HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager (Hardware P/N AJ575A, Version 2.1; Firmware Version: 4.8.9) FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Level 2 Validation Document Version 0.4 March 3, 2011 © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 PURPOSE ......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................... 5 2 HP ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER ...................................................................................... 6 2.1 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 6 2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ......................................................................................... 6 2.3 MODULE INTERFACES........................................................................................................................ 8 2.4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ........................................................................................ 11 2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role ................................................................................................................ 11 2.4.2 User Role............................................................................................................................... 12 2.4.3 HP User Role......................................................................................................................... 13 2.4.4 Cluster Member Role ............................................................................................................ 14 2.4.5 Authentication ........................................................................................................................ 14 2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services ..................................................................................................... 15 2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................... 15 2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................................... 15 2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................... 16 2.7.1 Keys and CSPs ..................................................................................................................... 16 2.7.2 Key Generation...................................................................................................................... 19 2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization ............................................................................................................. 19 2.8 SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................................... 19 2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................... 20 3 SECURE OPERATION........................................................................................................................ 21 3.1 INITIAL SETUP ................................................................................................................................. 21 3.2 INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION ................................................................................................ 21 3.2.1 First-Time Initialization .......................................................................................................... 21 3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration ...................................................................................................... 21 3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSURANCE .................................................................................................... 22 3.4 KEY AND CSP ZEROIZATION ............................................................................................................ 23 3.5 ERROR STATE ................................................................................................................................ 23 ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................... 24 Page 2 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Table of Figures FIGURE 1 – DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE OF THE HP ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER .............................. 6 FIGURE 2 – BLOCK DIAGRAM OF ESKM............................................................................................................ 7 FIGURE 3 – FRONT PANEL LEDS...................................................................................................................... 9 FIGURE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS ........................................................................................................... 9 FIGURE 5 – REAR PANEL LEDS ..................................................................................................................... 10 FIGURE 6 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN CLI ............................................................................................................ 22 FIGURE 7 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE ............................................................... 22 FIGURE 8 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABEL ........................................................................................................... 23 Page 3 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Table of Tables TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION ..................................................................................... 6 TABLE 2 – LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL PORTS MAPPING ....................................................................... 8 TABLE 3 – FRONT PANEL LED DEFINITIONS...................................................................................................... 9 TABLE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS DESCRIPTIONS ...................................................................................... 9 TABLE 5 – REAR PANEL LED DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................... 