I Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and 10 Gig Ethernet FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Security Policy Firmware Version v5.0 (with Point-to-Point license) Hardware Versions Gig Ethernet 1600X433, Rev. 02 10 Gig Ethernet 1600X437, Rev. 02 Thales e-Security, Inc 2200 North Commerce Parkway, Suite 200, Weston, FL 33326, USA TEL: + 1-888-744-4976 FAX: + 1-954-888-6211 http://iss.thalesgroup.com THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 4 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ............................................................ 11 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role .......................................................................................................... 11 2.2 User Role ......................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Authentication .................................................................................................................. 12 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................. 13 3.1 Roles and Services .......................................................................................................... 13 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights................................................................ 15 3.3 Zeroisation ....................................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information................................................................................ 18 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ............................................................................................. 19 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ...................................................... 19 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........................................................................ 23 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ 24 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 25 Tables Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators................................................................................ 7 Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping ............................................................................. 7 Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests ............................................................................................................... 9 Table 1-4 Conditional Tests ........................................................................................................... 10 Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .................................................. 12 Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ...................................................................... 12 Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer ........................................................................... 13 Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User ......................................................................................... 14 Table 3-3 Unauthenticated Services .............................................................................................. 14 Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs...................................................................................... 15 VERSION 001 PAGE 2 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figures Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration ........................ 5 Figure 4-1 1600X433, Rev. 02 Front .............................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-2 1600X433, Rev. 02 Rear .............................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-3 1600X437, Rev. 02 Front .............................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-4 1600X437, Rev. 02 Rear .............................................................................................. 20 Figure 4-5 1600x433, Rev. 02 Top................................................................................................. 21 Figure 4-6 1600x437, Rev. 02 Top................................................................................................. 22 VERSION 001 PAGE 3 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 1. INTRODUCTION Thales e-Security is a global leader in the network security market with over 60,000 network security devices in operation, being one of the first companies to introduce a link encryption product to the market in the early 1980s. The Datacryptor® family represents Thales’ next generation of network security devices for a wide variety of communications environments. It is the culmination of 20 years experience protecting wide-area and point-to-point networks for governments, financial institutions and information- critical industries worldwide. This document is the Security Policy1 for the Thales e-Security Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and Datacryptor® 10 Gig Ethernet, conforming to the FIPS140-2 Security Policy Requirements [1]. This Security Policy applies to the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and Datacryptor® 10 Gig Ethernet when operated in Point-to-Point mode with the corresponding license. Further information on the Datacryptor® family and the functionality provided by the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is available from the Thales web site: http://iss.thalesgroup.com Overview The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module which facilitates secure data transmission across Ethernet networks at 1 Gb/s or 10Gb/s. Operating at primarily at OSI Layer 2, the Data Link Layer of the protocol stack the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is targeted at high speed/high data throughput applications between telecommunication facilities introducing virtually no overhead or latency to the network. Unlike Layer 3 IP security devices (IPSEC) the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is independent of network configurations resulting in a solution that is simple and inexpensive to manage. As a solution for high speed/high-bandwidth data transport over LANs and WANs, the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet enables customers to take advantage of the most cost effective transport services available while ensuring the confidentiality of the information carried through these connections. