Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Version 4.0 Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Voltage Security, Inc. Copyright 2012 Voltage Security. May be reproduced only in its original entirety without revision. Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Revision History The following table presents the history of changes to this document. Document History Date Version Changes 02-04-2012 1.0 Initial draft for public release. Page 2 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy TABLE OF CONTENTS REVISION HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................. 2   1. MODULE OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................... 4   2. SECURITY LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................. 6   3. MODES OF OPERATION ...................................................................................................................................... 7   3.1 FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION .................................................................................................................. 7   3.2 NON-APPROVED MODE ......................................................................................................................................... 8   4. PORTS AND INTERFACES................................................................................................................................... 9   5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY............................................................................... 10   6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ............................................................................................................................ 11   6.1 ROLES AND SERVICES ......................................................................................................................................... 11   6.2 SERVICE INPUTS AND OUTPUTS .......................................................................................................................... 13   6.3 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) ................................................................................ 17   6.4 DEFINITION OF CSPS MODES OF ACCESS ........................................................................................................... 17   7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................................... 20   8. SECURITY RULES ............................................................................................................................................... 21   9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ...................................................................................................................... 22   10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ............................................................................................ 22   11. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................................... 23   12. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... 24   Page 3 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 1. Module Overview The Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Version 4.0 is a FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant software module, which is also referred to by the acronym VIBECM, or the capitalized word Module. The Voltage IBE Developers Toolkit product includes the VIBECM along with supporting documentation. The VIBECM is a software-only cryptographic module packaged as a single run-time library (vibecryptofips.dll on a Windows system or vibecryptofips.so on a Unix system) and is supported on the operating systems listed in Table 1. The cryptographic boundary is defined by the single run-time library file and the signature file. Table 1: Supported Operating Systems Operating System Version Word Size Windows 7 Professional SP1 32-bit Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server 5.3 32-bit The primary purpose for this cryptographic module is to provide encrypt/decrypt and cryptographic signature services for Internet Protocol (IP) traffic. The VIBECM provides status output via the “Show Status” service. The VIBECM provides program interfaces for data input and output. The diagram below illustrates these interfaces as well as defining the cryptographic boundary. Page 4 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Module Physical Boundary (PC Physical Boundary) Microsoft Windows, Linux, or Solaris Operating System Module Logical Boundary DSA, SHA-1, SHA-2, RSA, DH, VIBECM HMAC, BF, BB1, MD5 API Interface DES, TDES, AES vibecrypto.h Key Management, DRNG, DRBG, RSA, DH, IBE, DSA Key Generation Figure 1 – Image of the Cryptographic Module The physical cryptographic boundary for the Module is defined as the enclosure of the computer system on which the cryptographic module is to be executed. The physical embodiment of the Module, as defined in FIPS 140-2, is Multi-Chip Standalone. Persistent storage of keys is not supported by the VIBECM. Page 5 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2. Security Level The VIBECM meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 1 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 2: Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security N/A Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 1 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Page 6 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 3. Modes of Operation The VIBECM supports two modes of operation; a FIPS approved mode and a non-Approved mode. The Approved mode of operation is invoked by creating a FIPS Library context, which can be done through the function, VtCreateLibCtxFips. 