Comtech EF Data Corporation SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Hardware Version: 1.2; Firmware Version: 1.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 2 Document Version: 1.0 Prepared for: Prepared by: Comtech EF Data Corporation Corsec Security, Inc. 2114 West 7th Street 10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201 Tempe, Arizona 85281 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 United States of America United States of America Phone: +1 (480) 333-2200 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.comtechefdata.com http://www.corsec.com Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................................................ 4 1.2 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................................ 4 2 SLM-5650A TRANSEC MODULE .......................................................................................... 5 2.1 OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................................. 5 2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION ..................................................................................................................................... 6 2.3 MODULE INTERFACES .......................................................................................................................................... 8 2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES ........................................................................................................................................... 9 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role ................................................................................................................................................9 2.4.2 User Role ................................................................................................................................................................ 10 2.4.3 Unauthenticated Operator Role ..................................................................................................................... 11 2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism ............................................................................................................................... 11 2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ...........................................................................................................................................12 2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................12 2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................12 2.7.1 Key Generation..................................................................................................................................................... 17 2.7.2 Key Entry and Output ........................................................................................................................................ 17 2.7.3 CSP Storage and Zeroization .......................................................................................................................... 17 2.8 EMI/EMC ............................................................................................................................................................17 2.9 SELF -TESTS .........................................................................................................................................................17 2.10 DESIGN ASSURANCE ..........................................................................................................................................18 2.11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................18 3 SECURE OPERATION ......................................................................................................... 19 3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE ..........................................................................................................................19 3.1.1 Installation and Configuration ......................................................................................................................... 19 3.1.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................................ 19 3.1.3 Delivery ................................................................................................................................................................... 19 3.1.4 Maintenance of the Physical Security ........................................................................................................... 19 3.2 USER GUIDANCE ................................................................................................................................................20 4 ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................... 21 Table of Figures FIGURE 1 – TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT OF SATELLITE MODEMS................................................................................................5 FIGURE 2 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC MODULE (TOP) .........................................................................................................7 FIGURE 3 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC MODULE (BOTTOM) .................................................................................................7 FIGURE 4 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC MODULE BLOCK DIAGRAM .....................................................................................8 FIGURE 5 – TAMPER-EVIDENT LABEL PLACEMENT (LEFT SIDE VIEW) .............................................................................. 20 FIGURE 6 – TAMPER-EVIDENT LABEL PLACEMENT (RIGHT SIDE VIEW)........................................................................... 20 List of Tables TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................6 TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES ........................................................................................................................9 TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES TO CSPS AND TYPE OF ACCESS ......................................9 TABLE 4 – MAPPING OF USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO CSPS AND TYPE OF ACCESS ......................................................... 11 TABLE 5 – MAPPING OF UNAUTHENTICATED OPERATOR ROLE SERVICES TO CSPS AND TYPE OF ACCESS ............ 11 Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 2 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 TABLE 6 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM EMPLOYED BY THE MODULE ...................................................................... 11 TABLE 7 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 12 TABLE 8 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ................................. 