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is designed to easily fit into a variety of network configurations supporting multiple modes of operation including bulk, tunnel and Virtual LAN (VLAN). This Security Policy defines the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet cryptographic module for two hardware versions, 1600X433, Rev. 02 (low speed module) which utilizes a Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP30 FPGA and supports data transmission at 1Gb/s and 1600X437, Rev. 02 (high speed module) which utilizes two Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP50 FPGAs and supports data transmission at 10Gb/s. These variants utilize a different hardware platform but are functionally identical therefore all references to Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet or module refer to both variants unless explicitly stated otherwise. Figure 1-1 shows a typical Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet configuration where 2 LANs are securely linked across a public domain Ethernet network. 1 This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced freely in its entirety but not modified or used for purposes other than that intended. VERSION 001 PAGE 4 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Modes of Operation The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can only operate in an FIPS 140-2 Approved mode (this includes cryptographic services and bypass services). The modes of operation are detailed below:  Standby Mode The module transmits/receives no data via either its Host or Network interfaces on that channel. This mode is automatically entered if the module detects an error state or at start-up. This mode is indicated by the flashing green Encrypt LED.  Plain Text Mode2 All data received through the Host interface on that channel is transmitted through the Network interface as plain text. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is transmitted through the Host interface with no decryption applied. This mode should only be used for diagnostic purposes, or if there is no security risk to the data if it is transferred unencrypted. This mode is indicated by the solid red Plain LED. The module does not support an alternating plaintext mode.  Encrypt Mode All data received through the Host interface on that channel is encrypted using the transmit Data Encryption Key (DEK) and then the encrypted data is transmitted through the Network interface. Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that channel is decrypted using the receive DEK and then the decrypted data is transmitted through the Host interface. This mode is indicated by the solid green Encrypt LED. The mode of operation is selectable by the Crypto Officer using the Secure Remote Management facility and the current mode of operation is displayed using both the Front Panel LEDs and the Secure Remote Management (Element Manager PC) facility. Refer to the User Manual [3] for further details. Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Network Configuration 2 This is the bypass mode. VERSION 001 PAGE 5 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Physical Ports Both variants of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet provide the same set of physical ports with the exception of the host and network line interfaces, which use Small Form Factor Pluggable (SFP) for low speed modules and 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable (XFP) for high speed modules The physical ports are described below in Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators: VERSION 001 PAGE 6 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators Port Description Network Connects to the public network for sending and receiving encrypted user data and inter-module key exchange data. Host Connects to the private network for sending and receiving plaintext user data. RS-232 Connects to a local terminal for initialization of the module and also allows remote management from the Element Manager application utilizing the Point-to-Point (PPP) protocol. Ethernet Allows the remote management of a unit using the Element Manager application and status report using an SNMP management application. Front Panel LEDs Indicates the operational state of the unit, including Alarm state, Error state, Plain or Encrypt mode and Host and Network line status. Line Interface LEDs Indicates module present and laser input detected. PSU LEDs Indicates the status of the PSUs (powered/unpowered) Power Dual redundant power interface supporting customer options of AC or DC and international power cord standards. The physical ports are mapped to four logical ports defined by FIPS 140-2 as described below in Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping: Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping Logical Interface Description and Mapping to Physical Port Data Input Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Data Output Host Line Interface Network Line Interface Control RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Status RS-232 Interface Ethernet Interface Front Panel LEDs Line Interface LEDs PSU LEDs VERSION 001 PAGE 7 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY User Data Security The communications channel between two Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets is assumed to be vulnerable and therefore the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet encrypts the entire user data stream3. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet uses public key cryptography for authentication and key agreement4. Symmetric key cryptography is used for data confidentiality. The authentication mechanism employs signed X.509 v3 certificates using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for signature verification. The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is used to establish a Key Encryption Key (KEK) between modules. Data Encryption Keys (DEKs), used for encrypting and decrypting data traffic, are derived from the KEK. Random Number Generation This consists of a hardware random number source which provides entropy to a NIST SP800-90 Section 10.1 [2] approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG). Establishment of the module’s generated private and secret keys (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman static/ephemeral and Data Encryption Keys) uses the above random bit generation mechanism. Algorithm Support The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet contains the following algorithms:  AES-256 for data encryption  ECDSA using the P-384 curve for signature verification  SHA-384 hashing algorithm  ECDH using the P-384 curve for key agreement Physical Security The multi-chip standalone embodiment of the circuitry within the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is contained within a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The enclosure completely covers the module to restrict unauthorized physical access to the module. The physical security includes measures to provide both tamper evidence and tamper detection and response. In the case of tamper response all sensitive information stored within the module will be zeroised. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet’s cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its enclosure but excludes the dual redundant power supplies which are external to this boundary and may be hot-swapped by a customer and does not require a “return to factory” operation. 3 Providing the module is configured to operate in Encrypt mode. 4 This key agreement method provides 192-bits of encryption strength. VERSION 001 PAGE 8 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Secure Remote Management The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet may be remotely and securely managed using the Element Manager. SNMP Status Management The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can also be managed (for status only) using an SNMP v1, v2c or v3 management application. Only one management session is permitted at a time with a Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. Diagnostics A variety of diagnostics are available to maintain secure operation. These diagnostics include cryptographic mechanisms, critical functions and environmental monitoring. In addition the module supports a local loop back mode to aid in diagnosing network connectivity. Log files are maintained in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet and can be viewed or printed. If the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is faulty, as indicated by the failure of a self-test diagnostic, it will render itself inoperable until the fault is rectified.  Power-Up Tests On power-up known answer tests (KAT) are performed on all cryptographic algorithms and the pseudo-random number generator. In addition the integrity of all firmware is checked. Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests Function Checked Description ECDSA (CA Algorithm) KAT Test AES-256 (KEK Algorithm) KAT Test AES-256 (DEK Algorithm) KAT Test Primitive “Z” Computation KAT Test SHA-384 KAT Test Deterministic Random Bit Generator KAT Test Firmware Integrity 16 bit Error Detection Code (EDC) Checksum  Conditional Tests  The output of both the hardware random number generator and the pseudo-random number generator are checked whenever random data is requested by the module. Subsequent random numbers are compared against the last generated value to verify that these values are not the same.  The module performs periodic health tests on the instantiate, generate, reseed and uninstantiate functions of the deterministic random bit generator. The tests performed VERSION 001 PAGE 9 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY are known answer tests (KATs) designed to ensure the deterministic random bit generator is functioning as expected.  The module also performs a bypass test before entering an encrypted channel mode. When switching from a plain to an encrypted channel mode the module issues an encrypted challenge to its peer using the Data Encryption Key (DEK). The challenge is then decrypted by the peer using its DEK, and if verified, an encrypted response is returned to the module (using the DEK). The response is decrypted by the module (using the DEK) and verified. If successful the channel is established as being in an encrypted state with matching DEKs in each module.  In the case of a firmware upgrade, this is digitally signed by a CA using ECDSA with the P-384 curve allowing the module to verify the image so preventing unauthorized firmware upgrades. After loading firmware onto this module it may no longer be a FIPS 140-2 validated module unless the firmware has been FIPS 140-2 validated. This feature is used as an upgrade path for future FIPS 140-2 approved modules.  