Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Security Level 2 Rev. 0.7 – July 02, 2012 Seagate Technology, LLC Page 1 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Table of Contents 1  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 3  1.1  Scope ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3  1.2  Security Levels ................................................................................................................................................................ 3  1.3  References ....................................................................................................................................................................... 3  1.4  Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................................ 3  2  Cryptographic Module Description ........................................................................................................................................ 5  2.1  Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5  2.2  Logical to Physical Port Mapping .................................................................................................................................. 5  2.3  Product Versions ............................................................................................................................................................. 5  2.4  FIPS Approved Algorithms ............................................................................................................................................ 6  2.5  Self-Tests......................................................................................................................................................................... 6  2.6  FIPS 140 Approved Modes of Operation ....................................................................................................................... 7  2.6.1  TCG Security Mode ................................................................................................................................................ 7  2.6.2  ATA Enhanced Security Mode............................................................................................................................... 7  2.7  User Data Cryptographic Erase/Sanitize Methods ......................................................................................................... 7  2.8  RevertSP Method ............................................................................................................................................................ 7  2.9  Show Status ..................................................................................................................................................................... 7  3  Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy ..................................................................................................................... 9  3.1  Operator Roles ................................................................................................................................................................ 9  3.1.1  Crypto Officer Roles ............................................................................................................................................... 9  3.1.2  User Roles ............................................................................................................................................................... 9  3.1.3  Unauthenticated Role.............................................................................................................................................. 9  3.2  Authentication ................................................................................................................................................................. 9  3.2.1  Authentication Types .............................................................................................................................................. 9  3.2.2  Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode ............................................................................................... 10  3.2.3  Authentication in TCG Security Mode ................................................................................................................ 10  3.2.4  Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength ................................................................................................... 10  3.2.5  Personalizing Authentication Data ....................................................................................................................... 10  4  Access Control Policy ........................................................................................................................................................... 11  4.1  Services ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11  4.2  Cryptographic Keys and CSPs...................................................................................................................................... 14  5  Physical Security ................................................................................................................................................................... 16  5.1  Mechanisms................................................................................................................................................................... 16  5.2  Operator Requirements ................................................................................................................................................. 