Hughes Network Systems, LLC Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Firmware Version: 1.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 0.6 Prepared for: Prepared by: Hughes Network Systems, LLC Corsec Security, Inc. 11717 Exploration Lane, 13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220 Germantown, MD 20876 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America United States of America Phone: +1 (301) 428-2762 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050 http://www.hughes.com http://www.corsec.com Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Table of Contents 1  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3  1.1  PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................................... 3  1.2  REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................... 3  1.3  DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ........................................................................................................................ 3  2  HUGHES SPACEWAY CRYPTO KERNEL ............................................................................ 4  2.1  OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................ 4  2.2  MODULE SPECIFICATION................................................................................................................................. 6  2.3  MODULE INTERFACES ...................................................................................................................................... 9  2.4  ROLES AND SERVICES .................................................................................................................................... 10  2.4.1  Crypto-Officer Role ......................................................................................................................................... 10  2.4.2  User Role ........................................................................................................................................................... 11  2.5  PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................... 12  2.6  OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................................... 12  2.7  CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT......................................................................................................... 12  2.8  SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................................................... 14  2.8.1  Power-Up Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................ 14  2.8.2  Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................... 14  2.8.3  Critical Functions Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................... 14  2.9  MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS............................................................................................................... 15  3  SECURE OPERATION ............................................................................................................ 16  3.1  SECURE MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................................. 16  3.1.1  Initialization ...................................................................................................................................................... 16  3.1.2  Management .................................................................................................................................................... 16  3.1.3  Zeroization........................................................................................................................................................ 16  3.2  USER GUIDANCE............................................................................................................................................ 16  4  ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................. 17  Table of Figures FIGURE 1 – HUGHES SPACEWAY SYSTEM TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT ............................................................................... 4  FIGURE 2 – HN9500 SATELLITE ROUTER .......................................................................................................................... 5  FIGURE 3 – HUGHES SPACEWAY CRYPTO KERNEL CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY................................................... 7  FIGURE 4 – HARDWARE BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR HN9500 ............................................................................................... 8  List of Tables TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION ...................................................................................................... 5  TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS ................................................................................................. 10  TABLE 3 – CRYPTO-OFFICER SERVICES ............................................................................................................................ 11  TABLE 4 – USER SERVICES .................................................................................................................................................. 12  TABLE 5 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ........................................................................................ 13  TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ................................ 13  TABLE 7 – ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................................... 