The module performs a public key validation routine during ECDH and ECDSA operations which check all the arithmetic properties of the specified ECC public key.  The module performs a pair-wise consistency test on the modules own ECDSA key pair that the module generates. This key pair is used to generate and verify digital signatures so the pair-wise consistency test consists of the generation and verification of a digital signature. Table 1-4 Conditional Tests Function Checked Description Hardware RNG CRNG Deterministic Random Bit Generator CRNG Deterministic Random Bit Generator Health Tests Bypass Bypass Test Firmware Upgrade Authentication Verify (ECDSA) Public Key Validation ECDH and ECDSA Pair-wise Consistency Test Sign / Verify VERSION 001 PAGE 10 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY The two roles associated with the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet are: Crypto-Officer Commissioning and configuration of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. User This role occurs when two Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets are communicating with each other. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet does not support multiple concurrent roles. 2.1 Crypto-Officer Role The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet can be managed by the Crypto-Officer using either of the following two methods:  Element Manager - This PC-based software application enables a Crypto-Officer to commission and administer the module.  SNMP Management Station - This is limited to requesting and obtaining status information from the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. The Crypto-Officer role utilizes the Element Manager to commission and configure the module via the dedicated Ethernet or serial management port. Commissioning a module installs a X.509 certificate (containing the CA public key, certificate name, unit serial number and certificate life time) and the required Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters to allow the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet to generate a corresponding Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key set. This information is digitally signed allowing the unit to authenticate the certificate’s signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. The module must be commissioned before it may be administered. When administering the module the Element Manager establishes a secure connection (connection authentication and data confidentiality) to the module. This connection is established and protected in the same manner as a module to module connection. To establish the secure connection the Crypto-Officer uses a removable media key-material set containing the Crypto- Officer’s name and access rights, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key set and own certificate. To access the key-material set the Crypto-Officer must login to the Element Manager by presenting the key-material set and the Crypto-Officer’s own password of at least 8 ASCII printable characters. This allows the Element Manager to verify the identity of a Crypto-Officer before establishing a secure connection using the key material set. 2.2 User Role The Crypto-Officer can download one or more signed X.509 User Certificates to the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. Each User Certificate gives a Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet an identity. Identity-based authentication is implemented between two communicating Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets. The modules are then operating in the User role. This identity can be authenticated to another module which verifies the User Certificate’s signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. VERSION 001 PAGE 11 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY If the issuing CA Public key is not held within the authenticating module then verification cannot be undertaken. Therefore no communications channel can be established between the two Datacryptor® Gig Ethernets. 2.3 Authentication The types and strengths of authentication for each Role identified for the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet are given in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 below. Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data Crypto-Officer Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate User Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate The identity of each entity performing a role that requires authentication is held within the X.509 Digital Certificate allowing the identity and authorization of the operator to be validated by checking the signature (ECDSA) of the certificate. Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Signed X.509 The strength depends upon the size of the private key space. The Digital Certificate Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet uses ECDSA with the P-384 curve, which is a FIPS Approved algorithm. Therefore the probability of successfully guessing the private key (384 bits), and hence correctly signing an X.509 certificate, is significantly less than one in 1,000,000 (2384). Multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute period do not constitute a threat for secure operation of the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. This is because each attempt requires the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet to check the signature on the certificate that is to be loaded. Therefore the total number of attempts that can be made in a one-minute period will be limited by the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet signature verification and response operation, which takes on average approximately 30 seconds. The majority of this time is accounted for