Riverbed Cryptographic Security Module version 1.0 FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Non-Proprietary Security Policy January 6, 2014 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy Table of Contents 1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................4 2 Tested Configurations......................................................................................................... 6 3 Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................7 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality ...................................................... 8 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys............................................................. 9 5 Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................... 12 6 Self-test............................................................................................................................... 14 7 Operational Environment.................................................................................................... 16 8 Mitigation of other attacks.................................................................................................. 17 Modification History 2014-01-06 Note Dual EC DRBG is non-approved in Section 4 2013-11-25 Changes to Sections 4, 5, 6 2013-08-23 Added four new platforms 2013-04-10 Initial draft Page 2 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy Copyright © 2014 Riverbed Technology, Inc. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 1 Introduction This document comprises the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Riverbed Cryptographic Security Module v1.0, hereafter referred to as the Module. The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object module file named fipscanister.o. The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services). The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Security Requirement Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security NA Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 1 Mitigation of Other Attacks NA Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements The Module’s software version for this validation is v1.0. Page 4 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy Block Diagram Page 5 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 2 Tested Configurations Operational Environment Processor Optimizations (Target) 1 RiOS 8.0 on Steelhead Appliance 32-bit Intel Xeon (x86-64) None 2 RiOS 8.0 on Steelhead Appliance 64-bit Intel Xeon (x86-64) None 3 RiOS 8.0 64-bit under VMware ESXi 5.1 Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 None (x86_64) 4 RiOS 8.0 64-bit under VMware ESXi 5.1 Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 AES-NI (X86_64) 5 Stingray OS version 4.0 64-bit under VMware Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 None ESXi 5.1 (x86_64) 6 Stingray OS version 4.0 64-bit under VMware Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 AES-NI ESXi 5.1 (x86_64) 7 RiOS 8.0 on Steelhead Appliance 64-bit Intel Xeon E31220 AES-NI (x86_64) 8 Granite OS 2.0 on Riverbed GCA-02000 AMD Opteron 4122 None (x86_64) 9 Granite OS 2.0 under VMware ESXi 5.1 Intel Xeon E31220 None (x86_64) 10 Granite OS 2.0 under VMware ESXi 5.1 Intel Xeon E31220 AES-NI (x86_64) Table 2 - Supported Platforms Page 6 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 3 Ports and Interfaces The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API). Logical interface type Description Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters Data input API entry point data input stack parameters Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters Data output API entry point data output stack parameters Table 3 - Logical interfaces As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned). Page 7 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and Non-approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Function Algorithm Options Cert # Random Number [ANSI X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256 1179 Generation; [SP 800-90] DRBG1 Hash DRBG 310 Symmetric key Prediction resistance HMAC DRBG, no reseed generation supported for all variations CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function Dual EC DRBG2: P-256, P-384, P-521 [SP 800-67] 3-Key Triple-DES TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; 1485 CMAC generate and verify [FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8, 2374 Encryption, CFB 128, CTR, XTS; CCM; GCM; CMAC Decryption and [SP 800-38B] CMAC generate and verify CMAC [SP 800-38C] CCM [SP 800-38D] GCM [SP 800-38E] XTS Message Digests [FIPS 180-3] SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 2046 Keyed Hash [FIPS 198] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1476 Digital Signature and [FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, 1229 Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS, SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, Generation SigVerPSS (1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA sizes) [FIPS 186-2] DSA PQG Gen, PQG Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen, Sig 745 Ver (1024 with SHA-1 only) [FIPS 186-3] DSA PQG Gen, PQG Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen, Sig 745 Ver (1024/2048/3072 with all SHA sizes) [FIPS 186-2] ECDSA Key Pair, PKV, SigGen, SigVer (all NIST 392 Recommended B, K, and P curves with SHA-1 only) [FIPS 186-3] ECDSA Key Pair, PKV, SigGen, SigVer (all NIST 392 Recommended B, K and P curves with all SHA sizes) ECC CDH (CVL) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves 65 Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only NIST recommended curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. Refer to the transition tables that will be available at the CMVP Web site 1 For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800-90] and [SP800-57]. 2 Dual_EC DRBG is non-approved for key generation. No keys generated using this version of the DRBG can be used to protect sensitive data in the Approved mode. Any random output in Approved mode using the DUAL_EC DRBG is equivalent to plaintext. Page 8 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/. Category Algorithm Description Key Agreement EC DH Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all NIST Recommended B, K and P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module. Key Wrapping, RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for wrapping Unwrapping or unwrapping of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services. Random Number [SP 800-90] Dual EC DRBG: P-256, P-384, P-521 Generation; DRBG Symmetric key generation Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes FIPS_mode_set()3, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If FIPS_mode_set() fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed. The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST Recommended elliptic curves as trusted third party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-3 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process. 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures. CSP Name Description RSA SGK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature generation key RSA KDK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping DSA SGK [FIPS 186-3] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature generation key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature generation key ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST Recommended B, K, and P curves) signature generation key EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST Recommended B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key. AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key 3 The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the FIPS_mode_set() wrapper function. Page 9 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key AES GCM AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key and IV AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key Triple-DES EDK Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key Triple-DES CMAC Triple-DES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512) RNG CSPs Seed (128 bit), AES 128/192/256 seed key and associated state variables for ANSI X9.31 AES based RNG4 Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/880 bits) and C (440/880 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CO-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication User-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters The module does not output intermediate key generation values. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy. CSP Name Description RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key RSA KEK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping DSA SVK [FIPS 186-3] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature verification key ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves) signature verification key EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves) public key agreement key. Table 4.1b – Public Keys For all CSPs and Public Keys: Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores RNG and DRBG state values for the lifetime of the RNG or DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of RNG and DRBG state values used for the Modules' default key generation service. Generation: The Module implements ANSI X9.31 compliant RNG and SP 800-90 compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module. The AES GCM IV is generated using the SP 4 There is an explicit test for equality of the seed and seed key inputs Page 10 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 800-90A Hash DRBG, per NIST 800-38D section 8.2.2 which requires the minimum IV length of 96 bits. Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary. Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary. Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. Private and secret keys as well as seeds, seed keys, and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non- overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism: 128 bits for the [ANSI X9.31] RNG mechanism, and as shown in [SP 800-90] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and Table 4 (Dual_EC_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. The Module provides no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. Page 11 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 5 Roles, Authentication and Services The Module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both Crypto-User and Crypto-Officer roles. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Module does not support user authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module. The Crypto Officer can install and initialize the Module. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly entered when installing the Module or performing system administration functions on the host operating system. • User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. This role has access to all of the services provided by the Module. • Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module. This role is assumed implicitly when the system administrator installs the Module. All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access. If the module is not initialized as per Section 4 of the Security Policy, non‐ conformant versions of the services in Table 5 are made available to the calling application. Service Role Description Initialize User, CO Module initialization. Does not access CSPs. Self-test User, CO Perform self tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs. Functions that provide module status information: • Version (as unsigned long or const char *) Show status User, CO • FIPS Mode (Boolean) Does not access CSPs. Functions that destroy CSPs: • fips_rand_prng_reset: destroys RNG CSPs. • fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs Zeroize User, CO (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs.) All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application. Used for random number and symmetric key generation. • Seed or reseed an RNG or DRBG instance Random • Determine security strength of an RNG or DRBG instance number User, CO • Obtain random data generation Uses and updates RNG CSPs, Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs. Page 12 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy Service Role Description Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys: Asymmetric RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK User, CO key generation There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP800-90 Symmetric Used to encrypt or decrypt data. User, CO encrypt/decrypt Executes using AES EDK, Triple-DES EDK (passed in by the calling process). Symmetric Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. User, CO digest Executes using AES CMAC, Triple-DES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Message digest User, CO Does not access CSPs. Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Keyed Hash User, CO Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process). Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not Key transport5 User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process). Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not Key agreement User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Digital User, CO Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, signature ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process). Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs. Table 5 - Services and CSP Access 5 "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to this Module. Page 13 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 6 Self-test The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test. Algorithm Type Test Attributes Software integrity KAT HMAC-SHA1 HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 Per IG 9.1, this testing covers SHA POST requirements. AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length XTS-AES KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256) AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths Triple-DES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key Triple-DES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key RSA KAT Sign using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1 RSA KAT Verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1 DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384 DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA256 Dual_EC_DRBG: P-256 and SHA256 ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6 X9.31 RNG KAT 128, 192, 256 bit AES keys Table 6a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test) The FIPS_mode_set()6 function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set()6 succeeds. The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the calling application. 6 FIPS_mode_set() calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() Page 14 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy The Module also implements the following conditional and critical function tests: Algorithm Test DRBG Critical function test as required by [SP800-90] Section 11 DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ANSI X9.31 RNG Continuous test for stuck fault Table 6b - Conditional and Critical Function Tests In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re- instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90]; this is not something the Module can do itself. The uninstantiation of the DRBG by the calling application zeroizes the internal state of the DRBG to ensure it is not accessible prior to the reinstatiation of the DRBG. Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt. Page 15 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 7 Operational Environment The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation. The tested operating systems are listed in Table 2: RiOS 8.0 Stingray OS version 4.0 Granite OS 2.0 Page 16 of 17 Riverbed Cryptographic Secuirty Module v1.0 Security Policy 8 Mitigation of other attacks The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2. Page 17 of 17