10 TABLE 6 – CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES .......................................................................................................... 11 TABLE 7 – USER SERVICES ............................................................................................................................ 13 TABLE 8 – HP USER SERVICES ...................................................................................................................... 13 TABLE 9 – CLUSTER MEMBER SERVICES ........................................................................................................ 14 TABLE 10 – ROLES AND AUTHENTICATIONS .................................................................................................... 14 TABLE 11 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR SSH ......... 16 TABLE 12 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR TLS .......... 16 TABLE 13 – CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED BY THE MODULE’S TLS IMPLEMENTATION IN FIPS MODE ................... 17 TABLE 14 – OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ......................... 17 TABLE 15 – ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................. 24 Page 4 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager (ESKM) from Hewlett-Packard Company. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’ requirements for cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how HP’s ESKM meets these requirements and how to use the ESKM in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140-2. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager. More information about FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is available at the website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html. In this document, the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is referred to as the ESKM, the module, or the device. 1.2 References This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:  The HP website (http://www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP.  The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. Page 5 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 2 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager 2.1 Overview HP provides a range of security products for banking, the Internet, and enterprise security applications. These products use encryption technology—often embedded in hardware—to safeguard sensitive data, such as financial transactions over private and public networks and to offload security processing from the server. The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a hardened server that provides security policy and key management services to encrypting client devices and applications. After enrollment, clients, such as storage systems, application servers and databases, make requests to the ESKM for creation and management of cryptographic keys and related metadata. Client applications can access the ESKM via its Key Management Service (KMS) server. Configuration and management can be performed via web administration, Secure Shell (SSH), or serial console. Status-monitoring interfaces include a dedicated FIPS status interface, a health check interface, and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). The deployment architecture of the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is shown in Figure 1 below. Web Server Application Server Database Storage System HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager Figure 1 – Deployment Architecture of the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager 2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is validated at FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1. Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 2 8 EMI/EMC 2 Page 6 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Section Section Title Level 9 Self-Tests 2 10 Design Assurance 2 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A The block diagram of the module is given in Figure 2. The cryptographic boundary is clearly shown in the figure. Notice that the power supply is not included in the boundary. Figure 2 – Block Diagram of ESKM In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following Approved algorithms:  Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption: 128, 192, and 256 bits, in Electronic Codebook (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) modes (Certificate #1480)  Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES or TDES) encryption and decryption: 112 and 168 bits (2-key and 3-key), in ECB and CBC modes (Certificate #997)  Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Certificate #1338) Page 7 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011  Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256 (Certificate #871)  Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) American National Standard Institute (ANSI) X9.31 key generation, signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 and 2048 bits (Certificate #726)  Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) PQG generation, key generation, signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 bits (Certificate #467)  ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 with 2-key TDES Random Number Generator (RNG) (Certificate #807) In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following non-Approved algorithms:  A non-Approved Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) to seed the ANSI X9.31 RNG  The following commercially-available protocols for key establishment: o Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0/ Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.1 protocol using RSA 1024 and 2048 bits for key transport(key wrapping: key establishment methodology provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength) o SSHv2 protocol using Diffie-Hellman (key agreement: key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength) In the non-FIPS mode of operation, the module also implements the non-Approved algorithms DES, MD5, RC4, and RSA-512 and RSA-768 for signature generation and verification, and key establishment as well as the above listed protocols for key establishment. 