Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Software Version 5.5fi Hardware Version: Freescale P2020 SEC 3.1 Security Policy Document Version 1.2 Mocana Corporation May 12, 2014 Copyright Mocana Corporation 2014. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. MODULE OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................................................... 3  CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY .................................................................................................................................... 4  2. SECURITY LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................ 5  3. MODES OF OPERATION ..................................................................................................................................... 6  APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ............................................................................................................................... 6  NON-FIPS APPROVED ALGORITHMS ......................................................................................................................... 7  NON-FIPS APPROVED MODE: .................................................................................................................................... 7  4. PORTS AND INTERFACES.................................................................................................................................. 8  5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ................................................................................. 8  ASSUMPTION OF ROLES .............................................................................................................................................. 8  6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY .............................................................................................................................. 9  ROLES AND SERVICES ................................................................................................................................................ 9  OTHER SERVICES ..................................................................................................................................................... 11  DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)...................................................................................... 12  DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS: ................................................................................................................................. 14  DEFINITION OF CSPS MODES OF ACCESS ................................................................................................................ 16  7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................................... 18  8. SECURITY RULES .............................................................................................................................................. 18  9. PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................... 20  10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........................................................................................... 20  11. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE .................................................................................................. 20  KEY DESTRUCTION SERVICE ................................................................................................................................... 20  12. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... 21  Copyright Mocana Corporation 2014. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 1. Module Overview The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module (Hardware Version: Freescale P2020 SEC 3.1; Software Version 5.5fi) is a software hybrid, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module that runs on a general purpose computer. The primary purpose of this module is to provide FIPS Approved cryptographic routines to consuming applications via an Application Programming Interface. For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 the module is classified as a software-hybrid module. This module includes the following components: - Single-chip hardware component, Freescale P2020 SEC3.1. - Mocana cryptographic software component to drive the hardware component. The hardware component consists of a single chip that is physically protected by a hard tamper- resistant epoxy layer. The physical boundary of the hardware component is the boundary of the epoxy layer. The physical boundary of the module is the case of the general purpose computer. The logical boundary of the cryptographic module is the single shared object (SO). The cryptographic module runs on the following operating environments: - VxWorks 6.8 running on a XPedite5500 with a Freescale P2020 SEC3.1 processor (Single-user mode) The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operating environments for which operational testing was not performed: - VxWorks version 6.x Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module on the operational environments for which operational testing was not performed. Page 3 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Cryptographic Boundary The cryptographic boundary of the module includes the software binary (software component) as well as the P2020 chip (hardware component). All module interfaces, inputs and outputs are provided by the software component. Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Interface Diagram Page 4 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Figure 2 – Logical Cryptographic Boundary 2. Security Level The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Security Level 1 of FIPS 140-2. Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security 1 Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 1 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Page 5 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 3. Modes of Operation Approved mode of operation The module supports an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The following FIPS Approved algorithms are available for use in the Approved mode: Algorithms Certificate # AES (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR and GCM modes; E/D; Cert. #2291 128, 192 and 256) AES (CCM, CMAC 128, 192 and 256) Cert. #2290 AES XTS (128 and 256) Cert. #2290 Triple-DES (3-key and 2-key1; TCBC mode; E/D) Cert. #1440 HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-224; HMAC-SHA-256; Cert. #1407 HMAC-SHA-384; HMAC-SHA-512 SHA-1 Cert. #1974 SHA-2: SHA-224; SHA-256; SHA-384; SHA-512 FIPS 186-2 RSA: Cert. #1179 - ANSI X9.31 key generation: 2048, 3072, and 4096-bit - PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS signature generation: 2048, 3072, and 4096-bit using SHA-2 - PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS signature verification: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, and 4096-bit using SHA-1 and SHA-2 FIPS 186-2 DSA: Cert. #717 - PQG Ver: 1024-bit using SHA-1 - Sig Ver: 1024-bit using SHA-1 FIPS 186-2 ECDSA: Cert. #372 Key Gen: CURVES P; 224, 256, 384, 521 Sig Ver: CURVES P; 192, 224, 256, 384, 521 using SHA-1 PKV: CURVES P; 192, 224, 256, 384, 521 using SHA-1 FIPS 186-2 RNG Cert. #1141 AES-CTR based DRBG; Dual EC DRBG Cert. #284 During module initialization, a consuming application can configure the module to utilize all, or any subset of the above Approved algorithms. The module's FIPS_powerupSelfTest_Ex() function, which is called during module startup, takes a parameter that points to a configuration table data structure. This data structure contains an array of booleans indexed by an internal Algorithm-ID that will indicate to the module which FIPS algorithms should be initialized for use. The only configuration that was tested as part of the FIPS validation is the configuration which utilized ALL of the Approved algorithms. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module for all other configurations for which operational testing was not 1 Per NIST SP 800-131A: Through December 31, 2015, the use of 2-key Triple DES for encryption is restricted: the total number of blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 220. After December 31, 2015, 2-key Triple DES shall not be used for encryption. Decryption using 2-key Triple DES is allowed for legacy-use. Page 6 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy performed. Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Within the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the module supports the following allowed algorithms: - Diffie-Hellman ( key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) - RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength) - EC Diffie Hellman ( key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength) - NDRNG – Used to seed the Approved RNG and DRBGs Non-FIPS Approved mode: In addition to the above algorithms, the following algorithms are available in the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation: - DES, Blowfish, ARC2, ARC4, MD2, MD4, MD5, HMAC-MD5, AES EAX, AES XCBC - RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption/decryption The following algorithms are Disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions: - FIPS 186-2 RSA (Certs. #1059 and #1437)  ANSI X9.31 key generation: 1024 and 1536-bit  PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS signature generation: 1024 and 1536-bit using SHA-1 and SHA-2; 2048, 3072 and 4096-bit using SHA-1 - FIPS 186-2 DSA using SHA-1 (Certs. #647 and 840)  PQG generation: 1024-bit  Key generation: 1024-bit  Signature generation: 1024-bit - FIPS 186-2 ECDSA using SHA-1 (Certs. #298 and #479)  Signature generation: P-192, P-224 P-256, P-384, P521 curves  Key generation: P-192 curve - Diffie-Hellman ( key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant) - RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant) - EC Diffie Hellman ( key agreement; key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant) Page 7 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy During operation, the module can switch service by service between an Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The module will transition to the non- Approved mode of operation when one of the above non-Approved security functions is utilized in lieu of an Approved one. The module can transition back to the Approved mode of operation by utilizing an Approved security function 4. Ports and Interfaces The physical ports of the module are provided by the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical interfaces are defined as the API of the cryptographic module. The module’s API supports the following logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. 