18  6  Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................................................... 19  7  Security Rules ....................................................................................................................................................................... 19  7.1  Secure Initialization ...................................................................................................................................................... 19  7.2  Ongoing Policy Restrictions ......................................................................................................................................... 19  8  Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy....................................................................................................................................... 19  Table of Figures Figure 1: Savvio® 10K.6 (SAS Interface)..................................................................................................................................... 16  Figure 2: Constellation® ES.3 (SAS Interface) ............................................................................................................................. 16  Figure 3: Constellation® ES.3 (SATA Interface) .......................................................................................................................... 17  Figure 4: Savvio® 10K.6 (SAS Interface) security labels on sides of drive ................................................................................ 17  Figure 5: Constellation® ES.3 (SAS/SATA Interface) security labels on sides of drive ............................................................. 17  Page 2 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 1 Introduction 1.1 Scope This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives. This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard (Appendix C) and Implementation Guidance (section 14.1). It does not provide interface details needed to develop a compliant application. This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety. 1.2 Security Levels FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 Electromagnetic Interface / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI / EMC) 3 Self – tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A The overall security level pursued for the cryptographic modules is Security Level 2. 1.3 References 1. FIPS PUB 140-2 2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2 3. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program 4. TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 3.00, January 10, 2011 5. TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 0.9, May 24, 2007 6. TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification, Specification Version 1.0, 7. ATA-8 ACS 8. Serial ATA Rev 2.6 (SATA) 9. SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 15 (SPC-4) 10. SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3) 11. Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2) 1.4 Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197) CBC Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES CM Cryptographic Module CO Crypto-officer CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator MEK Media Encryption Key FIPS 140 FIPS 140-2 HDA Head and Disk Assembly HDD Hard Disk Drive IV Initialization Vector for encryption operation Page 3 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 LBA Logical Block Address KAT Known Answer Test MSID Manufactured SID, public drive-unique value that is used as default PIN, TCG term POR Power-on Reset (power cycle) PN Part Number(s) POST Power on Self-Test PSID Physical SID, public drive-unique value RNG Random Number Generator SID Security ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO role, TCG term SoC System-on-a-Chip SP Security Provider or Security Partition (TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140) Page 4 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 2 Cryptographic Module Description 2.1 Overview The Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module is embodied in Seagate Savvio® 10K.6 and Constellation® ES.3 Self-Encrypting Drives model disk drives. These products meet the performance requirements of the most demanding Enterprise applications. The cryptographic module (CM) provides a wide range of cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase, independently controlled and protected user data LBA bands and authenticated FW download. The services are provided through industry-standard TCG Enterprise SSC, SCSI and ATA protocols. The CM has a multiple-chip embedded physical embodiment. The physical interface to the CM is a SATA or SAS connector. The logical interfaces are the industry-standard ATA (refer to Section 1.3, item 7), SCSI (refer to Section 1.3, items 9 & 10), TCG SWG (refer to Section 1.3, item 5), and Enterprise (refer to Section 1.3, item 4) protocols, carried on the SATA (refer to Section 1.3, item 8) or SAS (refer to Section 1.3, item 11) transport interface. The primary function of the module is to provide data encryption, access control and cryptographic erase of the data stored on the hard drive media. The human operator of the drive product interfaces with the CM through a “host” application on a host system. 