2.3 Module Interfaces FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces:  Data Input  Data Output  Control Input  Status Output The module features the following physical ports and LEDs:  Serial port (RS232 DB9)  Ethernet 10/100/1000 RJ-45 ports (Network Interface Card [NIC], quantity: 4)  Monitor port (VGA DB15)  Power input (115VAC)  LEDs (three on the front panel and seven on the rear panel) The logical interfaces and their physical port mappings are described in Table 2. Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping Logical Interface Physical Ports Data Input Serial, Ethernet Data Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet Control Input Serial, Ethernet Status Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet, LEDs There are no ports on the front panel. There are three LEDs on the front panel. See Figure 3. Page 8 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs Descriptions of the LEDs are given in Table 3. Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions Item Description Status Blue = Identification is activated. Unit Identifier (UID) 1 Off = Identification is deactivated. LED/button Green = System health is normal. Amber = System health is degraded. To identify the component in a degraded state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display LEDs”. 2 Health LED Red = System health is critical. To identify the component in a critical state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display LEDs”. Off = System health is normal (when in standby mode). Green = System is on. Amber = System is in standby, but power is still applied. Power On/Standby button 3 Off = Power cord is not attached, power supply failure has and system power LED occurred, no power supplies are installed, facility power is not available, or the power button cable is disconnected. The components on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions of components on the rear panel are given in Table 4. Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions Item Definition Page 9 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Item Definition 1 Slot 1 PCIe2 (Blocked) 2 Slot 2 PCIe2 (Blocked) 3 Power supply bay 1 4 Power supply bay 2 5 iLO 3/NIC connector (Blocked) 6 Serial connector 7 Video connector 8 NIC 4 connector (Disabled) 9 NIC 3 connector (Disabled) 10 NIC 2 connector 11 NIC 1 connector 12 USB connectors (2) (Blocked) The seven LEDs on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 5. Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs Descriptions of LEDs on the rear panel are given in Table 5. Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions Item Description Status Green = Activity exists. 10/100/1000 NIC activity 1 Flashing green = Activity exists. LED Off = No activity exists. Green = Link exists. 2 10/100/1000 NIC link LED Off = No link exists. Page 10 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Item Description Status Blue = Identification is activated. 3 UID LED/button Off = Identification is deactivated. Green = Normal Off = One or more of the following conditions exists:  AC power unavailable 4 Power supply 2 LED  Power supply failed  Power supply in standby mode Power supply exceeded current limit Green = Normal Off = One or more of the following conditions exists:  AC power unavailable 5 Power supply 1 LED  Power supply failed  Power supply in standby mode  Power supply exceeded current limit 2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication The module supports four authorized roles:  Crypto-Officer  User  HP User  Cluster Member All roles require identity-based authentication. 2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role The Crypto-Officer accesses the module via the Web Management Console and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI). This role provides all services that are necessary for the secure management of the module. Table 6 shows the services for the Crypto-Officer role under the FIPS mode of operation. The purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column (“Description”). The keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 6 – Crypto-Officer Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with a username and Crypto-Officer passwords – read; the associated password TLS/SSH keys – read Page 11 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Service Description Keys/CSPs Perform first-time Configure the module when it is used for the Crypto-Officer (admin) password initialization first time – write; Kdsa public/private – write; Krsa private – write; Krsa private – write; Log signing RSA key – write; Log signature verification RSA key – write; KRsaPub – write; KRsaPriv – write. Upgrade firmware Upgrade firmware (firmware must be FIPS- Firmware upgrade key – read validated) Configure FIPS mode Enable/disable FIPS mode None Manage keys Manage all client keys that are stored within Client keys – write, read, delete; the module. This includes the generation, PKEK – write, read, delete. storage, export (only public keys), import, and zeroization of keys. Manage clusters Manage all clusters that are defined within Cluster Member passwords – the module. This includes the creation, write, delete joining, and removal of a cluster from the Cluster key –write, read, delete module. Manage services Manage all services supported by the None module. This includes the starting and stopping of all services. Manage operators Create, modify, or delete module operators Crypto-Officer passwords – (Crypto-Officers and Users). write, delete; User passwords – write, delete Manage certificates Create/import/revoke certificates KRsaPub – write, read, delete; KRsaPriv – write, read, delete; CARsaPub – write, read, delete; CARsaPriv – write, read, delete; Client RSA public keys – read. Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with All keys/CSPs – delete the module Restore default Delete the current configuration file and None configuration restores the default configuration settings Restore configuration Restore a previously backed up configuration None file file Backup configuration Back up a configuration file None file Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module All keys and CSPs – delete 2.4.2 User Role The User role is associated with external applications or clients that connect to the KMS via its XML interface. Users in this role may exercise services—such as key generation and management—based on configured or predefined permissions. See Table 7 for details. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Page 12 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Table 7 – User Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with a username and User passwords – read the associated password Generate key Generate a cryptographic key Client keys – write; PKEK – write. Modify key meta data Change the key owner or update/add/delete None the custom attributes Delete key Delete a cryptographic key Client keys – delete; PKEK – delete. Query key meta data Output key names and meta data that the Client keys – read; User is allowed to access PKEK – read. Import key Import key Client keys – write; PKEK – write. Export key Export a cryptographic key Client keys – read; PKEK – read. Export certificate Export a certificate Client certificate – read Get certificate info Return a list of local CAs including the None certificate status Clone key Clone an existing key under a different key Client keys – write, read; name PKEK – write, read. Generate random Generate a random number ANSI X9.31 RNG seed – write, number read, delete Manage operators Only users with administration permission can User passwords – write, delete create, modify, or delete module operators Sign certificate request Only users with administration permission can Client RSA public key; sign certificate requests CARsaPub – read; CARsaPriv – read. 2.4.3 HP User Role The HP User role can reset the module to an uninitialized state in the event that all Crypto-Officer passwords are lost, or when a self-test permanently fails. See Table 8. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 8 – HP User Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Page 13 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate to the Authenticate to ESKM with a signed token HP User RSA public key – read module Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with All keys/CSPs – delete the module Restore default Delete the current configuration file and None configuration restores the default configuration settings Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys/CSPs in the module All keys/CSPs – delete 2.4.4 Cluster Member Role The Cluster Member role is associated with other ESKMs that can connect to this ESKM and access cluster services. See Table 9. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1. Table 9 – Cluster Member Services Service Description Keys/CSPs Authenticate Cluster Authenticate to ESKM via TLS Cluster Member passwords – Member read; Cluster key – read; Cluster Member RsaPub – read Receive Configuration Update the module’s configuration settings None File Zeroize Key Delete a specific key Cluster key – delete Backup Configuration Back up a configuration file None File 2.4.5 Authentication The module performs identity-based authentication for the four roles. Two authentication schemes are used: authentication with certificate in TLS and authentication with password. See Table 10 for a detailed description. Table 10 – Roles and Authentications Role Authentication Crypto-Officer Username and password with optional digital certificate User Username and password and/or digital certificate HP User Digital certificate Cluster Member Digital certificate The 1024-bit RSA signature on a digital certificate provides 80-bits of security. There are 280 possibilities. The probability of a successful random guess is 2-80. Since 10-6 » 2-80, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. At least 80 bits of data must be transmitted for one attempt. (The actual number of bits that need to be transmitted for one attempt is much greater than 80. We are considering the worst case scenario.) The processor used by the module has a working frequency of 2.66 gigabytes, hence, at most 60×2.66×109 bits of data can be transmitted in 60 seconds. Since 80 bits are necessary for one attempt, at most (60×2.66×109)/80 = 2.00×109 attempts are possible in 60 seconds. However, there exist 280 Page 14 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 possibilities. (2.00×109)/280 = 1.65×10-15 « 10-5. The probability of a successful certificate attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5. Passwords in the module must consist of eight or more characters from the set of 90 human-readable numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower case), and special character symbols. Excluding those combinations that do not meet password constraints (see Section 2.7.1 – Keys and CSPs), the size of the password space is about 608. The probability of a successful random guess is 60-8. Since 10-6 » 60-8, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. After six unsuccessful attempts, the module will be locked down for 60 seconds; i.e., at most six trials are possible in 60 seconds. Since 10-5 » 6×60-8, the probability of a successful password attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5. 2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services The following services do not require authentication:  SNMP statistics  FIPS status services  Health check services  Network Time Protocol (NTP) services  Initiation of self-tests by rebooting the ESKM  Negotiation of the XML protocol version for communications with the KMS SNMP is used only for sending statistical information (SNMP traps). FIPS status and health check are status-report services, unrelated to security or cryptography. NTP is a date/time synchronization service that does not involve keys or CSPs. Initiation of self-tests and negotiation of the XML protocol version do not involve keys or CSPs. The services listed above for each role comprise the entire set of services available in non-FIPS mode. 2.5 Physical Security The module was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (that is, for business use). The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire contents of the module, including all hardware, software, firmware, and data, are enclosed in a metal case. The case is opaque and must be sealed using a tamper-evident label in order to prevent the case cover from being removed without signs of tampering. Two pick-resistant locks are installed on the module’s front bezel to protect the front interfaces, including the power switch, from unauthorized access. All circuits in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. Once the bezel is locked and the module has been configured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be accessed without signs of tampering. See Section 3.3 – Physical Security Assurance of this document for more information. 