Sun StorageTekTM T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Part Number 316055101 Revision: AB Sun Microsystems, Inc. June 24, 2009 Copyright Sun Microsystems 2009. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. Sun Microsystems T10000B Encrypting Tape Drive Security Policy June 24, 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 MODULE OVERVIEW..............................................................................................................................4 2 SECURITY LEVEL...................................................................................................................................6 3 MODES OF OPERATION (AREA 1)........................................................................................................7 3.1 APPROVED ALGORITHMS ............................................................................................................................7 3.2 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS......................................................................................................................8 3.3 DETERMINING FIPS MODE.........................................................................................................................8 3.4 CONFIGURING THE DRIVE IN FIPS MODE........................................................................................................9 3.4.1 Using an EKT to enable FIPS mode for KMS 1.x.....................................................................10 3.4.2 Using VOP to enable FIPS mode for KMS 2.x..........................................................................10 4 PORTS AND INTERFACES...................................................................................................................11 5 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY............................................................................13 5.1 ASSUMPTION OF ROLES.............................................................................................................................13 6 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)..........................................................16 6.1 DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS......................................................................................................................17 7 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................................17 7.1 ROLES AND SERVICES..............................................................................................................................17 8 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (AREA 6)..........................................................................................20 9 SECURITY RULES.................................................................................................................................21 9.1 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................21 10 PHYSICAL SECURITY.........................................................................................................................21 10.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS............................................................................................................21 10.2 REQUIRED OPERATOR ACTIONS................................................................................................................23 11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY.....................................................................................23 12 REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................23 13 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................................................................................25 Page 2 Sun Microsystems T10000B Encrypting Tape Drive Security Policy June 24, 2009 TABLE OF TABLES TABLE 1: MODULE SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION........................................................................6 TABLE 2: PORTS AND INTERFACES DESCRIPTION............................................................................11 TABLE 3: ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION...................................13 TABLE 4: STRENGTHS OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS............................................................14 TABLE 5: DESCRIPTION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)........................................16 TABLE 6: DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC KEYS WITHIN THE ETD.............................................................17 TABLE 7: SERVICES AUTHORIZED FOR ROLES..................................................................................18 TABLE 8: UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES............................................................................................20 TABLE 9: INSPECTION/TESTING OF PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS......................................23 Release History Date Rev Description Name 02/23/09 AA Initial version of Security Policy as submitted to NIST CMVP, with Matt Ball minor formatting changes. Engineering Change: EC000860 06/24/09 AB Updated allowed firmware revisions to include 1.41.210 and Matt Ball 