2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping For HW versions that support ATA protocol (defined in Section 2.3): FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports Data Input SATA Connector Data Output SATA Connector Control Input SATA Connector Status Output SATA Connector Power Input Power Connector For HW versions that support SCSI protocol (defined in Section 2.3): FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports Data Input SAS Connector Data Output SAS Connector Control Input SAS Connector Status Output SAS Connector Power Input Power Connector 2.3 Product Versions The following models and hardware versions (PNs) are validated with the following FW versions: • Savvio® 10K.6, 2.5-Inch, 10K-RPM, SAS Interface, 900/600 GB, o 900GB: ST900MM0036 o 600GB: ST600MM0036 o FW Versions: A000 • Constellation® ES.3, 3.5-Inch, 7K-RPM, SAS Interface, 4000 GB, o 4000 GB: ST4000NM0063 o FW Versions: A000 • Constellation® ES.3, 3.5-Inch, 7K-RPM, SATA Interface, 4000 GB, o 4000 GB: ST4000NM0073 o FW Versions: F001 Page 5 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 HW versions that support SCSI protocol are: • Savvio® 10K.6, 2.5-Inch, 10K-RPM, SAS Interface, 900/600 GB. • Constellation® ES.3, 3.5-Inch, 7K-RPM, SAS Interface, 4000 GB, HW version that supports ATA protocol is: • Constellation® ES.3, 3.5-Inch, 7K-RPM, SATA Interface, 4000 GB. The photographs on the title page consist of representative HW versions of each models mentioned in this section. 2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms Algorithm Certificate Number ASIC AES #1974, #2068 Firmware AES #1343 RSA #1021 SHA #1225 800-90 DRBG #62 ASIC AES Certificate #1974 is applicable for HW version that supports ATA protocol (defined in Section 2.3). ASIC AES Certificate #2068 is applicable for HW versions that support SCSI protocol (defined in Section 2.3). The remaining certificates are applicable for all HW versions of this Security Policy. 2.5 Self-Tests Function Tested Self-Test Implementation Failure Behavior Type ASIC AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and performed rejects host commands with error code. Firmware AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and performed rejects host commands with error code. RSA Power-On Sign Verify KAT performed Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code. SHA-1 Power-On Digest KAT performed Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code. SHA-256 Power-On Digest KAT performed Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code. 800-90 DRBG Power-On DRBG KAT performed Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code. Firmware Integrity Power-On 16-bit CRC, ECC verification Enters FW Integrity Error State and Check does not become operationally ready. Firmware Load Check Conditional: RSA PKCS#1 signature Firmware download is aborted. When new verification of new firmware firmware is image is done before it can be downloaded loaded. 800-90 DRBG Conditional: Newly generated random number Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and When a random is compared to the previously rejects host commands with error number is generated random number. Test code. generated fails if they are equal. Non-Approved but Conditional: Newly generated random number Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and Page 6 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Allowed NDRNG When a non- is compared to the previously rejects host commands with error Approved but generated random number. Test code. Allowed random fails if they are equal. number is generated 2.6 FIPS 140 Approved Modes of Operation Before the operator performs Secure Initialization steps detailed in Section 7.1, the drive will operate in a non- FIPS Approved mode (uninitialized state). For CM that support SCSI protocol on the SAS interface, the operator can only initialize the CM as “TCG Security” mode. For CM that support ATA protocol on the SATA interface, the operator may choose to initialize the CM to operate in either “TCG Security” or “ATA Enhanced Security” mode. After setting up (configuring) the module per the Security Rules of this policy, the CM is always in Approved mode of operation except when a critical failure has been detected, when any ‘Exit FIPS mode’ services are invoked, or when the module is not in ‘Use’ state. For CM that supports both Approved modes, an operator can switch the CM between these Approved modes of operation and to do so, the CM must transition to the uninitialized state (via ‘Exit FIPS mode’ service) which results in zeroization of keys and CSPs. The module’s FIPS modes of operation are enforced through configuration and policy. Violating the Security rules and ongoing policy restrictions (detailed in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2) would mean that one is no longer using the drive in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 describe the differences between the 2 modes. TCG Security Mode 2.6.1 This mode has the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/crypto erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that encompasses the whole user data area. In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (EraseMaster) to administer the above capability. ATA Enhanced Security Mode 2.6.2 This mode implements the Master and User roles, and lock/unlock/erase as defined in the ATA Security feature set as well as Sanitize feature set in ATA protocol. There is a single user data region which can be read/written/crypto-erased with one encryption key. 2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase/Sanitize Methods Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted by the CM for storage / retrieval on the drive media, the data can be erased/sanitized using cryptographic methods. The data is effectively erased/sanitized by changing the media encryption key (MEK). Thus, the FIPS 140 key management capability “zeroization” of the key effectively erases all the user data in that read operations will decrypt with a different key value and thus the data is not returned as it was written. Other FIPS service can be used to erase all the other private keys and CSPs (see Section 2.8). 