Version 1 Revision 2 i IBM LTO Generation 5 Encrypting Tape Drive Security Policy Version 1 Revision 2 Version 1 Revision 2 ii 1 Document History .................................................................................................................................................. 1 2 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 2 2.1 References ............................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Document Organization ........................................................................................................................ 3 3 LTO Generation 5 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description .................................................... 4 3.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 4 3.2 Secure Configuration ............................................................................................................................. 6 3.3 Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................................... 9 3.4 Roles and Services ................................................................................................................................ 11 3.5 Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. 17 3.6 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management............................................................................ 18 3.7 Design Assurance ................................................................................................................................. 21 3.8 Mitigation of other attacks .................................................................................................................. 21 Version 1 Revision 1 -1- 1 Document History Date Author Change 06/02/2010 Said Ahmad Initial Creation 07/22/2010 Said Ahmad Updated per SAIC comments 10/27/2010 Said Ahmad Update EC numbers 03/11/2011 Said Ahmad Updates per SAIC comments Version 1 Revision 2 2 2 Introduction This non-proprietary security policy describes the IBM LTO Generation 5 Encrypting Tape Drive cryptographic module and the approved mode of operation for FIPS 140-2, security level 1 requirements. This policy was prepared as part of FIPS 140-2 validation of the LTO Gen5. The LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive is referred to in this document as the LTO Gen5, the IBM LTO Gen5, and the encrypting tape drive. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2—Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST web site at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/ The security policy document is organized in the following sections: • Introduction • References • Document Organization LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description • Cryptographic Module Overview • Secure Configuration • Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces • Roles and Services • Physical Security • Cryptographic Key Management • Self-Tests • Design Assurance • Mitigation of Other Attacks Version 1 Revision 2 3 2.1 References This document describes only the cryptographic operations and capabilities of the LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive. More information is available on the general function of the LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive at the IBM web site: http://www.ibm.com/storage/tape/ The tape drive meets the T10 SCSI-3 Stream Commands (SSC) standard for the behavior of sequential access devices. The LTO Gen5 Encryption Tape Drive supports 2 host interface types: Fibre channel (FC) and serial- attached SCSI (SAS). The physical and protocol behavior of these ports conforms to their respective specifications. These specifications are available at the INCITS T10 standards web site: http://www.T10.org / A Redbook describing tape encryption and user configuration of the LTO Gen5 drive in various environments can be found at: http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/sg247320.html?Open The LTO Gen5 drive format on the tape media is designed to conform to the IEEE P1619.1 committee draft proposal for recommendations for protecting data at rest on tape media. Details on P1619.1 may be found at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4413113 2.2 Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the submission package contains: Vendor Evidence Document Other supporting documentation and additional references With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to IBM and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, contact IBM. Version 1 Revision 2 4 3 IBM LTO Generation 5 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description 3.1 Overview The IBM