2.6 Operational Environment The operational environment requirements do not apply to the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager—the module does not provide a general purpose operating system and only allows the updating of image components after checking an RSA signature on the new firmware image. Crypto-Officers can install a new firmware image on the ESKM by downloading the image to the ESKM. This image is signed by an RSA private key (which never enters the module). The ESKM verifies the signature on the new firmware image using the public key stored in the module. If the verification passes, the upgrade is allowed. Otherwise the upgrade process fails and the old image is reused. Page 15 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 2.7 Cryptographic Key Management 2.7.1 Keys and CSPs The SSH and TLS protocols employed by the FIPS mode of the module are security-related. Table 11 and Table 12 introduce cryptographic keys, key components, and CSPs involved in the two protocols, respectively. Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use DH 1024-bit Diffie- Generated by ANSI In In volatile Upon session Negotiate SSH public Hellman public X9.31 RNG during plaintext memory termination Ks and SSH param parameters session initialization Khmac DH 1024-bit Diffie- Generated by ANSI Never In volatile Upon session Negotiate SSH private Hellman private X9.31 RNG during memory termination Ks and SSH param parameters session initialization Khmac Kdsa 1024-bit DSA Generated by ANSI In In non-volatile At operator delete Verify the public public keys X9.31 RNG during plaintext memory or zeroize request signature of the first-time initialization server’s message. Kdsa 1024-bit DSA Generated by ANSI Never In non-volatile At operator delete Sign the private private keys X9.31 RNG during memory or zeroize request server’s first-time initialization message. Krsa 1024-bit RSA Generated by ANSI In In non-volatile At operator delete Verify the public public keys X9.31 RNG during plaintext memory or zeroize request signature of the first-time initialization server’s message. Krsa 1024-bit RSA Generated by ANSI Never In non-volatile At operator delete Sign the private private keys X9.31 RNG during memory or zeroize request server’s first-time initialization message. SSH Ks SSH session Diffie-Hellman key Never In volatile Upon session Encrypt and 168-bit TDES key, agreement memory termination or decrypt data 128-, 192-, 256-bit when a new Ks is AES key generated (after a certain timeout) SSH SSH session 512- Diffie-Hellman key Never In volatile Upon session Authenticate Khmac bit HMAC key agreement memory termination or data when a new Khmac is generated (after a certain timeout) Notice that SSH version 2 is explicitly accepted for use in FIPS mode, according to section 7.1 of the NIST FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance. Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS Generation / Key Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Pre-MS TLS pre-master Input in Never In volatile Upon session Derive MS secret encrypted form memory termination from client Page 16 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Generation / Key Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Input MS TLS master secret Derived from Pre- Never In volatile Upon session Derive TLS Ks MS using FIPS memory termination and TLS Approved key Khmac derivation function KRsaPub Server RSA public Generated by In plaintext In non- At operator Client encrypts key (1024- or 2048- ANSI X9.31 RNG a X509 volatile delete request Pre-MS. Client bit) during first-time certificate. memory verifies server initialization signatures KRsaPriv Server RSA private Generated by Never In non- At operator Server key (1024- or 2048- ANSI X9.31 RNG volatile delete or decrypts Pre- bit) during first-time memory zeroize request MS. Server initialization generates signatures CARsaPub Certificate Authority Generated by In plaintext In non- At operator Verify CA (CA) RSA public key ANSI X9.31 RNG volatile delete request signatures (1024- or 2048-bit) during first-time memory initialization CARsaPriv CA RSA private key Generated by never In non- At operator Sign server (1024- or 2048-bit) ANSI X9.31 RNG volatile delete or certificates during first-time memory zeroize request initialization Cluster Cluster Member Input in plaintext Never In volatile Upon session Verify Cluster Member RSA public key memory termination Member RsaPub (1024- or 2048-bit) signatures TLS Ks TLS session AES or Derived from MS Never In volatile Upon session Encrypt and TDES symmetric memory termination decrypt data key(s) TLS Khmac TLS session HMAC Derived from MS Never In volatile Upon session Authenticate key memory termination data Table 13 details all cipher suites supported by the TLS protocol implemented by the module. The suite names in the first column match the definitions in RFC 2246 and RFC 4346. Table 13 – Cipher Suites Supported by the Module’s TLS Implementation in FIPS Mode Key Symmetric Suite Name Authentication Hash Transport Cryptography TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-1 TLS_RSA_WITH_TDES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA RSA TDES (168-bit) SHA-1 Other CSPs are tabulated in Table 14. Table 14 – Other Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs Generation / Key Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Page 17 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Generation / Key Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Client AES 128, 192 or Generated by Via TLS in Encrypted in Per client’s Encrypt key 256-bit AES ANSI X9.31 encrypted form non-volatile request or zeroize plaintexts/decrypt key RNG (encrypted with memory request ciphertexts TLS Ks) per client’s request Client TDES key Generated by Via TLS in Encrypted in Per client’s Encrypt TDES key ANSI X9.31 encrypted form non-volatile request or zeroize plaintexts/decrypt RNG (encrypted with memory request ciphertexts TLS Ks) per client’s request Client RSA RSA public Generated by Via TLS in Encrypted in At operator delete Sign public keys key ANSI X9.31 encrypted form non-volatile messages/verify RNG (encrypted with memory signatures TLS Ks) per client’s request Client RSA RSA private Generated by Via TLS in Encrypted in Per client’s Sign keys keys ANSI X9.31 encrypted form non-volatile request or zeroize messages/verify RNG (encrypted with memory request signatures TLS Ks) per client’s request Client HMAC keys Generated by Via TLS in Encrypted in Per client’s Compute keyed- HMAC keys ANSI X9.31 encrypted form non-volatile request or zeroize MACs RNG (encrypted with memory request TLS Ks) per client’s request Client X.509 Input in Via TLS in In non-volatile Per client’s Encrypt certificate certificate ciphertext encrypted form memory request or by data/verify over TLS (encrypted with zeroize request signatures TLS Ks) per client’s request Crypto- Character Input in Never In non-volatile At operator delete Authenticate Officer string ciphertext memory or by zeroize Crypto-Officer passwords over TLS request User Character Input in Never In non-volatile At operator delete Authenticate passwords string ciphertext memory or by zeroize User over TLS request Cluster Character Input in Never In non-volatile At operator delete When a device Member string ciphertext memory or zeroize request attempts to password over TLS become a Cluster Member HP User 2048-bit RSA Input in Never In non-volatile At installation of a Authenticate HP RSA public public key plaintext at memory patch or new User key factory firmware Cluster key Character Input in Via TLS in In non-volatile At operator delete Authenticate string ciphertext encrypted form memory or by zeroize Cluster Member over TLS request Firmware 2048-bit RSA Input in Never In non-volatile When new Used in firmware upgrade public key plaintext at memory firmware upgrade upgrade integrity key factory key is input test Page 18 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Generation / Key Key Type Output Storage Zeroization Use Input Log signing 1024-bit RSA Generated by Never In non-volatile When new log Sign logs and keys public and ANSI X9.31 memory signing keys are verify signature private keys RNG at first- generated on on logs time demand by initialization Crypto-Officer ANSI X9.31 RNG seed Generated by Never In non-volatile When module is Initialize ANSI RNG seed non-Approved memory powered off X9.31 RNG RNG PKEK 256-bit AES Generated by In encrypted In non-volatile At operator delete Encrypt client key ANSI X9.31 form for backup memory or by zeroize keys RNG purposes only request 2.7.2 Key Generation The module uses an ANSI X9.31 RNG with 2-key TDES to generate cryptographic keys. This RNG is a FIPS 140-2 Approved RNG as specified in Annex C to FIPS 140-2. 2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization All ephemeral keys are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Ephemeral keys are zeroized when they are no longer used. Other keys and CSPs are stored in non-volatile memory with client keys being stored in encrypted form. To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute the reset factory settings zeroize command at the serial console interface. For security reasons, this command is available only through the serial console. 2.8 Self-Tests The device implements two types of self-tests: power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests. Power-up self-tests include the following tests:  Firmware integrity tests  Known Answer Test (KAT) on TDES  KAT on AES  KAT on SHA-1  KAT on SHA-256  KAT on SHA-384  KAT on SHA-512  KAT on HMAC SHA-1  KAT on HMAC SHA-256  KAT on ANSI X9.31 RNG  KAT on Diffie-Hellman  KAT on SSH Key Derivation Function  KAT on RSA signature generation and verification  Pairwise consistency test on DSA signature generation and verification Conditional self-tests include the following tests: Page 19 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011  Pairwise consistency test for new DSA keys  Pairwise consistency test for new RSA keys  Continuous random number generator test on ANSI X9.31 RNG  Continuous random number generator test on non-Approved RNG  Firmware upgrade integrity test  Diffie-Hellman primitive test The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When one or more power-up self-tests fail, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional self-test fails, the module enters the Soft Error state. See Section 3 of this document for more information. 2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. No claim is made that the module mitigates against any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation. Page 20 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 3 Secure Operation The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS mode of operation. 3.1 Initial Setup The device should be unpacked and inspected according to the Installation Guide. The Installation Guide also contains installation and configuration instructions, maintenance information, safety tips, and other information. The device itself must be affixed with a tamper-evident label that is included in the packaging. See Figure 8 for the location of the tamper-evidence label. 