2.8 RevertSP Method The TCG RevertSP method may be invoked to transition the CM back to the manufactured state (uninitialized). This corresponds to the Exit FIPS Mode service and is akin to a “restore to factory defaults” operation. This operation also provides a means to zeroize keys and CSPs. Subsequently, the CM has to be re-initialized before it can return to a FIPS Approved mode of operation. This RevertSP method is invoked as an unauthenticated service by virtue of the use of a public credential (PSID). 2.9 Show Status Show status service (refer to Section 4.1) can be used to determine if the drive is operational under the security constraints of FIPS. For this purpose TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism and TCG Get method are utilized. Page 7 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism maybe invoked by the operator to know if drive in “use” or security “fail” state. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is 0x80 then drive is in Use State i.e. security is operational. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is 0xFF the drive is in security Fail State i.e. drive is not operational in terms of FIPS services. In addition, the TCG Get method can be used to retrieve the approved modes of operation value. The values of 0x01 or 0x02 correspond to ATA Enhanced Security Mode and TCG Security Mode respectively. The value 0x00 indicates the CM is in the uninitialized state. Page 8 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy 3.1 Operator Roles Note: The following identifies the CO and User roles with a general description of the purposes. For further details of the services performed by each role in each FIPS mode, see section 4.1. 3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles 3.1.1.1 Drive Owner This CO role corresponds to the SID (Secure ID) Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to transition the CM to TCG Security Mode (applicable for SATA command interface) and to download a new FW image. Note: only a FIPS validated firmware version can be loaded to the module. Otherwise, the module is not operating in FIPS mode. 3.1.1.2 EraseMaster (TCG Security Mode) This CO role corresponds to same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to enable/disable User roles, and erase user data region (LBA band). An operator is authenticated to this role with role-based authentication. 3.1.2 User Roles 3.1.2.1 BandMasters (0-15) (TCG Security Mode) This user role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to lock/unlock and configure a user data band (“LBA band”) for read/write access. A CM can be configured to support up to 16 user data bands, which are controlled by their respective BandMaster credentials. By default 2 user bands are enabled. BandMasters are enabled/disabled using the EraseMaster role. An operator is authenticated to the BandMaster role with identity-based authentication. If a user data band is erased (EraseMaster service) then the BandMaster PIN is reset to MSID. 3.1.2.2 User (ATA Enhanced Security Mode) This role corresponds to the same named role as defined in ATA [refer to Section 1.3, item 7]. It can unlock (and also lock) the drive so that an operator can read and write data to the drive. This role can also use the Cryptographic Erase service. 3.1.2.3 Master (ATA Enhanced Security Mode) This role corresponds to the same named role as defined in ATA [refer to Section 1.3, item 7]. This role only provides a backup authentication to the ATA User and does not have access to administration services beyond those of the ATA User role. 3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role This role can perform the Show Status service. If the operator has physical access to the drive, this role can also reset the module with a power cycle (which results in POSTs). This role can also use the public PSID value to invoke the Exit FIPS Mode service. See section 4.1 for details. 3.2 Authentication Authentication Types 3.2.1 Some operator roles have role-based authentication and others have identity-based authentication. For example, the Drive Owner role uses role-based authentication as there is only one ID and one PIN. In TCG Security Mode, the CM has up to 16 User operators. Each of these operators is assigned a unique ID to which a PIN is associated, thus this provides identity-based authentication. For some services the authentication is performed in a separate associated service; e.g. the Read Unlock service is the authentication for subsequent User Data Read service. If the User Data Read service is attempted without prior authentication then the command will fail. Page 9 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode 3.2.2 In ATA Enhanced Security Mode, Master and User operator authentication is provided through a PIN provided in the ATA Security command [refer to Section 1.3, item 7]. In the event of authentication failure, the ATA command will abort, and subsequent read/write services will abort. A password attempt counter is implemented as specified in