17  Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 2 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel (firmware version: 1.0) from Hughes Network Systems, LLC. This Security Policy describes how the Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel is referred to in this document as the HSCK, the cryptographic module, or the module. 1.2 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • Hughes corporate website (http://www.hughes.com) contains information on the full line of products from Hughes. • The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the module. 1.3 Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: • Vendor Evidence document • Finite State Model document • Validation Submission Summary • Other supporting documentation as additional references This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to Hughes. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Package is proprietary to Hughes and is releasable only under appropriate non- disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Hughes. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 3 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 2 Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel 2.1 Overview Geostationary satellite coverage available via SPACEWAY 3 satellite from Hughes Network Systems, LLC provides the capability to deliver broadband internet service to individual consumers and businesses in the continental US (CONUS) coverage area. Optimized for broadband IP 1 services, Hughes SPACEWAY systems support a wide variety of applications, from high-speed Internet/intranet access to video conferencing. The Hughes SPACEWAY system is a broadband satellite system, designed and optimized for carrier-grade IP broadband networking and specialized for applications such as mobility and mesh networking. The system includes an economical access gateway earth station and high performance remote satellite terminals. Figure 1 – Hughes SPACEWAY System Typical Deployment The SPACEWAY system provides secure communication over an IPsec 2 protocol. The design of the SPACEWAY system includes the centralization of cryptographic functionality into a common cryptographic engine called the Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel (HSCK). The HSCK is used by the following components of the SPACEWAY systems for secure communications: • SPACEWAY Access Gateway: A core component of a SPACEWAY System deployment is the Access Gateways (AGWs), where uplinks to the satellite and Internet infrastructure are available. The Access Gateway uses a proprietary SPACEWAY encoding protocol for the outbound channel received by all SPACEWAY Satellite Terminals (ST). STs utilize FDMA 3 /TDMA 4 channels to communicate back to the Access Gateway (when deployed in star mode) or to each other (when configured in mesh mode). 1 IP – Internet Protocol 2 IPsec – Internet Protocol Security 3 FDMA – Frequency-Division Multiple Access 4 TDMA – Time-Division Multiple Access Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 4 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 • HN9500 Satellite Router: The HN9500 is Hughes’ high-performance satellite router that enables carrier-grade broadband IP services with enhanced security and selectable data rates to satisfy the most demanding bandwidth requirements. The HN9500 Satellite Router (Figure 2 below) is one of the available Satellite Terminals within the SPACEWAY system. Figure 2 – HN9500 Satellite Router HN9500 Satellite Routers are intended to be deployed in the field acting as the local access points to the satellite communication system and, ultimately to the network infrastructure. The HN9500 provides a broad array of standard networking functionality in a compact, high-performance package, allowing users to configure any combination of mesh and star topologies to create highly secure, broadband IP networks. The HSCK provides the following basic functionalities: • Creation of dynamically-generated shared session keys using Internet Key Exchange (IKE) • Establishment and teardown of IPSec tunnels between two or more hosts • Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128- or 256-bit encryption on all data transfer within an IPsec tunnel • Message authentication and integrity using Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) with SHA 5 1 or SHA256 as per the configuration The module provides cryptographic and secure communication services for other applications developed by Hughes as described above. In this document, those applications will be collectively referred as a host application. The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel is validated at the FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1. Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1 4 Finite State Model 1 5 SHA – Secure Hashing Algorithm Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 5 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Section Section Title Level 5 Physical Security 1 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 1 6 8 EMI/EMC 1 9 Self-tests 1 10 Design Assurance 1 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 14 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 1 2.2 Module Specification The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel is a firmware module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 1. The physical cryptographic boundary of the Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel is the appliance upon which it runs; however, the module is in the form of a standalone binary object file. The HSCK module has been