14 TABLE 9 – ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 21 Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 3 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Comtech EF Data Corporation's SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module (Hardware Version: 1.2; Firmware Version: 1.2.0). This Security Policy describes how the SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html. The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module is referred to in this document as the cryptographic module or the module. 1.2 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The Comtech EF Data website (http://www.comtechefdata.com/) contains information on the full line of products from Comtech EF Data. • The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. 1.3 Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: • Vendor Evidence document • Submission Summary • Finite State Model • Other supporting documentation as additional references This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to Comtech EF Data. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Comtech EF Data and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Comtech EF Data. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 4 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 2 SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module 2.1 Overview Comtech EF Data Corporation designs, develops, and markets satellite communication products for commercial and government customers internationally. The company’s product lines include satellite modems, modem accessories, performance enhancement proxies, satellite network gateways, bandwidth and capacity management products, encapsulators and receivers, converters, transceivers, amplifiers, terminals, block up converters, high-speed trunking modems, and legacy products. Its products are deployed in various applications by satellite operators, cellular service providers, broadcast and satellite news gathering organizations, government agencies, educational institutions, offshore oil and gas companies, and maritime enterprises. Comtech EF Data Corporation is based in Tempe, Arizona and operates as a subsidiary of Comtech Telecommunications Corp. Comtech’s satellite modem solution, called the SLM-5650, is an IP1 satellite modem designed to provide efficient and reliable data transmission over complex satellite connections. Figure 1 below shows a satellite modem sending and receiving traffic in a typical deployment. A typical deployment requires a satellite modem to be at both the transmitting and receiving ends of the communication to perform the encryption and decryption, respectively. Figure 1 – Typical Deployment of Satellite Modems The SLM-5650 satellite modem includes a a single FIPS card called the SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module that will perform bulk encryption of all packets for transmission over the satellite regardless of the protocol, the format of data, or existing encryption on the incoming data. The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module uses 256-bit AES2 in CBC3 mode for bulk encryption of all data requiring encryption. The module is managed using an HTTPS4 over TLS5 interface to provide a graphical user interface (GUI) for management (referred as Management & Control Console), and a command line management interface over SSH6. 1 Internet Protocol 2 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard 3 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining 4 HTTPS – Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol 5 TLS – Transport Layer Security 6 SSH – Secure Shell Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 5 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels: Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 2 7 8 EMI/EMC 2 9 Self-tests 2 10 Design Assurance 2 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 2.2 Module Specification The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module is a hardware module with a multi-chip embedded embodiment that meets overall level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements. Figure 2 and Figure 3 below show the top and bottom side of the multi-chip embedded cryptographic module respectively. Figure 4 below shows the block diagram of the hardware module; the blue dotted line surrounding the module components represents the cryptographic boundary. 7 EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 6 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 Figure 2 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module (Top) Figure 3 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module (Bottom) Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 7 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 SLM 5650 Security Module Flash M& C ( Embedded Processor ) RAM M&C Ethernet AES 256 ( FPGA ) Expansion FEC Card Ether Switch Demod/ RxIntf Turbo Decoder RF FPGA FPGA FPGAs Network Processor Coldfire TxIntf FPGA Mod RF FPGA Ether Switch 5650 Modem Main Board 5650 NP Option Card KEY: M&C – Management and Control (Power PC ) FPGA – Field Programmable Gate Array (Helion FPGA) FEC – Forward Error Correction Ether Switch – Ethernet Switch Coldfire – Base Modem Processor Crypto boundary NP Card – Network Processor Card RF – Radio Frequency Internal Connections Rx Intf – Receiver Interface Tx Intf – Transmitter Interface Demod – Demodulation/Decoder Mod – Modulation/Encoder RAM – Random Access Memory Figure 4 – SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Block Diagram 2.3 Module Interfaces The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that meets overall level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements. Interfaces on the module can be categorized into the following FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces: • Data Input Interface • Data Output Interface • Control Input interface • Status Output Interface • Power Interface Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 8 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 The module features the physical interfaces of the system depicted in Figure 4. The following is a list of the physical interfaces available for the module in the FIPS mode of operation: • System Clock Interface • Receiver(Rx) FPGA Interface • Transmitter(Tx) FPGA Interface • Encoder/Modulator Interface • Decoder/Demodulator Interface • Ethernet Interface • Mailbox Interface • Power Interface All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the following table: Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Interface Interface Data Input Transmitter (Tx) FPGA Interface, Decoder/Demodulator Interface, Ethernet Interface, Mailbox Interface Data Output Receiver (Rx) FPGA Interface, Encoder/Modulator Interface, Ethernet Interface, Mailbox Interface Control Input System Clock Interface, Ethernet Interface, Mailbox Interface Status Output Mailbox Interface, Ethernet Interface Power Input Power Interface 2.4 Roles and Services The module supports the following authorized roles: the Crypto-Officer (CO) role and the User role. The CO role is responsible for the management of the module. The User role performs the actual data protection services of encryption and decryption. In addition to the authenticated roles, the module also supports an unauthenticated user role called: Unauthenticated User Role. 