ATA, which when reached, blocks Master/User service authentication (with command abort), until the module is reset (Unblock PIN service). Depending on a parameter of the Set PIN service for the User password, the User services may or may not be fully extended to the Master role. If the Master Password Capability is set to “High”, then either role can access the same services. Otherwise the Master role only has access to the erase service. Drive Owner authentication for the Set PIN and Enable/Disable FW Download services is provided through the TCG Authenticate to Admin SP. Authentication in TCG Security Mode 3.2.3 Operator authentication is provided within a TCG session. The host application can have only a single session open at a time. Authentication of an operator, using the TCG interface, uses the Authenticate method to authenticate to a role after a session has been started. Authentications will persist until the session is closed. During a session the application can invoke services for which the authenticated operator has access control. Note that a security rule of the CM is that the host must not authenticate to more than one operator (TCG authority) in a session. For the Show Status the host application will authenticate to the “Anybody” authority which does not have a private credential. Therefore this operation is effectively an unauthenticated service. Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength 3.2.4 Operator authentication with PINs is implemented by hashing the operator input value and comparing it to the stored hash of the assigned PIN. The PINs have a retry attribute (“TryLimit”) that controls the number of unsuccessful attempts before the authentication is blocked until a module reset. The PINs have a maximum length of 32 bytes. Per the policy security rules, the minimum PIN length is 4 bytes (Rule 3 in Section 7.1). This gives a probability of 1/232 of guessing the PIN in a single random attempt. This easily meets the FIPS 140 authentication strength requirements of less than 1/1,000,000. In TCG interface, each failed authentication attempt takes a minimum of 15ms to complete. Thus a maximum of {(60*1000)/15} attempts can be processed in one minute. Thus the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is 4000/232. This is significantly lower than the FIPS requirement of 1/100,000. In ATA security interface, the PIN blocking feature limits the number of unsuccessful attempts to 5 (it “unblocks” with module reset) and the minimum time for a module reset is about 12 seconds (about 5/min). Thus the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed is 5/232. This is significantly lower than the FIPS requirement of 1/100,000. Personalizing Authentication Data 3.2.5 The initial value for SID and various other PINs is a manufactured value (mSID). This is a device-unique, 32- byte, public value. The Security Rules (Section 7) for the CM requires that the PIN values must be “personalized” to private values using the “Set PIN” service. Note that for ATA Enhanced Security Mode, setting the User PIN also sets the Drive Owner PIN to the same value; the Drive Owner PIN can be set to a different value with the TCG Set Method. Page 10 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 4 Access Control Policy 4.1 Services The following tables represent the FIPS 140 services for each FIPS Approved Mode in terms of the Approved Security Functions and operator access control. Hardware versions that support ATA protocol (defined in Section 2.3) provide services indicated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (when in TCG Security Mode), Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (when in ATA Enhanced Security Mode). Hardware versions that support SCSI protocol (defined in Section 2.3) provide services in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (when in TCG Security Mode). For cryptographic algorithm certificates and hardware version association, refer to Section 2.4. Note the following: • Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved mode. • Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g. hashing as part of asymmetric key) • Operator authentication is not represented in this table. • Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs. • Service input and output details are defined by the TCG, SCSI and ATA standards. • Unauthenticated services (e.g. Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs. • Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock services used by an authenticated operator; e.g. User data read / write. • If the Operator value contains “optional” then the access is dependent on the module setup (see Section 3.2.2). Page 11 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Table 1.1 - FIPS 140 Authenticated Services (TCG Security Mode) Service Name Description Operator Security Command(s)/Event(s) Access Function Control Set PIN Change operator authentication data. EraseMaster, Hashing TCG Set Method BandMasters, Drive Owner Firmware Enable/Disable FW download and load Drive Owner Asymmetric TCG Set Method, SCSI Write Download complete firmware image. If the self- Key Buffer, ATA DOWNLOAD test of the code load passes then the MICROCODE device will run with the new code. Enable / Disable Enable / Disable a User Authority. EraseMaster None TCG Set Method BandMasters Set Range Set the location, size, and locking BandMasters None TCG Set Method Attributes attributes of the LBA range. Lock / Unlock Block or allow read (decrypt) / write BandMasters None TCG Set Method, ATA User Data