3.1 FIPS approved mode of operation In FIPS mode, the VIBECM supports FIPS Approved algorithms as follows: Table 3: FIPS Approved Algorithms with Modes of Operation Algorithm Modes of Operation Certificate # DSA with 1024 bit keys Sign/Verify #547 TDES – 3 key mode ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB #1135 SHS (SHA-1, SHA-224, Byte Oriented #1539 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512) AES - 128 and 192 and 256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB #1752 key sizes are supported DRNG – FIPS 186-2 X-Change Notice (SHA-1) #934 K-Change Notice (SHA-1) HMAC – 112, 128, 192 and Byte Oriented #1029 256 bit keys are supported RSA Sign/Verify #871 DRBG Hash-DRBG #115 In FIPS mode, the VIBECM also supports non-FIPS Approved algorithms in limited uses as follows: Table 4: Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Available in FIPS mode. Algorithm Limitations to Use RSA (1024-bit and 2048-bit Use limited to the encryption and keys) (key wrapping; key decryption of symmetric keys establishment methodology provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength) MD5 Use limited to that required for generation of TLS keys Page 7 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 3.2 Non-Approved mode (non-FIPS mode) In addition to all of the algorithms available in Approved mode, the VIBECM also supports the use of the additional algorithms listed in Table 5 in non-Approved mode. Table 5: Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Available in non-Approved Mode. Algorithm Limitations to Use BF IBE, BB1 IBE Identity-based encryption public-key algorithms – only available in non- Approved mode AES FFX (128-, 192- and Format-preserving mode of AES – 256-bit keys) only available in non-Approved mode Diffie-Hellman (DLC Only available in non-Approved primitive only) mode DES Only available in non-Approved mode The VIBECM includes a deterministic random number generator (DRNG) that is compliant with FIPS 186-2 with 256-bit XKEY and underlying G function constructed from SHA-1 for generation of all cryptographic keys. FIPS-186-2 requires that the DRNG for DSA X values is slightly different from the algorithm for DSA K values (Appendix 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). The VIBECM implements both of these algorithms and they are used appropriately. The VIBECM also includes a deterministic random bit generator that is compliant with SP 800- 90. This DRBG only operates in Hash-DRBG mode. To operate the VIBECM in the FIPS approved mode, operators must run VIBECM on one of the operating systems specified in Table 1 and access only the service listed in Table 6 below. Page 8 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 4. Ports and Interfaces The logical interface of the Module is accessed through the API (VIBECM API) as defined in the header file vibecrypto.h. Control Input is provided by the API function calls, which represent the services provided by the Module. Data Input is provided by the variables passed with the function calls. These variables are passed on the program stack either directly on the stack or as a pointer on the stack that points to memory allocated in a heap. Both stack and heap are located in RAM. Data Output is provided by variables returned from a function call. As with Data Input, these variables are located either on the program stack or in a heap. The Status Output is provided in the return values and error codes provided by a function. All data output is inhibited during the self-test process, and during key generation. Only limited data processing will be allowed when the module is in a FIPS error state. During this limited processing no cryptographic operations are allowed. The only FIPS services available during limited process are Zeroize and Show Status. The only operations available during limited processing that output data provide Base64 encoding and decoding. There is no output of any critical security parameters during limited data processing. The only way to reset the Module from this limited processing state is to unload the Module or to power down the computer. Page 9 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 5. Identification and Authentication Policy This section describes the identification and authentication policy of the Module. The VIBECM supports two distinct operator roles (User and Cryptographic-Officer). The User role provides the basic services to process data (encryption, decryption, and key management), whereas the Crypto Officer role provides the services to perform integrity checking self-tests, and zeroize. VIBECM does not support a Maintenance role. The role of the operator of VIBECM is identified implicitly on the library function being called, as shown in Table 6 in the next section. There is no operator authentication. Page 10 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 6. Access Control Policy This section describes the access control policy of the Module. 