LTO Generation 5 Encrypting Tape Drive, also referred to herein the LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive and the module, is a set of hardware, firmware, and interfaces allowing the optional storage and retrieval of encrypted data to magnetic tape cartridges. The entire “brick” unit of the LTO Gen5 tape drive is FIPS certified as a multi-chip, standalone cryptographic module. In customer operation the “brick” unit may be used in conjunction with a computer system or tape library. Block diagrams of the LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive are shown below: FC Cryptographic Module Block Diagram BAB Port (J24) Protect Write SDRAM SDRAM (J4) Port 0 Port 1 Loop Link 422 232 Switches (U31) (U19,U20,U21,U22) (J14) FC FC FAS 88SC9210 (J1,SW2,D1,D13) (J32) Front Panel (U49) Hasu (J39) (J40) (J8) (J38) FC FC RS- RS- Feature Threader Ether- (U24) SDRAM (U69) Other Cartridge Mem FLASH Card (U16) Deck Functions (J10) (U8,U43,U46, (S4) U48,U58,U73) (J30) Port Head Tape (J6) (J42) net Main Card Power (J37) Drive Figure 1a: LTO Gen5 Fibre Channel Drive Block Diagram Version 1 Revision 2 5 SAS Cryptographic Module Block Diagram BAB Port (J24) Protect Write SDRAM SDRAM (J4) (U31) (U19,U20,U21,U22) Port 0 Port 1 SAS SAS FAS 88SC9210 (J1,SW2,D1,D13) (J14) Front Panel (U49) Hasu (U24) SDRAM (U69) Other RS- RS- Feature Threader Ether- 422 232 Switches (J8) (J38) Cartridge Mem FLASH Card (U16) Deck Functions (J10) (U8,U43,U46, (S4) U48,U58,U73) (J30) Port Head Tape (J6) (J42) net Main Card Power (J37) Drive Figure 1b: LTO Gen5 SAS Drive Block Diagram Version 1 Revision 2 6 The LTO Gen5 Encrypting Tape Drive has two major cryptographic functions: Data Block Cipher Facility: The tape drive provides functions which provide the ability for standard tape data blocks as received during SCSI-type write commands to be encrypted before being recorded to media using AES-GCM block cipher using a provided key, and decrypted during reads from tape using a provided key. Note the AES-GCM block cipher operation is performed after compression of the o host data therefore not impacting capacity and data rate performance of the compression function The LTO Gen5 drive automatically performs a complete and separate decryption o and decompression check of host data blocks after the compression/encryption process to validate there were no errors in the encoding process Secure Key Interface Facility: The tape drive provides functions which allow authentication of the tape drive to an external IBM key manager, such as the IBM Encryption Key Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and allow transfer of protected key material between the key manager and the tape drive. 3.2 Secure Configuration This section describes the approved mode of operation for the LTO Gen5 drive to maintain FIPS-140 validation. There are two configurations for the LTO Gen5 in the approved mode of operation. They are: System-Managed Encryption (SME) Library-Managed Encryption (LME) In order to be in an approved mode of operation, the values of the fields Key Path (manager Type) (from VPD), In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override, Indirect Key Mode Default, Key Scope, and Encryption Method must be set according to the table below. More details can be found in the LTO Ultrium Tape Drive SCSI Reference. Table 1: Settings for Approved Modes of Operation Required Fields System-Managed Library-Managed Encryption (SME) Encryption (LME) X’1’ X’6’ Key Path (Manager Type) (from VPD) Mode Page X’25’, byte 21, bits 7-5 X’0’ or X’1’ X’0’ In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override Mode Page X’25’, byte 21, bits 4-2 B’0’ B’0’ Indirect Key Mode Default Mode Page X’25’, byte 22, bit 4 X’0’ or X’1’ X’0’ or X’1’ Key Scope Mode Page X’25’, byte 23, bits 2-0 X’10’ or X’1F’ X’60’ Encryption Method Mode Page X’25’, byte 27 A user can determine if the LTO Gen5 is in the approved mode of operation by issuing a SCSI Mode Sense command to Mode Page X’25’ and evaluating the values returned. Version 1 Revision 2 7 Certain commands are prohibited while in the approved modes of operation. The commands vary based on which configuration is used in the approved mode. In the LME configuration, all Mode Select commands to subpages of Mode Page X’25’ are prohibited. In the SME configuration, Mode Select commands to the following subpages of Mode Page X’25’ are prohibited. Table 2: Mode Select Eligibility of Mode Page X’25’ Subpages Mode Page X’25’ Subpages System-Managed Encryption Library-Managed Encryption (SME) (LME) X’C0’ – Control/Status Prohibited Allowed X’D0’ – Generate dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited X’D1’ – Query dAK Prohibited Prohibited X’D2’ – Update dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited X’D3’ – Remove dAK/dAK’ Pair Prohibited Prohibited X’D5’ – Drive Challenge/Response Prohibited Allowed X’D6’ – Query Drive Certificate Prohibited Allowed X’D7’ – Query/Setup HMAC Prohibited Prohibited X’D8’ – Install eAK Prohibited Prohibited X’D9’ – Query eAK Prohibited Prohibited X’DA’ – Update eAK Prohibited Prohibited X’DB’ – Remove eAK Prohibited Prohibited X’DF’ – Query dSK Prohibited Allowed X’E0’ – Setup SEDK Prohibited Allowed X’E1’ – Alter DKx Prohibited Allowed X’E2’ – Query DKx (Active) Prohibited Allowed X’E3’ – Query DKx (Needed) Prohibited Allowed X’E4’ – Query DKx (Entire) Prohibited Allowed X’E5’ – Query DKx (Pending) Prohibited Allowed X’EE’ – Request DKx (Translate) Prohibited Allowed X’EF’ – Request DKx (Generate) Prohibited Allowed X’FE’ – Drive Error Notify Prohibited Allowed Loading a FIPS 140-2 validated drive microcode level and configuring the drive for SME or LME operation initializes the LTO Gen5 into the approved mode of operation. The LTO Gen5 supports multi-initiator environments, but only one initiator may access cryptographic functions at any given time. Therefore the LTO Gen5 does not support multiple concurrent operators. The LTO Gen5 implements a non-modifiable operational environment which consists of a firmware image stored in FLASH. The firmware image is copied to, and executed from, RAM. The firmware image can only be updated via FIPS-approved methods that verify the validity of the image. The LTO Gen5 drive operates as a stand-alone tape drive and has no direct dependency on any specific operating system or platform for FIPS approved operating mode, but does have requirements for: • Key Manager/Key Store attachment • Drive Configuration Version 1 Revision 2 8 The following criteria apply to the usage environment: Key Manager and Key Store Attachment o In both SME and LME modes of operation, an IBM key manager, such as the Encryption Key Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and a supported key store must be used in a manner which supports secure import and export of keys with the LTO Gen5 drive : • Keys must be securely passed into the LTO Gen5 drive. The key manager must support encryption of the Data Key to form an Session Encrypted Data Key (SEDK) for transfer to the LTO Gen5 drive using the LTO Gen5 drive public Session Key and a 2048-bit RSA encryption method. • The key manager/key store must be able to use the DKi it supplies the drive to determine the Data Key. Drive Configuration requirements o The LTO Gen5 drive must be configured in SME or LME encryption mode. o The LTO Gen5 drive must have the FIPS 140-2 validated drive firmware level loaded and operational. o Drive must be configured in the approved mode of operation. o In LME mode, the LTO Gen5 drive must be operated in an automation device which operates to the LDI or ADI interface specifications provided. Version 1 Revision 2 9 3.3 Ports and Interfaces The cryptographic boundary of the LTO Gen5 drive cryptographic module is the drive brick. Tape data blocks to be encrypted (write operations) or decrypted data blocks to be returned to the host (read operation) are transferred on the host interface ports using SCSI commands, while protected key material may be received on the host interface ports or the library port. The physical ports are separated into FIPS-140-2 logical ports as described below. Table 3: Ports Common to All Host Interface Types LTO Gen5 Drive FIPS-140-2 Crypto Interface Functionality Physical Ports Logical Interface Services BAB Port Disabled None Disabled by FIPS approved firmware levels. RS-422 Port Data Input Yes Inputs data Data Output Crypto: Inputs protected keys from the key Control Input manager in LME mode. Status Output Outputs data Outputs encrypted key components Inputs LDI and LMI protocol commands. Outputs LDI and LMI protocol status. RS-232 Port Disabled None Disabled by FIPS approved firmware levels. Ethernet Port Control Input None Inputs controls and image for firmware load Status Output Outputs status Data Input Threader Power Power None Supplies power to threader unit internal to tape Port drive brick. Input Power Port Power None Inputs power to the LTO Gen5 drive Write Protect Control Input None Inputs write protect state of the cartridge Switch Front Panel Single- Status Output None Displays status Character Display (SCD) Front Panel Amber Status Output None Displays status LED Front Panel Green Status Output None Displays status LED Front Panel Unload Control Input None Inputs unload command Button Places the drive in manual diagnostic mode Scrolls