1.41.211, based on change letter to NIST. Included changes based on NIST comments. Engineering Change: EC001172 Page 3 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy 1 Module Overview The Sun StorageTek T10000B Encrypting Tape Drive (ETD) (HW P/N:315488302; Firmware Versions: 1.40.208, 1.41.210, or 1.41.211) is a hardware cryptographic module with a multi-chip standalone physical embodiment as defined by FIPS 140-2. The primary purpose of this device is to provide FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security to data on magnetic tape, when operated in FIPS mode. The ETD can be used in one of two system configurations: Key Management System (KMS) 1.x or KMS 2.x. In the KMS 1.x configuration, the Sun StorageTek Crypto Key Management Station and the Sun StorageTek Key Token (FIPS 140-2 Certificate #993) manage the encryption keys used by the ETD. A Sun StorageTek Key Token acts as a key loader in the context of FIPS 140-2, and can be configured as either an "enabling key token" (EKT) or an "operational key token" (OKT) (see [KMS1UG]). Figure 1 shows the KMS 1.x configuration. KMS 1.x ETD Ethernet Ethernet Token Bay Token Bay Insert/Remove Insert/Remove Key Token Key Token Air Gap (EKT or OKT) (EKT or OKT) Figure 1: KMS 1.x Component Diagram In the KMS 2.x configuration, the ETD requests keys from the Sun StorageTek Crypto Key Management System (version 2.1 and higher), which is a cluster of two or more key management appliances. Figure 2 shows the KMS 2.x configuration. Ethernet KMS 2.x ETD Cluster Figure 2: KMS 2.x Component Diagram For more information on these system components please see the website http://docs.sun.com and browse under Hardware->Tape Storage->Tape Drives. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 4 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy The cryptographic boundary of the ETD is the external surface of the tape drive's commercial grade metallic enclosure. Excluded from the boundary are the components visible through the tape cartridge slot and the components visible from the ventilation holes. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the cryptographic boundary as defined: Figure 3: Front Image of the ETD Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 5 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Figure 4: Rear Image of the ETD Note: The picture in Figure 4 is upside-down to show the bottom cover of the ETD. 2 Security Level The ETD meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2, as is detailed in Table 1. Table 1: Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 6 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Security Requirements Section Level Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 3 Modes of Operation (Area 1) 3.1 Approved Algorithms Once configured per the procedures as defined in Section 3.4 the module is only able to operate in a FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of operation. Within the FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of operation the following Approved algorithms are available: : · AES CCM supporting 256 bit keys, which provide for the following operations in both hardware (AES Certificate # 495) and firmware (AES Certificate # 647): o Encryption o Decryption o Authentication · RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 supporting 2048 bit keys (RSA Certificate # 334) for digital signature verification (firmware load test) · HMAC SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 398) to create the challenge response as part of the certificate service of the KMS 2.x Agent Toolkit. · SHA-1 (SHS Certificate # 736) for the following: o as part of digital signature verification for the firmware o as part of HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC certificate # 398) o for hashing passwords used for authentication · AES ECB (AES Certificate # 941) supporting 256-bit keys. Used as part of the AES Key Wrap algorithm to securely establish keying material. · SP 800-90 CTR DRBG (DRBG Certificate # 6) for generating random numbers used for nonce values and cryptographic keys · AES CTR (AES Certificate # 942) as part of the SP 800-90 CTR DRBG. · AES CBC mode with 256-bit key (AES Certificate # 967), used within TLS session between ETD and KMS 2.x. · HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 540)with 160-bit key used to protect the integrity of TLS communications between the ETD and KMS 2.x. · SHA-1 (SHS Certificate #937) Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 7 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy o as part of the TLS Key Derivation Functionality o as part of HMAC SHA-1 (HMAC Certificate # 540) 3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms The cryptographic module supports the following Non-Approved algorithms that are allowed for use within FIPS Approved mode: MD5 as used within the TLS1.0 Key Derivation Function. (see [TLS1.0]) · AES Key Wrap (AES Certificate #941) used to securely establish media keys (Vendor Affirmed, key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of strength) · RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 supporting 2048-bit keys, for RSA public key encryption used to provide FIPS 140-2 allowed key transport within the TLS protocol. Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of security. · Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) (provides entropy input to the SP800-90 DRBG, and random values for use within the TLS protocol) · MD5 is used within the TLS protocol as part of key derivation 3.3 Determining FIPS Mode The user can determine whether the ETD is operating in FIPS mode by examining the VOP (Virtual Operator Panel). VOP is an external software application and the primary ETD remote management tool. VOP utilizes ETD services remotely. VOP is described in more detail in the document "Virtual Operator Panel User's Guide" (see [VOPUG]). Figure 5 shows the "View Current Drive Settings" of the VOP application (Drive Operations View Drive Data). The user can tell if the ETD has selected an Approved mode of operation by verifying that the labels "Encryption active" and "Running in FIPS mode" are both set to "Yes". If either of these labels is set to "No" then the ETD is not in a FIPS Approved mode. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 8 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Figure 5: VOP: View Current Drive Settings 3.4 Configuring the Drive in FIPS mode An ETD can only be configured for FIPS mode as a one-time decision taken during the encryption enrollment process. Once an ETD is licensed for encryption, it will remain in either FIPS mode or non FIPS compliant mode, depending on the configuration. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 9 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy There are two ways to configure the ETD to be in permanent FIPS 140-2 mode: 1. Insert a valid EKT (Enabling Key Token) into a token bay that is connected to an unlicensed ETD. (see 3.4.1 ). This is for KMS 1.x only. 2. Use the Virtual Operator Panel (VOP) to license the ETD for encryption and set permanent FIPS mode (see 3.4.2 ). This is valid for KMS 2.x. 3.4.1 Using an EKT to enable FIPS mode for KMS 1.x The process of inserting an EKT into an ETD that is not licensed for encryption will, by default, configure the ETD to always encrypt and to enter permanent FIPS mode. For process details on creating an EKT and using it to configure the ETD, see [KMS1UG] ("Enable Encryption in a Drive", Chapter 2). KMS 1.x FIPS Enable and License Procedure: 1. Create EKT and insert into the Token Bay connected to an unlicensed ETD and wait for the LED to indicate that the ETD has device keys. 2. Issue an IPL and then verify the FIPS status through VOP when the ETD completes a reboot. 3.4.2 Using VOP to enable FIPS mode for KMS 2.x VOP FIPS 140-2 configuration of ETD requires the presence of both a Sun service representative and the customer. In addition they will need to follow the licensing process as outlined in [KMS2IM] (KMS 2.x Installation and Service Manual), under "License and Enroll the Tape Drives" in Chapter 3 "T-Series Tape Drives". Both the Sun service representative and the customer (in the role of the Crypto-Officer) shall perform the following actions to enable FIPS mode through VOP: 1. The service representative shall examine the hardware part number on the rear label of the Tape Drive to ensure that it matches the part number as listed in Section 1 of this document. The service representative shall examine each of the seven tamper evident labels applied to the exterior chassis of the drive to ensure they have not been removed or altered (See section 7 of this document for examination details). 2. The service representative shall, using VOP, click on the menu item Drive Operations View Drive Data. 3. The service representative shall select the Version Tab and verify that the firmware version listed is that listed in Section 1 of this document. 4. The service representative shall license the tape drive for encryption using the process from [KMS2IM]. 5. The service representative shall set the drive offline by selecting Drive Operations Set Offline. 6. The service representative shall bring up the "Configure Drive Parameters" Window (see Figure 7) by selecting "Drive Data" from the Configure menu of the main VOP window, and in this window the customer (in the role of the Crypto-Officer) shall perform the following: a) Set the "Use tokens" field to "No". b) Set the "Permanently encrypting" field to "Yes". c) Set the "Set FIPS mode(permanent)" field to "On". d) Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and KMS 2.x IP address (see [KMS2IM]). 7. Click on the "Commit" button. The ETD will then reboot and come up in permanent FIPS mode. 8. Verify that FIPS mode was correctly set by examining the FIPS status (see 3.3 ). Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 10 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Figure 7: VOP: "Configure Drive Parameters" Window 4 Ports and Interfaces This section describes all ports and interfaces supported by the Encrypting Tape Drive. Table 2 below provides a listing of the following physical ports and logical interfaces(see [ETDOG] for details). Table 2: Ports and Interfaces Description Physical Port Qty Logical interface Technical Specification definition DB15(RS232) 1 data output, Primarily used for tape library communications. status output, control input Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 11 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Physical Port Qty Logical interface Technical Specification definition Host Interface 2 data input, This interface is used to transfer user data between the data output, ETD and the host. When the host transfers user data to status output, the ETD through this interface, the ETD encrypts and control input writes the data to the magnetic media. When the host receives user data from the ETD through this interface, the ETD delivers data read from the magnetic media that has been decrypted by the ETD. The interface can be configured to support one of two protocols: 1) Fibre Channel, in accordance with the Fibre Channel Protocol-3 (FCP-3)[1], SCSI Primary Commands-3 (SPC-3), and SCSI Stream Commands (SSC-3) specifications [8] 2) FICON, in accordance with the Fibre Channel Single-Byte Command Code Sets-3 Mapping Protocol (FC-SB-3), Revision 1.6 specification [9] Tape head 1 data input, Provides the interface to the magnetic tape media, data output where the user data to be encrypted is written to, and where the data to be decrypted is read from. Tape media resides in six possible cartridge types: 1) Standard Data 2) SPORT (reduced length) Data 3) VolSafe (write-once) Data 4) Sport VolSafe Data (reduced length, write-once) 5) Cleaning 6) Diagnostic (used by a service representative). Operator Panel 1 status output, A 20-pin connector (located on the bottom of the ETD) Connector control input that is designed to connect to a Rack Mount Operator Panel. This connector includes wires that are designed to hook to the following external components: 1) Four LED's to provide status output. 2) An LCD display is used to display ETD status and configuration menu text. 3) Four push button micro-switches. Two of the four switches are used to navigate through the ETD configuration menus. The other two switches are used to rewind/unload a cartridge, reboot the ETD, and to enter Boot Monitor mode at power-up. NOTE: The three interfaces listed directly above are not part of the Encrypting Tape Drive. They reside on an optional Sun Microsystems External Rack Mount Chassis into which two Encrypting Tape Drives may be inserted. Power Interface 1 power input 88-264 VAC @ 48-63 Hz Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 12 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Physical Port Qty Logical interface Technical Specification definition Drive Status LED 1 status output Provides status on the overall state of the ETD Encryption Status 1 status output Provides status on the encryption configuration of the LED ETD. Rear Panel Switch 1 control input Used by the service representative to temporarily set the ETD's IP settings to factory default values. RFID Reader 1 data input, Allows the tape drive to obtain control input from the data output RFID chip inside the magnetic tape cartridge. The RFID chip contains information that includes: 1) The state of the Media Information Record(MIR) 2) Location of the MIR and End-Of-Data (EOD) on tape 3) Cartridge type 4) The write operations count 5) Manufacturing information (e.g. serial number) 6) Certain performance/usage statistics RJ45(Ethernet) 1 data input, This primary uses of this interface are to: data output, 1) Configure the ETD status output, 2) Deliver encryption keys to the ETD control input 3) Obtain ETD status and diagnostic data 4) Download firmware to the ETD 5) Deliver status information to an SNMP server. 5 Identification and Authentication Policy 5.1 Assumption of roles The ETD cryptographic module shall support two distinct authenticated operator roles, User and Crypto- Officer (C.O.). Table 3 shows the roles and authentication methods. Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data User Role-based operator Any of the following Authentication Mechanisms (see Table 4) authentication. are allowed for authenticating the User Role: 1. OC_Key:256-bit AES key 2. CA_Cert Private Key: 2048-bit RSA Private key Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 13 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data Crypto-Officer Role-based operator Any of the following Authentication Mechanisms (see Table 4) authentication. are allowed for authenticating the Crypto-Officer Role: 1. VOP Password: 7 byte shared secret. 2. Passphrase: 8 byte shared secret. 3. PC_Key: 256-bit AES key 4. DS_Key: 256-bit AES key 5. FSRootCert: 2048-bit private RSA key Table 4 shows the strengths of authentication mechanisms for assuming each supported role based on the following descriptions of table headings: · Authentication Mechanism: This is the CSP (critical security parameter) or public key used to authenticate an operator. · Strength of Mechanism Per Guess: This is the probability that a single random authentication attempt succeeds. To meet FIPS 140-2 requirements, this probability needs to be less than 1 in 1,000,000. · Strength of Mechanism Per Minute: This is the probability that a series of random authentications succeeds over a one minute period. To meet FIPS 140-2 requirements, this probability needs to be less than 1 in 100,000. Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Description Strength of Mechanism Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Per Guess Per Minute VOP Password A 7 character password The probability that a The ETD allows fewer than chosen from the set of 96 random attempt 4,687,500 (at 100 MBits/s, printable ASCII characters succeeds or a false assuming a send and used to authenticate a Crypto- acceptance occurs is no receive packet of 64 bytes Officer. Each guess is throttled greater than 1 in each for each attempt, and by the data rate of the Ethernet 75,144,747,810,816 10 bits per byte encoding) port, at 100 MBits/s. (96^-7), which is less authentication attempts in a than 1 in 1,000,000. one minute period; therefore the random success rate for multiple retries is 1 in 16030879 (=4,687,500 /96^7). Passphrase A minimum 8 character 1 in 7.2 x 1015 (=1 in 968). 1 in 1.2 x 1013 (based on password, selected from the 600 attempts per minute). set of 96 printable ASCII characters used to authenticate a Crypto-Officer. The Passphrase is stretched using SHA-1 such that it takes 1/10 of a second to compute the Authentication Secret. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 14 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Authentication Description Strength of Mechanism Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Per Guess Per Minute FSRootCert A 2048-bit RSA signing key Chance of guessing No more than one attempt (with 112 bits of strength) used private key is 1 in 2112 per is allowed each millisecond, for signing firmware image. attempt. which means that no more Verified using FSRootCert. than 60,000 attempts are allowed in a one minute period, putting the chance of guessing the RSA private key to 1 in (2112)/60,000. PCKey (Via A 256-bit AES CCM key used Chance of guessing In a one minute period, the Token) to authenticate a Crypto-Officer PCKey and chance of a successful during the licensing phase and authenticating is 1 in 1077 authentication is less than 1 enrollment phase (2256). in 10^71. (This is limited by traffic over a 100Mbps Ethernet link, with minimum packet size of 70 bytes and an assumed 10 bits per byte encoding) DSKey (Via A 256-bit AES CCM key used Chance of guessing In a one minute period, the Token) to authenticate a Crypto- DSKey and chance of a successful Officer. authenticating is 1 in 1077 authentication is less than 1 (2256). in 10^71. (See rationale for NOTE: This key is only a CSP PCKey) in the 1.x configuration. In the 2.x configuration this key. In a 2.x configuration this key will not exist. OCKey (Via A 256-bit AES CCM key used Chance of guessing In a one minute period, the Token) to authenticate a User OCKey and chance of a successful authenticating is 1 in 1077 authentication is less than 1 NOTE: This key is only (2256), in 10^71. (See rationale for categorized as a CSP in the PCKey) 1.x configuration. In the 2.x configuration this key will not exist. CA_Cert Private A 2048-bit RSA private key Chance of guessing No more than one attempt Key (with 112-bits of strength) that private key is 1 in 5.2 x is allowed each millisecond, corresponds to the public key 1033 (2112) per attempt. which means that no more within the CA_Cert Used to than 60,000 attempts are authenticate the server during allowed in a one minute the TLS handshake. period, putting the chance of guessing the RSA private key to 1 in (2^112)/60,000. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 15 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy 6 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) Table 5 describes the CSPs that are contained within the ETD. Table 5: Description of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) CSP Description/Usage Preset The Preset Communication Key is a 256-bit AES key loaded into the ETD during Communication Key manufacturing. In the KMS 2.x configuration, the PCKey is used for encryption (PCKey) licensing. In the KMS 1.x configuration, the PCKey is used to enable encryption within a new ETD, and to reinitialize an ETD after the Reset service has been used. Communication Key A Communication Key is a 256-bit AES key used in the KMS 1.x configuration to (OCKey) encrypt communications between an OKT and an ETD. The OCKey is also used to provide mutual-authentication between an OKT and an ETD. Device Split Key A Device Split Key is a 256-bit AES key used in the KMS 1.x configuration to (DSKey) protect Media Keys and to support device key updates from an EKT after an ETD has been initialized. Media Key (MEKey) Media Keys are 256-bit AES CCM keys which are generated outside the Tape Drive by either the KMS 1.x or the KMS 2.x. An ETD uses a MEKey to encrypt and decrypt the customer bulk data it processes. Wrap Key (WKey) A Wrap Key is a 256-bit AES keys used in the KMS 1.x configuration to wrap a set of DSKey (MEKey xor DSKey), KeyID pairs. The objective of this process is to add an additional layer of encryption security beyond that provided by DSKey. Passphrase This is an 8-byte character string supplied independently to both the ETD and the KMS 2.x cluster as part of the enrollment process in the KMS 2.x configuration. The Passphrase must contain characters from at least three of the four character classes, and has a minimum length configurable by the end user. The Passphrase is used to mutually authenticate the ETD and KMS 2.x during first time authentication, and is erased from drive memory when the enrollment process completes. VOP Password A 7-byte shared secret used to authenticate an operator the Crypto-Officer Role. (TelnetPW) CTR_DRBG The CSPs within the SP 800-90 CTR DRBG are an AES-256 key , the 