Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and 10 Gig Ethernet FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Security Policy Firmware Version v4.5 Hardware Versions Gig Ethernet 1600X433 10 Gig Ethernet 1600X437 Thales e-Security, Inc 2200 North Commerce Parkway, Suite 200, Weston, FL 33326, USA TEL: + 1-888-744-4976 FAX: + 1-954-888-6211 http://iss.thalesgroup.com THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 4 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ............................................................ 11 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role .......................................................................................................... 11 2.2 User Role ......................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Authentication .................................................................................................................. 12 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................. 13 3.1 Roles and Services .......................................................................................................... 13 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights................................................................ 15 3.3 Zeroisation ....................................................................................................................... 18 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information................................................................................ 18 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ............................................................................................. 19 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ...................................................... 19 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........................................................................ 23 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ 24 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 25 Tables Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators................................................................................ 7 Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping ............................................................................. 7 Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests ............................................................................................................... 9 Table 1-4 Conditional Tests ........................................................................................................... 10 Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .................................................. 12 Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ...................................................................... 12 Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer ........................................................................... 13 Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User ......................................................................................... 15 Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Common to PP and MP ............................................... 15 Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs PP Mode Specific ........................................................ 17 Table 3-5 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs MP Mode Specific........................................................ 17 ASEC0691-003H PAGE 2 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figures Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration ........................ 5 Figure 1-2 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example in Multipoint Network Configuration .... 6 Figure 4-1 1600X433 Front ............................................................................................................ 20 Figure 4-2 1600X433 Rear ............................................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-3 1600X437 Front ............................................................................................................ 20 Figure 4-4 1600X437 Rear ............................................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-5 1600x433 Top ............................................................................................................... 21 Figure 4-6 1600x437 Top ............................................................................................................... 22 ASEC0691-003H PAGE 3 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 1. INTRODUCTION Thales e-Security is a global leader in the network security market with over 60,000 network security devices in operation, being one of the first companies to introduce a link encryption product to the market in the early 1980s. The Datacryptor® family represents Thales’ next generation of network security devices for a wide variety of communications environments. It is the culmination of 20 years experience of protecting wide-area network communications for governments, financial institutions and information-critical industries worldwide. This document is the Security Policy1 for the Thales e-Security Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet, conforming to the FIPS140-2 Security Policy Requirements [1]. Further information on the Datacryptor® family and the functionality provided by the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is available from the Thales web site: http://iss.thalesgroup.com This document is updated to reflect the version 4.5 of the firmware which supports a Multipoint (MP) licensed mode with MPLS capability as well as the Point to Point (PP) licensed mode. Overview The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module which facilitates secure data transmission across Ethernet networks at 1 Gb/s or 10Gb/s. Operating at primarily at OSI Layer 2, the Data Link Layer of the protocol stack the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is targeted at high speed/high data throughput applications between telecommunication facilities introducing virtually no overhead or latency to the network. Unlike Layer 3 IP security devices (IPSEC) the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is independent of network configurations resulting in a solution that is simple and inexpensive to manage. As a solution for high-speed/high-bandwidth data transport over LANs and WANs, the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet enables customers to take advantage of the most cost effective transport services available while ensuring the confidentiality of the information carried through these connections. Version 4.5 and later allow the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet to be licensed for use in a MP mode with one central unit and up to 199 remote units, Multipoint Label Switching mode (MPLS) is also supported. The mode of the unit, PP or MP, can be set using a management PC and Front Panel Viewer software. The internally stored license file dictates which mode can be set. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet uses the strongest commercially available and government approved cryptography. It is designed to easily fit into a variety of network configurations supporting multiple modes of operation including bulk, tunnel and Virtual LAN (VLAN). This Security Policy defines the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet cryptographic module for two hardware versions, 1600X433 (low speed module) which supports data transmission at 1Gb/s and 1600X437 (high speed module) which supports data transmission at 10Gb/s. These variants utilize a different hardware platform but are functionally identical therefore all references to Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet or module refer to both variants unless explicitly stated otherwise. 1 This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced freely in its entirety but not modified or used for purposes other than that intended. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 4 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 1-1 shows a typical Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet configuration where 2 LANs are securely linked across a public domain Ethernet network in PP licensed mode and Figure 1-2 a MP licensed mode network configuration. Modes of Operation The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can only operate in an FIPS 140-2 Approved mode (this includes cryptographic services and bypass services). The modes of operation are detailed below:  Standby Mode The module transmits/receives no data via either its Host or Network interfaces on that channel. This mode is automatically entered if the module detects an error state or at start-up. This mode is indicated by the flashing green Encrypt LED.  Plain Text Mode2 All data received through the Host interface on that channel is transmitted through the Network interface as plain text. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is transmitted through the Host interface with no decryption applied. This mode should only be used for diagnostic purposes, or if there is no security risk to the data if it is transferred unencrypted. This mode is indicated by the solid red Plain LED. The module does not support an alternating plaintext mode.  Encrypt Mode All data received through the Host interface on that channel is encrypted using the transmit Data Encryption Key (DEK) and then the encrypted data is transmitted through the Network interface. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is decrypted using the receive DEK and then the decrypted data is transmitted through the Host interface. This mode is indicated by the solid green Encrypt LED. Note: transmit and receive DEKs are identical when Multipoint mode is selected. The mode of operation is selectable by the Crypto Officer using the Secure Remote Management facility and the current mode of operation is displayed using either the Front Panel LEDs or the Secure Remote Management (Element Manager PC) facility. Refer to the User Manual [3] for further details. Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration 2 This is the bypass mode. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 5 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 1-2 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example in Multipoint Network Configuration Public Network Connection Datacryptor Datacryptor Ethernet Ethernet Datacryptor Datacryptor Ethernet Ethernet Physical Ports Both variants of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet provide the same set of physical ports with the exception of the host and network line interfaces, which use Small Form Factor Pluggable (SFP) for low speed modules and 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable (XFP) for high speed modules The physical ports are described below in Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators: ASEC0691-003H PAGE 6 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators Port Description Network Connects to the public network for send and receiving encrypted user data and inter-module key exchange data. Host Connects to the private network for send and receiving plaintext user data. RS-232 Connects to a local terminal for initialization of the module and also allows remote management from the Element Manager application utilizing the Point-to-Point (PPP) protocol. Ethernet Allows the remote management of a unit using the Element Manager application and status report using an SNMP management application. Front Panel LEDs Indicates the operational state of the unit, including Alarm state, Error state, Plain or Encrypt mode and Host and Network line status. Line Interface LEDs Indicates module present and laser input detected. PSU LEDs Indicates the status of the PSUs (powered/unpowered) Power Dual redundant power interface supporting customer options of AC or DC and international power cord standards. The physical ports are mapped to four logical ports defined by FIPS 140-2 as described below in Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping: Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping Logical Interface Description and Mapping to Physical Port Data Input Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Data Output Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Control RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Status RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Front Panel LEDs Line Interface LEDs PSU LEDs ASEC0691-003H PAGE 7 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY User Data Security The communications channel between two or more Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets is assumed to be vulnerable and therefore the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet encrypts the entire user data stream3. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet uses public key cryptography for authentication and key agreement in PP mode4 and symmetric key cryptographic for data confidentiality. The authentication mechanism employs signed X.509 v3 certificates using the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for signature verification. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to establish a Key Encryption Key (KEK) between modules. In PP licensed mode Data Encryption Keys (DEKs), used for encrypting and decrypting data traffic, are derived from the KEK. Multipoint Mode DEKs are generated internally in the central units from its RNG and are transmitted to remote units wrapped with the KEK. In Multipoint Mode the use of GCM cryptographic mode provides authentication between communicating units on the network data path. Random Number Generation The Random Number Generator consists of a hardware random number source providing a seed key to a FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 [2] Approved pseudo random number generator. The RNG is used in the generation of private and secret keys including Diffie-Hellman static/ephemeral and Data Encryption Keys in PP mode and for central unit DEK generation in MP mode. Algorithm Support The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet contains the following algorithms:  AES-256 for data encryption  AES-256 used for Key Wrapping (MP mode only)  AES-256 for GCM mode (MP mode only)  DSA for signature verification  SHA-1 hashing algorithm  Diffie-Hellman for key agreement Physical Security The multi-chip standalone embodiment of the circuitry within the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is contained within a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The enclosure completely covers the module to restrict unauthorized physical access to the module. The physical security includes measures to provide both tamper evidence and tamper detection and response. In the case of tamper response all sensitive information stored within the module will be zeroised. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet’s cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its enclosure but excludes the dual redundant power supplies which are external 3 Providing the modules are configured to operate in Encrypt mode. 4 This key agreement method provides 80-bits of encryption strength. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 8 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY to this boundary and may be hot-swapped by a customer and does not require a “return to factory” operation. Secure Remote Management The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet may be remotely and securely managed using the Element Manager. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can also be managed (for status only) using an SNMP v1 or v2c management application. Only one management session is permitted at a time with a Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. Diagnostics A variety of diagnostics are available to maintain secure operation. These diagnostics include cryptographic mechanisms, critical functions and environmental monitoring. In addition the module supports a local loop back mode to aid in diagnosing network connectivity. Log files are maintained in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and can be viewed or printed. If the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is faulty, as indicated by the failure of a self-test diagnostic, it will render itself inoperable until the fault is rectified.  Power-Up Tests On power-up known answer tests (KAT) are performed on all cryptographic algorithms and the pseudo-random number generator. In addition the integrity of all firmware is checked. Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests Function Checked Description PP Mode MP Mode DSA (CA Algorithm) KAT Test X X AES-256-S/W ( KEK KAT Test X X Algorithm) AES-256 – H/W (Traffic KAT Test X Encrypt/Decrypt Algorithm ) AES-256 – S/W, wrap KAT Test X mode (DEK wrapping ) AES-256 GCM (MP KAT Test X authenticated Traffic Encrypt/Decrypt Algorithm) SHA-1 KAT Test X X SHA-1 RNG KAT Test X X Firmware Integrity 16 bit Error Detection X X Code (EDC) Checksum ASEC0691-003H PAGE 9 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY  Conditional Tests  The output of both the hardware random number generator and the pseudo-random number generator are checked whenever random data is requested by the module. Subsequent random numbers are compared against the last generated value to verify that these values are not the same.  The module also performs a bypass test before entering an encrypted channel mode. When switching from a plain to an encrypted channel mode the module issues an encrypted challenge to its peer using the Data Encryption Key (DEK). The challenge is then decrypted by the peer using its DEK, and if verified, an encrypted response is returned to the module (using the DEK). The response is decrypted by the module (using the DEK) and verified. If successful the channel is established as being in an encrypted state with matching DEKs in each module.  In the case of a firmware upgrade, this is digitally signed by a CA using DSA allowing the module to verify the image so preventing unauthorized firmware upgrades. After loading firmware onto this module it may no longer be a FIPS 140-2 validated module unless the firmware has been FIPS 140-2 validated. This feature is used as an upgrade path for future FIPS 140-2 approved modules. Table 1-4 Conditional Tests Function Checked Description Hardware RNG CRNG FIPS186-2 RNG CRNG Bypass Bypass Test Firmware Upgrade Authentication Verify (DSA) ASEC0691-003H PAGE 10 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY The two roles associated with the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet are: Crypto-Officer Commissioning and configuration of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. User This role occurs when two Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets are communicating with each other. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet does not support multiple concurrent roles. 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can be managed by the Crypto-Officer using either of the following two methods:  Element Manager - This PC-based software application enables a Crypto-Officer to commission and administer the module.  