through manual diagnostics Exits manual diagnostic mode Forces drive dump Resets the drive Cartridge Memory Data Input Yes Inputs parameters. RFID Port Data Output Crypto: Inputs external key structures Outputs parameters. Crypto: Outputs external key structures Read/Write Head Data Input None Inputs data from tape cartridges Data Output Outputs data to tape cartridges Control Input Inputs command to load firmware from special FMR cartridges Version 1 Revision 2 10 Table 4a: Fibre Channel-Specific Host Interfaces Ports LTO Gen5 FC FIPS-140-2 Crypto Interface Functionality Drive Logical Interface Services Physical Ports Fibre Channel Port Data Input Yes Inputs data 0 Data Output Crypto: Inputs protected keys from the key Control Input manager in SME mode. Fibre Channel Port Status Output Outputs data 1 Outputs encrypted key components Inputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol commands Outputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol status Fibre Channel Control Input None Inputs fibre channel interface control parameters Loop ID Port Status Output Outputs fibre channel interface status Fibre Channel Link Control Input None Inputs fibre channel interface control parameters Characteristics Port Feature Switches Control Input None Inputs RS-422 interface control parameters Inputs fibre channel interface control parameters Inputs read/write head cleaner brush control parameters Table 4b: SAS-Specific Host Interfaces Ports LTO Gen5 SAS FIPS-140-2 Crypto Interface Functionality drive Logical Interface Services Physical Ports SAS Connector Data Input Yes Inputs data Data Output Crypto: Inputs protected keys from the key Control Input manager in SME mode Status Output Outputs data Power Outputs encrypted key components Inputs T10 SAS Standards commands Outputs T10 SAS Standards status Feature Switches Control Input None Inputs RS-422 interface control parameters Inputs read/write head cleaner brush control parameters Version 1 Revision 2 11 3.4 Roles and Services The LTO Gen5 drive supports both a Crypto Officer role and a User role, and uses basic cryptographic functions to provide higher level services. For example, the LTO Gen5 drive uses the cryptographic functions as part of its data reading and writing operations in order to perform the encryption/decryption of data stored on a tape. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed when an operator performs key zeroization. The User role is implicitly assumed for all other services. The two main services the LTO Gen5 drive provides are: • Encryption or decryption of tape data blocks using the Data Block Cipher Facility. • Establishment and use of a secure key channel for key material passing by the Secure Key Interface Facility. It is important to note that the Secure Key Interface Facility may be an automatically invoked service when a user issues Write or Read commands with encryption enabled that require key acquisition by the LTO Gen5 drive. Under these circumstances the LTO Gen5 drive automatically establishes a secure communication channel with a key manager and performs secure key transfer before the underlying write or read command may be processed. 3.4.1 User Guidance The services table describes what services are available to the User and Crypto Officer roles. There is no requirement for accessing the User Role There is no requirement for accessing the Crypto Officer Role Single Operator requirements: The LTO Gen5 drive enforces a requirement that only one host interface initiator may have access to cryptographic services at any given time. Version 1 Revision 2 12 3.4.2 Provided Services Available services are also documented in the specified references. They are summarized here: Table 5: Provided Services Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role General SCSI - Host As documented in the See See User commands LTO Ultrium Tape description description Drive SCSI Reference General Library - Library As documented in the See See User Interface commands Drive Library LDI and description description LMI Interface Specifications Unload tape - Host/Library Unload tape can be Button press Green LED User - Front Panel performed using unload flashes Unload button or via commands while Button over the host or library unload is in interrface progress. Enter manual - Front Panel Place in manual Button press SCD User diagnostic mode Unload diagnostic mode via the displays 0. Button unload button Amber LED becomes solid. Scrolls through - Front Panel Scroll through manual Button press SCD User manual diagnostic Unload diagnostic functions via changes to functions Button the unload button indicate scrolling. Exits manual - Front Panel