128-bit value V, and a reseed counter. The CTR_DRBG generates random numbers for nonce values and cryptographic keys AES Key Wrap Key An AES Key Wrap Key is a 256-bit AES ECB key used to protect the ME_Keys with (AKWK) AES Key Wrap as they enter the ETD Dump Encryption A Dump file encryption key is a 256-bit AES CCM key used for encrypting the dump Key (DEKey) files during generation and storage. Tape Drive Private The Tape drive Private Key is a 2048-bit RSA private key used during the TLS Key (TDPrivKey) handshake to authenticate the Tape Drive to a appliance within a KMS 2.x cluster. CA_Private Key The CA_Cert Private Key is for authentication of the appliance during TLS1.0 communication between the ETD and a KMS 2.x cluster. FSRootCert Private The FSRootCert Private Key is used to authenticate the firmware updates by Key authenticating the final firmware signing key in a certificate chain. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 16 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy CSP Description/Usage TLS_PM Premaster Secret for the TLS session. It consists of 2 bytes of version number concatenated with 46 bytes of random data. TLS_MS Master Secret for the TLS session; 48 bytes of pseudo-random data generated according to TLS, based on a hash of the premaster secret and nonces TLS_EMK Enccrypt MAC Key for TLS, used with HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits) TLS_DMK Decrypt MAC Key for TLS, used with HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits) TLS_ECK Encrypt Crypto Key for TLS. 256-bit key used in AES-CBC mode to encrypt TLS data. TLS_DCK Decrypt Crypto Key for TLS. 256-bit key used in AES-CBC mode to decrypt TLS data. 6.1 Definition of Public Keys Table 6 describes the public keys stored with the ETD. Table 6: Description of Public Keys within the ETD Public Key Name Description CA_Cert CA Certificate public key self-signed by a KMS 2.x cluster. Contains a 2048-bit RSA Public Key for each appliance in a KMS 2.x cluster. Used by the ETD to authenticate the appliance during the TLS handshake. Tape Drive Public The Tape drive Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA key used by TLS. The ETD sends Key (TDPubKey) this key to the KMS 2.x cluster to authenticate the Tape Drive during the TLS handshake. It is stored within an X.509 certificate within the ETD. Key Wrap Key Public The Key Wrap Key Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA public key used to wrap the AES Key (KWKPublicKey) Key Wrap Key. Dump Encryption The Dump Encryption Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA public key used to wrap the Public Key DEKey. It is stored stored in an X.509 certificate (DEPubKey) Firmware Signature The Firmware Signature Public Key is a 2048-bit RSA key used to validate any Public Key uploaded firmware. (FSPubKey) Firmware Signature The Firmware Signature Root Certificate Key is a 2048-bit RSA key within a PEM Root Certificate Key encoded certificate used to validate the certificate chain within the candidate (FSRootCert) firmware image. 7 Access Control Policy 7.1 Roles and Services Table 7 shows the services available to each authorized role and CSP access (Crypto-Officer (C.O.), or User). See section 6 for a description of the keys and CSPs. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 17 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Table 7: Services Authorized for Roles Name of Service Description Available on: Role Access to Keys/CSPs Service Enroll ETD Authenticates an external RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Uses Passphrase; management system acting on Writes and uses CA_Cert; behalf of the Crypto-Officer (KMS Writes TDPrivKey; 2.x cluster) to the ETD using the Writes TDPubKey Passphrase. License ETD This service is used in the VOP to RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Uses PCKey; enable the ETD encryption Writes DSKey; feature Writes OCKey; Writes Wkey; Uses VOP Login/passsword; Load updates the ETD firmware. RJ45(Ethernet), C.O. Writes and Uses Firmware Tape Head, FSPubKey; Host Interface Uses FSRootCert; Writes public keys stored in firmware Reset This service erases all keys, other RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Zeroizes all CSPs except than the PCKey, from ETD the PCKey memory (volatile and non- volatile). Zeroize This service erases all Critical RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Zeroizes all CSPs Security Parameters (CSPs) stored in ETD memory (volatile and non-volatile). VOP Login Log in to the Virtual Operator's RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Accesses VOP Password Panel (VOP) and authorizes the operator to the Crypto-Officer Role, providing access to all VOP commands Read EKT Read the Enabling Key Token RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Uses PCKey; (EKT) from the token bay and Writes OCKey; enable the ETD for reading media Writes and/or Uses DSKey; encryption keys (MEKey) off of an Writes WKey Operational Key Token (OKT) Read OKT Read the Operational Key RJ45(Ethernet) User Uses OCKey; Token(OKT) from the token bay Uses DSKey; and enable the ETD for Uses WKey; encryption and decryption of data Writes MEKey to and from tape Encrypt Data Encrypts data from the Host Tape Head, User Uses MEKey to Tape Interface on to the tape