5. Identification and Authentication Policy Assumption of roles The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module shall support two distinct roles (User and Cryptographic Officer). The cryptographic module does not provide any identification or authentication methods of its own. The Cryptographic Officer and the User roles are implicitly assumed based on the service requested. Table 2 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data User N/A N/A Cryptographic Officer N/A N/A Page 8 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 6. Access Control Policy Roles and Services Table 3 – Services Authorized for Use in the Approved modes of operation Role Authorized Services User  Self-tests  Show Status  Read Version Cryptographic-Officer  DH Key Generation  DH Key Exchange  ECDH Key Exchange  RSA Key Generation  RSA Signature Generation  RSA Signature Verification  RSA Key Wrapping Encryption  RSA Key Wrapping Decryption  DSA Key Generation  DSA Signature Generation  DSA Signature Verification  ECDSA Key Generation  ECDSA Signature Generation  ECDSA Signature Verification  AES Encryption (supported by hardware)  AES Decryption (supported by hardware)  AES Message Authentication Code  TDES Encryption  TDES Decryption  SHA-1  SHA-224/256  SHA-384/512  HMAC-SHA1 Message Authentication Code  HMAC-SHA224/256 Message Authentication Code  HMAC-SHA384/512 Message Authentication Code  FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generation  AES-CTR DRBG Random Number Generation  Dual EC DRBG Random Number Generation  Seed PRNG  Key Destruction Page 9 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Note: The module may be configured to support all or only a subset of the Approved security functions listed in Section 3 above. The services available in each Approved mode of operation depend on which algorithms were configured for use. Table 3 lists all of the module services. The following services will be available regardless of which Approved algorithms are configured for use: - Self-tests - Show Status - Read Version - Key Destruction Page 10 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Other Services Table 4 – Services Authorized for Use in the non-Approved mode of operation Role Authorized Services  User Self-tests  Show Status  Read Version  Cryptographic-Officer DES Encryption  DES Decryption  AES Message Authentication Code  Blowfish Encryption  Blowfish Decryption  ARC2, ARC4 Encryption  ARC2, ARC4 Decryption  MD2 Hash  MD4 Hash  MD5 Hash  HMAC-MD5 Message Authentication Code  AES EAX Encryption  AES EAX Decryption  AES XCBC Encryption  AES XCBC Decryption  RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP Encryption  RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP Decryption The cryptographic module supports the following service that does not require an operator to assume an authorized role:  Self-tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2. It is invoked by reloading the library into executable memory. Page 11 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following are CSPs that may be contained in the module: Table 5: CSP Information Key Description/Usa Generation Storage Entry / Output Destruction ge DH Private Used to derive Internally using Temporarily in N/A An application Components the secret the FIPS 186-2 volatile RAM program which session key RNG, AES-CTR uses the API during DH key DRBG, or Dual may destroy the agreement EC DRBG key. The Key protocol Destruction service zeroizes this CSP. ECDH Private Used to derive Internally using Temporarily in N/A An application Components the secret the FIPS 186-2 volatile RAM program which session key RNG, AES-CTR uses the API during ECDH DRBG, or Dual may destroy the key agreement EC DRBG key. The Key protocol Destruction service zeroizes this CSP. Seed and Seed Used to seed the Internally via Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext Automatically Keys RNG and NDRNG or volatile RAM if generated after use DRBGs for key externally externally generation Output: N/A RSA Private Used to create May be Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application Key RSA digital generated volatile RAM if generated program which signatures internally using externally uses the API the FIPS 186-2 may destroy the Output: Plaintext RNG, AES-CTR key. The Key DRBG, or Dual Destruction EC DRBG or service zeroizes generated this CSP. externally RSA Key Used for RSA May be Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application Wrapping Key Wrapping generated volatile RAM if generated program which Private Key decryption internally using externally uses the API operation the FIPS 186-2 may destroy the Output: Plaintext RNG, AES-CTR key. The Key DRBG, or Dual Destruction EC DRBG or service zeroizes generated this CSP. externally Page 12 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Key Description/Usa Generation Storage Entry / Output Destruction ge DSA Private Used to create May be Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application Key DSA digital generated volatile RAM if generated program which signatures internally using externally uses the API the FIPS 186-2 may destroy the Output: Plaintext RNG, AES-CTR key. The Key DRBG, or Dual Destruction EC DRBG or service zeroizes generated this CSP. externally ECDSA Private Used to create May be Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application Key DSA digital generated volatile RAM if generated program which signatures internally using externally uses the API the FIPS 186-2 may destroy the Output: Plaintext RNG, AES-CTR key. The Key DRBG, or Dual Destruction EC DRBG or service zeroizes generated this CSP. externally TDES Key Used during Externally. Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application TDES volatile RAM program which Output: N/A encryption and uses the API decryption may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP. AES Keys Used during Externally. Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application AES encryption, volatile RAM program which Output: N/A decryption, and uses the API CMAC may destroy the operations key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP. HMAC Keys Used during Externally. Temporarily in Entry: Plaintext An application HMAC-SHA-1, volatile RAM program which Output: N/A 224, 256, 384, uses the API 512 operations may destroy the key. The Key Destruction service zeroizes this CSP. Note: No assurance of the minimum strength of externally provided entropy; the module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy; no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. Page 13 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Definition of Public Keys: The following are the public keys contained in the module: Table 6: Public Key Information Key Description/Usage Generation Storage Entry/Output DH Public Used to derive the secret Internally using Temporarily in Entry: Receive Client Component session key during DH key the FIPS 186-2 volatile RAM Public Component agreement protocol RNG, AES-CTR during DH exchange. DRBG, or Dual EC DRBG Output: Transmit Host Public Component during DH exchange ECDH Public Used to derive the secret Internally using Temporarily in Entry: Receive Client Component session key during ECDH the FIPS 186-2 volatile RAM Public Component key agreement protocol RNG, AES-CTR during ECDH DRBG, or Dual exchange. EC DRBG Output: Transmit Host Public Component during ECDH exchange RSA Public Used to verify RSA May be Temporarily in Input: Plaintext if Keys signatures generated volatile RAM generated externally t internally using Output: Plaintext the FIPS 186-2 RNG, AES-CTR DRBG, or Dual EC DRBG or generated externally RSA Key Used for RSA Key May be Temporarily in Input: Plaintext if Wrapping Public Wrapping encryption generated volatile RAM generated externally Keys operation internally using Output: Plaintext the FIPS 186-2 RNG, AES-CTR DRBG, or Dual EC DRBG or generated externally DSA Public Used to verify DSA May be Temporarily in Input: Plaintext if Keys signatures generated volatile RAM generated externally internally using Output: Plaintext the FIPS 186-2 RNG, AES-CTR DRBG, or Dual EC DRBG or generated externally Page 14 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Key Description/Usage Generation Storage Entry/Output ECDSA Public Used to verify ECDSA May be Temporarily in Input: Plaintext if Keys signatures generated volatile RAM generated externally internally using Output: Plaintext the FIPS 186-2 RNG, AES-CTR DRBG, or Dual EC DRBG or generated externally Note: No assurance of the minimum strength of externally provided entropy; the module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy; no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. Page 15 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Definition of CSPs Modes of Access Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. Table 7 – CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services Role Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation C.O. User X DH Key Use DH Parameters Generation Generate DH Key pair X DH Key Exchange Use DH Private Component Generate DH shared secret X ECDH Key Use ECDH Private Component Exchange Generate ECDH shared secret X RSA Key Generate RSA Public/Private Key pair Generation X RSA Signature Use RSA Private Key Generation Generate RSA Signature X RSA Signature Use RSA Public Key Verification Verify RSA Signature X RSA Key Use RSA Public Key Wrapping Performs Key Wrapping Encryption Encryption X RSA Key Use RSA Private Key Wrapping Performs Key Wrapping Decryption Decryption X DSA Key Generate DSA Key Pair for Signature Generation/Verification Generation X DSA Signature Use DSA Private Key Generation Generate DSA Signature X DSA Signature Use DSA Public Key Verification Verify DSA Signature X ECDSA Key Generate ECDSA Key Pair for Signature Generation/Verification Generation X ECDSA Signature Use DSA Private Key Generation Generate ECDSA Signature X ECDSA Signature Use ECDSA Public Key Verification Verify ECDSA Signature X AES Encryption Use AES Key X AES Decryption Use AES Key X AES Message Use AES Key Authentication Page 16 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy Role Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation C.O. User Code X TDES Encryption Use TDES Key X TDES Decryption Use TDES Key X SHA-1 Generate SHA-1 Output; no CSP access X SHA-224/256 Generate SHA-224/256 Output; no CSP access X SHA-384/512 Generate SHA-384/512 Output; no CSP access X HMAC-SHA-1 Use HMAC-SHA-1 Key Message Generate HMAC-SHA-1 Output Authentication Code X HMAC-SHA- Use HMAC-SHA-224/256 Key 224/256 Message Generate HMAC-SHA-224/256 Output Authentication Code X HMAC-SHA- Use HMAC-SHA-384/512 Key 384/512 Message Generate HMAC-SHA-384/512 Output Authentication Code X FIPS 186-2 Use Seed Key to generate random number Random Number Destroy Seed Key after use Generation X AES-CTR DRBG Use Seed Key to generate random number Random Number Destroy Seed Key after use Generation X Dual EC DRBG Use Seed Key to generate random number Random Number Destroy Seed Key after use Generation X Seed PRNG Initialize RNG or DRBG with external Seed Key X Key Destruction Destroy All CSPs X Show Status N/A X Self-Tests N/A Page 17 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 7. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are applicable because the Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module operates in a modifiable operational environment. Operational testing of the module was performed on the following environment: - VxWorks 6.8 running on a XPedite5500 with a Freescale P2020 SEC3.1 processor (Single-user mode) 8. Security Rules The Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module design corresponds to the following security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module. 1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct roles. These are the User role and the Cryptographic Officer role. 2. The cryptographic module does not provide any operator authentication. 3. The cryptographic module shall encrypt/decrypt message traffic using the Triple-DES or AES algorithms. 4. The cryptographic module shall perform the following self-tests: Power-up Self-Tests:  Cryptographic Algorithm Tests: - AES-ECB, CBC, OFB. CFB, and CTR Known Answer Test - AES- CCM, CMAC, GCM, and XTS Known Answer Test - Triple-DES Known Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-224 Known Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test - SHA-1 Known Answer Test - SHA-224 Known Answer Test - SHA-256 Known Answer Test - SHA-384 Known Answer Test - SHA-512 Known Answer Test - RSA Encrypt Known Answer Test - RSA Decrypt Known Answer Test - RSA Sign Known Answer Test - RSA Verify Known Answer Test - DSA Pairwise Consistency Test Page 18 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy - ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test - ECDH Pairwise Consistency Test - DH Pairwise Consistency Test - FIPS 186-2 RNG Known Answer Test - AES-CTR DRBG Known Answer Test - Dual EC DRBG Known Answer Test  Software Integrity Test: HMAC-SHA-1  Critical Functions Tests: N/A Conditional Tests:  DSA Pairwise Consistency Test  RSA Pairwise Consistency Test  ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test  FIPS 186-2 RNG Continuous Test  AES-CTR DRBG Continuous Test  Dual EC DRBG Continuous Test  NDRNG Continuous Test The module can be configured to utilize all or only a subset of the Approved security functions listed in Section 3 above. The self-tests that are run at module power up depend on which Approved algorithms have been configured for use. The module's FIPS_powerupSelfTest_Ex() function, which is called during module startup, takes a parameter that points to a configuration table data structure. This data structure contains an array of booleans indexed by an internal Algorithm-ID that will indicate to the module which FIPS algorithms should be initialized for use. Only the self-tests of the algorithms that are to be utilized will be run at power up. Upon re- configuration, the module will reinitialize and perform all power-up self-tests associated with the new Approved mode of operation. 5. At any time, the operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power- up self-tests by reloading the cryptographic module into memory. 6. The cryptographic module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the power-up self-tests. 7. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 8. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 9. In the event of a self-test failure, the module will enter an error state and a specific error code will be returned indicating which self-test or conditional test has failed. The module will not provide any cryptographic services while in this state. Page 19 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 10. The module shall not support concurrent operators. 11. DES, Blowfish, ARC2, ARC4, MD2, MD4, MD5, HMAC-MD5, AES EAX, AES XCBC, and RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption/decryption are not allowed for use in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. When these algorithms are used, the module is no longer operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. It is the responsibility of the consuming application to zeroize all keys and CSPs prior to and after utilizing these non-Approved algorithms. CSPs shall not be shared between the Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. 9. Physical Security The FIPS 140-2 Area 5 Physical Security requirements are applicable to the Freescale P2020 SEC3.1 hardware component only. An image of the hardware component protected by hard epoxy is provided below: 10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements. 11. Cryptographic Officer Guidance The operating system running the Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module must be configured in a single-user mode of operation. Key Destruction Service There is a context structure associated with every cryptographic algorithm available in this module. Context structures hold sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. These context structures must be destroyed via respective API calls when the application software no longer needs to use a specific algorithm any more. This API call will zeroize all sensitive information including cryptographic keys before freeing the dynamically allocated memory. See the Mocana Cryptographic API Reference for additional information. Page 20 Mocana Corporation Mocana Cryptographic Suite B Hybrid Module Security Policy 12. Definitions and Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard API Application Program Interface CO Cryptographic Officer CSP Critical Security Parameter DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code RAM Random Access Memory RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Algorithm TDES Triple-DES SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SO Shared Object Page 21