Exit manual diagnostic Button press SCD User diagnostic mode Unload mode via the unload becomes Button button blank. Green LED becomes solid. Forces drive dump - Front Panel Force a drive dump via Button press SCD shows User Unload the unload button 0, then Button becomes blank. Resets the drive - Front Panel Power-cycle the device Button press Reboot User Unload via Unload Button occurs. Button Version 1 Revision 2 13 Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role Encrypting Write- - Host The Secure Key - Plaintext - Encrypted User type Command Interface Facility data data on tape automatically requests a - SEDK - DKx on key, provides - DKx tape authentication data, securely transfers and verifies the key material. The Data Block Cipher Facility encrypts the data block with the received Data Key using AES- GCM block cipher for recording to media. A received DKx is automatically written to media using the Cartridge memory and the RW Head Interface. The decryption-on-the- fly check performs AES- GCM decryption of the encrypted data block and verifies the correctness of the encryption process Decrypting Read- - Host The Secure Key SEDK - Plaintext User type Command Interface Facility data to host automatically requests a key, provides authentication data and DKx information if available, securely transfers and verifies the key material. The received Data Key is used by the Data Block Cipher Facility to decrypt the data block with using AES-GCM decryption and returning plaintext data blocks to the host; Optionally in Raw mode the encrypted data block may be returned to the host in encrypted form (not supported in approved configuration) Set Encryption - Host Performed via Mode Requested None User Control Parameters - Library Select to Mode Page Mode Page (including Bypass x’25’ and Encryption and Subpage Mode) Subpage X’C0’ Query Encryption - Host Performed via Mode Requested Mode Data User Control Parameters - Library Sense to Mode Page Mode Page (including Bypass x’25’ and Encryption and Subpage Mode) Subpage X’C0’ Version 1 Revision 2 14 Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role Show Status - Front Panel Visual indicators that an From LTO Visual User (Visual Indicators) LEDs and encryption operation is Gen5 drive indicators Single- currently in progress operating on front Character may be monitored on the system panel Display front panel Drive - Host Allows programming Requested Mode Data User Challenge/Response - Library challenge data and Mode Page reading an optionally) and Subpage encrypted, signed response; not used in default configuration. Performed via mode select and mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage x’D5’; not used in default configuration Query Drive - Host Allows reading of the Requested Mode Data User Certificate - Library Drive Certificate public Mode Page key. Performed via and Subpage mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage x’D6’; the provided certificate is signed by the IBM Tape Root CA. Query dSK - Host Allows reading of the Requested Mode Data User - Library Drive Session (Public) Mode Page Key Performed via and Subpage mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage X’DF’ . Setup SEDK - Host This is the means to Requested Mode Data User structure (a - Library import a protected Mode Page protected key private key to the LTO and Subpage structure) Gen5 drive for use in writing and encrypted tape or in order to read a previously encrypted tape. Performed via mode select to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage x’E0’. In this service, the module generates a drive session key pair. The module then sends the dSK to the key manager where it is used to create an SEDK. Then, the key manager sends the SEDK back to the module. Version 1 Revision 2 15 Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role Query DKx(s) – - Host Allows the reading from Requested Mode Data User active, needed, - Library the drive of DKx Mode Page pending , entire (all) structures in different and Subpage categories for the medium currently mounted. Performed by Mode Select commands to Mode Page x25’ and various subpages. Request DKx(s) - Host This status command is Requested Mode Data User Translate - Library used when the drive has Mode Page already notified the Key and Subpage Manager that is has read DKx structures from a mounted, encrypted tape and needs them translated to an SEDK and returned for the drive to read the tape. The key manager issues this command to read DKx structures which the drive requires to be translated by the Key Manager and subsequently returned to the drive as an SEDK structure to enable reading of the currently active encrypted area of tape. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage X’EE’. Request DKx(s) - Host This status command is Requested Mode Data User Generate - Library used when the drive has Mode Page already notified the Key and Subpage Manager that it requires new SEDK and DKx structures to process a request to write an encrypted tape. This page provides information about the type of key the drive is requesting. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage X’EF’. Version 1 Revision 2 16 Service Interface(s) Description Inputs Outputs Role Alter DKx(s) - Host This command is used to Requested Mode Data User - Library modify the DKx Mode Page structures stored to tape and Subpage and cartridge memory. The LTO Gen5 drive will write the modified structures out to the tape and cartridge memory as directed. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x’25’ and Encryption Subpage x’E1’. Drive Error Notify - Host These status responses Requested Mode Data User and Drive Error - Library are the means used by Mode Page Notify Query the drive to notify the and Subpage Key Manager that an action is required, such as a Key generation or Translate, to proceed with an encrypted write or read operation. These status responses are read via Mode Sense commands to Mode Page x’25’ subpage ‘EF” and ‘FF’. Power-Up Self-Tests - Power Performs integrity and None Failure User, - Host cryptographic algorithm required status, if Crypto - Library self-tests, firmware applicable Officer image signature verification Configure Drive - Host Allows controlling of From LTO Vital User Vital Product Data - Library default encryption mode Gen5 drive Product (VPD) settings and other operating operating Data (VPD) parameters system Key Path Check - Host As documented in the Send Send User diagnostic LTO Ultrium Tape Diagnostic Diagnositc Drive SCSI Reference command command specifying status the Key Path diagnostic Key Zeroization - Host Zeroes all private Send Send Crypto plaintext keys in the Diagnostic Diagnositc Officer LTO Gen5 drive via a command command Send Diagnostic specifying status command with the Key Diagnostic ID EFFFh, as Zeroization documented in the IBM TotalStorage LTO Ultrium Tape Drive SCSI Reference. Firmware Load - Host Load new firmware to New Load test Crypto the module firmware indicator Officer Version 1 Revision 2 17 3.5 Physical Security The LTO Gen5 drive cryptographic boundary is the drive “brick” unit. The drive brick unit has industrial grade covers, and all the drive’s components are production grade. The LTO Gen5 drive requires no preventative maintenance, and field repair is not performed for the unit. The drive brick covers are not removed in the field in the approved configuration. All failing units must be sent intact to the factory for repair. Figure 2 LTO Gen5 Drive Brick Version 1 Revision 2 18 3.6 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management 3.6.1 Cryptographic Algorithms The LTO Gen5 drive supports the following basic cryptographic functions. These functions are used by the Secure Key Interface Facility or the Data Block Cipher Facility to provide higher level user services. Table 6: Basic Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Type /Usage Specification Approved? Used by Algorithm Certificate AES-ECB mode Symmetric cipher AES: FIPS Yes Firmware #1530 encryption/decryption provides underlying 197 (256-bit keys) AES for the AES Key Wrapping mechanism AES-GCM mode Symmetric Cipher AES: FIPS- Yes ASIC #1531 and encryption / decryption Encrypts data blocks 197 #1532 (256-bit keys) while performing GCM: decrypt-on-the-fly SP800-38D verification Decrypts data blocks RNG IV generation for FIPS-186-2 Yes Firmware #825 AES-GCM, Drive using SHA-1 Session Key generation SHA-1 Hashing Algorithm FIPS-180-3 Yes Firmware #1361 Multiple uses SHA-256 Hashing Algorithm FIPS-180-3 Yes Firmware #1361 Digest checked on key manager messages, digest appended on messages to key manager PKCS #1 :RSA Digital signature FIPS 186-2 Yes Firmware #744 Sign/Verify generation and and PKCS#1 verification to sign the session key and to verify firmware image signature on firmware load PKCS #1 :RSA Key Key Generation Firmware N/A - No, but Generation Session key allowed in FIPS mode 1 (1024/2048-bit keys) generation PKCS #1 RSA Key Decryption of - No, but Firmware N/A Transport transported key allowed in (1024/2048-bit keys) material SEDK FIPS mode No 2 TRNG (Custom) Seeding RNG - ASIC N/A AES Key Wrapping Use served key to - No, but Firmware Relies upon encrypt drive- allowed in AES Cert. generated data FIPS mode #1530 encrypting key 1 Allowed for generation of keys used by