cartridge. Host Interface Decrypt Data Decrypts data from the tape Tape Head, User Uses MEKey from Tape cartridge Host Interface Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 18 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Name of Service Description Available on: Role Access to Keys/CSPs Service Create Dump Creates an encrypted diagnostic RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Uses and Modifies dump file and saves it to CTR_DRBG; EEPROM. Afterwards, the ETD Generates and Uses performs an Initial Program Load DEKey; (IPL) Uses DEPubKey Establish TLS Establishes a TLS 1.0 (Transport RJ45(Ethernet) User Uses and Modifies Session Layer Security) session between CTR_DRBG; the ETD and a KMS 2.x cluster Generates TLS_PM; Derives TLS_MS, TLS_EMK, TLS_DMK, TLS_ECK, TLS_DCK; Uses CA_Cert; Uses TDPubKey; Uses TDPrivKey Export AKWK Exports the AES Key Wrap Key RJ45(Ethernet) User Uses and Writes (AKWK) to the KMS 2.x cluster, CTR_DRBG; protected with RSA Encryption Generates AKWK; Uses KWKPublicKey; Uses TLS_EMK; Uses TLS_ECK; Input Inputs the KWKPublicKey from a RJ45(Ethernet) User Writes KWKPublicKey; KWKPublicKe KMS 2.x cluster into the ETD Uses TLS_DMK; y Uses TLS_DCK Input ME_Key Inputs one or more ME_Keys RJ45(Ethernet) User Writes ME_Key; from KMS 2.x (protected with AES Key Wrap) Uses TLS_DMK; into the ETD from the KMS 2.x Uses TLS_DCK; cluster Uses AKWK; ETD Allows configuration of the ETD RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable Configuration Initial Causes tape drive to reinitialize RJ45(Ethernet) C.O Not Applicable Program Load and perform Power-Up Self-Tests (IPL) Audit Log Allows the viewing, downloading, RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable deletion of the ETD Audit Log View Drive Allows read access to ETD RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable Data configuration data Error Log Allows the viewing, downloading, RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable deletion of the ETD Error Log Deletes Dump Deletes a dump file currently RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable stored on the ETD Deletes Deletes errors currently stored on RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable Perms ETD Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 19 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Name of Service Description Available on: Role Access to Keys/CSPs Service Tape Loads and/or Unloads a tape RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable Management cartridge Run Perform ETD Diagnostics RJ45(Ethernet) C.O. Not Applicable Diagnostics Access Type Definitions: Use: The CSP is used within an ETD security function or authentication mechanism. Write: The CSP is written to internal volatile or persistent memory of the ETD. This is done during the input of a new CSP or the modification of an existing. Generates: Generates the CSP using the FIPS Approved SP800-90 DRBG. Derives: The CSP is derived using the Allowed TLS1.0 Key Derivation Function. The ETD supports the unauthenticated services listed below in Table 8. None of the services modify, disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys and CSPs, or otherwise affect the security of the ETD. Table 8: Unauthenticated Services Name of Service Service Description Available On: Show Status Provides the current status of the ETD. Drive Status LED, Encryption Status LED, Operator Panel Connector, RJ45(Ethernet), Host Interface, DB15(RS232) Power-Cycle/Perform When the ETD is power-cycled, the ETD exercises Power Interface Self-Tests the cryptographic hardware and firmware tests for the FIPS Approved algorithms, as listed in 9.1 . Fibre Channel Interface Provides non-security relevant ETD management Host Interface Management and status output (see [ETDIR]). LibraryManagement Provides non-security relevant ETD management DB15 (RS232) and status outputof the ETD. Operator Panel Provides non-security relevant ETD management Operator Panel and status output. See [ETDOG] for details. Connector Rear Panel Switch Mechanical switch located on the rear of the ETD Rear Panel Switch that allows the module to enter the boot monitor mode. 8 Operational Environment (Area 6) The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the ETD functions in a limited operational environment. As such, the module performs a firmware load test (RSA Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 20 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy signature verification) to verify the authenticity and integrity of any newly loaded code (Note: New code images running on the hardware platform must be FIPS 140-2 validated as a single module). 9 Security Rules 9.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements This section documents the security rules enforced by the ETD cryptographic module 1) The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User role and the Crypto-Officer role. 2) When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services. 