FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Aspen Document Version 1.0.2 Sony Corporation Copyright © 2012-2013 Sony Corporation This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen Table of Contents Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................. 2 1. Module Overview ........................................................................................................................ 3 2. Security Level ............................................................................................................................. 5 3. Modes of Operation ................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Approved Mode of Operation ............................................................................................... 6 3.2. Non-Approved Mode of Operation ....................................................................................... 7 4. Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................... 8 5. Identification and Authentication Policy.................................................................................. 9 5.1. Assumption of Roles ............................................................................................................ 9 5.2. Authentication Mechanism ................................................................................................... 9 6. Access Control Policy ............................................................................................................. 10 6.1. Roles and Services ............................................................................................................ 10 6.2. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...............................................................11 6.3. Definition of Public Keys .....................................................................................................11 6.4. Definition of CSP Access Modes........................................................................................ 12 7. Operational Environment ........................................................................................................ 14 8. Security Rules .......................................................................................................................... 15 9. Physical Security Policy .......................................................................................................... 17 9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms........................................................................................... 17 9.2. Operator Actions ................................................................................................................ 17 10. Policy on Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................... 18 11. Definitions and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 19 12. Revision History ....................................................................................................................... 21 This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 1. Module Overview The Aspen cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module encased in a hard opaque commercial grade metal case. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire metal case perimeter, including all hardware and firmware encapsulated within. The interfaces are all traces that cross the cryptographic boundary. The primary purpose of the Aspen is to provide decryption, decoding/encoding of audio/video data for the digital cinema projector system in which it is used. The illustration below shows the Aspen, along with the cryptographic boundary. Top Side Bottom Side Figure 1 - Image of the Aspen Cryptographic Module The Aspen is validated in the following hardware / firmware versions:  Hardware version: 1.0.0  Firmware versions: 1.0.0 or 1.0.1 This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen Aspen firmware configuration table is as follows. Table 1 - Aspen Firmware Configuration Aspen Aspen Component Firmware version 1.0.0 Firmware version 1.0.1 MDC version 01.00.00 01.00.04 NSA version 01.00.00 01.00.05 CDM version 01.00.00 01.00.11 Kernel version 02.06.33 02.06.33 MBA version 01.00.00 01.00.01 CTU version 04.01.01 04.01.01 DSP version 01.00.06 01.00.06 Boot Loader version 01.00.00 01.00.00 This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 4 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 2. Security Level The Aspen meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 3 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 5 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 3. Modes of Operation 3.1. Approved Mode of Operation The Aspen is designed to continually operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The Aspen supports the following FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms:  AES with 128-bit key (as per FIPS 197) -CBC and ECB mode of operation - Certificates: #1539, #1540 -CBC mode of operation (Decrypt only) - Certificate: #1541  SHA-1 with 160-bit hash value (as per FIPS 180-3) - Certificates: #1364, #1365, #1367  SHA-256 with 256-bit hash value (as per FIPS 180-3) - Certificates: #1364, #1365, #1366  HMAC-SHA-1 with 160-bit MAC value (as per FIPS 198) - Certificates: #901, #902  RSA Signature Generation/Verification with 2,048-bit key (as per FIPS 186-2) - Certificates: #750, #751  ANSI X9.31 RNG using AES (as per ANSI X9.31) - Certificates: #829, #830  FIPS 186-2 RNG using SHA-1 (as per FIPS 186-2) - Certificate: #828 In addition to the above algorithms the Aspen employs the following Allowed non-FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms for use in the FIPS approved mode of operation.  RSA only for key wrapping. (Key establishment methodology provides 112-bit of encryption strength)  NDRNG for the seeding of the ANSI X9.31 RNGs  SP 800-135rev1 TLS KDF  HMAC-MD5 for the pseudo random function in TLS This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 6 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen The operator can be assured that the Aspen is in the approved mode by verifying that the firmware versions identified using the 'Get Status' service match each of the validated firmware component versions listed in Section 1. 