



Security Policy for FIPS 140-2

KVL 3000 *Plus*

Version 01.01.24

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1 Introduction



KVL 3000 Plus

1.1 Scope

This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the KVL 3000 Plus (*Hardware P/N T6717A, Firmware Version R03.52.45*), herein identified as the KVL, must operate. Included in these rules are those derived from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and additionally, those imposed by Motorola. These rules, in total, define the interrelationships between:

- 1) Module operators
- 2) Module services
- 3) Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

1.2 Overview

The Key Variable Loader (KVL) is a portable key distribution device. Encryption keys can be loaded into the KVL manually through its keypad interface or transferred from a key management facility through its serial interface. These keys can then be distributed to various secure communications equipment such as mobile and portable radios, base

stations, zone controllers, data controllers, and other fixed network devices. The KVL also includes a PCMCIA interface for firmware upgrades.

1.3 KVL Implementation

The KVL is implemented as a hardware multi-chip standalone cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2.

1.4 KVL Cryptographic Boundary

The KVL is defined as the handheld portable keyloading device with a built-in crypto engine. This includes the KVL motherboard containing various ICs, EEPROMS, RAM, and I/O ports. The KVL battery and coin cell battery are not included in the boundary.

1.5 KVL Acronym List

CBC	Cipher Block Chain
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CKR	Common Key Reference
CO	Crypto Officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
ECB	Electronic Code Book
IV	Initial Vector
KMF	Key Management Facility
KPK	Key Protection Key
KVL	Key Variable Loader
LFSR	Linear Feedback Shift Register
MAC	Media Access Control
MNP	Message Number Period
OFB	Output Feedback
OTAR	Over The Air Rekeying
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSI	Radio Set Indicator
SAF	Store and Forward
UCM	Universal Crypto Module

2 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

The KVL is validated to meet the FIPS 140-2 security requirements for the levels shown in Table 2.1. The overall module is validated to FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1.

FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section	Level
1. Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2. Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3. Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4. Finite State Model	1
5. Physical Security	1
6. Operational Environment	N/A
7. Cryptographic Key Management	1
8. EMI / EMC	1
9. Self-Tests	1
10. Design Assurance	1
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 2.1 KVL Security Levels

3 FIPS 140-2 Approved Operational Modes

The KVL includes modes of operation that are not FIPS 140-2 Approved. Documented below are the configuration settings that are required to provide FIPS 140-2 Approved operation:

1. FIPS mode must be turned on. FIPS mode may be turned on and the current status of FIPS mode may be viewed through the CONFIG menu. Note: If FIPS mode is turned on, Crypto-Officer (Supervisor) and User (Operator) passwords are required. Passwords are also created through the CONFIG menu.
2. The enablement of non-Approved algorithms causes the module to enter a non-FIPS Approved mode. A non-Approved algorithm may be invoked only when an encryption key for that algorithm has been loaded. The operator shall use the “Get Key Status” service in order to determine if keys for use in the non-Approved algorithms have been loaded. If any of the following keys are loaded then the module is currently in a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation:
 - DES
 - DES-XL
 - DVI-XL
 - DVI-SPFL
 - DVP-XL
 - ADP
 - HCA

The module supports the following Approved algorithms:

- AES-256 (Cert. #2) for encryption, decryption, and authentication (authentication, AES MAC, is Approved when used for Project 25 OTAR. Note: key establishment provides 256 bits of encryption strength) may be used in the following approved modes: OFB, ECB, and CBC.
- Use of TDES 8-bit CFB (Cert. #82) mode for symmetric encryption / decryption of keys and parameters stored in the internal database, and TDES CBC mode for symmetric decryption and authentication of firmware upgrades are approved modes.
- SHA-1 (Cert. #335) for password hashing for internal KVL storage.
- ANSI X9.31 PRNG (Cert. #121) for KPK generation.

In addition to the approved algorithms the module supports the following allowed algorithms:

AES MAC – This algorithm is used within the APCO *Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Protocol*, to secure communications. This key establishment methodology provides at minimum 256 bits of encryption strength.

There are two non-Approved Random Number Generators within FIPS Approved mode.

- Maximal Length 64-bit LFSR – Utilized for IV generation.
- HW RNG – Generates the seed for the ANSI X9.31 PRNG and the maximal length 64-bit LFSR.

