Catbird vSecurity Crypto Module v1.0 FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Version: v1.0 Last Updated: July 16, 2012 Catbird Networks, Inc. 1800 Green Hills Road, Suite 113 Scotts Valley, CA 95066 866.682.0080 tel 708.221.0401 fax info@catbird.com Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Copyright © 2012 Catbird Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Revision History Authors Date Version Comment Catbird 2012-06-20 1.0 Final edits Networks, Inc. 2012-01-07 1.0-rc1 Reorganization to new template Catbird Networks, Inc. Catbird 2011-04-22 1.0-rc0 Initial draft Networks, Inc. Page 2 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Table of Contents Revision History.................................................................................................................... 2 1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................4 2 Tested Configurations.........................................................................................................5 3 Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................5 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality ...................................................... 6 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys............................................................ 7 5 Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................... 9 6 Self-test............................................................................................................................... 11 7 Operational Environment....................................................................................................12 8 Mitigation of other attacks.................................................................................................. 12 Page 3 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy 1 Introduction This document comprises the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Catbird vSecurity Crypto Module v1.0, hereafter referred to as the Module. Block Diagram The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object module file named fipscanister.o. The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services). The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Security Requirement Security Level Page 4 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security NA Operational Environment 1 Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks NA Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements The Module’s software version for this validation is v1.0. 2 Tested Configurations Operational Environment Processor Optimizations (Target) Intel Core i5 (x86-64) CentOS 6.0 AES-NI Table 2 - Supported Platforms 3 Ports and Interfaces The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API). Logical interface type Description Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters Data input API entry point data input stack parameters Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters Data output API entry point data output stack parameters Table 3 - Logical interfaces As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output Page 5 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned). 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and Non-approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Function Algorithm Options Cert # Random Number [ANS X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256 1010 Generation; [SP 800-90] DRBG1 Hash DRBG 166 Symmetric key Prediction resistance HMAC DRBG, no reseed generation supported for all variations CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function Dual EC DRBG: P-256, P-384, P-521 [SP 800-67] 3-Key TDES TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; 1252 CMAC generate and verify [FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8, 1922 Encryption, CFB 128, CTR, XTS; CCM; GCM; CMAC Decryption and [SP 800-38B] CMAC generate and verify CMAC [SP 800-38C] CCM [SP 800-38D] GCM [SP 800-38E] XTS Message Digests [FIPS 180-3] SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1688 Keyed Hash [FIPS 198] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1157 Digital Signature and [FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, 991 Asymmetric Key SigGenPSS, SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, Generation SigVerPSS (1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA sizes) [FIPS 186-2] DSA PQG Gen, PQG Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen, Sig 609 Ver (1024 with SHA-1 only) [FIPS 186-3] DSA PQG Gen, PQG Ver, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen, Sig 609 Ver (1024/2048/3072 with all SHA sizes) [FIPS 186-2] ECDSA Key Pair, PKV, SigGen, SigVer (all NIST 274 defined B, K, and P curves with SHA-1 only) [FIPS 186-3] ECDSA Key Pair, PKV, SigGen, SigVer (all NIST 274 defined B, K and P curves with all SHA sizes) ECC CDH (CVL) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST defined B, K and P curves 14 Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. Category Algorithm Description 1 For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800-90] and [SP800-57]. Page 6 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Key Agreement EC DH Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all NIST defined B, K and P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module. Key Encryption, RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B Decryption compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services. Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes FIPS_mode_set()2, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If FIPS_mode_set() fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed. The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-3 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process. 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures. CSP Name Description RSA SGK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature generation key RSA KDK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key DSA SGK [FIPS 186-3] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature generation key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature generation key ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature generation key EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key. AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS cipher key TDES EDK TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key TDES CMAC TDES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512) RNG CSPs Seed (128 bit), AES 128/192/256 seed key and associated state variables for ANS X9.31 AES based RNG3 2 The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the FIPS_mode_set() wrapper function. 3 There is an explicit test for equality of the seed and seed key inputs Page 7 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/880 bits) and C (440/880 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs S (P-256, P-384, P-521), entropy input (length dependent on security strength) CO-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication User-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed. The module does not output intermediate key generation values. CSP Name Description RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key RSA KEK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key DSA SVK [FIPS 186-3] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature verification key ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key. Table 4.1b – Public Keys For all CSPs and Public Keys: Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores RNG and DRBG state values for the lifetime of the RNG or DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of RNG and DRBG state values used for the Modules' default key generation service. Generation: The Module implements ANSI X9.31 compliant RNG and SP 800-90 compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module. Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary. Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary. Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy Page 8 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non- overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism: 128 bits for the [ANS X9.31] RNG mechanism, and as shown in [SP 800-90] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and Table 4 (Dual_EC_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. 5 Roles, Authentication and Services The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed by passing the appropriate password to the FIPS_module_mode_set() function. The password values may be specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password. Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed. Since minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of 1/25616, or less than 1/1038. The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time. Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module. • User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. • Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API functions. Page 9 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access. Service Role Description Module initialization, inclusive of all Table 9 tests (FIPS_module_mode_set). Does Initialize User, CO not access CSPs. Self-test User, CO Perform all Table 9 tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs. Functions that provide module status information: • Version (as unsigned long or const char *) Show status User, CO • FIPS Mode (Boolean) Does not access CSPs. Functions that destroy CSPs: • fips_rand_prng_reset: destroys RNG CSPs. • fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs Zeroize User, CO (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs.) All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application. Used for random number and symmetric key generation. • Seed or reseed an RNG or DRBG instance Random • Determine security strength of an RNG or DRBG instance number User, CO • Obtain random data generation Uses and updates RNG CSPs, Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs. Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys: Asymmetric RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK User, CO key generation There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP800-90 Symmetric Used to encrypt or decrypt data. User, CO encrypt/decrypt Executes using AES EDK, TDES EDK (passed in by the calling process). Symmetric Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. User, CO digest Executes using AES CMAC, TDES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Message digest User, CO Does not access CSPs. Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Keyed Hash User, CO Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process). Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not Key transport4 User, CO establish keys into the module). Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process). Key agreement User, CO Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not 4 "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to this Module. Page 10 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy Service Role Description establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process). Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Digital User, CO Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, signature ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process). Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs. Table 5 - Services and CSP Access 6 Self-test The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test. Algorithm Type Test Attributes Software integrity KAT HMAC-SHA1 HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements. AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length XTS-AES KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256) AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths TDES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key TDES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1 DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384 DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA256 Dual_EC_DRBG: P-256 and SHA256 ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. The K-233 self-test is not performed for operational environments that support prime curve only (see Table 2). ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6 X9.31 RNG KAT 128, 192, 256 bit AES keys Table 6a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test) The FIPS_mode_set()5 function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator 5 FIPS_mode_set() calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set() Page 11 of 12 Catbird Networks Inc. - Crypto Module v1.0 Security Policy intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set()5 succeeds. The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the calling application. The Module also implements the following conditional tests: Algorithm Test DRBG Tested as required by [SP800-90] Section 11 DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair ANSI X9.31 RNG Continuous test for stuck fault Table 6b - Conditional Tests In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re- instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90]; this is not something the Module can do itself. Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt. 7 Operational Environment The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation. 8 Mitigation of other attacks The Module does not claim any attack mitigation beyond FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. Page 12 of 12