3.2. Non-Approved Mode of Operation The Aspen does not support a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 7 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 4. Ports and Interfaces The physical interfaces for Aspen are the traces that cross the perimeter of the physical cryptographic boundary. The traces are used to support TLS with the following logical interfaces required by FIPS 140-2:  Data Input  Data Output  Status Output  Control Input In addition, the Aspen receives power from an outside source and thus supports a power input interface.  Power Input This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 8 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 5. Identification and Authentication Policy 5.1. Assumption of Roles The Aspen supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto-Officer). The Aspen enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication. The Crypto-Officer and User are authenticated using the RSA 2048 signature verification algorithm. Table 3 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data User Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Certificate Crypto-Officer Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Certificate 5.2. Authentication Mechanism The Aspen supports an authentication mechanism. Table 4 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism RSA Digital Certificate The authentication is based on RSA 2,048, which has an equivalent Verification strength of 112-bit. Therefore, the probability with which a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 2-112 which is less than 1/1,000,000. There is a 10msec delay after each trial which limits the number of attempts per minute. The probability of a random attempt successfully authenticating to the Aspen within one minute is also 6000 * 2-112 (< 210 * 2-112 = 2-102) which is less than 1/100,000. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 9 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 6. Access Control Policy 6.1. Roles and Services Table 5 - Crypto-Officer Specific Services Service Description Firmware Update Updates the firmware of the Aspen. Clear Log All Security Log are deleted. Zeroization Destroys all plaintext CSPs. * Note: If a non-FIPS validated firmware version is loaded onto the Aspen, then the Aspen is no longer an FIPS validated module. Table 6 - Crypto-Officer and User Common Services Service Description CPL Control Controls and lists Digital Cinema Packages (DCP). Get Parameter Obtains each parameter which was set in the Aspen. Get Status Obtains the Aspen’s status and version number. KDM Control Controls the Key Delivery Message (KDM – import, read, store, clear). Log Management Obtains log data and tagging. Playback Plays back contents (Video and Audio). Playback Preparation Prepares and obtains the status of the playback. Property Setting Sets Real Time Clock (RTC) and network parameters. Status Initialization Initializes marriage and tamper status. Adjust Playback Parameter Adjusts parameters for playback and obtains the playback status. Certificate Control Obtains certificate information. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 10 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen Table 7 - Unauthenticated Services Service Description Show Status Obtains Aspen status. Self-tests Performs power-up self-tests. 6.2. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following CSPs are included in the Aspen.  Contents Encryption Key (CEK) - AES key used to decrypt contents.  Content Integrity Key (CIK) - HMAC-SHA-1 key for integrity check of contents.  Master Key (MK) - AES key used to protect all stored CSPs.  TLS Session Key (TSK) - The AES key established in TLS.  TLS MAC Secret (TMACS) - The HMAC key established in TLS.  RSA Signing Key (RSK) - RSA private key used for generation of a digital signature for the log data and TLS session data.  Device Private Key (DPK) - RSA private key used for decryption of CEK and decryption of wrapped cryptographic keys which are entered into the Aspen in TLS.  TLS Premaster Secret (TPS) - The parameter used for key establishment in TLS.  TLS Master Secret (TMS) - The parameter used for key establishment in TLS.  PRF State (PS) - The internal state used for key establishment in TLS.  Seed and Seed Key (SSK) - The secret values necessary for the FIPS approved RNGs. 6.3. Definition of Public Keys The following are the public keys contained in the Aspen: This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 11 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen  Aspen Manufacturer Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify a certificate chain of trust.  Aspen Trusted Public Key - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify a certificate chain of trust.  RSA Verifying Key - RSASSA 2048 public key corresponding to the RSA Signing Key.  Device Public Key - RSAES 2048 public key corresponding to the Device Private Key.  Public Key for F/W Upgrade - RSASSA 2048 public key used to verify the digital signature over the firmware image to be upgraded.  Operator Public Key - RSAES 2048 public key used to authenticate operators. 6.4. Definition of CSP Access Modes Table 8 defines the relationship between CSP access modes and module services. The access modes shown in Table 8 are defined as follows:  Generate (G): Generates the Critical Security Parameter (CSP) using an approved Random Number Generator (RNG).  Use (U): Uses the CSP to perform cryptographic operations within its corresponding algorithm.  Entry (E): Enters the CSP into the Aspen.  Output (O): Outputs the CSP from the Aspen.  Zeroize (Z): Removes the CSP. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 12 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen Table 8 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services Role Service Name CSP (Access Mode) C.O. User X Clear Log TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Zeroization All CSPs(Z), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X Firmware Update TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X CPL Control TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Certificate Control TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Parameter TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Get Status TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X KDM Control CEK(E, Z), CIK(G, Z), MK(U), DPK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U), SSK(U) X X Log Management RSK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Playback TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Playback Preparation TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Property Setting TSK(U), TMACS(U) X X Status Initialization TSK(U), TMACS(U), RSK(U) X X Adjust Playback Parameter CEK(U), CIK(U), TSK(U), TMACS(U) Any Any Show Status - Any Any Self-Test - * TPS, TMS, and PS are entered or generated, used and zeroized in TLS establishment. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 13 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 7. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the Aspen does not contain a modifiable operational environment. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 14 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 8. Security Rules The Aspen cryptographic module was designed with the following security rules in mind. These rules are comprised of both those specified by FIPS 140-2 and those derived from Sony’s company policy. 1. The Aspen shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User role, and the Crypto-Officer role. 2. The Aspen shall provide identity-based authentication. 3. When the Aspen has not been placed in an authenticated role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 4. The Aspen shall perform the following tests: i. Power-up Self-Tests: a. Cryptographic algorithm tests (for each implementation): - AES 128 CBC Encryption/Decryption Known-Answer Tests - AES 128 ECB Encryption/Decryption Known-Answer Test - ANSI X9.31 RNG Known-Answer Test - FIPS 186-2 RNG Known-Answer Test - SHA-1 Known-Answer Test - SHA-256 Known-Answer Test - HMAC-SHA-1 Known-Answer Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation/Verification Known-Answer Test b. Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-16 and CRC-32) c. Critical Functions Test: - HMAC-MD5 Known-Answer Test - RSA OAEP Pair-wise Consistency Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Pair-wise Consistency Test (Encryption/Decryption) ii. Conditional Self-Tests: This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 15 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen a. Continuous (RNG) Tests (ANSI X9.31 RNGs, FIPS 186-2 RNG, NDRNG) b. Firmware Load Test (RSA Digital Signature Verification) 5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Aspen to perform the power-up self-test using recycling power. 6. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 7. Data output shall be logically disconnected from key generation processes. 8. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Aspen. 9. The Aspen does not support simultaneous operation of more than two operators. 10. The Aspen shall not support a bypass capability or a maintenance interface. 11. If a non-FIPS validated firmware version is loaded onto the Aspen, then the Aspen ceases to be a FIPS validated module. 12. HMAC-MD5 is only used as the pseudo random function in TLS. 13. The Aspen only supports the electronic entry form of key establishment . This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 16 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 9. Physical Security Policy 9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms The Aspen is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module with the following physical security mechanisms:  Production-grade components,  The enclosure does not have any removable cover, door or ventilation slits. When the power supply from the outside is lost, all plaintext CSPs within the Aspen are zeroized,  The enclosure is opaque and provides tamper evidence,  The enclosure is sufficiently hard, providing tamper detection and response in accordance with FIPS 140-2 level 3 physical security requirements. 9.2. Operator Actions Due to the intended deployment environment for the Aspen, Sony defers the physical inspection criteria to the end user of the cryptographic module. Any such inspection shall be based on the customer security policy, in particular with regards to the inspection frequency. Table 9 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Recommended Physical Security Frequency of Inspection/Test Guidance Details Mechanisms Inspection/Test Non-Removable Enclosure Every startup and reboot. Inspect for scratches or deformation of the metal case. If such evidence is found, user should not use the module. Tamper detection Every startup and reboot. If the module was zeroized, user should return it to Sony. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 17 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 10. Policy on Mitigation of Other Attacks The Aspen was not designed to mitigate other attacks outside of the specific scope of FIPS 140-2. Therefore, this section is not applicable. Table 10 - Mitigation of Other Attacks Other Attack Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations N/A N/A N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 18 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 11. Definitions and Acronyms Table 11 -Definitions and Acronyms Term Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard CDM Contents Decryption and Decode Module CPL Compositions Playlists CRC Cyclic Redundancy Code CSP Critical Security Parameter CTU Counter Tampering & Tamper Detection Unit DCI Digital Cinema Initiative DCP Digital Cinema Package DRNG Deterministic RNG DSP Digital Signal Processor EMI / EMC Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code KDM Key Delivery Message MBA Media Block Application MDC Media Decrypt & Decode Controller NSA Nios & Audio Mapping OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding PAD FPGA that processes video and audio data PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards PRF Pseudo Random Function RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman RSA ES/SSA RSA Encryption Standard / Secure Signature Algorithm This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 19 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen Term Definition RTC Real Time Clock SHA Secure Hash Algorithm TLS Transport Layer Security This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 20 of 21 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Aspen 12. Revision History Date Version Description Aug. 20, 2012 1.0.0 Initial public release. Dec. 17, 2012 1.0.1 Incorporated comments from CST Lab. Aug. 30, 2013 1.0.2 Incorporated comments from NIST. This document may be reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 21 of 21