Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Number 1179470, Rev. 006 November 12, 2015 Prepared by: ViaSat, Inc. 6155 El Camino Real Carlsbad, CA 92009 Copyright ViaSat, Inc. 2015. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Record of Review and History Document Rev. Rationale Release Date Affected Pages Number 1148155 001 Initial Release in Agile October 31, 2012 All 1179470 001 Updated for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH March 13, 2015 All ECP 1179470 002 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP August 7, 2015 All Comments for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH ECP 1179470 003 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP October 7, 2015 All Comments 1179470 004 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 16, 2015 All 1179470 005 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 27, 2015 3, 5 1179470 006 Updated for FW v02.07.02. November 12, 1, 3, 4 2015 ii ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. MODULE OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................................................... 1 2. SECURITY LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................ 2 3. MODES OF OPERATION ..................................................................................................................................... 2 4. PORTS AND INTERFACES.................................................................................................................................. 6 5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ................................................................................. 6 6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ............................................................................................................................ 10 ROLES AND SERVICES .............................................................................................................................................. 10 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)...................................................................................... 13 DEFINITION OF CSPS AND PUBLIC KEY MODES OF ACCESS .................................................................................... 15 7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................................... 20 8. SECURITY RULES .............................................................................................................................................. 20 9. SELF-TESTS ......................................................................................................................................................... 22 10. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY..................................................................................................................... 23 PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS ......................................................................................................................... 23 OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 23 11. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........................................................................................... 26 12. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 27 13. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... 27 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module ............................................................................... 1 Figure 2: Block Diagram ................................................................................................................ 2 Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (8 Seals) .............................................. 24 Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (8 Seals) ............................................... 25 Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (2 Seals) ............ 25 Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (1 Seal) ..................... 25 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Module Security Level Specification ............................................................................... 2 Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ........................... 3 Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication ..................................................... 6 Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ......................................................................... 8 Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles ........................................................................................ 10 Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services ................................................................................ 16 Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services ..................................................................... 18 Table 8: Power Up Self-tests ........................................................................................................ 22 Table 9: Conditional Self-tests...................................................................................................... 23 iii ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 10: Critical Function Tests .................................................................................................. 23 Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms .................................................. 24 iv ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 1. Module Overview The Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip standalone module as defined in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2. The module has multiple configurations as shown below: Category Hardware Version Firmware Versions Strategic P/N 1010162, Version 1 02.07.02 P/N 1010162 with ESEM, Version 1 02.07.02 (also referred to as P/N 1091549, Version 1) P/N 1075559, Version 1 02.07.02 P/N 1075559 with ESEM, Version 1 02.07.02 (also referred to as P/N 1091551, Version 1) P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the N/A ESEM Tactical P/N 1010163, Version 1 02.07.02 P/N 1010163 with ESEM, Version 1 02.07.02 (also referred to as P/N 1091550, Version 1) P/N 1075560, Version 1 02.07.02 P/N 1075560 with ESEM, Version 1 02.07.02 (also referred to as P/N 1091552, Version 1) P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the N/A ESEM The cryptographic boundary is realized as the external surface of the EBEM enclosure. The EBEM is a high-speed, high performance, flexible and compatible Single Channel Per Carrier (SCPC) modem. The EBEM incorporates the latest technology in advanced modulation and coding, while providing backwards interoperability with the majority of existing SCPC modems. It offers optimal power and bandwidth efficiency with 16-ary modulation and Turbo-coding. It supports a large range of user data rates, from 64 kbps up to 155 Mbps. Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module 1 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Figure 2: Block Diagram 2. Security Level The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 1: Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 3. Modes of Operation 2 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Approved mode of operation In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms: Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions CAVP Algorithm Description Cert. # Algorithm Implementation EBEM AES AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3449 CTR 1 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in FPGA for data) Modes: ECB (Encryption only), CTR (Encryption and Decryption) Key sizes: 256 bits EBEM AES AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3450 CTR 2 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in FPGA for data) Modes: ECB (Encryption only), CTR (Encryption and Decryption) Key sizes: 256 bits EbemCrypto AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3448 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in Processor for CSPs) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES Key [SP 800-38F] 3448 Wrap Functions: Wrap, Unwrap (for CSPs) (KTS) Key sizes: 256 bits Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 192 or 256 bits of encryption strength. DRBG [SP 800-90A] 844 Functions: CTR DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits ECDSA [FIPS 186-2] 697 Functions: Signature Verification (for ESEM configuration files) Curves/SHA sizes: P-521 with SHA-1 Note: CAVP Tested as FIPS 186-4 per CAVP guidelines but still considered FIPS 186-2 because of curve/SHA size used. ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] 697 Functions: Signature Verification (for firmware images, and feature files) Curves/SHA sizes: P-521 with SHA-512 3 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] 697 Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification (for key transport messages) Curves/SHA sizes: P-384 with SHA-384 HMAC [FIPS 198-1] 2196 Functions: Generation, Verification (for SMAT and PBKDF2 authentication) SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAS [SP 800-56A] 60 Schema: Ephemeral Unified Parameter sets/Key sizes: EE Supports 256 bits of security. KAS [SP 800-56A] 60 Schema: One Pass DH Parameter sets/Key sizes: ED Supports 192 bits of security. SHA [FIPS 180-4] 2846 Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-1 (not used in sig gen), SHA-384, and SHA-512 NetSNMP KDF KDF [SP 800-135] 455 Functions: SNMP KDF (CVL) OpenSSH KDF KDF [SP 800-135] 454 Functions: SSH KDF (CVL) OpenSSL SHA SHA [FIPS 180-4] 2690 Functions: non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 SHA-256 uClibc SHA [FIPS 180-4] 2689 Functions: non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-256 In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved, but allowed algorithms and protocols: NDRNG ­ Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG. The NDRNG output is used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG. The NDRNG produces entropy in 128-byte blocks. The following are protocols and algorithms for which "no security is claimed". These are considered plaintext communication channels for the purposes of this module. This is allowed in FIPS mode because the ViaSat EBEM's proprietary FIPS Approved key establishment and encryption algorithms (as shown in Table 2) protect sensitive information that is sent over the Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, and SFTP protocols. 4 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 o Telnet ­ no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. o SSH ­ no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms: Protocol Defined Algorithm Names: Ciphers: aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc, 3des-cbc, aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc Key Exchange Algorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2- nistp384, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha-256, diffie-hellman- group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 Public Key Algorithms: Ssh-dss, Ssh-rsa, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 MACs: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512 Corresponding FIPS Algorithms: Ciphers: AES (non-compliant), TDES (non-compliant) Key Exchange Algorithms: ECDH (non-compliant), DH (non- compliant), SHA (non-compliant) Public Key Algorithms: DSA (non-compliant), RSA (non- compliant), ECDSA (non-compliant), SHA (non-compliant) MACs: HMAC (non-compliant), SHA (non-compliant) o SNMPv1 ­ no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. o SNMPv3 ­ no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms: Protocol Defined Algorithm Names: HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA, AES, DES Corresponding FIPS Algorithms: HMAC (non-compliant), SHA (non- compliant), AES (non-compliant), MD5, DES o FTP ­ no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. o SFTP ­ no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms: Same as SSH above. SP 800-132 PBKDF2 ­ no security is claimed. Anything imported into the module encrypted using PBKDF keys is considered plaintext for the purposes of this module. This is allowed in FIPS mode because the ViaSat EBEM's proprietary FIPS Approved key establishment and encryption algorithms (as shown in Table 2) protect sensitive information that is sent encrypted by PBKDF keys. Corresponding FIPS Algorithm: PBKDF (non-compliant). EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 160 bits of encryption strength). Ephemeral Unified KAS parameter set EE when used with SHA-1 in crypto compatibility mode. (This is part of our transition plan to eventually eliminate SHA-1 support while maintaining backward compatibility with older SW/FW versions.) 5 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 The EBEM cryptographic module does not contain a Non FIPS Approved mode. The FIPS Approved mode of operation is indicated by the firmware version. If the version is one that has a FIPS certificate, then the user knows they are operating in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The unauthenticated service "Display status" allows a user to view the firmware version by scrolling to "GeneralSW Version". 4. Ports and Interfaces The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces: J1 OVERHEAD (NON-INTELSAT): Data input, data output J3 EXT REF: Control input J4 DATA 1 (422/530): Data input, data output, control input J5 DATA 2 (COMSEC): Data input, data output, control input J7 DATA 3 (HSSI): Data input, data output J6 TX L-BAND: Data output, status output J8 RX L-BAND: Data input, control input J9 TX 70/140 MHz: Data output, status output J12 RX 70/140 MHz: Data input, control input J20 10/100/1000 (only available with ESEM installed): Data input, data output, status output (status is only PADQ link quality packets during an active PPPoE session) 100-240V~ 60Hz/50Hz: Power port, power input J13 ANT HANDOVER (only available in Tactical versions): Control input J10 ALARM: Status output J11 SERIAL: Data input, data output, control input, status output J2 10/100 BASE-T: Data input, data output, control input, status output Keypad: Control input, data input LCD: Status output, Data output Zeroize buttons: Control input LEDs: Status outputs Speaker: Status outputs 5. Identification and Authentication Policy Assumption of roles The EBEM cryptographic module supports five distinct operator roles (Operator, Administrator, Cryptographic-Officer, Peer Modem, and ViaSat, Inc.). The cryptographic module shall enforce the separation of roles using role-based and identity-based operator authentication. Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Type of Authentication Role Description Authentication Data Operator A "User" from the FIPS Identity-based User name and 140-2 perspective. Password Administrator A "User" from the FIPS Identity-based User name and 140-2 perspective. Password 6 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Type of Authentication Role Description Authentication Data Cryptographic- The "Crypto Officer" Identity-based User name and Officer (CO) from the FIPS 140-2 Password perspective. The CO may only access the module via the Front Panel. Peer Modem The modem at the other Role-based HMAC Key, also end of the RF link, with referred to as whom the TEK SMAT (Shared negotiation occurs. Modem Authentication Token) Identity-based Identity and Authentication (IA) FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Signature Key Pair ViaSat, Inc. Signer of firmware image Identity-based FIPS 186-4 files and feature files. A ECDSA Signature ViaSat trust anchor used Key to validate authenticity when loading these files on modem. ViaSat, Inc. Signer of ESEM Identity-based FIPS 186-2 configuration files. A ECDSA Signature ViaSat trust anchor used Key to validate authenticity when loading these files on modem. 7 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism Password The password is a minimum of 8-characters chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/72^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000. The module will lockout after a maximum of 5 consecutive failed login attempts. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 5/72^8 which is less than 1/100,000. HMAC Key The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1 / 2^160 which is less than 1/1,000,000. The HMAC key must be manually entered at the front panel. No more than 10 unique authentication attempts can occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10 / 2^160 which is less than 1/100,000. FIPS 186-4 ECDSA IA Using the EBEM's ECDSA implementation, the Signature Key probability that a random attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-384 function, or 1 / 2^192, which is less than 1/1,000,000. The IA key pair takes 20 seconds to fill so no more than 3 attempts can occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3 / 2^192 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of three attempts per minute. FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Using the EBEM's ECDSA implementation, the Firmware/Feature Signature Key probability that a random attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-512 function, or 1 / 2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000. If the signature verification fails, the user must reboot before transferring a different firmware image to the modem and trying the validation again. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 1 / 2^256 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of one attempt per minute. 8 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism FIPS 186-2 ECDSA Signature Using the EBEM's ECDSA implementation, the Key probability that a random attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-1 function, or 1 / 2^80, which is less than 1/1,000,000. It takes more than one second to FTP/SFTP a new configuration file to the modem. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is also 60 / 2^80 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of 60 attempts per minute. 9 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 6. Access Control Policy Roles and Services Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles Unauthenticated Cryptographic Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Officer Service Description Telnet, SSH, Remotely connect to the EBEM X X SNMPv1, SNMPv3, using Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, FTP, or SFTP SNMPv3, FTP or SFTP. These protocols are used to establish access to the module for the Operator and Administrator to perform other services, as described in this table. Circuit Establishment Set up an encrypted or unencrypted X X circuit Encryption Use HMAC (with SMAT) or X Establishment and ECDSA signature verification Authentication (with IA PKC) to authenticate the AES encrypted pipeline. Disconnect Encrypted Tear down the link (by command X X circuit or power cycle). Change one's own One may change one's own X X X password password after authentication with the module Set Admin, Operator Set Administrator and Operator's X X User Names & User Names & Passwords Passwords Change Admin and Change Administrator and X X Operator Passwords Operator Passwords Enable/disable Configure module exclusive bypass X encryption settings Set CO User Names Set CO's User Names & Passwords X & Passwords Change CO Change CO Passwords X Passwords SMAT Entry SMAT Entry via front panel X 10 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Unauthenticated Cryptographic Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Officer Service Description Set Crypto Set encryption compatibility mode. X Compatibility Mode Encryption Perform encryption on an X established encrypted circuit with a peer modem. Cryptographically Cryptographically validate and load X Validate image an uploaded firmware image, feature file, or ESEM configuration file. Zeroize Actively overwrite all CSPs. Then X X X (authenticated) the module must be powered down. Configure System Adjust the module's system time. X Time Configure Access to Enable/disable remote access via X Unsecure Protocols FTP, SNMPv1, and Telnet. Configure password Set minimum password X policy length/complexity requirement and password expiration period. Change configuration Adjust all modem and ESEM X X or monitor modem parameters. Monitor status of all modem parameters. View or clear audit View or clear audit log, which logs X log actions of all users and the associated access method. Upload Image Upload a firmware image, a feature X file, or ESEM configuration file. This will later be validated by the ViaSat, Inc. role. Issue Trust Anchor Issue a Trust Anchor certificate to X the modem. Fill Issued Trust Fill a Trust Anchor certificate that X Anchor has been previously issued into the modem. Delete Trust Anchor Delete a filled Trust Anchor X Certificate 11 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Unauthenticated Cryptographic Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Officer Service Description Issue/Fill Simplex Issue/Fill key material needed for X PKI Key Material authentication and key establishment for PKI circuits (except Trust Anchor). This includes: Certificate Authority certificates, CRLs, IA /KE certificates, and IA/KE private keys. Delete Simplex PKI Delete PKI circuit key material X X Key Material including: Certificate Authority certificates, CRLs, IA /KE certificates, and IA/KE private keys. User Login Login to the modem configuration X interfaces (i.e. SSH, Telnet, (S)FTP, Front Panel, and SNMP) Power On Power on the modem X Power Off Power off the modem X Reset Reset the modem X Display Status Show non-security relevant status X of the cryptographic module via the front panel. Zeroize Actively overwrite all Critical X (unauthenticated) Security Parameters (CSPs) through SNMPv1, or the front panel. Then the module must be powered down. Self-Tests Perform a suite of Power On Self X Tests (POSTs). All POSTs are initiated automatically without operator intervention Antenna Handover Command sent from ship to X Service modem to switch antennas Local/Remote Switch to Local (which only allows X commands through the Front Panel) or switch to Remote (which allows access via remote protocols like SSH). 12 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Unauthenticated Cryptographic Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Officer Service Description Alarm Mute Mute the audible alarm. X Note: Operator and Administrator roles are permitted access to the module via the front panel as well as remote interfaces (Telnet, SSH, FTP, SFTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv3). Cryptographic Officers are only permitted access to the module via the front panel. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following are CSPs contained in the module: SMAT (HMAC Key): Used to authenticate the peer modem role (within a given community of modems) during the initial key agreement messages related to secure circuit establishment. This key is used during re-key operations to authenticate a peer modem. The HMAC algorithm in the EBEM modem uses the SMAT as input, so only EBEM modems configured with the same SMAT will correctly authenticate each other. Authentication of peer modem using this parameter takes place while the modems are performing ECC CDH in key agreement, and the authentication is a 160-bit or 256-bit value depending on the crypto compatibility mode. DRBG Seed: 384 bytes (3072 bits) of random data generated from an entropy source (non-deterministic) used to initialize the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (per NIST SP 800-90A). DRBG Internal State: The internal state of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. These are values "V" and "Key". SMAT Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over SMAT-authenticated RF circuits from modems to peer modems. SMAT Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over SMAT- authenticated RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer modem's TxTEK for symmetric AES cryptographic communication. PKI Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over PKI-authenticated RF circuits from modems to peer modems. PKI Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over PKI-authenticated RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer modem's TxTEK for symmetric AES cryptographic communication. PKI Circuit KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt the TxTEK for PKI-authenticated circuits before it is output in the Key Transport message. 13 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Static IA Private Key: Used to digitally sign the Ephemeral KE public key sent in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment. Ephemeral KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK to encrypt the TEK sent in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment. Static KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt the TEK received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment. SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Private Key: Module's private key used for SMAT-based circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). Key Fill Ephemeral Private Key: Private key used for Key Fill KEK establishment with LCT, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). Key Fill KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt private keys filled into the modem. ECC CDH Primitive Shared Secret: FIPS SP800-56A C(2e, 0s, ECC CDH) and C(1e, 1s, ECC CDH), key agreement schemes and used with the Concatenation KDF to establish key material for SMAT/PKI authenticated circuits and private key fill. Bypass Flag: Determines if a circuit is processed as plaintext or `encryption enabled.' Crypto Compatibility Mode: When enabled, uses SHA-1 instead of SHA-512 for the HMAC and the KDF for backward compatibility with modules that did not have SHA- 512 implemented. This is part of our transition plan to eventually eliminate SHA-1 support while maintaining backward compatibility with older SW/FW versions. CO Password: 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate CO and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by CO) failed attempts. Administrator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the Administrator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by CO) failed attempts. Operator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the Operator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by CO) failed attempts. Local Unique Key (LUK): A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt CSPs so they can be stored on the RAM or flash file system. Definition of Public Keys: The following are the public keys contained in the module. Firmware/Feature Trust Anchor ­ FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate the authenticity of signed code images and/or feature files ESEM Configuration File Trust Anchor ­ FIPS 186-2 ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate the authenticity of ESEM configuration files SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Public Key: Module's public key used for SMAT- authenticated circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s, ECC CDH). SMAT Circuit Remote Modem's Ephemeral Public Key: Peer Modem's public key used for circuit establishment, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s, ECC CDH). PKI Circuit Trust Anchor ­ ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate ECDSA signatures of 14 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 CA, IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits. PKI CA Public Key ­ Certificate Authority public key used to validate ECDSA signatures of IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits. Static IA Public Key: Used to digitally sign (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA) and validate the signature the KE Public Key sent in Simplex Key Agreement messages for PKI- authenticated circuit establishment. Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to encrypt/decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s, ECC CDH). Receiver Static KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to encrypt/decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA). Received over the air. Remote IA Public Key: Used to validate authenticity (digital signature) of received Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment, (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA). Received over the air. Remote Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s, ECC CDH). Key Fill Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key generated and used when inputting a static private key into the modem (per NIST SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). LCT Key Fill Remote Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key received from the LCT and used when inputting a static private key into the modem (per NIST SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). Received over an authenticated connection from the LCT. Definition of CSPs and Public Key Modes of Access Table 6 defines the relationship between CSPs and only those module services that access CSPs. The modes of access shown in the Table 6 are defined as follows. Input (I): the data item is entered into the cryptographic module Output (O): the data item is output (Note: CSPs that are output are encrypted). Store (S): the data item is set into the persistent storage Use (U): the data item is used within its corresponding security function Establish (E): the data item is established via a commercially available key establishment technique Generate (G): the data item is generated Zeroize (Z): the data item is actively overwritten 15 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services CSPs SMATCircuit TxTEK Static KE Private Key Crypto Compatibility Static IA Private Key DRBG Internal State ECC CDH Primitive PKI Circuit RxTEK PKI Circuit TxTEK Ephemeral Private PKI Circuit KEK Local Unique Key Key Fill Ephemeral DRBG Seed and SMAT (HMAC Ephemeral KE SMAT Circuit SMAT Circuit Administrator Shared Secret Key Fill KEK CO Password Service Bypass Flag Private Key Password Password Operator RxTEK Mode Key) Key Private Key Telnet, SSH, I,U I,U SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, or SFTP Circuit U I, U I, U Establishment Encryption U G, E E G, I E, U G, U U G, E, U U I, U I, U Establishment and U O U U U Authentication Disconnect I, U I, U Encrypted circuit Change one's own I,U, I,U, I,U, U password S S S Set Admin, I, S I, S U Operator User Names & Passwords Change Admin and I, S I, S U Operator Passwords Enable/disable I,S I, U encryption Set CO User Names I, S U & Passwords Change CO I, S U Passwords SMAT Entry I, S I, S U Set Crypto I, S I, U Compatibility Mode Encryption U U U U Cryptographically Validate image Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z (Authenticated) Configure System I,U Time 16 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 CSPs SMATCircuit TxTEK Static KE Private Key Crypto Compatibility Static IA Private Key DRBG Internal State ECC CDH Primitive PKI Circuit RxTEK PKI Circuit TxTEK Ephemeral Private PKI Circuit KEK Local Unique Key Key Fill Ephemeral DRBG Seed and SMAT (HMAC Ephemeral KE SMAT Circuit SMAT Circuit Administrator Shared Secret Key Fill KEK CO Password Service Bypass Flag Private Key Password Password Operator RxTEK Mode Key) Key Private Key Configure Access I,U to Unsecure Protocols Configure password I,U policy Change I,U I,U configuration or monitor modem View or clear audit I,U log Upload Image I,U Issue Trust Anchor I,U Fill Issued Trust I,U Anchor Delete Trust I,U Anchor Issue/Fill Simplex G, I,U I,U, G, E,U E, I,U U PKI Key Material U ,S S U U Delete Simplex PKI I,U Key Material User Login I, U I, U I, U U Power On G, G,S U Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Reset Front Panel Display O O status Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z (Unauthenticated) Self-tests G, G U Antenna Handover Service Local/Remote Alarm Mute 17 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services Public Keys Remote IA Public Key Ephemeral KE Public Static IA Public Key PKI CA Public Key Remote Ephemeral Firmware/ Feature Receiver Static KE Configuration File PKI Circuit Trust Ephemeral Public Ephemeral Public Ephemeral Public Remote Modem's KE Public Key SMAT Circuit SMAT Circuit Trust Anchor Trust Anchor LCT Key Fill Service Public Keys Key Fill Anchor ESEM Key Key Key Key Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, or SFTP Circuit Establishment Encryption G, U, O I,U U U U, G,U, U I,U Establishment and O O Authentication Disconnect Encrypted circuit Change one's own password Set Admin, Operator User Names & Passwords Change Admin and Operator Passwords Enable/disable encryption Set CO User Names & Passwords Change CO Passwords SMAT Entry Set Crypto Compatibility Mode Encryption Cryptographically I,S I,S Validate image Zeroize (Authenticated) 18 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Public Keys Remote IA Public Key Ephemeral KE Public Static IA Public Key PKI CA Public Key Remote Ephemeral Firmware/ Feature Receiver Static KE Configuration File PKI Circuit Trust Ephemeral Public Ephemeral Public Ephemeral Public Remote Modem's KE Public Key SMAT Circuit SMAT Circuit Trust Anchor Trust Anchor LCT Key Fill Service Public Keys Key Fill Anchor ESEM Key Key Key Key Configure System Time Configure Access to Unsecure Protocols Configure password policy Change U configuration or monitor modem View or clear audit log Upload Image U Issue Trust Anchor I Fill Issued Trust I,S Anchor Delete Trust Anchor Issue/Fill Simplex I, I,S I,S G,U, I,U PKI Key Material S O Delete Simplex PKI Key Material User login Power On Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Reset Front Panel Display status Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Self-tests Antenna Handover Service Local/Remote Alarm Mute 19 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 7. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the EBEM device contains a limited operational environment; the cryptographic module only supports the loading and execution of code ECDSA digitally authenticated firmware signed by ViaSat, Inc. 8. Security Rules This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, Level 2. The cryptographic module shall support defined roles with a defined set of corresponding services. The defined roles shall be: o Operator o Administrator o Cryptographic-Officer o Peer Modem o ViaSat, Inc. Separation of roles: The cryptographic module shall require distinct authentication for each role. Simultaneous service is permitted, but authentication is always required when switching between roles The cryptographic module shall not support a maintenance role or maintenance interface. The purpose, function, service inputs, and service outputs performed by each role shall be defined and appropriately restricted. The cryptographic module shall not support the output of plaintext CSPs. The cryptographic module design shall ensure that services that do not require authentication do not provide the ability to modify, disclose, or substitute any module CSPs, use Approved security functions, or otherwise affect module security. The cryptographic module shall support exclusive bypass capabilities. The cryptographic module shall require two independent internal actions to enter into the bypass state. The authorized operator shall be able to determine when bypass capability is selected as follows: Bypass LED illuminated A defined methodology shall be enforced to control access to the cryptographic module prior to initialization. The module shall arrive to the end customer with a default Cryptographic Officer password that shall be changed before any services are allowed. Re-authentication shall be required upon power cycling the module. The cryptographic module shall support role-based or identity-based authentication for all security relevant services; re-authentication shall be required to change roles. Feedback provided during the authentication process shall not weaken the strength of the implemented authentication mechanisms. During password entry, the module shall not display the entered values in a readable form; all inputs will be echoed back to the display as asterisks. The cryptographic module's finite state machine shall provide a clear description of all states and corresponding state transitions. The design of the cryptographic module shall disallow the ability to simultaneously occupy more than one state at a time. 20 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 The cryptographic module's physically contiguous cryptographic boundary shall be defined including all module components and connections (ports), information flows, processing, and input/output data. All vendor-defined non-security relevant circuitry shall be argued for exclusion from the cryptographic boundary. All cryptographic module data output shall be inhibited when the module is in an error state any during self-tests. Data output shall be logically disconnected from the processes performing key generation, manual key entry, and zeroization. All physical ports and logical interfaces shall be defined; the cryptographic module shall be able to distinguish between data and control for input and data and status for output. In addition, the cryptographic module shall support a power interface. All of the implemented integrated circuits shall be standard quality, production-grade components. The cryptographic module shall contain an opaque tamper evident enclosure. CSPs shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. Public keys and critical settings shall be protected against unauthorized modification and substitution. The cryptographic module shall support key generation using an Approved RNG listed in FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C. The cryptographic module shall enforce an entity association for all keys that are input to/output from the cryptographic module; an entity association shall be enforced for all keys stored within the cryptographic boundary. Key establishment techniques supported by the cryptographic module shall be commercially available as allowed under the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D. The cryptographic module shall provide the ability to zeroize all plaintext CSPs. Note: To fully complete the Zeroize Service, the unit must be manually power-cycled. Power-up self-tests shall not require operator actions. The cryptographic module shall provide an indicator upon successful self-test completion as follows: o Fault LED off The cryptographic module shall enter an error state upon failure of any self-test and shall provide an indicator upon failure as follows: o Fault LED on Upon entering an error state, the cryptographic module shall inhibit all data outputs, inhibit cryptographic operations, and shall provide error status. The status output shall not contain any CSPs or other sensitive information that could be used to compromise the cryptographic module. The loading of non-FIPS-validated firmware versions will invalidate the FIPS module. The tamper evident seals described in Section 10 shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The module has the following restrictions on concurrent operators: o While a Crypto Officer, Administrator, or Operator is logged into the Front Panel, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, and SFTP protocols users cannot configure EBEM modem. o While the Peer Modem is authenticated, the Crypto Officer cannot change the Crypto Compatibility Mode. 21 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 9. Self-Tests The cryptographic module shall support the following self-tests: Table 8: Power Up Self-tests Test Target Description Firmware 32-bit EDC performed over all executable code Integrity FPGA AES KATs: EBEM AES CTR 1 Encryption only (because CTR mode utilizes Encrypt ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits FPGA AES KATs: EBEM AES CTR 2 Encryption only (because CTR mode utilizes Decrypt ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES KATs: EbemCrypto, separate encryption and decryption tests Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES Key Wrap KATs: Separate wrap and unwrap tests. Key sizes: 256 bits DRBG KATs: CTR DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits ECDSA KAT: FIPS 186-2 Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-521 with SHA-1 ECDSA KAT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-521 with SHA-512 ECDSA PCT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-384 with SHA-384 HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAS KATs: Ephemeral Unified, per IG 9.6 ­ ECCCDH Primitive Computation and KDF using P-521 curve. Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EE KAS KATs: One Pass DH, per IG 9.6 ­ ECCCDH Primitive Computation and KDF using P-384 curve. Parameter Sets/Key sizes: ED KDF KATs: SNMP KDF KDF KATs: SSH KDF SHA KATs: EbemCrypto SHA-1, SHA-384, SHA-512 SHA KATs: OpenSSL SHA SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 SHA KATs: SHA-256 uClibc SHA-256 22 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 9: Conditional Self-tests Test Target Description NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG. DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG. ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key pair generation (static and ephemeral per IG 9.9). Firmware Load FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-521 with SHA-512 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded. DRBG Health Performed conditionally per SP 800-90A Section 11.3. Required per IG Checks C.1. SP 800-56A Pairwise key validation (per IG 9.6) Assurances Exclusive Bypass Test verifies which mode (Bypass or Encryption) the module is in Bypass Test by checking a flag value, which is stored in FLASH and whose integrity is verified by a 32-bit EDC (CRC). Manual Key Manual Key Entry Test performed via Error Detection Code Entry Table 10: Critical Function Tests Test Target Description BIT Verification of FPGA loading 10. Physical Security Policy Physical Security Mechanisms The EBEM multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms. Production-grade components Production-grade opaque enclosure with 10 (ten) tamper evident seals applied during manufacturing if the Expansion Port on the module has the Blank Plate installed Production-grade opaque enclosure with nine (9) tamper-evident seals if the EBEM contains an ESEM card (eight (8) seals applied during manufacturing and one (1) rectangular tamper-evident seal applied by the Crypto-Officer Protected vents Operator Required Actions The CO is required to periodically inspect the tamper evident seals, enclosure, and vents as shown in Table 11. If suspicious markings are found, the cryptographic module should be zeroized and returned to the manufacturer (contact ViaSat, Inc. at www.viasat.com) for inspection/maintenance. 23 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Physical Security Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Guidance Details Mechanisms Inspection/Test Tamper Evident Seals As specified per end user policy Visually inspect the seals for tears, rips, dissolved adhesive, and other signs of malice. Opaque enclosure As specified per end user policy Visually inspect the enclosure for broken screws, bent casing, scratches, and other questionable markings. Protected vents As specified per end user policy Visually inspect the vents for tears, bent baffles, and other signs of tampering. The following diagrams depict the tamper seal locations (circled in blue): Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (8 Seals) 24 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (8 Seals) Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (2 Seals) Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (1 Seal) 25 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 All tamper seals are installed at the factory except the one shown in Figure 5 for the ESEM. In the case of an EBEM that contains an ESEM (i.e., as in Figure 5), the one (1) tamper seal must be installed by the CO. Prior to installation, the CO is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals. Detailed instructions for the ESEM and tamper seal installation are provided in ViaSat, Inc.'s EBEM Crypto Officer & User Guide and Software/Firmware Installation Guide, ViaSat document number 1153093, Section 11. The tamper evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Note: The tamper seal applied over the ESEM is HW P/N 1047117; however, the CO cannot order additional tamper seals from ViaSat, Inc. If the device is found to be tampered, the unit should be returned to the factory for a repair inspection. 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The module has not been designed to mitigate specific attacks outside of the scope of FIPS 140- 2. 26 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 12. References FIPS PUB 140-2 FIPS PUB 180-1 FIPS PUB 180-2 FIPS PUB 186-4 FIPS PUB 198 FIPS PUB 46-3 FIPS PUB 186-2 FIPS SP800-56A FIPS SP 800-90A FIPS SP 800-132 FIPS SP 800-38F 13. Definitions and Acronyms Acronym DEFINITION AES Advanced Encryption Standard BIT Built-in Test CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System CO Cryptographic Officer CSP Critical Security Parameter (as defined per FIPS 140-2) CTR Counter (i.e. AES Counter mode) DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EBEM Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem ECB Electronic Code Book ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Co-factor Diffie-Hellman ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ESEM Ethernet Service Expansion Module FIFO First-in, First-out (data buffer) FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards FTP File Transfer Protocol FW Firewall HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code IA Identity and Authentication KAT Known Answer Test KDF Key Derivation Function KW Key Wrap (AES Key Wrap without Padding from SP 80038-F) LCT Local Control Terminal LED Loop Encryption Device Mbps Million Bits per Second Modem Modulator/Demodulator 27 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 006, November 12, 2015 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function PKI Public Key Infrastructure RNG Random Number Generator RX Receiver SCPC Single Channel Per Carrier SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SMAT Shared Message Authentication Token SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol TX Transmit 28 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page