6.1 Roles and Services The services available to each role are described in the following table. Table 6: Services Authorized for Roles Role Authorized Services User Create Algorithm Object: Creates a new algorithm object. • This role shall provide all Destroy Algorithm Object: Destroys an algorithm object. • of the services necessary to: Create Random Object: Creates a new random number • generator object. Examine and set the • attributes of the Destroy Random Object: Destroys a random number • Voltage IBE generator object. Cryptographic Module. Create Key Object: Creates a new key object. • Support data encryption • and decryption Destroy Key Object: Destroys a key object. • operations. Set Key Object: Sets the key object with information. • Compute hashes • Get Key Info: Returns key information. • Create and verify • Create Parameter Object: Creates a new parameter object. digital signatures. • Destroy Parameter Object: Destroys a parameter object. Generate DSA, RSA • • key pairs Set Parameter Object: Sets a parameter object with • information. Compute HMAC • message authentication Get Parameter Info: Returns parameter information. code • Generate Parameters: Generates DSA parameters. • Digest Data: Initializes an object for digesting. Finishes the • digest process, generating the final digest output. Encrypt Data: Initializes an object for encrypting. Encrypts • a data stream. Decrypt Data: Initializes the object for decrypting. Decrypts • Page 11 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Role Authorized Services a data stream. Seed Random: Add seed material to a DRNG or DRBG • object. Generate Random Bytes: Generates bytes of random data. • Sign: Creates a DSA or RSA signature. • Verify: Verifies a DSA or RSA signature. • Generate Key Pair: Generates a DSA, RSA key pair • MAC Data: Calculates a HMAC of input data. • Show Status: Returns the current status of the Module. • Other non-security relevant functions. • Cryptographic-Officer Perform Self-Tests: Executes the suite of self-tests required • Role: by FIPS 140-2. This role shall Zeroize: Actively destroys all plaintext critical security • provide the services parameters. necessary for: Other non-security relevant functions. • Performing module Self-Tests Zeroizing and destroying CSPs The Perform Self-Tests service is automatically run when the VIBECM is powered on/initialized. The operator can cause this service to be run by calling the VtCreateLibCtxFips function in the C language API vibecrypto.h. Page 12 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 6.2 Service Inputs and Outputs The following table specifies the inputs and output for each service. Table 7: Specification of Service Inputs & Outputs Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output Create VtCreateAlgorithmObject Algorithm Algorithm Succeed / Algorithm function call Specific Object Fail Object Information Destroy VtDestroyAlgorithmObject Pointer to None Succeed / Algorithm function call Algorithm Fail Object Object Create VtCreateRandomObject XKEY DRNG Object Succeed / Random function call Fail Object Destroy VtDestroyRandomObject Pointer to None Succeed / Random function call DRNG Object Fail Object Create Key VtCreateKeyObject function None Key Object Succeed / Object call Fail Destroy VtDestroyKeyObject function Pointer to Key None Success / Key Object call Object Fail Set Key VtSetKeyParam function call Key Data None Succeed / Object Fail Get Key VtGetKeyParam function call Pointer to Key Key data Succeed / Info Object Fail Create VtCreateParameterObject None Parameter Succeed / Parameter function call Object Fail Object Destroy VtDestroyParameterObject Pointer to None Succeed / Parameter function call Parameter Fail Object Object Set VtSetParameterParam function Parameter None Succeed / Parameter call Data. Fail Object Page 13 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output Get VtGetParameterParam function Pointer to Parameter Succeed / Parameter call Parameter Data Fail Info Object Generate VtGenerateParameters function Size of DSA Parameter Succeed / Parameters call Prime; Size of Object Filled Fail DH Prime and with Subprime; or Generated Size of IBE Parameters Prime and Subprime Digest Data VtDigestInit, VtDigestUpdate, Data to Hash Hashed data Succeed / and VtDigestFinal function Fail calls Encrypt VtEncryptInit, Data to Encrypted Succeed / Data VtEncryptUpdate, and Encrypt, Key Data Fail VtEncryptFinal function calls Object, Random Number Generator Object Decrypt VtDecryptInit, Encrypted Decrypted Succeed / Data VtDecryptUpdate, and Data, Key Data Fail VtDecryptFinal function calls Object, Random Number Generator Object Seed VtSeedRandom function call DRNG Seed None Succeed / Random Data Fail Generate VtGenerateRandomBytes None Random Data Succeed / Random function call Fail Bytes Page 14 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output Sign VtSign function call Key Object, Cryptographic Succeed / Hashed Data, Signature Fail Random Number Generator Object MAC Data VtMACInit, Key Object, MAC Data Succeed/Fail Algorithm VtMACUpdate, Object, Data to MAC VtMACFinal Generate VtGenerateSharedSecret Key Object Shared Secret Succeed/Fail Shared (Sender), Key Secret Object (Recipient), Random Number Generator Object Verify VtVerifySignature function call Cryptographic Verification Succeed / Signature, Result Fail Key Object, Hashed Data, Random Number Generator Object Generate VtGenerateKeyPair function Algorithm DSA, RSA Succeed / Key Pair call Object, Public and Fail Random Private Key Number Objects Generator Object Show VtGetFipsError function call None Cryptographic Succeed / Status Module Status Fail Perform VtCreateLibCtxFips function None None Succeed / Self Test call Fail Page 15 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output Zeroize VtDestroyLibCtxFips function None None Succeed / call Fail Win32FipsDestroyMemoryCtx function call LintelFipsDestroyMemoryCtx function call Page 16 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 6.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following are the critical security parameters contained in the Module: AES Keys: These keys are imported into the Module by the operator using VIBECM • services. Triple-DES Keys: These keys are imported into the Module by the operator using • VIBECM services. DSA Private Keys. These keys are generated by, or imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. DRNG XKEY: This key is imported into the Module by the operator using VIBECM • services and is the initial XKEY value for the FIPS 186-2 DRNG. DRBG Seed and Entropy Input: These values are imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. DRBG V and C: These values are imported into the Module by the operator using • VIBECM services. RSA Private Keys: These keys are generated by, or imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. HMAC Secret Key: These keys are generated by, or imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. Definition of Public Keys: The following are the public keys contained in the Module: DSA Software Signing Public Key: This key is the DSA public key associated with the • DSA private key used to sign the Module DLL or shared library for software integrity checking. DSA Public Keys. These keys are generated by, or imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. RSA Public Keys. These keys are generated by, or imported into the Module by the • operator using VIBECM services. 6.4 Definition of CSPs Modes of Access Table 8 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different Module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows: Create: Creates two key objects, and then fills the key objects with cryptographic keys, • using previously created random object as input. One key object contains the private key, and the other key object contains the public key. Page 17 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Zeroize: Destroys a cryptographic key object, freeing memory allocated for this object. • Write: Sets a cryptographic key object with key data. • Read: Accesses a CSP to obtain information about the CSP. • The following table describes how the services performed by each role access the CSP. An “X” means that the service is allowed in that mode. Table 8: CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services Role Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation User Crypto graphic Officer Create None X Algorithm Object Destroy None X Algorithm Object Create Random Writes a DRNG XKEY key to a Random Number X Object Generator Object Destroy None X Random Object Create Key None X Object Destroy Key Zeroizes AES Key, Triple-DES Key, HMAC key or DSA X Object Key Set Key Object Writes to a key object with key data X Get Key Info Reads key data X Create None X Parameter Object Destroy None X Parameter Object Set Parameter None X Object Page 18 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy Role Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation User Crypto graphic Officer Get Parameter None X Info Generate None X Parameters Digest Data None X Encrypt Data Reads key for selected algorithm (AES Key or Triple- X DES Key) Decrypt Data Reads key for selected algorithm (AES Key or Triple- X DES Key) Seed Random Writes DRNG seed into a Random Number Generator X Object Generate None X Random Bytes Sign Reads key for the selected algorithm (DSA, RSA) X Verify Reads key for the selected algorithm (DSA, RSA) X Generate Key Creates key pair for the selected algorithm (DSA, RSA, X Pair DH) MAC Data Reads HMAC key X Show Status None X Perform Self None X Test Zeroize Zeroize all CSPs X Page 19 