validated and tested for use on the custom-built Hughes HN9500 Satellite Terminal (ST) and the Access Gateway (AGW) appliances running the VxWorks 5.4 operating system. The HSCK module comprises a single binary object file. This object file is used to provide a cryptographic Application Programming Interface (API) to the applications of the ST and AGW appliances. The HSCK module provides an API for invocation of FIPS-Approved cryptographic functions from host applications. The logical cryptographic boundary of the module is shown in Figure 3 and indicated with a dotted line. 6 EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 6 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Figure 3 – Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Cryptographic Boundary The module runs on a VxWorks 5.4 operating system on a custom-built Hughes HN9500 and a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) HP ProLiant DL320 Generation 2 and 5 servers (AGWs). Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the block diagrams of the HN9500 and AGW appliances. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 7 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 DDR2 FLASH DDR (16M x 32) (16M x 16) (16M x 32) DDR32 ECB DDR FRONT BOOT UPAM SAM LED CNTRL SAM IICO PANEL ROM PowerPC LEDS DaVINCI (PPC405EP) ASIC SERIAL PPC-INTR[5:0] IRQ[6:1] RS232 UART[1] DEBUG 333MHz XCVR IF +3.3V HEADER PU UPAM RST SYS RST V.92 TELCO PCI PCI UART[0] DISECQ MODEM PORT (RJ-11) MUX DISEQC IN/OUT PCI JTAG HEADER JTAG ODU-ID HEADER RS232 SERIAL CONTROL SP1 XCVR DEBUG DAUGHTERCARD ECB BIST BIST DATA SP1 (2) HEADERS CONNECTOR EMC[1] N/C DEBUG DBG[52:0] RX HEADER MARCONII A/D DI[5:0] / DQ[5:0] USER IFL ASIC PORT 1 EMC[0] P5 P2 (RJ-45) JTAG DANUBE JTAG TX HEADER I_TXD / Q_TXD ASIC +3.3V +1.8V IFL LAN SW USER ENET P4 P3 PORT 2 +48V MDC / MDIO MDC/MDIO (RJ-45) MASTER RESET POWER 6.5V IF PWR SUPER THERMAL SHUT RESET DC/DC REG SWITCH +1.0V +1.8V +3.3V +1.0V +1.8V +3.3V +3.3V +6.0V 1.0V 1.8V 3.3V 6.0V VI DC/DC VI DC/DC VIDC/DC VIDC/DC E E E E N N N N +48V POWER +6.0V +13.5V INPUT 5V THERMAL +5.0V REGULATO FAN SHUTDOWN R Figure 4 – Hardware Block Diagram for HN9500 Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 8 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Figure 5 – Hardware Block Diagram for AGW 2.3 Module Interfaces The HSCK implements distinct module interfaces in its firmware design. Physically, the module ports and interfaces are considered to be those of the host platform that the firmware runs upon. However, the firmware communicates through an Application Programming Interface (API), which allows a host application to access the module. Both the APIs and the physical ports/interfaces can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2: • Data Input Interface • Data Output Interface • Control Input Interface • Status Output Interface These logical interfaces (as defined by FIPS 140-2) map to the platform’s physical interfaces, as described in Table 2. All of these physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces required by FIPS 140-2 as described in Table 2. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 9 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings Physical Port/Interface FIPS 140-2 Hughes SPACEWAY HN9500 Satellite Logical Interface Crypto Kernel Interface Access Gateway Router Data Input Interface • Ethernet ports (2) • Arguments for a function that Ethernet ports (2) takes the data to be used or • Serial port • Serial connector processed by the module • Satellite IN port • Keyboard connector • Mouse connector • USB connectors (4) • Ethernet ports (2) • Data Output Arguments for a function that Ethernet ports (2) Interface specify where the result of • Serial port • Serial connector the function is stored • Satellite OUT port • Video connector • USB connectors (4) • Ethernet ports (2) • Function arguments used to Control Input Ethernet ports (2) control the operation of the Interface • Serial port • Serial port iLO management port module • Satellite IN port • • Keyboard connector • Mouse connector • UID button • USB connectors (4) • Power button • • Status Output Return values for function Ethernet ports (2) Ethernet ports (2) Interface calls or function argument in • • Serial port Serial connector ‘hck_module_status_t’ data • • Satellite IN port iLO management port structure • • LEDs Video connector • USB connectors (4) • LEDs • Power interface • Power interface Power Interface Not Applicable • 48V, 13.5V external • 48V DC power supply AC/DC power supply 2.4 Roles and Services There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: a Crypto-Officer role and a User role. The module does not support authentication mechanisms. Role assumption is implicit; operators assume their role based on the service selected for execution. 2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role The Crypto-Officer (CO) role is responsible for initializing the module, zeroizing keys and CSPs 7 , performing self-tests, and monitoring status. Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in Table 3. Please note that the keys and CSPs listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation: • R – Read access: The CSP may be read. • W – Write access: The CSP may be established, generated, modified, or zeroized. 