The module supports the following non-Approved algorithms:

- DES (ECB, OFB, CFB, and CBC modes)
- DES MAC
- DES-XL
- DVI-XL
- DVI-SPFL
- DVP-XL
- ADP
- HCA (Home Country Algorithm)

4 Security Rules

4.1 *FIPS140-2 Imposed Security Rules*

This section documents the security rules used by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of a FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.

1. The KVL 3000 Plus is placed in FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant mode by turning the FIPS option, located in the CONFIG menu, ON. Note that when toggling between FIPS modes (ON & OFF), the KVL shall erase all its keys in the database.
2. Upon detection of a low voltage power condition the cryptographic module shall erase the KPK, and consequently, all the TEKs and the KEKs would be unusable.
3. The module shall not at any time output any Plaintext CSPs from any ports other than the “keyloading port”.
4. The cryptographic module shall erase all plaintext keys, the KPK and critical information, when a tamper condition is detected.
5. Keys manually entered into the cryptographic module shall be entered twice. If the key entries match the entry is successful; otherwise key entry fails.
6. Keys entered into the cryptographic module shall be accompanied by a valid key tag and unique logical ID. Also, checksums will be calculated over each encrypted key to ensure the key’s integrity throughout its lifetime. Each key in the KVL is entered and stored with the following information:
 - Key Identifier – 16 bit identifier
 - Algorithm Identifier – 8 bit identifier
 - Key Type – Traffic Encryption Key or Key Encryption Key
 - Physical ID, Common Key Reference (CKR) number, or CKR/Keyset number – Identifiers indicating storage locations.Along with the encrypted key data, this information is stored in a key record that includes a checksum over all of the fields to detect data corruption. When used or deleted the keys are referenced by Key ID/AlgID, Physical ID, or CKR/Keyset.
7. The cryptographic module shall be capable of encrypting, using the KPK, all keys before they are stored in the unit’s EEPROM. The cryptographic module shall also be capable of decrypting all keys stored in the EEPROM.
8. Upon the application of power or the receipt of a Reset command the cryptographic module shall perform the following cryptographic related tests:

- EEPROM Test where we validate the checksum over the entire EEPROM.
- KPK Integrity Check, where KPK encrypts known value in the EEPROM and compares to a known value, using the TDES algorithm.
- Flash Memory Test (32-bit Checksum test)

The following self-tests and algorithm implementations are performed within the UCM (Universal Crypto Module). The UCM-performed self-tests are as follows:

- Power up and on-demand tests
 - Cryptographic algorithm test: The cryptographic algorithm known answer test is performed on each algorithm within the module:
 - TDES CFB8
 - TDES CBC
 - AES OFB
 - AES CBC
 - AES ECB
 - SHA-1
 - ANSI X9.31 PRNG
 - Firmware integrity test: The firmware test calculates a checksum over the code. The checksum is calculated by summing over the code in 32 bit words. The code is appended with a value that makes the checksum value 0. The test passes if the calculated value is 0, otherwise it fails.
 - Critical Functions tests:
 - LFSR Test: The LFSRs are tested by setting the feedback taps to a known value, loading them with known data, shifting the LFSR 64 times, and then comparing the LFSR data to a known answer. The test passes if the final data matches, otherwise it fails.
 - General Purpose RAM Test: The general purpose RAM is tested for stuck address lines and stuck bits. This is accomplished through a series of operations that write and read the RAM. The test passes if all values read from the RAM are correct, otherwise it fails.

Powering the module off then on or resetting the module using the Reset service will initiate the power up and on-demand self tests.

- Conditional tests
 - Manual Key Entry Test: The module requires duplicate keys be entered during manual key entry. If the two separately entered keys do not match then the module will enter an error state.
 - Firmware load test: A MAC is generated over the code when it is built using TDES-CBC. Upon download into the module, the MAC is verified. If the MAC matches the test passes, otherwise it fails.
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test: The continuous random number generator test is performed on each of the 3 supported RNGs within the module:
 - ANSI X9.31 PRNG
 - HW RNG