the RSA Key Transport mechanism 2 Allowed in FIPS mode for seeding approved RNG Version 1 Revision 2 19 3.6.2 Security Parameters The following table provides a summary of both critical security parameters (CSPs) and non-critical security parameters used by the LTO Gen5 drive. Table 7: Security Parameters Security Input into Output Generation Storage Storage Zeroized CSP Key Type Parameter Module from Method Location Form Module Drive RSA Yes - Yes N/A Drive Vital Non-volatile N/A No Certificate 2048-bit at time of Product Plaintext Public Key PKCS#1 manufacture Data (VPD) (dCert) Drive Yes RSA Yes - No N/A Drive VPDNon-volatile Yes Certificate 2048-bit at time of X.509 Private Key PKCS#1 manufacture certificate (dCert’) signed with the IBM Tape root CA Drive No RSA No – Yes Non-approved, Drive RAM Ephemeral N/A Session 2048-bit Generated allowed in Plaintext Public Key PKCS#1 by module FIPS mode (dSK) Drive Yes RSA No – No Non-approved, Drive RAM Ephemeral Yes Session 2048-bit Generated allowed in Plaintext Private PKCS#1 by module FIPS mode Key (dSK’) Data Key Yes AES Yes – No N/A Before Use: Ephemeral Yes (DK) 256-bit (Received in Drive RAM Plaintext symmetric encrypted When in key form) use: Stored In ASIC; (unreadable register) Cryptograp Yes AES No – No PRNG Before Use: Ephemeral Yes hic Data 256-bit Generated Drive RAM plaintext Key (cDK) symmetric by module When in Ephemeral key use: encrypted Stored in form as wDK ASIC (unreadable register) 186-2 RNG Yes Seed No – No TRNG Drive RAM Ephemeral Yes Key Generated Plaintext by module 186-2 RNG Yes Seed No – No TRNG Drive RAM Ephemeral Yes Seed (20 bytes) Generated Plaintext by module Additional notes on key management: • Secret and private keys are never output from the LTO Gen5 drive in plaintext form. • Secret keys may only be imported to the LTO Gen5 drive in encrypted form. Version 1 Revision 2 20 3.6.3 Self-Test The LTO Gen5 drive performs both Power On Self Tests and Conditional Self tests as follows. The operator shall power cycle the device to invoke the Power On Self tests. Table 8: Self-Tests Function Self-Test Type Implementation Tested AES-ECB Power-up KAT performed for Encrypt and Decrypt AES-GCM Power-Up KAT performed for Encrypt and Decrypt (256- (256-bit keys) bit) RNG Power-Up KAT performed SHA-1 Power-Up KAT performed SHA-256 Power-Up KAT performed RSA PKCS#1 Power-Up KAT performed Sign/Verify Firmware Power-Up RSA PKCS #1 digital signature verification of Integrity application firmware; CRC check of SH vital Check product data (VPD); CRC check of FPGA image. RNG Conditional: Ensure the newly generated random number does When a random number is generated not match the previously generated random number. Also ensure the first number generated after start up is not used and is stored for the next comparison TRNG Conditional: Ensure the newly generated random number does (Custom) When a random number is generated not match the previously generated random number. Also ensure the first number generated after start up is not used and is stored for the next comparison Firmware Conditional: RSA PKCS #1 signature verification of new Load Check When new firmware is loaded or firmware image before new image may be loaded current firmware is re-booted Exclusive Conditional: Ensure the correct output of data after switching Crypto When switching between encryption modes Bypass Test and bypass modes Check to ensure the key is properly loaded Version 1 Revision 2 21 3.6.4 Bypass States The LTO Gen5 drive supports a single static bypass mode. Bypass entry, exit, and status features are provided to meet approved methods for use of bypass states. Two independent internal actions are required to activate bypass mode. First, the LTO Gen5 drive checks the host interface on which the bypass request was received for transmission errors. Then the LTO Gen5 drive checks the settings in the Encryption Control 1 field of Mode Page X’25’ to determine if the bypass capability is enabled. 3.7 Design Assurance LTO Gen5 drive release parts are maintained under the IBM Engineering Control (EC) system. All components are assigned a part number and EC level and may not be changed without re-release of a new part number or EC level. The following table shows the certified configuration for each host interfaces of the LTO Gen5 encrypting tape drive: Table 9: Certified Configurations IBM LTO Hardware Generation 5 Hardware Part Firmware Image Encrypting Tape EC Level Number Drive Fibre Channel 45E8192 M11221 pf100923e.A9Q5.FC.fips.ro Interface SAS Interface 45E8193 M11221 pf100923e.A9Q5.SAS.fips.ro 3.8 Mitigation of other attacks The LTO Gen5 drive does not claim to mitigate other attacks.