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role The CO role performs services such as initialization and installation, configuration, management, monitoring, zeroization and upgrading the cryptographic module. Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer role are provided in the Table 3 below. Table 3 – Mapping of Crypto Officer Role’s Services to CSPs and Type of Access Service Description CSP and Type of Access Initialize and install Initialize and install the FIPS None SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 9 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 Service Description CSP and Type of Access Configure the FIPS SLM- Allows the operator to Seed (passphrase), Seed Key 5650A TRANSEC Module configure the password, (TRANSEC key), Password - TRANSEC key and Read, Write, Execute passphrase Configure Network Allows the operator to None Parameters configure network parameters of the module Configure Operator Allows the operator to Password - Credential Parameters configure operator Read, Write, Execute credential parameters of the module Access the module via GUI Access the module using Authentication keys, TLS Session TLS protocol authentication key, TLS Session key, Key establishment key, X9.31 PRNG Seed Key, X9.31 PRNG Seed - Read, Write, Execute Access the module via CLI Authentication keys, SSH Session Access the module using authentication key, SSH Session key, SSH protocol Peer public key, Key establishment key, X9.31 PRNG Seed Key, X9.31 PRNG Seed - Read, Write, Execute Upgrade Parameters Configure upgrade ECDSA Public Key - parameters of the module Execute Event Log Parameters Check the event log None parameters of the module Cryptographic module status Check the current status of None the FIPS module Perform Self-Tests Performs the required self- None test on the module Zeroization Zeroize all the All keys and CSPs -Read, Write cryptographic keys and key components 2.4.2 User Role The User role has access to encryption/decryption service in the cryptographic module over the Encoder/Modulator and Decoder/Demodulator Interface. Descriptions of the service(s) available to the User role are provided in the Table 4 below. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 10 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 Table 4 – Mapping of User Role’s Services to CSPs and Type of Access Service Description CSP and Type of Access Encryption/decryption Configure TRANSEC key, TEKs, TDKs, Parameters encryption/decryption TRANSEC passphrase - parameters of the module Write, Execute 2.4.3 Unauthenticated Operator Role The Unauthenticated Operator role has access to the services listed in Table 5 below for which the operator is not required to assume an authorized role. None of the services listed in the table modify, disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys and Cryptographic Security Parameters (CSPs), or otherwise affect the security of the module. See Table 5 below for a list and description of the associated services. Table 5 – Mapping of Unauthenticated Operator Role Services to CSPs and Type of Access Service Description CSP and Type of Access Change IP address and Change the module's IP None Subnet address and subnet Change network default Change the module's IP None gateway network default gateway 2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism Table 6 below describes the authentication method employed by the module to authenticate the Crypto- Officer and User. Table 6 – Authentication Mechanism Employed by the Module Authentication Role Authentication Strength Type Any authenticated Password Operators authenticate with a role and password over a TLS operator role or SSH connection. Passwords are required to be at least 7 characters long. All printable ASCII except for <, >, “, and ~ can be used, which gives a total of 90 characters to choose from. With the possibility of repeating characters, the probability of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1:907, or 1:47,829,690,000,000. This would require 478,296,900 attempts in one minute to lower the random attempt success rate to less than 1:100,000. The fastest connection supported by the module is 155 Mbps. Hence, at most 9,300,000,000 bits of data (155 × 106 × 60 seconds, or 9.3 x 109) can be transmitted in one minute. At that rate and assuming no overhead, a maximum of 166,071,428 attempts can be transmitted over the connection in one minute. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 11 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 2.5 Physical Security The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module. The entire contents of each module, including all hardware, firmware, and data are protected by a metal cover on the top and all sides and a hard plastic material on the bottom of the module. The metal cover and hard plastic material are opaque and sealed using preinstalled tamper-evident labels, which prevent the cover or plastic material from being removed without signs of tampering. All components are made of production-grade materials, and all IC’s8 in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. It is the Crypto-Officer’s responsibility to ensure that the physical security posture of the module is maintained. The proper maintenance of physical security of the module is detailed in the “Secure Operation” section of this document. 2.6 Operational Environment The operational environment requirements do not apply to the SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module. 