- o Maximal Length 64-bit LFSR
9. After power up tests are completed, the unit will perform role-based authentication using a password entry mode.
 10. If a KVL undergoes a firmware upgrade, it is no longer considered to be operating in a FIPS Approved mode. To return to this mode of operation the Crypto-Officer must turn on the FIPS config option again.
 11. The cryptographic module shall support the Key Management Security Requirements for Type 3 Block Encryption Algorithms as described in Addendum A of the APCO Project 25 OTAR Protocol (TIA/EIA 102.AACA-A). The requirements dictate the security standards to be followed when transmitting Type 3 Key Management Messages and also the standards for encrypting Type 3 keys when sent as part of a KMM.
 12. The KVL supports the following interfaces:
 - Data input interface
 - a) RS 232 - Plaintext Data, Ciphertext Data, Key Management Data (target RSI and MNP), Encrypted Cryptographic Keys, Configuration Data
 - b) PCMCIA - Plaintext Data, Ciphertext Data, Key Management Data (target RSI and MNP), Encrypted Cryptographic Keys, Configuration Data, firmware upgrades
 - c) Keypad – Plaintext data and CSPs.
 - Data output interface
 - a) Keyloading (MX) port - Plaintext Keys and Data, Key Management Data (target RSI and MNP), Encrypted Cryptographic Keys, Configuration Data
 - b) RS 232 - Plaintext Data, Ciphertext Data, Key Management Data (target RSI and MNP), Encrypted Cryptographic Keys, KVLRSI, KMFRSI and TargetRSI.
 - c) PCMCIA - Plaintext Data, Ciphertext Data, Key Management Data (target RSI and MNP), Encrypted Cryptographic Keys, KVLRSI, KMFRSI and TargetRSI.
 - d) Display – Configuration and Key Management data,
 - Control input interface
 - a) Keypad - Input Commands
 - Status output interface
 - a) Display – status messages (text)
 - b) RS 232 – status codes
 - c) PCMCIA – status codes
 - d) MX Port – status codes
 - Power interface
 - a) 7.5V Main Battery – Powers entire KVL
 - b) 3.0V Coin Cell Battery – Powers the Real Time Clock

The function of the various interfaces is as follows:

1. RS-232: This interface is used for downloads from the KMF and to communicate with other targets. This interface is also used for encrypted key entry and output.
 2. MX: This interface is used to communicate with the targets. The target could be either a radio, or an infrastructure device or another KVL.
 3. PCMCIA: This interface is used to upgrade the KVL Firmware using a PCMCIA card. In addition, it is used to communicate with external devices using a modem.
 4. Keypad: This interface is used to enter plaintext keys as well as select the GUI options.
 5. Power: This interface is used to provide power to the KVL.
 6. Display: This interface is used to provide visual feedback as the GUI menus are navigated and to view other data (e.g. plaintext keys as they are entered).
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13. The KVL inhibits all data output via the data output interface whenever an error state exists and during self-tests.
 14. The KVL logically disconnects the output data path from the circuitry and processes when performing manual key entry, key generation, and key zeroization.
 15. Authentication data and Secret cryptographic keys are entered through the Keypad.
 16. The KVL supports a User role and a Crypto-Officer role. The Crypto-Officer role has a higher number of services.
 17. The KVL re-authenticates a role when it is powered up after being powered off by using a 6 byte alpha-numeric (0-9 and A-F) password.
 18. The KVL provides the following services not requiring a role:
 - Enter Password
 - Shutdown Crypto Module
 - Initiate Self-Tests
 19. In addition to services that do not require a role, the KVL provides the following services that do require one:
 - Manual Key Data Entry
 - Manual Key Zeroization
 - Transfer Key Variable
 - APCO OTAR Store and Forward
 - Privileged Store and Forward

- Change Active Keyset
- Change Password
- Zeroize Selected Keys
- Zeroize All Keys
- Zeroize All Keys and Passwords
- Program Update
- Extract Error and Action Logs
- Clear Logs
- Get Key Status
- Program Update

20. The KVL implements all firmware using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to bootstrap the module and enhance performance.
21. The KVL protects secret keys from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution.
22. The KVL denies access to plaintext secret and private keys contained within the module.
23. The KVL provides the capability to zeroize all plaintext cryptographic keys and other unprotected critical security parameters within it.
24. The KVL conforms to all FCC requirements.
25. The KVL enters an error state if the Firmware Load test fails. As soon as an error indicator is output via the status interface, the module transitions from the error state to a state that only allows new firmware to be loaded.
26. The KVL outputs an error indicator via the status interface whenever an error state is entered due to a failed self-test.
27. The KVL does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.

4.2 *Motorola Imposed Security Rules*

1. The KVL does not support multiple concurrent operators.
2. The cryptographic module will continue to provide User Role and Crypto-Officer Role services until the module has been powered down.
3. All cryptographic module services are suspended during key loading.
4. Upon detection of tamper, the cryptographic module shall erase all CSPs.

5 Identification and Authentication Policy

The KVL uses unique passwords to authenticate the User and the Crypto-Officer. The password is made up of 6 alpha-numeric (0-9 and A-F) characters which is the equivalent of a 24-bit password. The passwords are cleared (i.e. disabled) during manufacturing. They may be initialized/changed at the discretion of the user.

The probability of a successful, random, 24-bit password attempt is one in 16,777,216.

It would require 168 attempts in one minute to increase the random attempt success rate to one in 100,000 which is impossible to perform in that timeframe since it would require over 1,176 button presses on the KVL keypad within a one-minute period.

Role	Authentication Type	Authentication Data Required
User	Role-Based	6 BYTE Password
Crypto-Officer	Role-Based	

6 Physical Security Policy

The KVL is production grade and does not use any FIPS Approved physical security mechanisms.

The KVL uses a tamper-detect circuit that has not been tested as part of FIPS 140-2 validation testing. The KVL's tamper-detect circuit triggers a tamper detection mechanism whenever the module's housing is removed while operating under FIPS Approved mode. Any detection of a physical intrusion will cause all CSPs to be deleted immediately if the module is still powered up, or at next power up if it is not powered up.

Physical Security Mechanism	Maintenance Needed
Tamper Detect Circuit (not tested as part of FIPS 140-2 validation testing)	None

7 Access Control Policy

7.1 KVL Supported Roles

The KVL supports two (2) roles. These roles are defined to be:

- the User Role
- the Crypto-Officer (CO) Role

7.2 KVL Services

- Get Key Status: Key identifier information for existing keys in the database may be viewed. Available in CO mode only.
- Manual Key Data Entry: Plaintext key data may be manually entered through the keypad. Available in CO mode only.
- Manual Key Zeroization: Keys may be deleted from the database. Available in CO mode only.
- Transfer Key Variable: Transfer Plaintext or Encrypted key variables and/or zeroize key variables from the Key Database to a target device through the MX port. Transfer Encrypted key variables and/or zeroize key variables from the Key Database to a target device through the RS232 port. The target could be either a radio, or an infrastructure device or another KVL. Available in both User as well as CO roles.
- APCO OTAR Store and Forward: Download SAF data from a KMF and transfer SAF KMMs to target units. The target could be either a radio, or an infrastructure device or another KVL. Available in both User as well as CO roles. Data could be clear (in Red SAF) or encrypted (Black SAF). Red SAF is only used to transfer keys through the MX port to a connected target. All keys transferred through the RS232 port are encrypted.
- Privileged Store and Forward: Delete SAF data downloaded from KMF. Available only in CO role.
- Change Active Keyset: Modify the currently active keyset used for selecting keys by PID or CKR. Available in User and CO Roles.
- Change Password: Modify the current password used to identify and authenticate the User and CO Roles. Available to User and CO Roles. Note: User can only modify 'User' password.
- Zeroize Selected Keys: Zeroize selected key variables in a target by Physical ID (PID) or Common Key Reference (CKR). Available to User and CO Roles.
- Zeroize All Keys: Zeroize all keys in a target. The target could be either a radio, or an infrastructure device or another KVL. Available in User and CO Roles.
- Zeroize All Keys and Passwords: Zeroizes all keys and CSPs in the key database. Disables the passwords. Allows Operator to gain controlled access to the module if the password is forgotten. Available in User and CO roles.

- Shutdown Crypto Module: Prepares module for removal of power. Available without a role.
- Extract Action and Error Logs: Provides detailed history of success and failure events. Available in User and CO roles.
- Clear Logs: Clears history of error events. Available in CO role only.
- Program Update: Update the module firmware. Available in User and CO Roles.
- Initiate Self Tests: Performs module self tests comprised of cryptographic algorithms test, software firmware test, and critical functions test. Initiated by module reset or transition from power off state to power on state. Available without a Role.

