FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy AQ42-M Document Version 1.0.1 Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd. Copyright © 2014 Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Table of Contents Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................. 2 1. Module Overview ......................................................................................................................... 3 2. Security Level .............................................................................................................................. 5 3. Modes of Operation ..................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Approved Mode of Operation ................................................................................................. 6 3.2. Non-Approved Mode of Operation ......................................................................................... 7 4. Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 8 5. Identification and Authentication Policy ................................................................................... 9 5.1. Assumption of Roles .............................................................................................................. 9 5.2. Authentication Mechanism ..................................................................................................... 9 6. Access Control Policy............................................................................................................... 10 6.1. Roles and Services .............................................................................................................. 10 6.2. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ................................................................ 13 6.3. Definition of Public Keys....................................................................................................... 13 6.4. Definition of CSP Access Modes .......................................................................................... 14 7. Operational Environment.......................................................................................................... 18 8. Security Rules ............................................................................................................................ 19 9. Physical Security Policy ........................................................................................................... 21 9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms ............................................................................................. 21 9.2. Operator Actions ................................................................................................................... 21 10. Policy on Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................... 23 11. Definitions and Acronyms ........................................................................................................ 24 12. Revision History ........................................................................................................................ 26 This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 1. Module Overview The AQ42-M cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module encased in a hard opaque commercial grade metal case. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire metal case perimeter, including all hardware and firmware encapsulated within. The interfaces are all traces that cross the cryptographic boundary. The primary purpose of the AQ42-M is to provide decryption, decoding/encoding of audio/video data for the digital cinema projector system in which it is used. The illustration below shows the AQ42-M, along with the cryptographic boundary. Top Side Bottom Side Figure 1 - Image of the AQ42-M Cryptographic Module This document is written about the following validated hardware / firmware version of AQ42-M:  Hardware version: 2.0.0  Firmware version: 1.2.2 AQ42-M firmware configuration table is as follows. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Table 1 - AQ42-M Firmware Configuration Component Firmware Component Version Firmware 1.2.2 MDC version 01.22.01 NSA version 01.21.00 CDM version 01.22.00 Kernel version 02.06.33 MBA version 01.22.00 CTU version 04.01.01 DSP version 01.00.09 Boot Loader version 01.00.00 This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 4 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 2. Security Level The AQ42-M meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 3 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 5 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 3. Modes of Operation 3.1. Approved Mode of Operation The AQ42-M is designed to continually operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The AQ42-M supports the following FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms:  AES with 128-bit key (as per FIPS 197) -CBC and ECB mode of operation - Certificates: #2932, #2934 -CBC mode of operation (Decrypt only) - Certificate: #2933  SHA-1 with 160-bit hash value (as per FIPS 180-3) - Certificates: #2469, #2470, #2468  SHA-256 with 256-bit hash value (as per FIPS 180-3) - Certificates: #2469, #2470, #2471  HMAC-SHA-1 with 160-bit MAC value (as per FIPS 198) - Certificates: #1858, #1859  RSA Signature Generation with 2,048-bit key using SHA-256 (as per FIPS 186-4) - Certificates: #1537, #1538  RSA Signature Verification with 2,048-bit key using SHA-1 (as per FIPS 186-2) - Certificate: #1538  RSA Signature Verification with 2,048-bit key using SHA-256 (as per FIPS 186-2) - Certificates: #1537, #1538  ANSI X9.31 RNG using AES (as per ANSI X9.31) - Certificates: #1294, #1295  FIPS 186-2 RNG using SHA-1 (as per FIPS 186-2) - Certificate: #1293  SP 800-135rev1 TLS KDF using SHA-1 (as per SP 800-135rev1) - Certificate: #333 In addition to the above algorithms the AQ42-M employs the following Allowed non-FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms for use in the FIPS approved mode of operation.  RSA only for key encapsulation. (Key establishment methodology provides 112-bit of encryption strength) This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 6 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M  NDRNG for the seeding of the ANSI X9.31 RNGs  HMAC-MD5 for the pseudo random function in TLS The module supports the following algorithms which are Disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:  RSA Signature Generation with 2,048-bit key using SHA-1 Algorithms providing less than 112 bits of security strength (Disallowed per NIST SP 800-131A) are not allowed in the FIPS Approved mode of operation for use by Federal agencies. The operator can be assured that the AQ42-M is in the approved mode by verifying that the firmware versions identified using the 'Get Version' service match each of the validated firmware component versions listed in Section 1. 