Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Security Policy Firmware Version v4.2 Hardware Version 1600X439 Thales e-Security, Inc 2200 North Commerce Parkway, Suite 200, Weston, FL 33326, USA TEL: + 1-888-744-4976 FAX: + 1-954-888-6211 http://iss.thalesgroup.com DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 3 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ............................................................ 10 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role .......................................................................................................... 10 2.2 User Role ......................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Authentication .................................................................................................................. 11 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................. 13 3.1 Roles and Services .......................................................................................................... 13 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights................................................................ 15 3.3 Zeroisation ....................................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information................................................................................ 18 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ............................................................................................. 19 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ...................................................... 19 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY........................................................................ 21 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ 22 REFERENCES............................................................................................................................... 23 Tables Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators................................................................................ 6 Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping ............................................................................. 6 Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests ............................................................................................................... 8 Table 1-4 Conditional Tests ............................................................................................................. 9 Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .................................................. 11 Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms...................................................................... 12 Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer........................................................................... 13 Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User ......................................................................................... 14 Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs...................................................................................... 15 Figures Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration ........................ 4 Figure 4-1 1600X439 Front ............................................................................................................ 19 Figure 4-2 1600X439 AC and DC Rear.......................................................................................... 19 Figure 4-3 1600x439 Top ............................................................................................................... 20 Figure 4-4 1600x439 Bottom.......................................................................................................... 20 TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 2 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 1. INTRODUCTION Thales e-Security is a global leader in the network security market with over 60,000 network security devices in operation, being one of the first companies to introduce a link encryption product to the market in the early 1980s. The Datacryptor® family represents Thales' next generation of network security devices for a wide variety of communications environments. It is the culmination of 20 years experience of protecting wide-area network communications for governments, financial institutions and information-critical industries worldwide. This document is the Security Policy 1 for the Thales e-Security Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet, conforming to the FIPS140-2 Security Policy Requirements [1]. Further information on the Datacryptor® family and the functionality provided by the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is available from the Thales web site: http://iss.thalesgroup.com Overview The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is a multi-chip (Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4FX40 FPGA with two embedded PPC 405 processor cores) standalone cryptographic module which facilitates secure data transmission across Ethernet networks at 100Mb/s. Operating at OSI Layer 2, the Data Link Layer of the protocol stack the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is targeted at high speed/high data throughput applications between telecommunication facilities introducing virtually no overhead or latency to the network. Unlike Layer 3 IP security devices (IPSEC) the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is independent of network configurations resulting in a solution that is simple and inexpensive to manage. As a solution for high speed/high-bandwidth data transport over LANs and WANs, a layer 2 device enable customers to take advantage of the most cost effective transport services available while ensuring the confidentiality of the information carried through these connections. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses the strongest commercially cryptography (AES 256-bit key). It is designed to easily fit into a variety of network configurations supporting multiple modes of operation, point-to-point and switched networks, and bulk and tunnel modes with Virtual LAN (VLAN) traffic. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is built on a 19 inch rack-mountable tamper-proof metal enclosure with internal AC and DC power options. With the exception of the mains power connection, all interfaces are located in the front panel for easy access. In addition to RJ-45 Host and Network interfaces, dual serial and Ethernet management connections are provided along with Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) status indicators. Figure 1-1 shows a typical Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet configuration where 2 LANs are securely linked across a public domain Ethernet network. 1 This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced freely in its entirety but not modified or used for purposes other than that intended. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 3 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Modes of Operation The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can only operate in an FIPS 140-2 Approved mode (this includes cryptographic services and bypass services). The modes of operation are detailed below: Standby Mode The module transmits/receives no data via either its Host or Network interfaces on that channel. This mode is automatically entered if the module detects an error state or at start-up. This mode is indicated by the Encrypt LED being flashing green. Plain Text Mode 2 All data received through the Host interface on that channel is transmitted through the Network interface as plain text. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is transmitted through the Host interface with no decryption applied. This mode should only be used for diagnostic purposes, or if there is no security risk to the data if it is transferred unencrypted. This mode is indicated by the Plain LED being solid red. The module does not support an alternating plaintext mode. Encrypt Mode All data received through the Host interface on that channel is encrypted using the transmit Data Encryption Key (DEK) and then the encrypted data is transmitted through the Network interface. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is decrypted using the receive DEK and then the decrypted data is transmitted through the Host interface. This mode is indicated by the Encrypt LED being solid green. The mode of operation is selectable by the Crypto Officer using the Secure Remote Management facility and the current mode of operation is displayed using either the Front Panel LEDs or the Secure Remote Management (Element Manager PC) facility. Refer to the User Manual [3] for further details. Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration Physical Ports 2 This is the bypass mode. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 4 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet use 100BASE-T ports for user traffic and 10/100BASE-T ports for management traffic. The physical ports are described below in Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators: TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 5 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators Port Description Network Connects to the public network for send and receiving encrypted user data and inter-module key exchange data. Host Connects to the private network for send and receiving plaintext user data. RS-232 Connects to a local terminal for initialization of the module and also allows remote management from the Element Manager application utilizing the Point-to-Point (PPP) protocol. Ethernet Allows the remote management of a unit using the Element Manager application and status report using an SNMP management application. Front Panel LEDs Indicates the operational state of the unit, including Alarm state, Error state, Plain or Encrypt mode and Host and Network line status. Line Interface LEDs Indicates module present and laser input detected. Power Power interface supporting customer options of AC or DC and international power cord standards. The physical ports are mapped to four logical ports defined by FIPS 140-2 as described below in Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping: Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping Logical Interface Description and Mapping to Physical Port Data Input Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Data Output Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Control RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Status RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Front Panel LEDs Line Interface LEDs TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 6 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY User Data Security The communications channel between two Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets is assumed to be vulnerable and therefore the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet encrypts the entire user data stream 3 . The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses public key cryptography for authentication and key agreement 4 and symmetric key cryptographic for data confidentiality. The authentication mechanism employs signed X.509 v3.0 certificates using the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for signature verification. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to establish a Key Encryption Key (KEK) between modules. Data Encryption Keys (DEKs), used for encrypting and decrypting data traffic, are derived from the KEK. Random Number Generation This consists of a hardware random number source which provides a seed key to a FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 [2] Approved pseudo random number generator. Establishment of the module's generated private and secret keys (Diffie-Hellman static/ephemeral and Data Encryption Keys) uses the above random number generation mechanism. Algorithm Support The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet contains the following algorithms: AES-256 for data encryption DSA for signature verification SHA-1 hashing algorithm Diffie-Hellman for key agreement Physical Security The multi-chip standalone embodiment of the circuitry within the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is contained within a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The enclosure completely covers the module to restrict unauthorized physical access to the module. The physical security includes measures to provide both tamper evidence and tamper detection and response. In the case of tamper response all sensitive information stored within the module will be zeroized. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet's cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its enclosure. Secure Remote Management The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet may be remotely and securely managed using the Element Manager. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can also be managed (for status only) using an SNMP v3.0 management application. Only one management session is permitted at a time with a Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. 3 Providing the modules are configured to operate in Encrypt mode. 4 This key agreement method provides 80-bits of encryption strength. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 7 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Diagnostics A variety of diagnostics are available to maintain secure operation. These diagnostics include cryptographic mechanisms, critical functions and environmental monitoring. In addition the module supports a local loop back mode to aid in diagnosing network connectivity. Log files are maintained in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet and can be viewed or printed. If the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is faulty, as indicated by the failure of a self-test diagnostic, it will render itself inoperable until the fault is rectified. Power-Up Tests On power-up known answer tests (KAT) are performed on all cryptographic algorithms and the pseudo-random number generator. In addition the integrity of all firmware is checked. Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests Function Checked Description CA Algorithm (DSA) KAT Test KEK Algorithm (AES-256) KAT Test DEK Algorithm (AES-256) KAT Test SHA-1 KAT Test SHA-1 RNG KAT Test Firmware Integrity 16 bit Error Detection Code (EDC) Checksum Conditional Tests The output of both the hardware random number generator and the pseudo-random number generator are checked when ever random data is requested by the module. Subsequent random numbers are compared against the last generated value to verify that these values are not the same. The module also performs a bypass test before entering an encrypted channel mode. When switching from a plain to an encrypted channel mode the module issues an encrypted challenge to its peer using the Data Encryption Key (DEK). The challenge is then decrypted by the peer using its DEK, and if verified, an encrypted response is returned to the module (using the DEK). The response is decrypted by the module (using the DEK) and verified. If successful the channel is established as being in an encrypted state with matching DEKs in each module. In the case of a firmware upgrade, this is digitally signed by a CA using DSA allowing the module to verify the image so preventing unauthorized firmware upgrades. The firmware upgrade is currently a factory only service. After loading firmware onto this module it may no longer be a FIPS 140-2 validated module unless the firmware has been FIPS 140-2 validated. This feature is used as an upgrade path for future FIPS 140-2 approved modules. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 8 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 1-4 Conditional Tests Function Checked Description Hardware RNG CRNG SHA-1 RNG CRNG Bypass Bypass Test Firmware Upgrade Authentication Verify (DSA) TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 9 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY The two roles associated with the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet are: Crypto-Officer Commissioning and configuration of the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. User This role occurs when two Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets are communicating with each other. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet does not support multiple concurrent roles. 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can be managed by the Crypto-Officer using either of the following two methods: Element Manager - This PC-based software application enables a Crypto-Officer to commission and administer the module. SNMP Management Station - This is limited to requesting and obtaining status information from the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. The Crypto-Officer role utilizes the Element Manager to commission and configure the module via the dedicated Ethernet or serial management port. Commissioning a module installs a X.509 certificate (containing the CA public key, certificate name, unit serial number and certificate life time) and the required Diffie Hellman parameters (base and modulus) to allow the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet to generate a corresponding Diffie Hellman key set. This information is digital signed allowing the unit to authenticate the certificate's signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. The module must be commissioned before it may be administered. When administering the module the Element Manager establishes a secure connection (connection authentication and data confidentiality) to the module. This connection is established and protected in the same manner as a module to module connection. To establish the secure connection the Crypto-Officer uses a removable media key-material set containing the Crypto- Officer's name and access rights, Diffie-Hellman key set and own certificate. To access the key- material set the Crypto-Officer must login to the Element Manager by presenting the key-material set and the Crypto-Officer's own password of at least 8 ASCII printable characters. This allows the Element Manager to verify the identity of a Crypto-Officer before establishing a secure connection using the key material set. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 10 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 2.2 User Role The Crypto-Officer can download one or more signed X.509 User Certificates to the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. Each User Certificate gives a Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet an identity. Identity-based authentication is implemented between two communicating Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets. The modules are then operating in the User role. This identity can be authenticated to another module which verifies the User Certificate's signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. If the issuing CA Public key is not held within the authenticating module then verification cannot be undertaken. Therefore no communications channel can be established between the two Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets. 2.3 Authentication The types and strengths of authentication for each Role identified for the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet are given in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 below. Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data Crypto-Officer Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate User Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate The identity of each entity performing a role that requires authentication is held within the X.509 Digital Certificate allowing the identity and authorization of the operator to be validated by checking the signature (DSA) of the certificate. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 11 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Signed X.509 The strength depends upon the size of the private key space. The Digital Certificate Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses DSA, which is a FIPS Approved algorithm. Therefore the probability of successfully guessing the private key (160 bits), and hence correctly signing an X.509 certificate, is significantly less than one in 1,000,000 (2160). Multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute period do not constitute a threat for secure operation of the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. This is because each attempt requires the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet to check the signature on the certificate that is to be loaded. Therefore the total number of attempts that can be made in a one-minute period will be limited by the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet signature verification and response operation, which takes on average approximately 30 seconds. The majority of this time is accounted for by the communications overheads since the signature checking operation within the module is relatively fast. Given the very large size (160 bits) of the private key space used by the FIPS Approved signature algorithm (DSA) loaded in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet it follows that the probability that an intruder will be able to guess the private key, and thereby gain authentication, by making multiple attempts is significantly less than one in 100,000 (2160 / 2). There is no feedback of authentication data to the Crypto-Officer or User that might serve to weaken the authentication mechanism. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 12 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 3.1 Roles and Services Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer lists the authorized services available for each role within the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. All services require authentication to the module. For further details of each operation refer to the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet User Guide [3]. Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer Service Description Input Output Access Access module Login/logout of the password, crypto Command Peer Module Certificate - read module officer public response key, crypto officer certificate Manage Key Material Loads module's key module public Command CA Public Key ­ read/write, material, deletes key, module response Module Certificate ­ read/write module's key material certificate General Configuration Display/edit module's Commands and Command None name, description, time parameters response and interface settings. Diagnostics Reboot or erase key Commands and Command None material. Configure parameters response loopback mode IP Management Display/edit module's Commands and Command None ports, Ethernet and parameters response serial, configuration. SNMP Display/edit general Commands and Command None information, SNMP parameters response version, SNMP communities and SNMP traps. IP Routes Display/edit IP routing Commands and Command None information parameters response Security Display/edit key Commands and Command Key Encryption Key ­ write lifetimes, and general parameters response; (delete), Data Encryption Key ­ key exchange key write (delete) parameters exchange if forced. RIP Display/edit RIP version Commands and Command None and RIP password parameters response Communications Display/edit Ethernet Commands and Command None mode (bulk, tunneling), parameters response laser mode and interface mode TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 13 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Service Description Input Output Access Encryption Display current Commands and Command None connection mode - one parameters response, of standby, plain or ping packet encrypt and ping the to connected unit. connected peer. Expert Display/edit Cipher Text Commands and Command Stealing mode 5 , parameters response enabled or disabled. Tunneling Display own MAC Commands and Command address, display/edit parameters response. peer MAC address, filter rules, VLAN identification and fragmentation size. Environment Display fan speed, and Commands and Command None module temperature. parameters response License Display/edit currently License file Command None loaded license file for Response the Datacryptor OC- 3/12/48C module. Show Status View status of the None Front Panel None module. LEDs Status Commands and Indicators parameters Status information over Element Manager or SNMP Traps Operator Callable Self- Module performs self- Reboot Module Front Panel None Test test LEDs Status Indicators Plaintext Enable module to Commands and Bypass test None perform bypass. parameters. pass or fail indicated by Front Panel Status LEDs Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User Service Description Input Output Accessed Encrypt Encrypt data received User traffic User traffic DEK ­ read from the Host interface (plain) (encrypted) 5 Ciphertext Stealing (CTS) is a CBC method of manipulating the data in the last two blocks of messages that are not exactly divisible into 128 bit blocks such that the last incomplete block can be sent securely without increasing the overall message size. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 14 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Service Description Input Output Accessed and transmit on the Network interface. Decrypt Decrypt data received User traffic User traffic DEK - read from the Network (encrypted) (plain) interface and transmit on the Host interface. 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights The cryptographic keys and CSPs stored in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet module are listed in Table 3-3. All private and secret keys (Diffie-Hellman, KEKs and DEKs) are generated internally in the module and may not be either loaded or read by the Crypto Officer or User. Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Keys/CSPs Description Key/CSP Generated/ Stored Zeroised Type Established and Size Master Key Encrypts all non-volatile AES At start-up if not FRAM On tamper Keys and CSPs stored on present using the detect or by the module (256 bits) module's hardware (plaintext) user. random number generator and an approved RNG (cert# 588). CA Public Key The public key of the CA DSA Generated external Non-volatile When the key is key pair use to verify and loaded as part of memory ­ deleted or subsequent key material (1024 bits) the commissioning Compact replace by a loaded into the module. process. Flash subsequent key. (encrypted) Own Module An X.509 certificate Diffie- The Diffie-Hellman Own Module When the Certificate/Diffie- containing the module Hellman static key pair is Certificate certificate is Hellman Static Key name, Diffie-Hellman static (1024 bits) generated locally by Non-volatile deleted or Pair public key (the static private the module, using the memory ­ replaced by a key is stored separately) module's hardware Compact subsequent and associated parameters. random number Flash certificate. generator and an (encrypted) approved RNG The Diffie- (cert#588) from the Diffie- Hellman static parameters supplied Hellman private key may during the static private deleted by a commissioning key ­ Non- user. process. The module volatile name and Diffie- memory ­ Hellman static public FRAM key is then exported (encrypted) to be signed by issuing CA so forming the module certificate. Diffie-Hellman The Diffie-Hellman Diffie- The Diffie-Hellman Volatile Zeroised when a Ephemeral Key ephemeral key pair. Hellman ephemeral key pair is memory - new link is TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 15 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Keys/CSPs