Range (encrypt) of user data in a range. SECURITY UNLOCK for Read and/or Write User Data Read / Encryption / decryption of user data None* Symmetric SCSI Read, Write Commands Write to/from a LBA range. Key ATA Read, Write Commands Access control to this service is provided through Lock / Unlock User Data Range. Cryptographic Erase user data in an LBA range by EraseMaster, RNG, TCG Erase Method Erase cryptographic means: changing the Symmetric encryption key. BandMaster PIN is Key also reset. Table 1.2 - FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services (TCG Security Mode) Service Name Description Operator Security Command(s)/Event(s) Access Function Control Show Status Reports if the CM is operational in None None TCG Level 0 Discovery, TCG Get terms of FIPS services and approved Method mode of operation value. Drive Security Life Cycle State =0x80(Use State) and, Approved mode of operation value =0x02. Reset Module Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP None None POR RAM. DRBG Generate Returns an SP 800-90 DRBG Random None None TCG Random() Bytes Number of 256 bytes Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation. None (using None TCG AdminSP.RevertSP() Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode. PSID) FIPS 140 Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall None None SCSI SECURITY PROTOCOL IN Compliance Security Level, Hardware and Firmware – Protocol 0 Descriptor revisions and Module name ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE – Protocol 0 Page 12 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Table 2.1- FIPS 140 Services – Authenticated Services (ATA Enhanced Security Mode) Service Name Description Operator Security Command(s)/Event(s) Access Function Control Set PIN Change operator authentication data. Master, User, Hashing ATA SECURITY SET Note: Setting the User PIN also sets Drive Owner PASSWORD, TCG Set the Drive Owner PIN. Method Firmware Enable / Disable FW Download and Drive Owner* Asymmetric TCG Set Method, ATA Download load complete firmware image. If the Key DOWNLOAD MICROCODE self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code. Unlock User Enable user data read/write and Set User (optional Symmetric ATA SECURITY UNLOCK Data PIN services. Master) Key (to unwrap MEK) User Data Read Encryption / decryption of user data. None* Symmetric ATA Read / Write Commands / Write Key Cryptographic Erase user data through cryptographic Master, User RNG ATA SECURITY ERASE Erase means: by zeroizing the encryption PREPARE + ATA SECURITY key and the User PIN. ERASE UNIT Note: FIPS mode is exited. Sanitize Sanitize user data through None* RNG ATA CRYPTO SCRAMBLE cryptographic means: by zeroizing the encryption key. Disable Disables ATA Security commands None* None ATA SECURITY FREEZE Services until POR LOCK Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation. User*(optional RNG, ATA SECURITY DISABLE Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode. Master*) Hashing, PASSWORD, ATA Symmetric SECURITY ERASE Key PREPARE + ATA SECURITY ERASE UNIT Table 2.2 - FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services (ATA Enhanced Security Mode) Service Name Description Operator Security Command(s)/Event(s) Access Function Control Unblock PIN Reset Master and User password None None POR attempt counter. Show Status Reports if the CM is operational in None None TCG Level 0 Discovery, TCG Get terms of FIPS services and approved Method mode of operation value. Drive Security Life Cycle State=0x80(Use State) and, Approved mode of operation value=0x01. Reset Module Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP None None POR RAM storage. Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation. None (using None TCG AdminSP.RevertSP() Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode. PSID) FIPS 140 Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall None None ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE – Compliance Security Level, Hardware and Protocol 0 Descriptor Firmware revisions and Module name *Security has to be Unlocked Page 13 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs The following table defines the keys / CSPs and the operators / services which use them. Note the following: • • The use of PIN CSPs for authentication is implied by the operator access control. • The Set PIN service is represented in this table even though generally it is only used at module setup. • All non-volatile storage of keys and CSPs is in the system area of the drive media to which there is no logical or physical access from outside of the module. • The module uses SP 800-90 DRBG and adopts Hash_DRBG mechanism. • Read access of private values are internal only to the CM and are thus not represented in this table. • There is no security-relevant audit feature. Page 14 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Table 3 – “Key Management” Mode (ATA / Type (Pub / Priv, key / CSP Name Description Operator Role Services Used In Access **(W, X) TCG / Both) (e.g. PIN)), size SID (Secure ID), aka Drive Both Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32 bytes Drive Owner Set PIN W Owner PIN None (subject to unlocked) Set PIN W Master, User Unlock User Data X Master, User Passwords ATA Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32 bytes Master, User Cryptographic Erase X Master, User Sanitize X Master, User Exit FIPS Mode X Master, User MEK ATA MEK mixed with PINs Private, AES Key, 512 bits Master, User Unlock User Data X EraseMaster TCG EraseMaster Auth