SNMP Management Station - This is limited to requesting and obtaining status information from the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. The Crypto-Officer role utilizes the Element Manager to commission and configure the module via the dedicated Ethernet or serial management port. Commissioning a module installs a X.509 certificate (containing the CA public key, certificate name, unit serial number and certificate life time) and the required Diffie Hellman parameters (base and modulus) to allow the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet to generate a corresponding Diffie Hellman key set. This information is digital signed allowing the unit to authenticate the certificate’s signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. The module must be commissioned before it may be administered. When administering the module the Element Manager establishes a secure connection (connection authentication and data confidentiality) to the module. This connection is established and protected in the same manner as a module to module connection. To establish the secure connection the Crypto-Officer uses a removable media key-material set containing the Crypto- Officer’s name and access rights, Diffie-Hellman key set and own certificate. To access the key- material set the Crypto-Officer must login to the Element Manager by presenting the key-material set and the Crypto-Officer’s own password of at least 8 ASCII printable characters. This allows the Element Manager to verify the identity of a Crypto-Officer before establishing a secure connection using the key material set. 2.2 User Role The Crypto-Officer can download one or more signed X.509 User Certificates to the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. Each User Certificate gives a Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet an identity. Identity-based authentication is implemented between two communicating Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets. The modules are then operating in the User role. This identity can be authenticated to another module which verifies the User Certificate’s signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 11 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY If the issuing CA Public key is not held within the authenticating module then verification cannot be undertaken. Therefore no communications channel can be established between the two Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets. 2.3 Authentication The types and strengths of authentication for each Role identified for the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet are given in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 below. Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data Crypto-Officer Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate User Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate The identity of each entity performing a role that requires authentication is held within the X.509 Digital Certificate allowing the identity and authorization of the operator to be validated by checking the signature (DSA) of the certificate. Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Signed X.509 The strength depends upon the size of the private key space. The Digital Certificate Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet uses DSA, which is a FIPS Approved algorithm. Therefore the probability of successfully guessing the private key (160 bits), and hence correctly signing an X.509 certificate, is significantly less than one in 1,000,000 (2160). Multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute period do not constitute a threat for secure operation of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. This is because each attempt requires the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet to check the signature on the certificate that is to be loaded. Therefore the total number of attempts that can be made in a one-minute period will be limited by the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet signature verification and response operation, which takes on average approximately 30 seconds. The majority of this time is accounted for by the communications overheads since the signature checking operation within the module is relatively fast. Given the very large size (160 bits) of the private key space used by the FIPS Approved signature algorithm (DSA) loaded in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet it follows that the probability that an intruder will be able to guess the private key, and thereby gain authentication, by making multiple attempts is significantly less than one in 100,000 (2160 / 2). There is no feedback of authentication data to the Crypto-Officer or User that might serve to weaken the authentication mechanism. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 12 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 3.1 Roles and Services Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer lists the authorized services available for each role within the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. All services require authentication to the module. For further details of each operation refer to the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet User Guide [3]. Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer Service Description Input Output Access Access module Login/logout of the password, crypto Command Peer Module Certificate - read module officer public response key, crypto officer certificate Loads module’s key CA Public Key – read/write, Manage Key Material module public Command Module Certificate – read/write material, deletes key, module response module’s key material certificate Display/edit module’s General Configuration Commands and Command None name, description, time parameters response and interface settings. Diagnostics Reboot or erase key Commands and Command None material. Configure parameters response loopback mode Display/edit module’s IP Management Commands and Command None ports, Ethernet and parameters response serial, configuration. SNMP Display/edit general Commands and Command None information, SNMP parameters response version, SNMP communities and SNMP traps. IP Routes Display/edit IP routing Commands and Command None information parameters response Key Encryption Key – write Security Display/edit key Commands and Command (delete), Data Encryption Key – lifetimes, and general parameters response; key exchange key write (delete) parameters exchange if forced. RIP Display/edit RIP version Commands and Command None and RIP password parameters response Communications Display/edit Ethernet Commands and Command None mode (bulk, tunneling), parameters response interface mode, Multipoint/Point-to-point mode ASEC0691-003H PAGE 13 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Service Description Input Output Access Encryption Display current Commands and Command None connection mode - one parameters response, of standby, plain or ping packet encrypt and ping the to connected unit. connected peer. Expert Display/edit Cipher Text Commands and Command Stealing mode, enabled parameters response (only applicable to or disabled. 