2.7 Cryptographic Key Management The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 7 below. Table 7 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations Approved or Allowed Security Function Certificate Number Symmetric Key Algorithm AES – 128, 192 and 256-bit in ECB9 and CBC10 mode 1537 AES – 256-bit in ECB and CBC mode (Helion FPGA) 1538 Triple-DES11 – 112-bit in CBC mode 1012 Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) SHA-1 1363 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Function HMAC using SHA-1 893 Random Number Generator (RNG) FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1, Option 1 827 ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 827 Asymmetric Key Algorithm RSA PKCS#1v1.5 sign/verify – 2048 bit 746 ECDSA verify – P-521 curve 189 The module implements the following non-Approved algorithms: 8 ICs – Integrated Circuits 9 ECB – Electronic Codebook 10 CBC – Cipher-Block Chaining 11 DES – Data Encryption Standard Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 12 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 • Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) • 2048-bit RSA12 (key transport; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) • Message Digest 5 (MD5) 12 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 13 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 The module supports the keys and critical security parameters listed in Table 8 below. Table 8 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs FIPS-Approved Generation / Key Key Type Key Strength Establishment Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Mechanism ED/EE13 TRANSEC AES-CBC – 256-bit Never exits Stored in By Zeroize Used as Seed Key to Generated Key 256-bit key the module non-volatile command generate the externally and (TSK) memory TRANSEC entered into Encryption keys the module (TEKs) in FIPS 186-2 electronically RNG over a TLS session. TRANSEC AES – 256-bit 256-bit Entered into ED/EE Never exits Stored in Seed in FIPS 186-2 By Zeroize passphrase key the module the module volatile RNG command or power electronically in memory cycling the module encrypted form TRANSEC AES-CBC – 256-bit Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in By Zeroize Encrypt the data Encryption 256-bit key generated with the module volatile command or power keys (TEKs) FIPS 186-2 memory cycling the module RNG TRANSEC AES-CBC – 256-bit Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in By Zeroize Decrypt the data Decryption 256-bit key generated with the module volatile command or power keys (TDKs) FIPS 186-2 memory cycling the module RNG 13 ED/EE – Electronic Distribution/Electronic Entry Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 14 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 FIPS-Approved Generation / Key Key Type Key Strength Establishment Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Mechanism Authentication RSA 2048-bit 112-bit RSA key is ED/EE Public key Stored in By Zeroize Authentication of public/private key externally exported non-volatile command SSH/TLS sessions key generated and electronically memory imported in in plaintext ; encrypted form private component not output Peer public RSA 2048-bit 112-bit Imported ED/EE Never exits Stored in None Peer Authentication key key electronically the module volatile for SSH sessions during memory handshake protocol Local CA RSA 2048-bit 112-bit Externally ED/EE Public key Stored in By Zeroize Local signing of public/private key generated and certificate non-volatile command certificate and key imported in exported memory establish trusted encrypted form electronically point in peer entity in plaintext; private component not output TLS Session HMAC SHA-1 80-bit Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in Power cycle or Data authentication Authentication generated the module volatile session termination for TLS sessions key memory • TDES-CBC • 80-bit TLS Session Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in Power cycle or Data key generated the module volatile session termination encryption/decrypti key • 128-, 256-bit memory on for TLS sessions • AES-CBC 128-, 256- bit key Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 15 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 FIPS-Approved Generation / Key Key Type Key Strength Establishment Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Mechanism SSH Session HMAC SHA-1 80-bit Internally Not applicable Never exists Stored in Power cycle or Data authentication Authentication generated the module volatile session termination for SSH sessions key memory • TDES-CBC • 80-bit SSH Session Internally Not applicable Never exists Stored in Power cycle or Data key generated the module volatile session termination encryption/decrypti key • 128-, 192, memory on for SSH sessions • AES-CBC 256-bit 128-, 192-, 256-bit key Key Diffie-Hellman 112-bit Internally Not applicable Public Stored in Power cycle or Key Establishment 2048-bit key, generated exponent volatile session termination exchange/agreement key RSA 2048-bit electronically memory for TLS and SSH key in plaintext, sessions private component not output Operator Password See Section 2.4.4 Externally input Not applicable Never exits Stored in By Zeroize Operator password the module non-volatile command authentication memory Firmware ECDSA 521- 80-bit Externally Not applicable Never exits Stored in N/A To Verify firmware update bit generated the module non-volatile update ECDSA public memory key X9.31 RNG TDES 112-bit 112-bit Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in Power cycle or Generates FIPS- Seed Key key generated the module volatile session termination Approved random memory number X9.31 RNG 64-bits of Seed 64-bit Internally Not applicable Never exits Stored in Power cycle or Generates FIPS- Seed value generated the module volatile session termination Approved random memory number Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 16 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 2.7.1 Key Generation The module uses FIPS-Approved FIPS 186-2 and FIPS-Approved ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 algorithms to generate keys. The algorithms have undergone and passed independent testing. 2.7.2 Key Entry and Output The cryptographic module implements key entry with keys electronically imported into the module. The module does not provide a means to output private keys or CSPs from its physical boundary. 2.7.3 CSP Storage and Zeroization All the keys and CSPs are stored in either the non-volatile or volatile memory in plaintext and can be zeroized by using the zeroization command or power cycling the cryptographic module respectively. 2.8 EMI/EMC The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module was tested and found to be conformant to the Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) requirements specified by Federal Communications Commission 47 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for business use). 2.9 Self -Tests The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module performs the following self-tests at power-up: • Firmware integrity test using CRC-32 • Cryptographic algorithm tests o Firmware AES Known Answer Test (KAT) o Helion AES KAT o Triple-DES KAT o SHA-1 KAT o HMAC SHA-1 KAT o RSA sign/verify o ECDSA KAT o FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT o ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 RNG KAT The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module also performs the following conditional self-tests: • Continuous RNG Test for the ANSI X9.31 RNG • Continuous RNG Test for FIPS 186-2 RNG • Firmware load test (ECDSA digital signature verification) If the firmware integrity test fails the system will not boot up. Upon firmware integrity test failure, the module reinitializes itself by loading a redundant, backup firmware image (this is a factory-installed copy of the primary firmware image which is stored in a second firmware slot). The newly-loaded image then undergoes the firmware integrity test. If there is no backup firmware or the backup firmware is also corrupt, the module must be serviced by Comtech EF Data Corporation. If any of the power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests fail, data transmission is disabled and the modem writes an event to an event log before entering into a critical error state. No data output or cryptographic operations are possible when the module enters the critical error state. The CO can clear this error by power-cycling the module. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 17 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 2.10 Design Assurance Comtech EF Data uses Concurrent Versions System (CVS) and Polytron Version Control System (PVCS) Professional as the configuration management system. Concurrent Versions System (CVS) records the history of the source files. It stores all the versions of a file in a single file in a clever way that only stores the differences between versions. It also helps as a part of a group of people working on the same project by insulating everyone from each other. Every person works in his own directory, and CVS merges the work when each person is done. PVCS follows the "locking" approach to concurrency control; it has no built-in merge operation. PVCS can be configured to allow several users to simultaneously edit files. With this configuration, subsequent editors create their own branches, ensuring that modifications create parallel histories for the same file. Additionally, Microsoft Visual SourceSafe (VSS) version 6.0 is used to provide configuration management for the SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module’s FIPS documentation. This software provides access control, versioning, and logging. 2.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks in an approved FIPS mode of operation. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 18 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 3 Secure Operation The SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation. 3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance The Crypto-Officer role is responsible for initializing and managing the module. 3.1.1 Installation and Configuration The cryptographic module is designed to be embedded in an SLM-5650 satellite modem as a single FIPS card called the SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module. The cryptographic module will perform bulk encryption of all packets for transmission over the satellite regardless of the protocol, format of data, or existing encryption on the incoming data. The following steps provide rules for secure installation and configuration of the cryptographic module. Installation: • Turn off modem power • Put on Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protection • Remove top cover of SLM-5650 • Install Forward Error Correction (FEC) board • Install FIPS Module – SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module card • Close SLM-5650 • Turn on modem power Configuration: • Configure IP Address • Log into the web as Crypto Officer for first time access • Enter Initial/Configure Encryption Key • Enter Initial/Configure Passphrase 3.1.2 Management The module can run only in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The Crypto-Officer is able to monitor and configure the module via the web GUI (HTTPS over TLS) and SSH. 3.1.3 Delivery The Crypto-Officer can receive the module from the vendor via trusted delivery couriers including UPS, FedEx, and DHL. Upon receipt of the module, the Crypto-Officer should check the package for any irregular tears or openings. If the Crypto-Officer suspects any tampering, he/she should immediately contact Comtech EF Data Corporation. 3.1.4 Maintenance of the Physical Security The module employs tamper-evident labels to ensure that no one can tamper with the components of the module without leaving some form of evidence. These labels are installed by Comtech EF Data prior to delivery; however, it is the Crypto-Officer’s responsibility to ensure that the physical security posture of the module is maintained. To accomplish this, the CO has the following responsibilities: • The CO must visually inspect the module for the secure placement of tamper-evident labels. The tamper-evident labels ensure that no one can tamper with the components of the module without Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 19 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 leaving some form of evidence. The module requires two labels to be placed on it to meet FIPS requirements. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the required label placement. Figure 5 – Tamper-Evident Label Placement (Left Side View) Figure 6 – Tamper-Evident Label Placement (Right Side View) • The CO must visually inspect the module periodically for signs of tampering (including labels that have been voided, peeled off, or damaged in any way). If signs of tampering are noticed, the CO should remove the module from service and contact Comtech EF Data Corporation. 3.2 User Guidance The User role uses 256-bit AES in CBC mode for bulk encryption of all data requiring encryption. Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 20 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 4 Acronyms This section defines the acronyms used throughout the Security Policy. Table 9 – Acronyms Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard CA Certificate Authority CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line Interface CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Crypto Officer CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada CSP Critical Security Parameter CVS Concurrent Versions System DES Data Encryption Standard ECB Electronic Code Book ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array GUI Graphical User Interface HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code ICs Integrated Circuits KAT Known Answer Test MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program PVCS Polytron Version Control System RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman SSH Secure Shell SSL Secure Socket Layer SVN Subversion TDKS Transmission Decryption Keys TEKs Transmission Encryption Keys Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 21 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.0 May 9, 2011 Acronym Definition TLS Transport Layer Security TRANSEC Transmission Security Key TSK TRANSEC Key VSS Visual Source Safe Comtech EF Data SLM-5650A TRANSEC Module Page 22 of 23 © 2011 Comtech EF Data Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 United States of America Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.corsec.com