3.2 Initialization and Configuration 3.2.1 First-Time Initialization When the module is turned on for the first time, it will prompt the operator for a password for a default Crypto-Officer. The module cannot proceed to the next state until the operator provides a password that conforms to the password policy described in Section 2.7.1. The default username associated with the entered password is “admin”. During the first-time initialization, the operator must configure minimum settings for the module to operate correctly. The operator will be prompted to configure the following settings via the serial interface:  Date, Time, Time zone  IP Address/Netmask  Hostname  Gateway  Management Port 3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration In order to comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the following functionality must be disabled on the ESKM:  Global keys  File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for importing certificates and downloading and restoring backup files  Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication  Use of the following algorithms: RC4, MD5, DES, RSA-512, RSA-768  SSL 3.0  RSA encryption and decryption operations (note, however, that RSA encryption and decryption associated with TLS handshakes and Sign and Sign Verify are permitted) These functions need not be disabled individually. There are two approaches to configuring the module such that it works in the Approved FIPS mode of operation: Through a command line interface, such as SSH or serial console, the Crypto-Officer should use the fips compliant command to enable the FIPS mode of operation. This will alter various server settings as described above. See Figure 6. The fips server command is used for the FIPS status server configuration. The show fips status command returns the current FIPS mode configuration. Page 21 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Figure 6 – FIPS Compliance in CLI In the web administration interface, the Crypto-Officer should use the “High Security Configuration” page to enable and disable FIPS compliance. To enable the Approved FIPS mode of operation, click on the “Set FIPS Compliant” button. See Figure 7. This will alter various server settings as described above. Figure 7 – FIPS Compliance in Web Administration Interface In the web administration interface, the User can review the FIPS mode configuration by reading the “High Security Configuration” page. The Crypto-Officer must zeroize all keys when switching from the Approved FIPS mode of operation to the non-FIPS mode and vice versa. 3.3 Physical Security Assurance A serialized tamper-evidence label has been applied during manufacturing at one location on the metal casing. See Figure 8. The tamper-evidence label has a special adhesive backing to adhere to the module’s surface. The tamper-evidence label has an individual, unique serial number. It should be inspected periodically and compared to the previously-recorded serial number to verify that a fresh label has not been applied to a tampered module. If the label shows evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the module has been compromised and contact HP Customer Support. Page 22 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Figure 8 – Tamper-Evidence Label 3.4 Key and CSP Zeroization To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute reset factory settings zeroize command in the serial console interface. Notice that, for security reasons, the command cannot be initiated from the SSH interface. When switching between different modes of operations (FIPS and non-FIPS), the Crypto-Officer must zeroize all CSPs. 3.5 Error State The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When a power-up self-test fails, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional self-test fails, the module will enter the Soft Error state. The module can recover from the Fatal Error state if power is cycled or if the ESKM is rebooted. An HP User can reset the module when it is in the Fatal Error State. No other services are available in the Fatal Error state. The module can recover from the Soft Error state if power is cycled. With the exception of the firmware upgrade integrity test and Diffie-Hellman primitive test, the only service that is available in the Soft Error state is the FIPS status output via port 9081 (default). A User can connect to port 9081 and find the error message indicating the failure of FIPS self-tests. Access to port 9081 does not require authentication. Page 23 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Acronyms Table 15 – Acronyms Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standard Institute BIOS Basic Input/Output System CA Certificate Authority CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line Interface CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPU Central Processing Unit CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check CSP Critical Security Parameter DES Data Encryption Standard DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECB Electronic Codebook EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference ESKM Enterprise Secure Key Manager FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FTP File Transfer Protocol HDD Hard Drive HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code HP Hewlett-Packard IDE Integrated Drive Electronics iLO Integrated Lights-Out I/O Input/Output IP Internet Protocol ISA Instruction Set Architecture KAT Known Answer Test KMS Key Management Service LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LED Light Emitting Diode MAC Message Authentication Code N/A Not Applicable NIC Network Interface Card NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology Page 24 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety. Security Policy, version 0.3 January 28, 2011 Acronym Definition NTP Network Time Protocol PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect RFC Request for Comments RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SSH Secure Shell SSL Secure Socket Layer TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TLS Transport Layer Security UID Unit Identifier USB Universal Serial Bus VGA Video Graphics Array XML Extensible Markup Language Page 25 of 25 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager © 2011 Hewlett-Packard Company This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety.