FIPS 140‐2 Security Policy for: Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (PX model) TOSHIBA CORPORATION Rev 1.3 Aug 07, 2014 1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................ 3 ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................... 3 SECTION 1 – MODULE SPECIFICATION............................................................................................... 4 SECTION 1.1 – PRODUCT VERSION ...................................................................................................... 4 SECTION 2 – ROLES SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .................................................................. 4 SECTION 2.1 – SERVICES ....................................................................................................................... 4 SECTION 3 – PHYSICAL SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 5 SECTION 4 – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................... 8 SECTION 5 – KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................... 8 SECTION 6 – SELF TESTS ....................................................................................................................... 8 SECTION 7 – DESIGN ASSURANCE ....................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 8 – MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS................................................................................. 9 Aug 07, 2014 2 Overview The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (listed in Section1.1 Product Version) is used for solid state drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, and FW download. This CM is multiple-chip embedded, and the physical boundary of the CM is the entire SSD. The physical interface for power-supply and for communication is one SAS connector. The CM is connected with host system by SAS cable. The logical interface is the SAS, TCG SWG, and Enterprise SSC. The CM has the non-volatile storage area for not only user data but also the keys, CSPs, and FW. The latter storage area is called the “system area”, which is not logically accessible / addressable by the host application. Section Level 1. Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3. Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4. Finite State Model 2 5. Physical Security 2 6. Operational Environment N/A 7. Cryptographic Key Management 2 8. EMI/EMC 2 9. Self‐Tests 2 10. Design Assurance 2 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Level 2 Table 1 ‐ Security Level Detail This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety. Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard CM Cryptographic Module CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC Error Detection Code FW Firmware HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication code KAT Known Answer Test LBA Logical Block Address MSID Manufactured SID NRBG Non-deterministic random bit generator PCB Printed Circuit Board POST Power on Self-Test Aug 07, 2014 3 PSID Printed SID SED Self-Encrypting Drive SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SID Security ID Section 1 – Module Specification The CM has one FIPS 140 approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation. The CM provides services defined in Section 2.1 and other non-security related services. Section 1.1 – Product Version The Toshiba Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive has been validated: - HW version: A0 with PX02SMU020 (SAS Interface, 200GB), PX02SMU040 (SAS Interface, 400GB), PX02SMU080 (SAS Interface, 800GB), or PX02SMQ160 (SAS Interface, 1600GB) - FW Version: NA00 The PX02SMU080 varies “Product ID” value of INQUIRY command according to customer requirements. These “Product ID” values are X440_PHM2800MCTO and X577_PHM2800MCTO. Section 2 – Roles Services and Authentication This section describes roles, authentication method, and strength of authentication. Role Name Role Type Type of Authentication Authentication Multi Attempt strength Authentication Strength EraseMaster Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 SID Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster0 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster1 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 … … … … … … BandMaster8 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 Table 2 Identification and Authentication Policy Per the security policy rules, the minimum PIN length is 6 bytes. Therefore the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/248 < 1,000,000 (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 4msec when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 15,000 times in 1 min. Therefore the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000. Section 2.1 – Services This section describes services which the CM provides. Aug 07, 2014 4 Service Description Role(s) Keys & CSPs Algorithm(CAV RWX(Read,Wr Method P Certification ite,eXecute) Number) Block or allow read (decrypt) / BandMaster0 Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 SECURITY Band write (encrypt) of user data in … Key (#1611) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Lock/Unlock a band. Locking also requires BandMaster8 Set Method Result) read/write locking to be enabled Erase user data (in EraseMaster MEK(s) W Hash_DRBG(#3 SECURITY Cryptographic cryptographic means) by 97) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Erase changing the data encryption Erase Method Result) RKey X AES256CBC(#2 key 598) Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 Key (#1611) Encryption / decryption of None MEKs X XTS-AES256(#2 SCSI READ/WRITE Data unlocked user data to/from 598) Commands read/write(decr band ypt/encrypt) Enable / Disable Firmware SID Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 SECURITY Download Port Download service Key (#1611) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Lock/Unlock Set Method Result) Load complete firmware None PubKey X RSASSA-PKCS- SCSI WRITE Firmware image. The device is reset and v1_5(#1331) BUFFER Download will run with the new code Provide a random number None Seed R Hash_DRBG(#3 SECURITY RandomNumbe generated by the CM 97) PROTOCOL IN(TCG r generation Random Method Result) Runs POSTs and delete None N/A N/A N/A Power on reset Reset(run CSPs in RAM POSTs) Set the location and size of BandMaster0 Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 SECURITY Set band the LBA range … Key (#1611) PROTOCOL IN(TCG position and BandMaster8 Set Method Result) size Setting PIN (authentication All for their RKey X AES256CBC(#2 SECURITY Set PIN data) PIN Table MAC X 598) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Key Set Method Result) HMAC-SHA256 (#1611) SHA256(#2183) Report status of the CM None N/A N/A N/A SCSI REQUEST Show Status SENSE Erase user data in all bands AdminSP.PSI RKey X,W AES256CBC(#2 SECURITY Zeroization by changing the data D(using 598) PROTOCOL IN(TCG encryption key, initialize PSID1) RevertSP Method Table MAC X HMAC-SHA256 range settings, and reset Result) KEY (#1611) PINs for TCG MEKs W Hash_DRBG(#3 97) PIN W Table 3 – FIPS Approved services Section 3 – Physical Security The CM has the following physical security: Production-grade components with standard passivation  Exterior of the drive is opaque  In PX02SMU020/040/080: Four tamper-evident security seals (CORNER SEAL A, CORNER  SEAL B, CORNER SEAL C, and CORNER SEAL D) are applied to the CM in factory. These opaque and tamper-evident security seals are applied to top cover of the CM. These seals prevent top cover removal In PX02SMQ160: Three tamper-evident security seals are applied to the CM in factory  One opaque and tamper-evident security seal (BASE SEAL) is applied to base of the CM.  This seal prevents an attacker to access the PCB 1 PSID (Printed SID) is public drive-unique value which is used for the TCG Revert AdminSP method. Aug 07, 2014 5 Two opaque and tamper-evident security seals (SIDE SEAL A and SIDE SEAL B) is  applied to side of the CM. These seals prevent cover removal The tamper-evident security seals cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without  tamper-evidence CORNER SEAL A CORNER SEAL B CORNER SEAL C CORNER SEAL D (PX02SMU020/040/080) OVERVIEW OF TOP COVER (PX02SMU020/040/080) Aug 07, 2014 6 BASE SEAL(PX02SMQ160) SIDE SEAL A SIDE SEAL B (PX02SMQ160) OVERVIEW OF BASE (PX02SMQ160) The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be removed. Message “VOID” on security seal or enclosure  Text on security seals does not match original  A scratch on security seals covered screws  Security seal cutouts do not match original  Aug 07, 2014 7 Section 4 – Operational Environment Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a “non-modifiable”, that is the CM cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. Section 5 – Key Management The CM uses keys and CSPs in the following table. Key/CSP Length Type Zeroize Method Establishment Output Persistence/Storage BandMaster/Erase 256 PIN Zeroization service Electronic input No SHA digest/System Area Master/SID PINs Encrypted by RKey / MEKs 512 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No System Area Output: Host can MSID 256 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing Plain / System Area retrieve PubKey 2048 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing No Plain / System Area Obfuscated(Plain in FIPS RKey 256 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No means) / System Area Entropy collected Seed 440 DRBG seed Power-Off from NDRNG at No Plain/RAM instantiation Encrypted by RKey / Table MAC Key 256 HMAC Key Zeroization service DRBG No System Area Note that there is no security-relevant audit feature and audit data. Section 6 – Self Tests The CM runs self-tests in the following table. Function Self-Test Type Abstract Firmware Integrity Check Power-On EDC 32-bit SHA256 Power-On Digest KAT FW HMAC SHA256 Power-On Digest KAT Aug 07, 2014 8 AES(AES CBC) Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT AES(AES XTS) Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT FW Hash_DRBG Power-On DRBG KAT FW RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 Power-On Signature verification KAT FW Hash_DRBG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one NDRNG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one When the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state. Section 7 – Design Assurance Initial operations to setup this module are following: 1. Get MSID from SAS interface. 2. Set range configurations with BandMaster authority by using MSID as PIN. 3. Change BandMaster(s)/EraseMaster PINs. To get more details, refer to the guidance document provided with the CM. Section 8 – Mitigation of Other Attacks The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements. Aug 07, 2014 9