwrite with used for 802.11i client new secret. authentication. 802.11i Pairwise Master Key HMAC-SHA-1 The PMK is transferred to 32 byte SDRAM ‘switchconfig (PMK) the module, protected by key-zeroize RADIUS AES KeyWrap controller’ key. Used to derive the command or Pairwise Transient Key Power cycle (PTK) for 802.11i communications 802.11i Key Confirmation Key HMAC-SHA1 The KCK is used by IEEE 16 byte SDRAM ‘switchconfig (KCK) 802.11i to provide data key-zeroize origin authenticity in the controller’ 4-Way Handshake and command or Group Key Handshake Power cycle messages. 802.11i Key Encryption Key AES Key Wrap The KEK is used by the 16 byte SDRAM ‘switchconfig (KEK) EAPOL-Key frames to key-zeroize provide confidentiality in controller’ the 4-Way Handshake and command or Group Key Handshake Power cycle messages. 802.11i Pairwise Transient Key AES-CCM The PTKis the 802.11i 16/32 SDRAM ‘switchconfig (PTK) session key for unicast byte key key-zeroize communications. size controller’ command or Power cycle 802.11i Group Temporal Key AES-CCM The GTK is the 802.11i 16/32 SDRAM ‘switchconfig (GTK) session key for broadcast byte key-zeroize communications. controller’ command or Power cycle RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK AES-ECB This key is used by the 16 bytes SDRAM ‘switchconfig RADIUS Keywrap service key-zeroize to protect the PMK for the controller’ 802.11i protocol. command or Power cycle © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Key/CSP Name Generation/ Description Key Storage Zeroization Algorithm Size RADIUS KeyWrap MACK HMAC-SHA1 The MAC key used by the 16 bytes SDRAM ‘switchconfig RADIUS Keywrap service key-zeroize to authenticate RADIUS controller’ traffics. command or Power cycle Table 7 - Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Note: The KDF infrastructure used in DTLS v1.0 is identical to the one used in TLS v1.0/1.1, which was certified by CVL Cert. #322. 2.9 Self-Tests The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are functioning correctly. 2.10 Self-tests performed  Cisco 5508 Series Wireless Controller o AES (encryption/decryption KATs (firmware) o AES (encryption/decryption) KATs (hardware) o SHA-1 KAT (firmware) o SHA-256 KAT (firmware) o SHA-1 KAT (hardware) o HMAC SHA-1 KAT (firmware) o HMAC SHA-256 KAT (firmware) o HMAC SHA-1 KAT (hardware) o SP 800-90 DRBG KAT (firmware) o RSA (verify) KAT (firmware) o Firmware Integrity Test RSA with SHA-256 (firmware) The module perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the AP’s from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure. The following conditional tests are also performed –  Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the FIPS-approved DRBG © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.  Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the non-approved NDRNG 3 Secure Operation The module was validated with firmware version 8.0 with SNMP Stack v15.3, OPENSSL- 0.9.8g-8.0.0, QUICKSEC-2.0-8.0 and FP-CRYPTO-7.0.0 (This is the only allowable image for FIPS-approved mode of operation.). Follow the setting instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating the module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps: 1. Enable FIPS Mode of Operations The following CLI command places the controller in FIPS mode of operations, enabling all necessary self tests and algorithm restrictions: > config switchconfig fips-prerequisite enable 2. Configure HTTPS Certificate The following command configures the controller to use the manufacture-installed Cisco device certificate for the HTTPS server. It must be executed after enabling FIPS mode of operations: > config certificate use-device-certificate webadmin 3. Configure Authentication Data All users shall have a password containing 8 or more characters, including numbers and letters. A crypto officer can use the following CLI command to set user passwords: >config mgmtuser password username password read-write Note that this and all subsequent configuration steps may also be performed through HTTPS. However, only the CLI commands are included in this document. It is the Crypto Officer’s responsibility to securely deliver the password over to User. 4. Configure Communications with RADIUS Communications between the controller and RADIUS may be configured for RADIUS KeyWrap or IPSec. 5. RADIUS KeyWrap and MACK Keys © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. The following CLI commands configure the RADIUS secret and AES-key wrap KEK and MACK: > config radius auth add index ip-address port hex secret > config radius auth keywrap add hex kek mack index > config radius auth keywrap enable 6. IPSec/IKE Optionally, the controller may be configured to communicate with RADIUS via IPSec/IKE. Refer to the document at the following link for additional instructions: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6366/products_tech_note09186a0080a829b8.shtml In addition, please be aware that AES is the only allowed symmetric algorithm used in IPSec/IKE encryption/decryption operations in FIPS mode. 7. Configure 802.11i Pre-shared Key (PSK) 802.11i Pre-shared key (PSK) is an optional mode permitted by this security policy. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this security policy, but it should be 64 hexadecimal values (256 bits) and entered by Crypto Officer using the following commands: > config wlan security wpa akm psk enable index > config wlan security wpa akm psk set-key hex key index Refer to Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions. 8. Configure Ciphersuites for 802.11i The following CLI commands create a wireless LAN, configure it to use WPA2, associate it with a RADIUS server, and enable it: > config wlan create index profile_name ssid > config wlan radius_server auth add index radius-server-index > config wlan enable index 9. Configure SNMPv3 © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Only SNMPv3 with HMAC-SHA-1 is permitted by this security policy. The user passwords shall be selected to be 8 or more characters, including numbers and letters. This has been tested and is FIPS compliant. The following CLI commands enable SNMPv3 with HMAC-SHA1: > config snmp version v1 disable > config snmp version v2c disable > config snmp version v3 enable > config snmp v3user create username hmacsha aescfb128 authkey encryptkey 10. Configure TACACS+ secret The crypto officer may configure the module to use TACACS+ for authentication, authorization and accounting. Configuring the module to use TACACS+ is optional. If the module is configured to use TACACS+, the Crypto-Officer must define TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long. The following CLI command configures TACACS+ for authentication (auth), authorization (athr) and accouting (acct): config tacacs add index ip port secret Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions. 11. Configure MFP (Management Frame Protection) Infrastructure MFP enables one access point to validate a neighboring Access Point’s management frames. Configuring the module to use MFP is optional. The following CLI command is used to enable infrastructure MFP: config wps mfp infrastructure enable Client MFP is used to encrypt and sign management frames between the AP and the client. The following CLI command is used to enable client MFP: config wlan mfp client enable index required Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions. 12. Configure Data DTLS (optional) © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. The crypto officer may configure the module to use CAPWAP data encryption. CAPWAP data packets encapsulate forwarded wireless frames. Configuring the module to use CAPWAP data encryption is optional. The following CLI commands enable DTLS data encryption for access points on the controller: To enable or disable data encryption for all access points or a specific access point, enter this command: a. config ap link-encryption {enable | disable} {all | Cisco_AP} When prompted to confirm that you want to disconnect the access point(s) and attached client(s), enter b. >Y To save your changes, enter this command: c. save config Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions. 13. Configure Data DTLS with Office Extend Access Points (optional) The crypto officer may configure the module to use CAPWAP data encryption with Office Extend Access Points (AP models 1131, 1142, and 3502i). CAPWAP data encryption with Office Extend APs secures communications from a controller to a remote access points using CAPWAP data encryption. The following CLI commands enable CAPWAP data encryption with Office Extend APs: To enable hybrid-REAP on the access point, enter this command: a. config ap mode flexconnect Cisco_AP To configure one or more controllers for the access point, enter one or all of these commands: b. config ap primary-base controller_name Cisco_AP controller_ip_address c. config ap secondary-base controller_name Cisco_AP controller_ip_address d. config ap tertiary-base controller_name Cisco_AP controller_ip_address To enable the OfficeExtend mode for this access point, enter this command: © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. e. config flexconnect office-extend {enable | disable} Cisco_AP To save your changes, enter this command: f. save config Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions. 14. Save and Reboot After executing the above commands, you must save the configuration and reboot the system: a. save config b. reset system © Copyright 2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.