1600X433 module) Tunneling Display own MAC Commands and Command address, display/edit parameters response. (not applicable to MP peer MAC address, mode) filter rules, VLAN identification and fragmentation size. Environment Display fan speed, Commands and Command None module temperature parameters response and unit power status. License Display/edit currently License file Command None loaded license file for Response the Datacryptor OC- 3/12/48C module. Show Status View status of the None Front Panel None module. LEDs Status Commands and Indicators parameters Status information over Element Manager or SNMP Traps Operator Callable Self- Module performs self- Reboot Module Front Panel None Test test LEDs Status Indicators Plaintext Enable module to Commands and Bypass test None perform bypass. parameters. pass or fail indicated by Front Panel Status LEDs ASEC0691-003H PAGE 14 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User Service Description Input Output Accessed DEK – read Encrypt Encrypt data received User traffic User traffic from the Host interface (plain) (encrypted) and transmit on the Network interface. Decrypt Decrypt data received User traffic User traffic DEK - read from the Network (encrypted) (plain) interface and transmit on the Host interface. 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights The cryptographic keys and CSPs stored in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet module are listed in Table 3-3. All private and secret keys (Diffie-Hellman, KEKs and DEKs) are generated internally in the module and may not be either loaded or read by the Crypto Officer or User. Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Common to PP and MP KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size Master Key Encrypts all non-volatile AES At start-up if not Battery On tamper Keys and CSPs stored on present using the Backed detect or by (256 bits) module’s hardware the module. SRAM user. random number (plaintext) generator and an approved RNG (cert# 588). CA Public Key The public key of the CA DSA Generated external Non-volatile When the key is memory – key pair use to verify and loaded as part of deleted or (1024 bits) subsequent key material the commissioning Compact replace by a loaded into the module. process. Flash subsequent key. (encrypted) ASEC0691-003H PAGE 15 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size Own Module An X.509 certificate Diffie- The Diffie-Hellman Own Module When the Certificate/Diffie- containing the module Hellman static key pair is Certificate certificate is Hellman Static Key name, Diffie-Hellman static generated locally by Non-volatile deleted or (1024 bits) memory – Pair public key (the static the module, using the replaced by a module’s hardware private key is stored Compact subsequent separately) and associated random number Flash certificate. parameters. generator and an (encrypted) The Diffie- approved RNG Hellman static (cert#588) from the Diffie- private key may parameters supplied Hellman deleted by a during the static private user. key – Non- commissioning process. The module volatile memory – name and Diffie- Hellman static public FRAM key is then exported (encrypted) to be signed by issuing CA so forming the module certificate. Diffie-Hellman The Diffie-Hellman Diffie- The Diffie-Hellman Volatile Zeroised when a – Ephemeral Key ephemeral key pair. Hellman ephemeral key pair is memory new link is Pair generated locally by SRAM established. (1024 bits) the module, using the (encrypted) module’s hardware random number generator and an approved RNG (cert#588) from the parameters supplied during the commissioning process. This key pair is used in conjunction with the static key pair to establish the KEK. Peer Module Received during link Diffie- Generated by peer in Non-Volatile Zeroised when a memory – Certificate/Diffie- establishment between two Hellman the same manner as new link is Hellman Static modules to allow Own Module Compact established. (1024 bits) Public Key authentication of the peer Certificate. Flash module using signature (encrypted) verification (DSA). Seed Key Used by the Approved RNG Seed Generated via Not stored. Zeroised when a RNG Key internal hardware subsequent seed RNG key is generated (256 bits) and the CRNG comparison is successful. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 16 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Note: A Thales e-Security public key is embedded within the firmware which is used to verify the integrity of the firmware during module startup. Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs PP Mode Specific KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size Data Encryption A pair of keys (one for AES Generated during link Volatile Zeroised when a memory – Keys (DEKs) transmit and one for establishment using new link is (256 bits) receive) used for AES (KEK), DEKDD BRAM & established or encryption and decryption and XOR operations. FRAM when a new of line data. DEK is (up to three generated at a stored with user defined CRC time interval. integrity protection) Data Encryption Random data used to 256 bits Generated during Not stored. N/A Key Derivation derive data encryption keys DEK derivation using the module’s Data (DEKDD) in conjunction with KEK hardware random number generator and an approved RNG (cert# 588). Key Encryption Key used to derive data AES Established during Volatile Zeroised when a – Key (KEK) encryption keys in link establishment memory new link is (256 bits) conjunction with DEKID with Diffie-Hellman BRAM established or using the static and when a new KEK (encrypted) ephemeral key pairs. is generated at a user defined time interval. Table 3-5 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs MP Mode Specific KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size Data Encryption A key used for encryption AES Generated using the Volatile Zeroised when a memory – Keys (DEKs) and decryption of line data. RNG. new link is (256 bits) BRAM & established or In MP mode the same DEK FRAM when a new is used for encrypt and DEK is decrypt. (up to three requested at a stored with user defined In MP mode every central CRC time interval. to remote unit link utilizes integrity the same DEK. protection) Key Encryption Key used by the Central AES Established during Volatile Zeroised when a – Key (KEK) unit to wrap data encryption link establishment memory new link is (256 bits) keys to send to remote with Diffie-Hellman BRAM established or units, unique to each using the static and when a new KEK (encrypted) central unit to remote link. ephemeral key pairs. is generated at a user defined time interval. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 17 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3.3 Zeroisation The Crypto Officer can zeroise keys through the Element Manager application. As indicated in the table above, the Crypto Officer has the choice to directly delete keys, establish a new link with another peer module or force the module to generate new keys. Keys that are not zeroised are encrypted by the master key. The module zeroises the master key when the tamper response and zeroisation circuitry responds to an intrusion of the enclosure which renders all other keys indecipherable. 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information FIPS Approved Mode of Operation The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet only operates in an Approved mode and does not support any unapproved modes of operation. 1. FIPS 140-2 Approved and Certified  SHA-1 (FIPS Certificate #985)  DSA (FIPS Certificate #349)  FIPS 186-2 RNG (FIPS Certificate #588)  AES-256 (FIPS Certificate #1033, 1548 and 1550)  AES-256 GCM Mode (FIPS Certificate #1488 and 1489) 2. Non-Approved Allowed  Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength) Note applicable to PP use Only  Hardware RNG for generating seed key for Approved RNG Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet FPGA Details This Security Policy defines the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet cryptographic module for two hardware versions which utilize different FPGAs as described below:  1600X433 (low speed module) utilizes a Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP30 FPGA.  1600X437 (high speed module) utilizes two Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP50 FPGAs. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 18 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of production-grade components to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is protected by a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum with tamper evident labels and tamper response mechanisms. Attempts to access the module without removing the cover will cause visible physical damage to the module and/or tamper evident labels. The module’s ventilation holes on the sides and back on the enclosure are fitted with baffles to prevent physical probing of the enclosure. The module has a removable top cover which is protected by tamper response circuitry, which zeroises all plaintext CSPs. Access to the internal components of the module requires that these covers are removed. The module's cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its external casing but excludes the field replaceable dual redundant power supply. 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms The following guidelines should be considered when producing a Security Policy for the network in which the module is deployed. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet should be periodically checked by the Crypto Officer for evidence of tampering, in particular damage to the clear tamper evident labels (highlighted in outline red) as these are part of the security of the unit. In addition the audit logs should be checked for activation of the tamper response mechanism. The frequency of a physical inspection depends on the information being protected and the environment in which the unit is located. At a minimum it would be expected that a physical inspection would be made by the Crypto Officer at least monthly and audit logs daily. The tamper evident labels shall only be applied at the Thales facility. Tamper evident labels are not available for order or replacement from Thales. Two tamper evident labels are required to be visible and undamaged for each module to be operated in a FIPs approved mode of operation. They must be in the positions shown (see Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6), one on the top front centre (position 1) and one on the top centre rear (position 2). ASEC0691-003H PAGE 19 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-1 1600X433 Front Figure 4-2 1600X433 Rear Figure 4-3 1600X437 Front Figure 4-4 1600X437 Rear ASEC0691-003H PAGE 20 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-5 1600x433 Top 1 2 ASEC0691-003H PAGE 21 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-6 1600x437 Top 1 2 ASEC0691-003H PAGE 22 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY None. ASEC0691-003H PAGE 23 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute CA Certification Authority CTS Cipher Text Stealing DEK Data Encryption Key DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EDC Error Detection Code FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards GCM Galois Counter Mode ITU International Telecommunications Union KAT Know Answer Test KEK Key Encryption Key LAN Local Area Network MAC Media Access Control NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology PPP Point-to-Point PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator PSU Power Supply Unit RIP Routing Information Protocol RNG Random Number Generator SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy SFP Small Form Factor Pluggable SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol VLAN Virtual LAN XFP 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable ASEC0691-003H PAGE 24 OF 25 19 MAY 2011 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY REFERENCES 1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal 25th Information Processing Standards Publication, May 2001. Including Change Notices 2,3,4: 12/03/2002 Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp 2. FIPS 186-2 Digital Signature Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 27th January 2000. Including Change Notice 1: 5th October 2001. Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp 3. Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet User Manual, 1270A427, Issue 8 June 2008. Available from Thales e-Security. 4. AES Keywrap Specification Nov 2001 NIST ------------------------------------------- END OF DOCUMENT -------------------------------------------------------- ASEC0691-003H PAGE 25 OF 25 19 MAY 2011