Description Key/CSP Generated/ Stored Zeroised Type Established and Size Pair (1024 bits) generated locally by SRAM established. the module, using the (encrypted) module's hardware random number generator and an approved RNG (cert#588) from the parameters supplied during the commissioning process. This key pair is used in conjunction with the static key pair to establish the KEK. Peer Module Received during link Diffie- Generated by peer in Non-Volatile Zeroised when a Certificate establishment between two Hellman the same manner as memory ­ new link is modules to allow (1024 bits) Own Module Compact established. authentication of the peer Certificate. Flash module using signature (encrypted) verification (DSA). Key Encryption Key used to derive data AES Established during Volatile Zeroised when a Key (KEK) encryption keys in link establishment memory ­ new link is conjunction with DEKID (256 bits) with Diffie-Hellman BRAM established or using the static and (encrypted) when a new KEK ephemeral key pairs. is generated at a user defined time interval. Data Encryption Random data used to 256 bits Generated during Not stored. N/A Key Derivation derive data encryption keys DEK derivation using Data (DEKDD) in conjunction with KEK the module's hardware random number generator and an approved RNG (cert# 588). Data Encryption Two keys (one for transmit AES Generated during link Volatile Zeroised when a Keys (DEKs) and one for receive) used establishment using memory ­ new link is for encryption and (256 bits) AES (KEK), DEKDD BRAM established or decryption of line data. and XOR operations. (encrypted) when a new DEK is generated at a user defined time interval. Seed Key Used by the Approved RNG RNG Seed Generated via internal Not stored. Zeroised when a Key hardware RNG subsequent seed key is generated (256 bits) and the CRNG comparison is successful. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 16 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3.3 Zeroisation The Crypto Officer can zeroise keys through the Element Manager application. As indicated in the table above, the Crypto Officer has the choice to directly delete keys, establish a new link with another peer module or force the module to generate new keys. Keys that are not zeroised are encrypted by the master key. The module zeroises the master key when the tamper response and zeroisation circuitry responds to an intrusion of the enclosure which renders all other keys indecipherable. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 17 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information FIPS Approved Mode of Operation The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet only operates in an Approved mode and does not support any unapproved modes of operation. 1. FIPS 140-2 Approved and Certified SHA-1 (FIPS Certificate #985) DSA (FIPS Certificate #349) FIPS 186-2 (FIPS Certificate #588). AES-256 (FIPS Certificate #1033 and 1078) 2. Non-Approved Allowed Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength) Hardware RNG for generating seed key for Approved RNG TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 18 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of production-grade components to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is protected by a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum with tamper evident labels (highlighted in red) and tamper response mechanisms. Attempts to access the module without removing the cover will cause visible physical damage to the module and/or tamper evident labels. The module's ventilation holes on the sides and back on the enclosure are fitted with baffles to prevent physical probing of the enclosure. The module has a removable top cover which is protected by tamper response circuitry, which zeroizes all plaintext CSPs. Access to the internal components of the module requires that these covers are removed. The module's cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its external casing. 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms The following guidelines should be considered when producing a Security Policy for the network in which the module is deployed. The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet should be periodically checked for evidence of tampering, in particular damage to the tamper evident labels as these are part of the security of the unit. In addition the audit logs should be checked for activation of the tamper response mechanism. The frequency of a physical inspection depends on the information being protected and the environment in which the unit is located. At a minimum it would be expected that a physical inspection would be made at least monthly and audit logs daily. Figure 4-1 1600X439 Front Figure 4-2 1600X439 AC and DC Rear TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 19 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-3 1600x439 Top Figure 4-4 1600x439 Bottom The tamper evident labels shall only be applied at the Thales facility. Tamper evident labels are not available for order or replacement from Thales. Two undamaged tamper evident labels must be visible for the module to be operated in a FIPs approved mode of operation. They shall be in the positions shown (see Figure 4-1), one on the left side of the front panel (position 1) and one on the right side of the front panel (position 2) TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 20 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY None. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 21 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute CA Certification Authority CTS Cipher Text Stealing DEK Data Encryption Key DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EDC Error Detection Code FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards ITU International Telecommunications Union KAT Know Answer Test KEK Key Encryption Key LAN Local Area Network MAC Media Access Control NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology PPP Point-to-Point PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator PSU Power Supply Unit RIP Routing Information Protocol RNG Random Number Generator SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol VLAN Virtual LAN TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 22 OF 23 30 MAR 2010 DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY REFERENCES 1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 25th May 2001. Including Change Notices 2,3,4: 12/03/2002 Available from the NIST web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/ 2. FIPS 186-2 Digital Signature Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 27th January 2000. Including Change Notice 1: 5th October 2001. Available from the NIST web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/ 3. Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet User Manual, 1270A427, Issue 8 June 2008. Available from Thales e-Security. TH ASEC0950 002E PAGE 23 OF 23 30 MAR 2010