7.3 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

CSP Identifier	Description
ANSI X9.31 seed	A 64-bit seed value used within the ANSI X9.31 DRNG. The seed is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory in plaintext form and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed is not entered into or output from the module.
ANSI X9.31 seed key	Key used to seed the ANSI X9.31 DRNG during initialization. The seed key is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory in plaintext form and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed key is not entered into or output from the module.
Key Protection Key (KPK)	TDES Key used to encrypt the database and other non-volatile parameters. Randomly generated. Generated on Initial firmware programming, or on every firmware upgrade, or successful power up after erasure. Stored in plaintext in battery backed RAM. Erased when any of the following occurs: firmware upgrade, physically tampering with the KVL, changing the FIPS configuration parameter, no power for more than a minute, resetting the KVL. The KPK is not entered into or output from the module.
Plaintext Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs)	Keys used for data encryption. Entered by the Operator through the keypad, or received through the MX port during Store and Forward. Stored encrypted on the KPK. Erased on firmware upgrade, KPK loss, or active Operator deletion. Output through the data output interface.
Plaintext Key Encryption	Keys used for encryption of keys in during Store

Keys (KEKs)	and Forward (SAF). Algorithms, as purchased and specified by the user. Entered by the Operator through the keypad, or received through the MX port during Store and Forward. Stored encrypted on the KPK. Erased on firmware upgrade, KPK loss, or active Operator deletion. Output through the data output interface.
Passwords	User and CO passwords entered during Operator authentication. Created by the Operator. Hash of the password (and not the password itself) is stored in the EEPROM. Erased on resetting the KVL or Operator deletion. Passwords are not output from the module.
Plaintext MAC Key	TDES key used for authentication of firmware upgrade. Stored in non-volatile memory in plaintext form. Entered and zeroized using the Program Update service. Cannot be output.
Plaintext Signaling Encryption Keys (SEKs)	Keys used for data encryption during Red Store and Forward (SAF) or Manual Key Fill via the RS232 port (Transfer Key Variable). Entered by the Operator through the keypad. Stored encrypted on the KPK. Erased on firmware upgrade, KPK loss, or active Operator deletion. Output through the data output interface.
Plaintext Black Keyloading Key (BKK)	AES256-OFB key used for encrypting key variables before transfer with the Transfer Key Variable Service. Entered using the Program Update service. Stored in plaintext form. Cannot be output.

7.4 CSP Access Types

CSP Access Type	Description
c - Check CSP	Checks status and key identifier information of key.
d - Decrypt CSP	Decrypts TEK, KEK, or SEK retrieved from non-volatile memory using the KPK and returns plaintext version.
e - Encrypt CSP	Encrypts TEK, KEK, or SEK with KPK prior to storage in non-volatile memory.
g - Generate CSP	Generates KPK.
o - Output CSP	Output TEK, KEK, or SEK through RS232 or Keyloading port
s - Store CSP	Stores encrypted TEK, KEK, or SEK in non-volatile memory. Stores plaintext BKK or plaintext MAC Key in non-volatile memory.
u - Use CSP	Uses CSP internally for encryption / decryption services.

z - Zeroize CSP	Zeroizes key.
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7.5 Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Services and Access

	CSP									Role		
	ANSI X9.31 seed	ANSI X9.31 seed key	KPK (Key Protection Key)	TEK (Traffic Encryption Key)	KEK (Key Encryption Key)	Passwords	Plaintext MAC Key	SEK (Signalling Encryption Key)	BKK (Black Keyloading Key)	User Role	Crypto Officer Role	No Role Required
Operator Service												
1. Enter Password						u						√
2. Initiate Self-Tests	g, u	g, u										√
3. Get Key Status											√	
4. Manual Key Data Entry			u	e, s	e, s			u, e, s			√	
5. Manual Key Zeroization				z	z			z			√	
6. Transfer Key Variable			u	d, o	d, o			d, o	u	√	√	
7. APCO OTAR Store and Forward			u	u, s, o	u, s, o			u, s, o	u	√	√	
8. Privileged Store and Forward				z	z			z			√	
9. Change Active Keyset										√	√	
10. Change Password						u				√	√	
11. Zeroize Selected Keys										√	√	
12. Zeroize All Keys										√	√	
13. Zeroize All Keys and Passwords			z, g	z	z	z		z		√	√	
14. Shut Down Crypto Module	z	z										√
15. Extract Error and Action Logs										√	√	
16. Clear Logs											√	
17. Program Update			z, g	z	z	z	u, s, z	z	s, z	√	√	

8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The KVL is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of those required by FIPS 140-2, including but not limited to power consumption, timing, fault induction, or TEMPEST attacks.