by the communications overheads since the signature checking operation within the module is relatively fast. Given the very large size (384 bits) of the private key space used by the FIPS Approved signature algorithm (ECDSA) loaded in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet it follows that the probability that an intruder will be able to guess the private key, and thereby gain authentication, by making multiple attempts is significantly less than one in 100,000 (2384 / 2). There is no feedback of authentication data to the Crypto-Officer or User that might serve to weaken the authentication mechanism. VERSION 001 PAGE 12 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 3.1 Roles and Services Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer lists the authorized services available for each role within the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet. All services require authentication to the module. For further details of each operation refer to the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet User Guide [3]. Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer Service Description Input Output Access Access module Login/logout of the password, crypto Command Peer Module Certificate - read module officer public response key, crypto officer certificate Loads module’s key CA Public Key – read/write, Manage Key Material module public Command Module Certificate – read/write material, deletes key, module response module’s key material certificate Display/edit module’s General Configuration Commands and Command None name, description, time parameters response and interface settings. Diagnostics Reboot or erase key Commands and Command None material. Configure parameters response loopback mode Display/edit module’s IP Management Commands and Command None ports, Ethernet and parameters response serial, configuration. SNMP Display/edit general Commands and Command None information, SNMP parameters response version, SNMP communities and SNMP traps. IP Routes Display/edit IP routing Commands and Command None information parameters response Key Encryption Key – write Security Display/edit key Commands and Command (delete), Data Encryption Key – lifetimes, and general parameters response; key exchange key write (delete) parameters exchange if forced. RIP Display/edit RIP version Commands and Command None and RIP password parameters response Communications Display/edit Ethernet Commands and Command None mode (bulk, tunneling), parameters response interface mode Encryption Display current Commands and Command None connection mode - one parameters response, of standby, plain or ping packet encrypt and ping the to connected unit. connected peer. VERSION 001 PAGE 13 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Service Description Input Output Access Expert Display/edit Cipher Text Commands and Command None Stealing mode, enabled parameters response (only applicable to or disabled. 1600X433, Rev. 02 module) Tunneling Display own MAC Commands and Command None address, display/edit parameters response. peer MAC address, filter rules, VLAN identification and fragmentation size. Environment Display fan speed, Commands and Command None module temperature parameters response and unit power status. License Display/edit currently License file Command None loaded license file for Response the Datacryptor module. Plaintext Enable module to Commands and Bypass test None perform bypass. parameters. pass or fail indicated by Front Panel Status LEDs Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User Service Description Input Output Accessed DEK – read Encrypt Encrypt data received User traffic User traffic from the Host interface (plain) (encrypted) and transmit on the Network interface. Decrypt Decrypt data received User traffic User traffic DEK - read from the Network (encrypted) (plain) interface and transmit on the Host interface. Table 3-3 Unauthenticated Services Service Description Input Output Accessed Show Status via SNMP View status of the Commands and Status None module. parameters information over Element Manager or SNMP Traps Show Status via LEDs Front Panel View status of the None None LEDs Status module. Indicators VERSION 001 PAGE 14 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Service Description Input Output Accessed Operator Callable Self Module performs self- Reboot Module Front Panel None Tests via Reboot test LEDs Status Indicators 3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights The cryptographic keys and CSPs stored in the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet module are listed in Table 3-4. All private and secret keys (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, KEKs and DEKs) are generated internally in the module and may not be either loaded or read by the Crypto Officer or User. Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size Master Key Encrypts all non-volatile AES Generated at start-up Battery Upon tamper Keys and CSPs stored on if not present using Backed detect or by user (256 bits) the module’s the module. SRAM initiated erasure hardware random (plaintext) of key material. number generator and an approved DRBG (cert #188). CA Public Key The public key of the CA ECDSA Generated external Non-volatile Upon tamper memory – key pair use to verify and loaded as part of detect or by user (384 bits) subsequent key material the commissioning Compact initiated erasure loaded into the module. process. Flash of key material. (encrypted) Own Module An X.509 certificate ECDH The Elliptic Curve Own Module Upon tamper Certificate/Elliptic containing the module Diffie-Hellman static Certificate detect or by user (384 bits) Curve Diffie- name, Elliptic Curve Diffie- key pair is generated Non-volatile initiated erasure memory – Hellman Static Key Hellman static public key locally by the module, of key material. using the module’s Pair (the static private key is Compact stored separately) and hardware random Flash associated parameters. number generator (encrypted) and an approved This key pair is used during ECDH static DRBG (cert #188) the establishment of the private key from the parameters KEK and the Management – Non- supplied during the KEK. volatile commissioning memory – process. The module FRAM name and Elliptic (encrypted) Curve Diffie-Hellman static public key is then exported to be signed by issuing CA so forming the module certificate. Elliptic Curve The Elliptic Curve Diffie- ECDH The Elliptic Curve Volatile Upon tamper memory – Diffie-Hellman Hellman ephemeral key Diffie-Hellman detect or by user (384 bits) Ephemeral Key pair. ephemeral key pair is SRAM initiated erasure Pair generated locally by (encrypted) of key material. the module, using the module’s hardware VERSION 001 PAGE 15 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size random number generator and an approved DRBG (cert #188) from the parameters supplied during the commissioning process. This key pair is used in conjunction with the static key pair to establish the KEK. Peer Module Received during link ECDH Generated by peer in Non-Volatile Upon tamper memory – Certificate/Elliptic establishment between two the same manner as detect or by user (384 bits) Curve Diffie- modules to allow Own Module Compact initiated erasure Hellman Static authentication of the peer Certificate. Flash of key material. Public Key module using signature (encrypted) verification (ECDSA). Data Encryption A pair of keys (one for AES Generated during link Volatile Upon tamper memory – Keys (DEKs) transmit and one for establishment using detect or by user (256 bits) receive) used for AES (KEK), DEKDD BRAM & initiated erasure encryption and decryption and CMAC KDF FRAM of key material. of line data. operations. (encrypted) (up to three stored with CRC integrity protection) Data Encryption Random data used to 256 bits Generated during Not stored. Not zeroised Key Derivation derive data encryption keys DEK derivation using directly. The the module’s Data/Nonce in conjunction with KEK memory that (DEKDD) hardware random holds this CSP is number generator erased upon the and an approved tamper DRBG (cert #188). response/restart process. Key Encryption Key used to derive data AES Established during Volatile Upon tamper memory – Key (KEK) encryption keys in link establishment detect or by user (256 bits) conjunction with DEKDD with Elliptic Curve BRAM initiated erasure Diffie-Hellman using (encrypted) of key material. the static and ephemeral key pairs. Management Key Key used to derive AES Established during Not Stored. Not zeroised Encryption Key management data management link directly. The (256 bits) (MKEK) encryption keys in establishment with memory that conjunction with MDEKDD Elliptic Curve Diffie- holds this CSP is Hellman using the erased upon the static and ephemeral tamper key pairs. response/restart process. Management Data A pair of keys (one for AES Generated during Not Stored. Not zeroised Encryption Key transmit and one for management link directly. The (256 bits) (MDEK) receive) used for establishment using memory that encryption and decryption AES (MKEK), holds this CSP is VERSION 001 PAGE 16 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY KEY/CSP Generated/ Keys/CSPs Description Stored Zeroised Type and Established Size of management line data. MDEKDD and CMAC erased upon the KDF operations. tamper response/restart process. Management Data Random data used to 256 bits Generated during Not stored. Not zeroised Encryption Key derive management data MDEK derivation directly. The using the module’s Derivation encryption keys in memory that Data/Nonce conjunction with MKEK. hardware random holds this CSP is (MDEKDD) number generator erased upon the and an approved tamper DRBG (cert #188). response/restart process. Entropy Input Entropy input into the Entropy Generated via Not stored. Not zeroised String approved DRBG during internal hardware directly. The (256 bits) instantiation RBG memory that holds this CSP is erased upon the tamper response/restart process. Seed Used by the approved Seed Generated during the Not stored. Not zeroised DRBG instantiation and directly. The (888 bits) reseed functions of memory that the DRBG holds this CSP is erased upon the tamper response/restart process. C Value Internal state value of the C Value Generated as part of Not stored. Not zeroised approved DRBG the internal state of directly. The (888 bits) the DRBG. memory that holds this CSP is erased upon the tamper response/restart process. V Value Internal state value of the V Value Generated as part of Not stored. Not zeroised approved DRBG the internal state of directly. The (888 bits) the DRBG. memory that holds this CSP is erased upon the tamper response/restart process. Thales e-Security A public key embedded ECDSA Generated externally Embedded Not zeroised. Firmware Upgrade within the firmware which is (384 bits) and embedded within in the firmware – Public Key used to verify the integrity the firmware. of the firmware during Compact firmware upgrade. Flash. 3.3 Zeroisation The Crypto Officer can zeroise keys through the Element Manager application. As indicated in the table above, the Crypto Officer has the choice to directly delete keys, establish a new link with VERSION 001 PAGE 17 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY another peer module or force the module to generate new keys. Keys that are not zeroised are encrypted by the master key. The module zeroises the master key when the tamper response and zeroisation circuitry responds to an intrusion of the enclosure which renders all other keys indecipherable. 