3) The cryptographic module shall encrypt and decrypt sensitive data using the AES-256 CCM algorithm 4) The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests: a) Power-up Self-tests i) Cryptographic algorithm tests: (1) AES ECB KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt) (2) AES Key Wrap KAT (Wrap/Unwrap) (3) AES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt) (4) AES CCM Firmware Implementation KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt) (5) AES CCM Hardware Implementation KAT (Encrypt/Decrypt) (6) SP800-90 CTR DRBG KAT (7) SHA-1 KAT (8) HMAC SHA-1 KAT (9) HMAC SHA-1(TLS) KAT (SHA-1 as used within this HMAC is tested as part of this KAT) (10) RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 Known Answer Test (verification only) ii) Firmware Integrity Test (32 bit CRC) b) Conditional Self-tests: i) Firmware Load Test: 2048 bit RSA PKCS1 digital signature verification ii) SP800-90 DRBG Continuous Test iii) NDRNG Continuous Test 5) An operator may command the module to perform the power up self-test by initiating a power cycle of the module. 6) The cryptographic module inhibits data output during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 7) Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 8) The module supports concurrent operators. 10 Physical Security 10.1 Physical Security Mechanisms The ETD multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms: · Production-grade components · Production-grade opaque enclosure · Tamper evident labels The following figures (Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10) show the locations of the seven tamper-evident seals on the ETD. The seals are identified by a red circle. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 21 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy Figure 8: Tamper Evident Seals on Left Side Figure 9: Tamper Evident Seals on Right Side Figure 10: Tamper Evident Seal on Bottom Upon secure receipt of the ETD cryptographic module, the operator shall examine all seven tamper- evident seals to determine whether the ETD has been compromised. If any of the seven tamper-evident labels show evidence of tampering, then the module is not physically secure and is no longer compliant with FIPS 140-2. The following list describes possible ways that the tamper-evident labels show evidence of tampering: 1. The pattern "Void" is visible through the tamper-evident label. 2. One or more corners of the tamper-evident label is lifted. 3. The tamper-evident label is missing. 4. A tamper-evident label on the sides is misplaced such that it does not touch two metal covers. 5. The tamper-evident label on the bottom is misplaced such that it does not cover the screw that secures the front bezel (honeycomb grate that allows airflow). Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 22 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy 10.2 Required Operator Actions The operator is required to periodically inspect tamper evident seals using the following guidance found in Table 9: Physical Security Mechanisms Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Guidance Details Inspection/Test Tamper-Evident Seals Per internal security policy Inspect seven tamper seals; three requirements of ETD customer. on the left side, three on the right side, and one on the bottom. Table 9: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks. 12 References [1619.1] IEEE Std 1619.1-2007, IEEE Standard for Authenticated Encryption with Length Expansion for Storage Devices. May 2008. [CCM] NIST Special Publication 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality. U.S. DoC/NIST, May 2004. Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html [ETDIR] T10000 Tape Drive: Interface Reference Manual, Sun Microsystems, Part Number MT9259J. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/MT9259J. [ETDOG] Sun Microsystems T10000 Operator's Guide, Part No. 96174, Rev. EB. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/96174revEB. [FC-SB-3] Fibre Channel Single-Byte Command Code Sets-3 Mapping Protocol (FC-SB-3), Revision 1.6 specification. [FCP-3] Fibre Channel Protocol-3 (FCP-3), SCSI Primary Commands-3 (SPC-3), and SCSI Stream Commands (SSC-3) specifications [KMS1UG] Sun Key Management Station Users Guide, Part No. 96262, Rev B. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/CRCM2146 [KMS2IM] KMS 2.0 Installation and Service Manual (Rev. BA), Part Number 316194903BA, Sun Microsystems. June 2008. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/316194903BA. [SPC-3] SCSI Primary Commands-3 (SPC-3) [SSC-3] SCSI Stream Commands (SSC-3) Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 23 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy [TLS1.0] RFC 2246: "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0". [VOPUG] Virtual Operator Panel User's Guide (Customer) rev JA, Sun Microsystems, Part Number 96179JA, April 2008. Available at http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/96179revJA. Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 24 Sun Microsystems Sun StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive Security Policy 13 Definitions and Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard CO Crypto-Officer ETD The Sun StorageTek T10000B Encrypting Tape Drive. IPL Initial Program Load. The process that brings up the ETD after a power-on or reset. TLS Transport Layer Security, v1.0, as defined by IETF RFC 2246 User Data Arbitrary data which is being written to or read from magnetic tape. VOP Virtual Operator Panel ­ Software used to configure the ETD Jun 24, 2009 Part 316055101, Rev: AA Page 25