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 7. Operational Environment The operating environment for the Module is a “modifiable operational environment”. The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements for Security Level 1 are satisfied in the following ways: When the Module is operated in FIPS approved mode, the environment is restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). The Module prevents access by other processes to plaintext private and secret keys, CSPs, and intermediate key generation values during the time the cryptographic Module is executing/operational; using address space separation mechanisms of the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the Module are owned by the Module and are not owned by external processes/operators. Non-cryptographic processes shall not interrupt the Module during execution. The Module software is installed in a form that protects the software and executable code from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic algorithm integrity tests are performed using Power-Up Self-Tests, Software Integrity Tests, and Conditional Self Tests. (See Section 8 - Security Rules) Page 20 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 8. Security Rules 1. The Module design corresponds to the VIBECM security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the Module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module. 2. The VIBECM performs all of the tests listed below. A. Power up Self-Tests: These are performed without any operator intervention. 1. Cryptographic algorithm tests a. DSA, Sign/Verify Pairwise Consistency Test b. RSA Sign/Verify Known Answer Test c. RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Pairwise Consistency Test d. DH Pairwise Consistency Test e. MD5 Known Answer Test f. HMAC SHA-1 Known Answer Test g. HMAC SHA-256 Known Answer Test h. HMAC SHA-512 Known Answer Test i. AES, CBC mode, 128 bit key size Known Answer Test j. TDES, CBC mode, Known Answer Test k. DRNG, X values, Known Answer Test l. DRNG, K values, Known Answer Test m. DRBG, V values Known Answer Test n. DRBG, C values Known Answer Test 2. Software Integrity Test a. DSA Signature verification of the vibecryptofips.dll or the vibecryptofips.so. B. Conditional Self-Tests: These tests are performed during the appropriate services. 1. Continuous Random Number Generator (DRNG) tests – initiated at random number generation and performed by both the FIPS 186-2 appendix 3.1 (DRNG, X values) and the FIPS 186-2 appendix 3.2 (DRNG, K values) random number generators 2. Continuous Random Bit Generator (DRBG) tests – initiated at random byte generation and performed for both the V and C values as defined in SP 800-90. 2. Pairwise consistency test for newly generated DSA key pairs 3. Pairwise consistency test for newly generated RSA signature key pairs. Page 21 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 4. Pairwise consistency test for newly generated RSA encryption key pairs 5. Pairwise consistency test for newly generated DH key pairs 9. Physical Security Policy VIBECM is a software module and the physical security requirements are not applicable. 10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The Module is not designed to mitigate any other attacks. Page 22 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 11. References This section contains informative references that provide helpful background information. [FIPS-140-2] “Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” Version 2, May 25, 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf [FIPS-180-2] “Secure Hash Standard,” Version 2, August 1, 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf [FIPS-186-2] “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” Version 2, January 27, 2000. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-2/fips186-2.pdf [FIPS-197] “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 26, 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf [FIPS-46-3] “Data Encryption Standard,” October 25, 1999. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf [FIPS-198] “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),” April 8, 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198/fips-198a.pdf Page 23 Voltage IBE Cryptographic Module Security Policy 12. Definitions and Acronyms The following paragraphs define the acronyms used in this document. AES. Advanced Encryption Standard secret key algorithm. See [FIPS-197]. API. Application Program Interface CBC. Cipher Block Chaining mode CFB. Cipher Feed Back mode CSP. Critical Security Parameters DES. Data Encryption Standard. See [FIPS-46-3]. DRNG. Deterministic Random Number Generator. DSS. Digital Signature Standard. See [FIPS-186-2] ECB. Electronic Codebook mode EMI. Electromagnetic Interference EMC. Electromagnetic Compatibility FIPS. Federal Information Processing Standards of NIST. IV. Initialization Vector NIST. National Institute of Standards and Technologies. OFB. Output Feed Back mode SHA-1. Secure Hash Algorithm revision 1. See [FIPS-180-2]. TDES. Triple DES. See [FIPS-43-3]. Page 24