7 CSP – Critical Security Parameter Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 10 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 • X – Execute access: The CSP may be used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication mechanism. Table 3 – Crypto-Officer Services Service Description CSP and Type of Access hck_init() Validates input parameters before None performing power-on self-tests; Initializes configuration hck_initialize_csp() Initializes the CSPs for a peer IPsec Traffic key – W IPsec MAC key – W hck_zeroize_csp() Zeroizes IKE/IPsec ephemeral IKE Key Agreement key – W CSPs IPsec Traffic key – W IPsec MAC key – W hck_shutdown() Shuts down all crypto functionality None hck_do_self_tests() Performs power-on self-tests None hck_get_status() Retrieves the crypto-module None status hck_get_name_and_version() Retrieves the module name and None version number hck_get_version() Retrieves the module’s major and None minor version numbers hck_get_fips_mode() Determines whether or not FIPS None mode has been enabled hck_print_status() Prints module status variables and None statistics to a display or log file hck_update_parms() Sets configuration parameters None based on module’s current mode of operation 2.4.2 User Role The User role establishes IKE/IPsec sessions and utilizes secure communication functionality provided by the module. Descriptions of the services available to the User role are provided in Table 4. CSP access types (R, W, or X) are defined in Section 2.4.1 above. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 11 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Table 4 – User Services Service Description CSP and Type of Access hck_process_ike_event() Ensures that the crypto-module is Preshared key – R, W, X active and validates input IPsec Traffic key – W parameters before processing a IPsec MAC key – W received IKE packet or provides a IKE Key Agreement key – W timer event to the IKE state Entropy Input string – W, X machine DRBG seed – W, X hck_process_tx_pkt() Ensures that the crypto-module is IPsec Traffic key – X active and validates input IPsec MAC key – X parameters before processing Entropy Input string – W, X IPsec transmission packet DRBG seed – W, X hck_process_rx_pkt() Ensures that the crypto-module is IPsec Traffic key – X active and validates input IPsec MAC key – X parameters before processing Entropy Input string – W, X IPsec received packet DRBG seed – W, X hck_send_ike_msg() Ensures that the crypto-module is IKE Key Agreement key – R active and validates input parameters before invoking IKE transmit function 2.5 Physical Security Since this is a firmware module, the module relies on the host platform (a purpose-built Hughes appliance or a COTS HP ProLiant DL320 G5 server) to provide the mechanisms necessary to meet FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements. All components of the target platform are made of production-grade materials, and all integrated circuits are coated with commercial standard passivation. The host platforms have been tested for and meet applicable Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic Interference and Electromagnetic Compatibility requirements for business use as defined in Subpart B of FCC Part 15. 2.6 Operational Environment On the host platforms, Hughes employs VxWorks 5.4, a non-modifiable OS. Hence, the operational environment requirements do not apply to the firmware module. 2.7 Cryptographic Key Management The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 5 below. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 12 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations Algorithm Certificate Number 8 AES CBC (128-, 256-bit key) 1788 SHA-1, SHA-256 1570 HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA-256 1053 HMAC-based SP800-90 DRBG 126 Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations: • MD5 9 - used for the firmware integrity test • Diffie-Hellman - key agreement mechanism (caveat: 1024-bit or 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength) The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 6. Table 6 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use Pre-shared key Generated externally, Never exits Resides in Reboot Generation of enters the module in the module plaintext on the IPsec Traffic plaintext volatile key and internal memory IKE authentication IKE Key Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot or on key Exchange of Agreement key during IKE Phase 1 the module volatile derivation completion shared secret negotiation memory during IKE IKE Session Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot, session Encryption or key during IKE Phase 1 the module volatile termination, or by decryption of negotiation memory calling to IKE sessions ‘hck_zeroize_csp()’ function IKE MAC key Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot, session Data during IKE Phase 1 the module volatile termination, or by authentication negotiation memory calling to during IKE ‘hck_zeroize_csp()’ sessions function IPsec Traffic Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot, session Encryption or key during IKE Phase 2 the module volatile termination, or by decryption of negotiation memory calling to IPsec ESP ‘hck_zeroize_csp()’ packets function IPsec MAC key Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot, session Authentication during IKE Phase 2 the module volatile termination, or by of IPsec ESP negotiation memory calling to packets ‘hck_zeroize_csp()’ function 8 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining 9 MD5 – Message Digest 5 Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 13 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use DH public key Generated internally Exits the Plaintext in Reboot or session Generation of module in volatile termination IKE Key plaintext memory Agreement key and IPsec session key DH private key Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot or session Generation of the module volatile termination IKE Key memory Agreement key and IPsec Session key Entropy Input Continually polled from Never exits Plaintext in Reboot Random number string various system the module volatile generation resources to accrue memory entropy DRBG seed Generated internally Never exits Plaintext in Reboot Random number using nonce and the module volatile generation personalization string memory along with entropy input 2.8 Self-Tests The HSCK performs a set of self-tests upon power-up and conditionally as required in FIPS 140-2. 2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests Power-up self tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded into memory space. If any one of the self-tests fail, the module enters an error state and prevents all cryptographic data processing and functionality. The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel performs the following power-up self-tests: • Firmware integrity test using an Error Detection Code (MD5 hash) • Known Answer Tests (KATs) AES KAT (encryption and decryption) o SHA-1 and SHA-256 KATs o HMAC SHA-1 and HMAC SHA-256 KATs o SP800-90 HMAC-based DRBG KAT o 2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests The module performs a Continuous RNG Test (CRNGT) for the Approved DRBG to ensure that the 256- bit random result is not equivalent to the previous result. Upon reseed, the CRNGT for the reseed also verifies that the next seed value is not equivalent to the previous seed value. 2.8.3 Critical Functions Self-Tests At the power-up, the module also tests for the following: • Minimum available memory on the host platform • Operating system version Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 14 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks in its FIPS- Approved mode of operation. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 15 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 3 Secure Operation The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Section 3.1 below provides guidance to the Crypto-Officer for managing the module. 3.1 Secure Management The Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel is distributed by Hughes installed on a custom appliance as part of a single monolithic binary image containing the Hughes’ HN9500 and AGW system applications, and is not distributed as a separate binary. Thus, module operators are not required to perform any steps to ensure that the module is running in its FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Host applications must first call the function hck_install() to load and initialize the module. This function call is the entry point to the module, and ensures that all necessary power-up self-tests are called. When properly initialized, the HSCK will only operate in its defined FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Any use of the module without proper initialization will result in the module operating in a non-Approved manner. 3.1.1 Initialization On host platforms, VxWorks 5.4 is a non-modifiable operating system; hence, it does not require to be configured for single user mode. The module itself checks for the OS version and available memory on the platform at startup. 3.1.2 Management The Crypto-Officer should monitor the module’s status regularly and make sure only the services listed in Table 3 and Table 4 are being used. If any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Hughes Network Systems customer support should be contacted. 3.1.3 Zeroization The module does not persistently store any key or CSPs. All ephemeral keys used by the module are zeroized upon reboot, or session termination. The Crypto-Officer can also zeroize keys by calling the hck_shutdown() function. 3.2 User Guidance Only the module’s cryptographic functionalities are available to the User. Users are responsible to use only the services that are listed in Table 4. Although the User does not have any ability to modify the configuration of the module, they should report to the Crypto-Officer if any irregular activity is observed. Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 16 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 4 Acronyms This section lists acronyms used in the document. Table 7 – Acronyms Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standard Institute API Application Programming Interface CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCI Common Cryptographic Interface CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Crypto-Officer COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada CSP Critical Security Parameter DC Direct Current EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FDMA Frequency-Division Multiple Access FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard HSCK Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code IKE Internet Key Exchange IP Internet Protocol IPGW Internet Protocol Gateway IPsec Internet Protocol Security KAT Known Answer Test LED Light Emitting Diode MAC Message Authentication Code MD Message Digest NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NOCC Network Operations Control Center OS Operating System Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 17 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 0.6 November 16, 2011 PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator RAM Random Access Memory SHA Secure Hash Algorithm TDMA Time-Division Multiple Access Hughes SPACEWAY Crypto Kernel Page 18 of 19 © 2011 Hughes Network Systems, LLC This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.corsec.com