3.2. Non-Approved Mode of Operation The AQ42-M does not support a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 7 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 4. Ports and Interfaces The physical interfaces for AQ42-M are the traces that cross the perimeter of the physical cryptographic boundary. The traces are used to support TLS with the following logical interfaces required by FIPS 140-2:  Data Input  Data Output  Status Output  Control Input In addition, the AQ42-M receives power from an outside source and thus supports a power input interface.  Power Input This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 8 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 5. Identification and Authentication Policy 5.1. Assumption of Roles The AQ42-M supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto-Officer). The AQ42-M enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication. The Crypto-Officer and User are authenticated using the RSA 2048 signature verification algorithm. Table 3 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data User Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Certificate Crypto-Officer Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Certificate 5.2. Authentication Mechanism The AQ42-M supports an authentication mechanism. Table 4 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism RSA Digital Certificate The authentication is based on RSA 2,048, which has an equivalent Verification strength of 112-bit. Therefore, the probability with which a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 2-112 which is less than 1/1,000,000. There is a 10msec delay after each trial which limits the number of attempts per minute. The probability of a random attempt successfully authenticating to the AQ42-M within one minute is also 6000 * 2-112 (< 210 * 2-112 = 2-102) which is less than 1/100,000. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 9 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 6. Access Control Policy 6.1. Roles and Services Table 5 - Crypto-Officer Specific Services Service Description Clear Log Deletes all logs required by Digital Cinema Initiative (DCI) specification. Update Start Sequence Checks a certificate and prepares for firmware update. Update Module Receives a firmware image from the operator and perform firmware updating. Update End Sequence Ends a firmware update procedure. Zeroization Deletes all plaintext CSP. * Note: If a non-FIPS validated firmware version is loaded onto the AQ42-M, then the AQ42-M is no longer an FIPS validated module. Table 6 - Crypto-Officer and User Common Services Service Description Delete KDM Deletes Key Delivery Message (KDM) specified with Compositions Play list (CPL) ID. Delete KDM ID Deletes KDM specified with KDM ID. Detail KDM ID Outputs detailed information of KDM specified with KDM ID. Get Audio Frequency Outputs the audio frequency. Get Audio Muting Outputs audio mute information. Get Audio Routing Outputs the audio routing switch information. Get Certificate Outputs information of certificates that the module has. Get CPL List ID Outputs CPL playing information buffer ID of the module. Get Date Outputs the time and date. Get Delay Outputs the audio delay value. Get FM ID Outputs the forensic mark ID. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 10 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Service Description Get Marriage Status Outputs the current connection status with an external device. Get MS Configuration Outputs the Master/Slave mode of the module. Get Playback Information Outputs the current CPL playback status. Get Root Certificate Outputs information of root certificates. Get Security Status Outputs the current protection status of the module. Get Status Outputs information of various statuses. Get Time-zone Outputs set time-zone information. Get Version Outputs version information of the module. Get White Point Outputs the mode of the white point. Heartbeat Keeps the current session with an operator. Initialize Marriage* Initializes the connection status with an external device. Initialize PCIE Connection Sends a signal to an external device to reset its own status. List KDM ID Outputs an ID list of stored KDM and keys. List Root Cert Outputs a file name list of stored root certificates. List Security Log Outputs a file name list of stored security logs. Play Pause Execution Pauses playback of the current content. Play Pause Resume Resumes playback of the paused content. Play Prepare Completed Checks the current playback preparation status of an operator. Play Prepare CPL Prepares playback of CPL. Play Set SPL Reads the construction of Show Play List (SPL). Play Step Plays the paused content frame by frame. Play Stop Stops playback of the current content. Relate KDM ID Outputs an ID list of KDM specified with CPL ID. Retrieve Certificate Outputs stored certificates. Retrieve Root Cert Outputs stored root certificates. Retrieve Security Log Outputs stored logs required by DCI specification. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 11 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Service Description Set Audio Frequency Sets the audio frequency. Set Audio Muting Sets the audio muting switch. Set Audio Routing Sets the audio routing switch. Set Date Sets a time of the module. Set Date 2 Sets a time of the module. Set Delay Sets the audio delay value. Set MS Configuration Switches the Master/Slave mode of the module. Set Timed Text Key ID Sets ID of key used for decrypting encrypted Material eXchange Format (MXF) file. Set Time-zone Sets time-zone. Set White Point Sets the mode of the white point. Shutdown Shuts down or reboots the module. Snapshot Outputs logs in the form of ZIP format. Store KDM Stores KDM given by an operator. Verify CPL Checks whether the specified CPL is playable. Version Checks the version of an operator interface. * Services impacted by the SP 800-131A algorithm transitions. It is the responsibility of the module operator to ensure that algorithms, modes, and key sizes Disallowed per NIST SP 800-131A are not used. Table 7 - Unauthenticated Services Service Description Show Status Outputs the module status. Self-tests Performs power-up self-tests. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 12 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 6.2. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following CSPs are included in the AQ42-M.  Contents Encryption Key (CEK) - AES key used to decrypt contents.  Content Integrity Key (CIK) - HMAC-SHA-1 key for integrity check of contents.  Master Key (MK) - AES key used to protect all stored CSPs.  TLS Session Key (TSK) - The AES key established in TLS.  