Data Private, PIN, 32 bytes EraseMaster SetPIN W BandMasters (0-15) TCG Users Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32 bytes BandMasters Set PIN W Passwords LBA Range MEKs TCG MEK (per LBA band) Private, AES Key, 512 bits Users Unlock User Data X *Input to a DRBG mechanism Services which use the RNG (e.g; Entropy Input String Both of a string of bits that contains Private, 520 bytes None X cryptographic erase, sanitize) entropy *String of bits that is used as Services which use the RNG (e.g. Seed Both Private, Hash seed, 544 bytes None X input to a DRBG mechanism cryptographic erase, sanitize) *Collection of stored Services which uses the RNG (e.g. Internal State Both information about DRBG Private, V and C None X cryptographic erase, sanitize) instantiation Firmware Load Test Signature Drive Owner (enable FW ORG0-0 - ORG0-3 Both Public, RSA Key, 2048 bits FW Download X Verify Key download) * Source: Section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication 800-90 ** W - Write access is allowed, X - Execute access is allowed Page 15 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 5 Physical Security 5.1 Mechanisms The CM has the following physical security: • Production-grade components with standard passivation • One Opaque, tamper-evident, security label (TEL) on the exposed (back) side of the PCBA applied by Seagate manufacturing prevents electronic design visibility and protects physical access to the electronics by board removal • On each side of the top cover a tamper-evident security label is applied by Seagate manufacturing prevent HDA cover removal for access or visibility to the media • Exterior of the drive is opaque • The tamper-evident labels cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence • The tamper-evident labels cannot be easily replicated with a low attack time Security label on PCBA of drive to provide tamper-evidence of PCBA removal o Figure 1: Savvio® 10K.6 (SAS Interface) Figure 2: Constellation® ES.3 (SAS Interface) Page 16 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 Figure 3: Constellation® ES.3 (SATA Interface) • Security labels on side of drive to provide tamper-evidence of HDA cover removal, Figure 4: Savvio® 10K.6 (SAS Interface) security labels on sides of drive Figure 5: Constellation® ES.3 (SAS/SATA Interface) security labels on sides of drive Page 17 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 5.2 Operator Requirements The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence: • Checkerboard pattern on security label or substrate Checkerbox Pattern Tamper Evidence • Security label over screws at indicated locations is missing or penetrated, Screws - covered by security label Screws - covered by security label • Text (including size, font, orientation) on security label does not match original, • Security label cutouts do not match original. Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service. Page 18 Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 0.7 6 Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a “non-modifiable operational environment”. That is, while the module is in operation the operational environment cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. FW can be upgraded (replaced) with a signed FW download operation. If the code download is successfully authenticated then the module will begin operating with the new code image. 7 Security Rules 7.1 Secure Initialization The following are the security rules for initialization and operation of the CM in a FIPS 140 compliant manner. Reference the appropriate sections of this document for details. 1. Users: At installation and periodically examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper evidence. 2. CM that supports ATA protocol on the SATA interface can transition to either of the modes by doing one of the following: • ATA Enhanced Security Mode: User Set PIN. • TCG Security Mode: authenticates to the Locking SP as BandMaster 0, BandMaster 1or EraseMaster. CM that supports SCSI protocol on the SAS interface can only transition to TCG Security Mode. • Transition to TCG Security Mode is done by authenticating to Locking SP as BandMaster 0, BandMaster 1 or EraseMaster. 3. COs and Users: At installation, set all operator PINs applicable for the FIPS mode to private values of at least 4 bytes length: • ATA Enhanced Security Mode: Master and User. Drive Owner (optional). • TCG Security: Drive Owner, EraseMaster and BandMasters 4. Drive Owner: At installation, disable the “Makers” authority (defined in TCG Core Specification [refer to Section 1.3, item 5] 5. At installation, the value of LockOnReset (defined in TCG Core Specification [refer to Section 1.3, item 5]) for FW Download must be set to “Power Cycle” and it must not be modified. 6. After secure initialization is complete, do a power-on reset to clear authentications established during initialization. 7.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions 1. Prior to assuming a new role, close the current Session and start a new Session, or do a power-on reset, so that the previous authentication is cleared. 2. Users for TCG Security Mode: If it is intended to have a band lock on module reset then set ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled (defined in TCG Core Specification [refer to Section 1.3, item 5]) to “True”. The default value is “False”. If a band is configured with a value of False then the band is to be considered excluded from the module boundary. 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2. Page 19