3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information FIPS Approved Mode of Operation The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet only operates in an Approved mode and does not support any unapproved modes of operation. 1. FIPS 140-2 Approved and Certified  AES #2014 (AES-256, PowerPC Core 405)  AES #2030 (CMAC using AES-256, Generation only)  AES #2061 (AES-256, Xilinx XC2VP30 FPGA)  AES #2063 (AES-256, Xilinx XC2VP50 FPGA)  ECDSA #289 (Application)  ECDSA #304 (Bootstrap)  Key Agreement Scheme #34 (ECDH, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 192 bits of encryption strength)  NIST SP800-90 DRBG #188  NIST SP800-108 KDF #1 (Counter Mode)  SHS #1764 (SHA-384, Application)  SHS #1808 (SHA-384, Bootstrap) 2. Non-Approved Allowed  Hardware RBG for generating entropy for approved and certified DRBG Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet FPGA Details This Security Policy defines the Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet cryptographic module for two hardware versions which utilize different FPGAs as described below:  1600X433, Rev. 02 (low speed module) utilizes a Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP30 FPGA.  1600X437, Rev. 02 (high speed module) utilizes two Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP50 FPGAs. VERSION 001 PAGE 18 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of production-grade components to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet is protected by a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum with tamper evident labels and tamper response mechanisms. Attempts to access the module without removing the cover will cause visible physical damage to the module and/or tamper evident labels. The module’s ventilation holes on the sides and back on the enclosure are fitted with baffles to prevent physical probing of the enclosure. The module has a removable top cover which is protected by tamper response circuitry, which zeroises all plaintext CSPs. Access to the internal components of the module requires that these covers are removed. The module's cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its external casing but excludes the field replaceable dual redundant power supply. 4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms The following guidelines should be considered when producing a Security Policy for the network in which the module is deployed. The Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet should be periodically checked by the Crypto Officer for evidence of tampering, in particular damage to the clear tamper evident labels (highlighted in outline red) as these are part of the security of the unit. In addition the audit logs should be checked for activation of the tamper response mechanism. The frequency of a physical inspection depends on the information being protected and the environment in which the unit is located. At a minimum it would be expected that a physical inspection would be made by the Crypto Officer at least monthly and audit logs daily. The tamper evident labels shall only be applied at the Thales facility. Tamper evident labels are not available for order or replacement from Thales. Two tamper evident labels are required to be visible and undamaged for each module to be operated in a FIPs approved mode of operation. They must be in the positions shown (see Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6), one on the top front centre (position 1) and one on the top centre rear (position 2). VERSION 001 PAGE 19 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-1 1600X433, Rev. 02 Front Figure 4-2 1600X433, Rev. 02 Rear Figure 4-3 1600X437, Rev. 02 Front Figure 4-4 1600X437, Rev. 02 Rear VERSION 001 PAGE 20 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-5 1600x433, Rev. 02 Top 1 2 VERSION 001 PAGE 21 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY Figure 4-6 1600x437, Rev. 02 Top 1 2 VERSION 001 PAGE 22 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY 5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY None. VERSION 001 PAGE 23 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute CA Certification Authority CTS Cipher Text Stealing DEK Data Encryption Key DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman EDC Error Detection Code FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards ITU International Telecommunications Union KAT Know Answer Test KEK Key Encryption Key LAN Local Area Network MAC Media Access Control NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology PPP Point-to-Point PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator PSU Power Supply Unit RIP Routing Information Protocol RBG Random Bit Generator SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy SFP Small Form Factor Pluggable SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol VLAN Virtual LAN XFP 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable VERSION 001 PAGE 24 OF 25 19 JULY 2013 THALES e-SECURITY DATACRYPTOR® GIG ETHERNET & DATACRYPTOR® 10 GIG ETHERNET SECURITY POLICY REFERENCES 1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal 25th Information Processing Standards Publication, May 2001. Including Change Notices 2,3,4: 12/03/2002 Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp 2. NIST SP800-90 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication, March 2007. Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp 3. Datacryptor® Gig Ethernet User Manual, 1270A450-011, Issue June 2012. Available from Thales e-Security. 4. AES Keywrap Specification Nov 2001 NIST ------------------------------------------- END OF DOCUMENT -------------------------------------------------------- VERSION 001 PAGE 25 OF 25 19 JULY 2013