TLS MAC Secret (TMACS) - The HMAC key established in TLS.  RSA Signing Key (RSK) - RSA private key used for generation of a digital signature for the log data and TLS session data.  Device Private Key (DPK) - RSA private key used for decryption of CEK and decryption of wrapped cryptographic keys which are entered into the AQ42-M in TLS.  TLS Premaster Secret (TPS) - The parameter used for key establishment in TLS.  TLS Master Secret (TMS) - The parameter used for key establishment in TLS.  PRF State (PS) - The internal state used for key establishment in TLS.  Seed and Seed Key (SSK) - The secret values necessary for the FIPS approved RNGs. 6.3. Definition of Public Keys The following are the public keys contained in the AQ42-M:  AQ42-M Manufacturer Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify a certificate chain of trust.  AQ42-M Trusted Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify a certificate chain of trust.  RSA Verifying Key - RSASSA 2048 public key corresponding to the RSA Signing Key.  Device Public Key - RSAES 2048 public key corresponding to the Device Private Key. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 13 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M  Public Key for F/W Upgrade - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify the digital signature over the firmware image to be upgraded.  Operator Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to authenticate operators.  Projector Public Key - RSAES 2048 public key used to authenticate an external device.  KDM Issuer Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify signature of KDM. 6.4. Definition of CSP Access Modes Table 8 defines the relationship between CSP access modes and module services. The access modes shown in Table 8 are defined as follows:  Generate (G): Generates the Critical Security Parameter (CSP) using an approved Random Number Generator (RNG).  Use (U): Uses the CSP to perform cryptographic operations within its corresponding algorithm.  Entry (E): Enters the CSP into the AQ42-M.  Output (O): Outputs the CSP from the AQ42-M.  Zeroize (Z): Removes the CSP. Table 8 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services Role Service Name CSP (Access Mode) C.O. User X Clear Log TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Update End Sequence TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Update Module TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Update Start Sequence TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Zeroization CEK(Z), CIK(Z), MK(Z), RSK(Z), DPK(Z), TSK(UZ), TMACS(UZ), TPS(Z), TMS(Z), PS(Z), SSK(Z) This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 14 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Role Service Name CSP (Access Mode) C.O. User X X Delete KDM CEK(Z), CIK(Z), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Delete KDM ID CEK(Z), CIK(Z), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Detail KDM ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Audio Frequency TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Audio Muting TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Audio Routing TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Certificate TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get CPL List ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Date TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Delay TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get FM ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Marriage Status TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get MS Configuration TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Playback Information TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Root Certificate TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Security Status TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Status TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Time-zone TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Version TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get White Point TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Heartbeat TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Initialize Marriage RSK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Initialize PCIE Connection TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X List KDM ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X List Root Certificate TSK(U), TMACS(U) This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 15 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Role Service Name CSP (Access Mode) C.O. User X X List Security Log RSK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Pause Execution TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Pause Resume TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Prepare Completed CEK(U), CIK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Prepare CPL TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Set SPL TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Step TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Play Stop TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Relate KDM ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Retrieve Certificate TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Retrieve Root Certificate TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Retrieve Security Log TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Audio Frequency TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Audio Muting TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Audio Routing TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Date TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Date 2 TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Delay TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set MS Configuration TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Timed Text Key ID TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set Time-zone TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Set White Point TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Shutdown TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Snapshot TSK(U), TMACS(U) This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 16 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Role Service Name CSP (Access Mode) C.O. User X X Store KDM CEK(UE), CIK(G), MK(U), SPK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U), SSK(U) X X Verify CPL TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Version TSK(U), TMACS(U) Any Any Show Status - Any Any Self-Test - * TPS, TMS, and PS are entered or generated, used and zeroized in TLS establishment. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 17 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 7. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the AQ42-M does not contain a modifiable operational environment. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 18 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 8. Security Rules The AQ42-M cryptographic module was designed with the following security rules in mind. These rules are comprised of both those specified by FIPS 140-2 and those derived from Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd.’s company policy. 1. The AQ42-M shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User role, and the Crypto-Officer role. 2. The AQ42-M shall provide identity-based authentication. 3. When the AQ42-M has not been placed in an authenticated role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 4. The AQ42-M shall perform the following tests: i. Power-up Self-Tests: a. Cryptographic algorithm tests (for each implementation): - AES 128 CBC Encryption/Decryption Known-Answer Tests - AES 128 ECB Encryption/Decryption Known-Answer Test - ANSI X9.31 RNG Known-Answer Test - FIPS 186-2 RNG Known-Answer Test - SHA-1 Known-Answer Test - SHA-256 Known-Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-1 Known-Answer Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation/Verification Known-Answer Test - SP 800-135rev1 TLS KDF Known-Answer Test b. Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-16 and CRC-32) c. Critical Functions Test: - HMAC-MD5 Known-Answer Test - RSA OAEP Pair-wise Consistency Test (Encryption/Decryption) This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 19 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Pair-wise Consistency Test (Encryption/Decryption) ii. Conditional Self-Tests: a. Continuous (RNG) Tests (ANSI X9.31 RNGs, FIPS 186-2 RNG, NDRNG) b. Firmware Load Test (RSA Digital Signature Verification) 5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the AQ42-M to perform the power-up self-test using recycling power. 6. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 7. Data output shall be logically disconnected from key generation processes. 8. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the AQ42-M. 9. The AQ42-M does not support concurrent operators. 10. The AQ42-M shall not support a bypass capability or a maintenance interface. 11. If a non-FIPS validated firmware version is loaded onto the AQ42-M, then the AQ42-M ceases to be a FIPS validated module. 12. HMAC-MD5 is only used as the pseudo random function in TLS. 13. The AQ42-M only supports the electronic entry form of key establishment. 14. RSA Signing Key is used for TLS establishment when the AQ42-M behaves as a TLS client in communication with an external device. 15. Device Private Key is used for TLS establishment when the AQ42-M behaves as a TLS server in communication with an external device. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 20 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 9. Physical Security Policy 9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms The AQ42-M is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module with the following physical security mechanisms:  Production-grade components,  The enclosure of AQ42-M has a removable cover that four tamper evidence seals (See Figure 2 and Figure 3) are sealed by Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd. in secure manufacturing facility. When the cover is removed or the power supply from the outside is lost, all plaintext CSPs within the AQ42-M are zeroized,  The enclosure is opaque and provides tamper evidence. The enclosure is sufficiently hard, providing tamper detection and response in accordance with FIPS 140-2 level 3 physical security requirements. #2 #1 #3 #4 Figure 2 – Image of Tamper Evidence Seal Figure 3 – Seal Location 9.2. Operator Actions This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 21 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Due to the intended deployment environment for the AQ42-M, Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd. defers the physical inspection criteria to the end user of the cryptographic module. Any such inspection shall be based on the customer security policy, in particular with regards to the inspection frequency. Table 9 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Physical Security Recommended Frequency Inspection/Test Guidance Details Mechanisms of Inspection/Test Hard Removable Enclosure Every startup and reboot. Inspect for scratches or deformation of the metal case. If such evidence is found, user should not use the module. Tamper Evidence Seals Every startup and reboot. Inspect for curled corner, peel, rips, or appearance of words “WARRANTY VOID IF REMOVED”. If found such evidences, user should not use the module. Tamper detection Every startup and reboot. If the module was zeroized, user should return it to Digicine Oristar Technology Development (Beijing) Co., Ltd.. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 22 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 10. Policy on Mitigation of Other Attacks The AQ42-M was not designed to mitigate other attacks outside of the specific scope of FIPS 140-2. Therefore, this section is not applicable. Table 10 - Mitigation of Other Attacks Other Attack Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations N/A N/A N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 23 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 11. Definitions and Acronyms Table 11 -Definitions and Acronyms Term Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard CDM Contents Decryption and Decode Module CPL Compositions Playlists CRC Cyclic Redundancy Code CSP Critical Security Parameter CTU Counter Tampering & Tamper Detection Unit DCI Digital Cinema Initiative DCP Digital Cinema Package DRNG Deterministic RNG DSP Digital Signal Processor EMI / EMC Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code KDF Key Derivation Function KDM Key Delivery Message MBA Media Block Application MDC Media Decrypt & Decode Controller NSA Nios & Audio Mapping OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding PAD FPGA that processes video and audio data PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards PRF Pseudo Random Function RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 24 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M Term Definition RSA ES/SSA RSA Encryption Standard / Secure Signature Algorithm RTC Real Time Clock SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SPL Show Play List TLS Transport Layer Security This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 25 of 26 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy AQ42-M 12. Revision History Date Version Description Aug. 13, 2014 1.0.0 Initial release. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 26 of 26